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enrolled in my first history course.  It was Professor William Colby’s “History of the 
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rather skeptical of history.  Yet from day one, I was hooked.  It was during that semester 
when I realized that I too wanted to be a historian. And it is for that reason that this 
dissertation is dedicated to Professor Colby.   
In pursuit of my newfound career, I soon matriculated at the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison.  At UW, I benefited from the guidance of several professors, but I 
would like to express my profound gratitude to Alfred W. McCoy.  Having agreed to 
advise my senior honor’s thesis, Professor McCoy took me under his wing and taught me 
the tools of the trade—how to conduct primary-source research, how to engage 
historiography, how to read documents, and, perhaps most importantly, how to write.  
Florencia Mallon introduced me to Latin American history and historiography, pushed 
me to think critically about sources, and encouraging me to embrace theory.  Ned 
Blackhawk, Jeremi Suri, and Paul Boyer also indulged my intellectual curiosity and 
subsequently provided important guidance as I set my sights on graduate study.   
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I am especially grateful to the faculty, staff, and graduate students at the 
University of Texas at Austin, where I carried out my graduate study.  Mark Lawrence 
proved an excellent mentor and remained encouraging even as I decided to abandon U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin America for modern Bolivian history.  Susan Deans-Smith’s 
Colonial Latin American History seminars were exemplary, and she guided my early 
efforts to understand the legacy of Spanish Colonial Rule in the Americas.  I would also 
like to thank H.W. Brands, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, Lina del Castillo, Yoav Di-Capua, 
Nora England, Alison K. Frazier, Charlie Hale, Karl Miller, Howard Miller, Julie 
Hardwick, Bruce Hunt, Raul Madrid, Robert Olwell, David Oshinsky, James Sidbury, 
and Ann Twinam, each of whom contributed to my professional development through 
word and examples.  I am especially grateful to UT History’s graduate coordinator, 
Marilyn Lehman for helping me navigate the university bureaucracy.    
It is my dissertation advisors, Seth Garfield and Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, to whom 
I owe the greatest debts of personal and intellectual gratitude.  Since the first day in his 
Nineteenth-Century Historiography seminar, Professor Tenorio pushed me to think not 
only critically, but imaginatively about big historical questions.  He taught me the 
importance of language and challenged me to question my own underlying assumptions 
about historical knowledge and its construction.  Even after moving on to Chicago, he 
provided a constant source of friendship and intellectual inspiration.  Professor Garfield 
proved an equally inspiring mentor.  His salient criticisms of and careful comments on 
my scholarship—from grant proposals to chapter drafts—provided a continuing lesson on 
how (and how not) to reconstruct the past.  He ensured that I did not lose sight of the 
“nuts and bolts” while pushing me to contextualize the questions I was asking within 
broader global-historical processes.  It was also Professor Garfield who provided the best 
piece of practical advice I received in graduate school.  Crestfallen after having received 
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a grant rejection, he pulled me aside and told me, “In order to succeed in this business, 
you have to have thick skin and an open mind.”  How right he was.  Both he and 
Professor Tenorio provided extraordinary mentorship, and I cannot thank them enough 
for their time, commitment, and effort over the years.  
My dissertation committee also deserves special mention.  I was very fortunate to 
have Brooke Larson on my doctoral committee.  Since I decided to study Bolivia, her 
research on both the colonial and modern Andes has served as a model for historical 
scholarship and of interdisciplinary inquiry.  She has been an inspiring mentor since I set 
out on this project, carefully reading chapters and providing invaluable expertise on 
modern Bolivian history.  Frank Guridy pushed me to think critically about race and 
ethnicity in Latin America, while urging me to consider the relationship between local 
and global processes.  Virginia Garrard-Burnett encouraged me to consider the role of the 
Church and popular religion in postrevolutionary Bolivia.  Emilio Zamora continually 
emphasized the importance of oral history and popular memory in considering Bolivian 
history and historiography. 
As I carried out my coursework and field research, fellow graduate students 
provided a constant source of support, encouragement, and distraction.  I would 
especially like to thank José Barragán, Chris Dietrich, Jorge Derpic, Bill Epps, Bonar 
Hernández, Chris Heaney, Pablo Mijangos, Hernán Pruden, and Tyler Fleming, each of 
whom kindly read chapters of the dissertation and offered valuable suggestions.  I would 
also like to thank the following individuals for making graduate school fun: Juan Camilo 
Agudelo, Christopher Albi, María José Alfanador, Brett Bennett, Karl Brown, Takkara 
Brunson, Claudia Carreta, Ann Cooper, Ryan Field, Jessica Grogan, Aldo Guevara, Larry 
Gutman, Veronica Jimenez Vega, Andres Lombana Bermudez, Pablo Lapenga, Shannon 
Nagy, Jeff Parker, Andrew Paxman, Heather Peterson, Franz Riveros Hensel, María 
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This dissertation rethinks postcolonial nation-state formation in Latin America by 
investigating the cultural politics of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952.  At the heart of 
Latin America’s postcolonial predicament were the social hierarchies of the colonial 
caste system, which persisted into the Republican era despite liberal ideals of legal 
equality and universal citizenship.  This predicament was especially acute in Bolivia.  
Indians constituted sixty-five percent of the national population yet—still a century after 
Independence—remained politically excluded and socially marginalized by a European-
descendant, or creole, minority.  Following the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, a new 
generation of creole nationalists set out to integrate Indians into a modern nation of their 
own making.  In subsequent years, artists, intellectuals, social scientists, and indigenous 
activists worked to transform Bolivia from a segregated, multiethnic republic into a 
unified nation.  This study interrogates the dynamic interplay between state and society as 
these diverse agents negotiated the terms of indigenous inclusion, the content of national 
culture, and the contractions of postrevolutionary modernity. 
 xiii
My research challenges the prevailing historiographical consensus that the 
transformative socioeconomic reforms introduced by Bolivia’s postrevolutionary 
government were not accompanied by a parallel cultural initiative.  Drawing on new 
archival sources from Bolivia, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United States, I reveal 
that not only did the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 include a cultural element; but that the 
establishment of a unifying national culture for the integrated republic was one of the 
primary objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership.  Through a burgeoning array of 
government institutions, officials promoted a new national culture model that celebrated 
Bolivia’s mixed Andean and Hispanic heritage.  I argue that despite its inclusive veneer, 
this effort reproduced racialized identities founded on colonial social hierarchies. With 
case studies on rural sociology, the revision of national history, the reconstruction of 
archeological ruins, and the creation of a national folklore, this study demonstrates how 
the postrevolutionary politics of culture and knowledge operated, in conjunction, to 
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History is hard to know, because of all the hired bullshit, but even without being sure of 
“history” it seems entirely reasonable to think that every now and then the energy of a 
whole generation comes to a head in a long fine flash, for reasons that nobody really 
understands at the time—and which never really explain, in retrospect, what actually 
happened. 
-Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas 
 
Una fase revolucionaria es, para las sociedades, lo mismo que un cataclismo para la 
geográfica. Hay una fase de caos, de incertidumbre e indefinición que es inseparable de 
tal tipo de acontecimientos.   
-René Zavaleta Mercado, 50 años de historia 
 
Popular lore has it that during the Revolution, President Víctor Paz Estenssoro 
and his entourage always brought DDT along on their frequent trips to the countryside.  
The President was immensely popular among Bolivia’s rural indigenous majority, 
symbolizing revolutionary promises of equal citizenship, access to education, and 
agrarian reform.  Women hugged him, children kissed him, and men greeted their 
compañero presidente with the hearty handshake-hug-handshake typical of highland 
Bolivia.  As enthusiastic Aymara and Quechua supporters awaited the President, aides 
soused them with the toxic insecticide, ridding them of whatever bichos they were 
perceived to be carrying.  Even a young Ernesto Guevara reported witnessing such a 
spectacle while briefly passing through La Paz on his famed motorcycle trip, in 1953; 
whereupon he subsequently disparaged the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 as the “DDT 
Revolution.”   
Whether this tale is true or just another figment of the popular imagination 
matters not.  As truth, as fiction, it accurately portrays the contradictory logic underlying 




citizenship to indigenous Bolivians for the first time, deeply-rooted notions of cultural 
inferiority remained embedded in state practices and ultimately undermined ethnic 
equality.  This dissertation traces the making of this contradictory logic during the period 
spanning the April 9, 1952 popular insurrection that triggered the Revolution and the 
November 3, 1964 military coup that ousted the civilian leadership of the 
postrevolutionary government.  
 
Illustration 1:  President Víctor Paz Estenssoro embracing indigenous man, circa 1952.1 
                                                 
1 Photograph from: José Fellman Velarde, Álbum de la Revolución Nacional: 128 años de lucha por la 




Yet, as this study also illustrates, the contradictions that characterized indigenous-
state relations after 1952 are rooted in longer, deeper historical processes dating to 
centuries of Spanish colonial rule.2  Although Bolivia formerly severed its imperial ties to 
the Crown in 1825, the racialized social hierarchies of the colonial caste system remained 
deeply-entrenched well into the republican period.  In 1950, on the eve of the Revolution, 
Indians constituted sixty-five percent of the population.  They nevertheless remained 
politically excluded and socially marginalized by a European-descendant, or creole, 
minority.   
After 1952, a new generation of creole nationalists resolved to break with the 
colonial past once and for all.  They uprooted the entrenched system of ethnic apartheid 
that characterized pre-revolutionary society and set out to incorporate Indians into a 
modern nation of their own making. In subsequent years, state bureaucrats, labor 
militants, social scientists, indigenous activists, faceless technocrats, and career 
politicians worked to transform Bolivia from a traditional, segregated republic into a 
modern, integrated nation state.  This dissertation chronicles the dynamic interplay 
between state and society as these diverse agents negotiated the terms of indigenous 
inclusion, the content of national culture, and the contractions of postrevolutionary 
modernity. 
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 followed on a decade marked by the widespread 
mobilization of civil society vaguely united in their opposition to the oligarchic elite, but 
espousing divergent and often conflicting opinions of what “revolution” meant.  Upon 
securing its dominant position within the postrevolutionary state, however, the 
                                                 
2 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de 




Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR) 
rapidly consolidated an ad-hoc government and defined the Revolution in terms of 
national modernization.  The MNR was the most moderate of the reform-orientated 
parties to emerge in the period of sweeping sociopolitical transformation wrought by 
Bolivia’s tragic defeat to Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932-35).3  Drawing from 
prevailing currents of nationalism, Marxism, indigenismo, and fascism, the party’s 
middle-class leadership singled out Bolivia’s landed and mining oligarchy as the primary 
obstacle to progress.  Under the banner of economic nationalism and in the name of 
national sovereignty, they envisioned a social democracy, one in which the state managed 
the republic’s finite natural resources and served as an instrument of capital accumulation 
to finance domestic development.   
After 1952, the MNR leadership transformed its revolutionary vision into the 
most ambitious state-led development project in Bolivian history.  The centerpiece of this 
initiative was the nationalization of the “Big Three” tin mines, decreed on October 31, 
1952.  With the majority of mining revenues now in the rightful hands of the state, 
officials set out to finance domestic economic development and ensure the wellbeing of 
the population through expanded government initiatives in education, public health, 
social welfare, and the arts.  Agrarian reform also proved critical to postrevolutionary 
development. Bolivia had one of the most exploitive and unproductive agrarian 
economies in the hemisphere.  According to the 1950 agrarian census, 6.3 percent of the 
population owned 91.9 percent of the arable land, yet only two percent of available land 
                                                 





was under cultivation.4  Highland haciendas were reliant on a system of coerced labor in 
which Indians worked the estates in exchange for usufruct right to small parcels of land 
where they practiced subsistence agriculture.  By freeing both land and labor from the 
unproductive estates, the agrarian reform decree of August 2, 1953 enabled the 
postrevolutionary government to boost agricultural production, expand the domestic 
market, and diversify the national economy. 
The MNR leadership not only assigned Indians a central role in this ambitious 
modernization scheme, but its very success depended upon their active participation. 
Indigenous Bolivians would provide the labor needed to transform the seigniorial 
economy into a vibrant commercial agricultural sector.  The grand majority of indigenous 
Bolivians practiced subsistence agriculture, lacked basic Spanish literacy skills, and 
operated largely outside of the formal market economy.  The postrevolutionary 
government sought not only to integrate this population into the social, political and 
economic structure of the republic, but to transform it into a modernized, integrated 
peasantry.  On July 21, 1952 the government decreed universal suffrage, extending 
political citizenship to Indians (and women).  Yet in order to assume the role imagined 
for them by postrevolutionary planners, they would have to learn Spanish, the basic 
arithmetic necessary for market transactions, modern sanitation and health practices, and, 
perhaps most importantly, to think in terms of a “nation.”  Through rural education, the 
postrevolutionary government set out to create a modernized peasantry who would drive 
national development through both their production and consumption.    
                                                 
4 República de Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. I 




As the postrevolutionary government set out to transform indigenous Bolivians 
into a modernized peasantry, it initiated a parallel project to construct a unifying national 
culture for the newly-integrated republic.  Forging a society in which Indians and creoles 
enjoyed equal citizenship necessitated the reconceptualization of Bolivia as a nation.  
Seeking to unify Bolivia’s diverse population around a shared national identity, the MNR 
promoted a new “revolutionary esthetic” that venerated Bolivia’s mixed Andean and 
European heritage.5  Historian Carlos Mesa correctly asserts that “no es que el indio o el 
pasado pre-hispánico fuesen descubierto en 1952.”6  The Revolution does mark, however, 
the first time that the government actively moved indigenous popular culture to the center 
of the national imagination.  Historians wrote Indians into the nation by recasting national 
history as a multiethnic struggle against foreign economic exploitation. Archeologists 
reconstructed Tiwanaku, identifying in the pre-Hispanic ruins the primordial origins of 
Bolivian nationhood.  Anthropologists studied rural communities, expanding the 
definition of cultural patrimony to include indigenous art, music, and dance.  At the core 
of this effort, the government promoted a myth of ethnic unity intended to unify all 
Bolivians as they mobilized for this unprecedented national modernization initiative.  
Although the government granted political citizenship to indigenous Bolivians, I 
argue that it was the cultural politics of revolution that ultimately determined the limits of 
ethnic inclusion.  One of the primary factors that rendered the postrevolutionary 
modernization initiative imaginable in the first place were new modes of racial thinking 
that, for their time and place, were quite progressive. Subscribing to ascending currents of 
cultural relativism, postrevolutionary officials dismissed as “atavistic” and “backwards” 
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the biological construction of race that had prevailed since the nineteenth century.  They 
instead explained indigenous backwardness in terms of inherent cultural inferiority, 
resulting from structural factors—particularly the (neo)colonial domination and agrarian 
exploitation of the seigniorial economy. As such, the generation of statesmen and 
intellectuals that came to power in 1952 emphasized, above all, the improvability of the 
Indian “race.”  And as they transformed Bolivia into a modern integrated nation, they set 
out to remake indigenous Bolivians into a modernized peasant workforce, upon which the 
dreams of postrevolutionary modernization rested.  It is in this seemingly benign, even 
benevolent modernization initiative where what Silvia Rivera describes as the “violencia 
invisible” of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 becomes most salient.7   
 
 
THE 1952 REVOLUTION AND INDIGENOUS-STATE RELATIONS 
Did 1952 mark a turning point in Bolivia’s contested history of indigenous-state 
relations?  In the relatively-underdeveloped historiography on the Revolution and its 
legacy, responses to this question vary widely.  In Bolivia, as in all nation-states, the 
production of historical knowledge has been intimately entwined with local experiences, 
divergent memories, social movements, and political ideologies. Since 1952, the multi-
ethnic society has been wrought by efforts to resolve centuries-old tensions, commonly 
articulated in terms of race, class, ethnicity, and region.  Indeed, recent historiographical 
developments provide a particularly salient example of how contemporary events shape 
historical memory.  During a moment when the Bolivian state has actively set out to 
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“decolonize” the nation, perhaps no topic within the historiography of modern Bolivia is 
more historicized than indigenous-state relations.   
The first wave of historiography was generally celebratory of the Revolution, 
championing the moment as a true social revolution that liberated Indians from the 
coercive haciendas, and set out to integrated them, as equals, into the republic.  Much of 
this work was produced by the revolutionaries themselves—that is, MNR ideologues and 
nationalist intellectuals affiliated, at one time or another, with the postrevolutionary 
state.8  This body of scholarship is rooted in the work of MNR co-founder, Carlos 
Montenegro.9  Recasting Bolivian history as a struggle between nationalism and 
neocolonialism, he forged a potent interpretation of the past that cast the MNR as the 
harbingers of Bolivia’s true independence.  This dialectic provided the foundation for a 
nationalist historiography—whose most prominent contributors were Augusto Céspedes 
and José Fellman Velarde—which shaped the early scholarship of most foreign 
observes.10  Like their nationalist counterparts, foreign scholars such as Robert 
Alexander, Richard Patch, and Charles Arnade also lauded the MNR for its 
socioeconomic reforms, citing indigenous integration and rural education as exemplary of 
Bolivia’s authentic social revolution.11  
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The revisionism of the 1960s was steeped in class-struggle and shaped the by the 
prevailing epistemologies of the “new social history” popular at the time.  During an 
epoch defined by military dictatorship, student protest, and identity politics, scholars 
critically reassessed the Revolution from two distinct ideological positions.  On the right, 
figures such as Jorge Siles, Hugo Roberts, and Edgar Avila—militants of the Falange 
Socialista Bolivia (FSB) or formerly of the MNR right—underscored the economic 
failures, political violence, and revolutionary excesses of the MNR.12  On the left, such 
authors as Guillermo Lora, Sergio Almaraz, Liborio Justo, Jorge Ovando, James Malloy, 
James Dunkerely, and René Zavaleta muted the celebratory tone of the first wave of 
historiography.13  While the orthodox scholarship had cited indigenous integration as the 
most salient example of the social change wrought by the Revolution, revisionists 
advanced a more cynical interpretation of 1952 and its legacies. Shifting the terms of the 
debate to class relations, they emphasized the MNR’s cooptation of the radical left and 
the shortcoming of lasting social gains for workers, miners, and indigenous peasants. 
Theirs was an “uncompleted,” “restrained,” or “defeated” Revolution.”14   
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Though underscoring the pivotal role of labor militancy in defining the 
Revolution, the revisionists nevertheless tended to pass off Indians as passive actors, 
asserting that class consciousness emerged in the countryside only once radicalized by 
the left. This may not be a surprising interpretation given the fact that most of this 
scholarship was contemporaneous with the “pacto-militar campesino.”15 Regardless, 
during the latter part of the decade, and well into the next, research by Jorge Dandler, 
Luis Antezana, and Hugo Romero revealed a long history of rural organization and social 
mobilization that preceded the Revolution.16  They emphasized, above all, indigenous 
political agency, while underscoring the mixed legacy of the Revolution process in terms 
of achieving lasting social change for indigenous Bolivians.   
Towards the end of the 1970s, a new wave of revisionist scholarship emerged 
alongside the radical Indianism of Fausto Reinaga and the ethnic-based political 
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mobilization promoted by the Katarista movement.17  This scholarship was largely 
written by “los hijos de la Revolución,” that is, the generation of Aymara and Quechua 
intellectuals who grew up in the countryside in the 1950s and 1960s and personally 
experienced the exclusionary politics of the Revolution. Roberto Choque Canqui, the first 
formally-trained Aymara historian, revealed a long history of resistance to liberal land 
divestiture policies among Aymara comunarios in the highland province of Jesús de 
Machaca.18  Also studying rural Aymara communities was the Catalonian Jesuit 
Anthropologist, Xavier Albó, who demonstrated more recent political mobilization 
among Aymara activists in the La Paz province of Omasuyos.19  It was during this time 
when sociologist, Silvia Rivera founded the Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA) with 
Aymara students at the Universidad Mayor de San Andres in La Paz.20  During the late 
1980s, as the Katarista movement emerged as the primary conduit of political 
participation for indigenous Bolivians, Rivera, along with Esteban Ticona, Javier 
Hurtado, and others turned to historical questions of power, agency, and representation to 
critically reassess the Revolution and its legacy.21  Though emphasizing class, they 
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privileged ethnicity, arguing that the Revolution produced new modes of creole 
hegemony and ethnic exclusion.  It revealed the discursive practices of postrevolutionary 
mestizaje, locating them primary in the “campesino” designation that the government 
assigned rural Bolivians. Yet Indians were not merely cast as passive victims of a 
monolithic state; in fact, Rivera and her contemporaries explicitly rejected prevailing 
narratives of indigenous victimization.22   
In the past decade, scholars from multiple disciplines have dug even deeper into 
the Revolution, producing a more nuanced but equally critical reception of 1952 and its 
legacy.   The power dynamics between state and society, traditionally cast in broader 
structural terms, were reduced to their component parts and careful inspected by the 
social historians of the 1970s, explored through the lens of ethnicity in the 1980s, and 
armed with novel tools of historical analysis in recent decades.  Driven by concerns with 
discourse, textuality, historicity, temporality, a new generation of historians, sociologists, 
and anthropologist have begun to reframe traditional questions of power and authority. 
This emerging wave of scholarship recognizes the exclusionary practices that underlie the 
Revolution, while allowing for a more subtle analysis of the complex processes that it set 
into motion.23  In a recent study, for example, anthropologist Michelle Bigenho affirms 
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the exclusionary politics of postrevolutionary mestizaje while reminding readers that the 
Revolution was “also about changing the attitudes of those who held power, and about 
the breaking down of their racialized views about who ‘belonged’ in what spaces.”24   
Indeed it was.  And in order to truly understand the Revolution and its legacy, the 
exclusionary practices of the postrevolutionary state must not only be considered 
alongside the goals and aspiration of the those behind it—however progressive, inclusive, 
or utopian they may have seemed at the time—but also contextualized with intellectual 
and cultural trends of the particular world-historical moment.  One of the primary 
objectives of this study is to examine the rearticulation of social hierarchies after 1952. 
Did the Revolution mark an authentic moment of social change for indigenous peoples, 
fundamentally transforming their status as citizens, their political representation in the 
state, and their place in the nation?  Yes, it did.  At the same time, however, the 
revolutionary process consolidated new forms of ethnic exclusion that disparaged the 
“traditional” customs embraced by indigenous Bolivians, while actively encouraging 
their assimilations into “modern” society.   In addition to this implicit temporal 
distinction between “traditional” Indians and “modern” nationhood, the prevailing 
prejudices and ingrained beliefs underlying centuries of racial discrimination remained 
deeply embedded in the cultural politics and development initiatives of the 
postrevolutionary state. 
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MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 coincided with the rise and consolidation of 
Third World development paradigms.  After triumphing over the forces of totalitarianism 
in the Second World War, the advanced industrialized democracies of North America and 
Western Europe set out to remake the world in their own image.  Urbanization, 
industrialization, universal education, and political inclusion stood as the hallmarks for 
modern society as the exceptional history of western progress became the normative 
model for republican nationhood. Through infusions of capital, knowledge, and 
technology, both national governments and international institutions promoted 
accelerated economic and social change in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East, where poverty, inequality, decolonization threatened to destabilize the exiting 
liberal order.25   
To be sure, development was also rooted in geopolitical concerns resulting from 
the emerging Cold War.  Western policymakers saw development as a means to alleviate 
the socioeconomic inequalities that made Marxist ideology appealing to local 
populations.  By creating the conditions for increased political participation, more 
equitable distribution of wealth, universal education, and market integration, Western 
development proponents hoped to inoculate developing nations from the specter of 
communist subversion.  By the 1950s, the U.S., the U.N. were sending armies of social 
scientists to “underdeveloped” regions to provide specialized expertise in agriculture, 
education, public health, and economic planning. In this partial world-historical 
moment—one defined by Cold War brinksmanship, decolonization, and unprecedented 
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advancements in science and technology—reform-minded leaders across the Third World 
also looked West to articulate their modernization fantasies.   
Bolivia’s postrevolutionary leadership was no exception, and as they mobilized 
both state and society for the most ambitious national development initiative in history, 
they framed their aspirations within a nebulous concept called modernization.  
Characterized by the exceptional experience of the North Atlantic West, modernization 
refers to a specific set of values embedded in liberal traditions that included social 
democracy, free market capitalism, and religious tolerance.  Yet, the concept also rested 
on specific assumptions surrounding the meaning of its necessary opposite, “tradition.” 
As philosopher H.C.F. Mansilla argues, mid-twentieth century development paradigms 
rested on two fundamental principles: “la idea de que el orden tradicional, rural, y pre-
industrial constituirá un sistema político injusto, carente de dinamismo e históricamente 
superado, y la ilusión de que la modernidad traería consigo simultáneamente el progreso 
material y la justicia social.”26  It was precisely this opinion “acerca de lo negativo del 
mundo tradicional” that was at the center of postrevolutionary modernization in Bolivia.27   
In order to understand what modern nationhood meant to the postrevolutionary 
leadership, it is perhaps best to start by exploring what it was not.  Modern was not being 
dependent on a tin-based monoculture economy dominated by three private companies.  
It was not an agricultural economy characterized by a rural seigniorial order dependent 
on coerced Indian labor.  It was not being required to import foreign goods to meet the 
minimum caloric intake of the population.  And it certainly was not Indian.  Rather, for 
the MNR modern meant, first and foremost, an independent and diversified national 
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economy under the responsible, rational, and scientific management of the state.  It was a 
state that ensured the economic and social wellbeing of the national by providing all 
citizens with education, health care, and social security.  It meant having a diversified 
commercial agriculture sector, worked by a productive peasantry that was integrated—as 
both consumers and producers—into a vibrant domestic market.  It was an integrated, 
consolidated nation, linked by modern highways, railroads, and airlines.  It had a 
developed national culture, universal in its existence though unique in its particular 
national manifestation, replete with martyrs, icons, and a proper history.   
While the postrevolutionary development initiative responded to local historical 
circumstances, it was increasingly influenced by the international exchange of ideas. If, 
as historian Maurico Tenorio Trillo argues, the Americas served as the laboratory for 
development, then Bolivia was perhaps its boldest experiment.28  The Mexican 
Revolution provided American social scientists a laboratory to apply social scientific 
knowledge to the process of directed socioeconomic change.  During the 1920s and 
1930s, American and Mexican social scientists developed important applied social 
scientific theories—Robert Redfield’s diffusionism for instance—that evolved in a host 
of national and international institutions and small-scale development initiatives during 
the 1940s.29  After 1952, Bolivia served as a hemispheric laboratory to test the hypothesis 
that accelerated socioeconomic change could be achieved through the application of 
social scientific knowledge.  Coinciding with the golden age of development, 
postrevolutionary Bolivia provided the ideal conditions to experiment with 
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socioeconomic planning.  Scholarship commonly cites the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos 
as the most salient example of Cold War modernization paradigms in action in the central 
Andes.30  There were four such programs operating in Bolivia by 1955. By the end of the 
decade, the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru were all sending specialists to 
Bolivia, not simply to assist with the development effort, but also to gain practical field 
experience to bring back and implement in their own countries.   
Bolivia was the highest recipient of U.S. economic assistance in the Americas.  
Between 1952 and 1964, the U.S. provided $150 million dollars in developmental aid—
more than any other Latin American nation received during this time—in addition to 
technical training and military assistance.31  Such an outpouring of support to a 
revolutionary regime in Latin Americas during the height of the red scare was indeed 
exceptional.  As historian Kenneth Lehman points out, Washington’s support of the MNR 
represented a rare case of “pragmatic anticommunism” motivated by a sincere belief that 
an injection of development capital would mitigate the communist threat.32 This 
exceptional policy reflected the faith shared among Cold War policymakers in a novel 
development paradigm emerging in the U.S. academic and foreign policy establishments 
called modernization theory.   
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Modernization theory refers to a specific body of knowledge regarding the nature 
of “traditional” societies and the historical trajectory of “modern” republics. Established 
by such thinkers as Walt Rostow, Lucien Pye, and Edward Shils, modernization theory 
posited a theory of state-led socioeconomic development founded on Keynesian 
economics and social scientific knowledge.33  During the 1950s, as U.S. aid increased 
apace with Bolivia’s dependency on foreign economic assistance, policymakers in La Paz 
increasingly articulated their development strategies in terms of modernization theory.  
Policies that were historically articulated in terms of class-struggle, dialectical 
materialism, and national sovereignty, were rearticulated in terms of “underdevelopment” 
and “take-offs.”  By the time the Washington launched the Alliance for Progress in 1962, 
Bolivia was the testing ground for U.S. modernization schemes. A Kennedy-era policy 
paper, for example, stated that the “Bolivian experience will be a test case of the thesis 
that social and political reforms are essential for development” before warning that “a 
failure of the Bolivian effort would reflect adversely both on the concept of the Alliance 
and our own ability and seriousness in developmental assistance.”34 As the modernizing 
hopes of postrevolutionary planners confronted the reality of the rural society and the 
resilience of its residents, Bolivia would dash the hopes of social scientists, politicians, 
and diplomats alike. 
In exploring how Bolivia’s own development initiatives converged with U.S. 
modernization paradigms, this study contributes to a growing body of literature seeking 
to “decenter” modernization theory.  In the past decade, historians have explored the 
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intellectual and ideological underpinning of modernization theory as manifest in the 
Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, Military Civic Action, and other foreign 
assistance projects.35  Recent scholarship has adopted a more critical perspective, 
advocating the study of what Nils Gilman calls “the local experience of development.”36 
Development initiatives were not simply implemented in host countries.  They were 
instead melded with an array of ongoing development projects, local political practices, 
embedded social hierarchies, local forms of knowledge, and cultural politics.  By 
studying the ways in which Bolivian leaders melded their own ideas of national 
development with foreign modernization theories, this dissertation joins a growing body 
of literature seeking to “decenter” modernization theory.  In so doing, I hope to add 
nuance to our understanding of the international dynamics of modernization theory while 
answering David Engerman’s call for a “global history of modernization.”37  
Finally, exploring development paradigms during the 1950s and 1960s provides a 
window onto the profoundly transnational nature of the Revolution.  Existing scholarship 
focuses almost exclusively on U.S.-Bolivian relations—a topic with a well-developed 
historiography steeped in both U.S. and Bolivian sources. Yet, in addition to providing 
the intellectual model, Mexico also provided the cultural icon for postrevolutionary 
Bolivia.  José Vasconcelos, Moisés Sáenz, David Alfaro Siqueiros, Manuel Gamio, and 
other luminaries captured the imagination of postrevolutionary artists and intellectuals, 
who modeled their own efforts on the murals, monuments, and museums that continue to 
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characterize the Mexican Revolution in the popular imagination.  Diego Rivera visited La 
Paz in 1953, upon being personally invited by President Paz Estenssoro.38  Julia Elena 
Fortún, Bolivia’s leading postrevolutionary anthropologist, did her postgraduate work in 
anthropology at UNAM.  Mexico’s National Directorate of Anthropology trained a 
generation of Bolivian anthropologists at pilot programs not only in La Paz and 
Cochabamba, but also in Puebla and Chiapas.  Indeed, the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 
was deeply-rooted in the particular contours of its own postcolonial republican history.  
But like all revolutions, it too was shaped by the transnational flows of ideas and broader 
global-historical processes.   
 
SCIENCE, RACE, AND KNOWLEDGE 
In articulating their modernization fantasies and designing their attendant 
development strategies, the postrevolutionary leadership appealed to modern science.  
The Bolivian Revolution coincided with the atomic age and the space age, the invention 
of the polio vaccine, and the discovery of the structure of DNA.  Pilots exceeded the 
speed of sound, and Carbon-14 unlocked the mysteries of ancient civilizations.  It 
followed on the greatest atrocity in modern world history; one articulated in terms of 
“racial purity” and carried out in the name of science by a host of Nazi physicians and 
scientists.  It was a novel moment in world history characterized not only by the Cold 
War, but a new international body, the United Nations. The charter of UNESCO, the 
cultural and scientific arm of the UN, reflected the signs of the times, stating "the great 
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and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the 
democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the 
propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the 
inequality of men and races." In this emerging new world order, science would 
undermine race and refashion modernization as synonymous with equality.  
Science proved to be the shibboleth of the MNR, a catchword that framed the 
modernizing aspirations of the postrevolutionary government. Politician, technocrat, and 
intellectual alike evoked the term whenever possible, citing the scientific bases of the 
agrarian reform, the scientific bases of the education reform, and, of course, the scientific 
bases of the Revolution itself.39   For the MNR leadership, ever faithful in the 
modernizing capacity of the state, science provided the solution to urgent problems of 
rural modernization, economic planning, and national culture formation.  After 1952, an 
increasing number of social scientists entered public service.  They headed the agrarian 
and educational reforms committees.  They served on state planning boards.  They staffed 
state cultural offices.  From sociologists and anthropologists to economists and 
statisticians, social scientists played a central—though largely overlooked—role in the 
revolutionary process.  And as a result of the increasing collaboration between Bolivian 
academics and the state, social scientific knowledge contributed to processes of racial 
formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia.   
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Race is a social construct that emerged in a particular historical moment marked 
by the rise of the modern nation-state, industrial revolution, the secularization of 
knowledge, and European imperial expansion. Michael Omi and Howard Winant employ 
the term “racial formation” to describe the processes by which individuals or groups are 
assigned a specific racial identity on account of “markers” such as appearance, skin color, 
or even cultural attributes such as language, style of dress, or place of residence.40  
Thomas Holt further points out that “the meaning or race and the nature of racisms 
articulate with (perhaps even are defined by) the given social formation of a particular 
historical moment.”41  Not only does this formulation of race (and racisms) belie the 
constructed nature of race, but it underscores the historical contingency of racialized 
identities.  Yet as Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper show, however constructed 
identity may be, the process of naming, classifying, and categorizing are real cultural 
practices that carry implicit social weight.42 Though fictional, though socially 
constructed, race continues to operate as a language of exclusion.    
Social scientific knowledge has historically played a central role in the process of 
racial formation.  Peter Wade argues that “race” must be understood “in the context of a 
history of ideas, of Western institutionalized knowledge (whether social or natural 
science).”43  Tracing the history of modern anthropology, George Stocking, Jr. provides a 
vivid illustration of the interconnected relationship between social scientific thought and 
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the idea of race.44  In recent decades, scholars have set out to explore how the relationship 
between racialization and the production of scientific knowledge have developed in 
distinct local, regional, and national contexts across Latin America.  Nancy Leys Stepan 
pioneered research on race and science in Latin America with her study of the eugenics 
movement, demonstrating not only the spread of European ideas, but how they were 
interpreted and subsequently deployed according to local-historical contexts. Since then, 
scholars have built on Stepan’s critical approach to the supposed universality of science 
to underscore the cultural specificity and historical contingency surrounding the 
construction of both scientific knowledge and social categories of race.45  With this 
dissertation, I hope to contribute to this rich body of literature by demonstrating the role 
that social scientific knowledge played in the (re)construction of racialized identities in 
Bolivia.   
This study traces two interconnected and often overlapping aspects of racial 
formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia. The first is mestizaje. Generally speaking, 
mestizaje refers to the process by which intellectuals and statesmen across the Americas 
broke with notions of purity of blood and embraced the mixed cultural and ethnic 
heritage of their populations as the foundation for a new national identity.46 The content 
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and meaning of the practice varied across time and space.  For instance, Mexico’s raza 
cósmica or Brazil’s racial democracy differed markedly from the “great American 
melting pot.”  But each of these governments pursued the common objective of 
downplaying ethnic and cultural differences in order to unify diverse societies around 
shared national identities.  Numerous studies have demonstrated the deceptive nature of 
the concept, which portends inclusion, but operates as “an all-inclusive ideology of 
exclusion” by promoting homogeneity.47  
After 1952, Bolivia was declared a race-less society.48  Seeking to unite the 
fragmented nation around a shared national identity, the postrevolutionary state 
celebrated Bolivia’s mixed Andean and Hispanic heritage.  Scholarship on the Revolution 
fixated on the postrevolutionary government’s promotion of the term “campesino” to 
replace the disparaging “indio” in public discourse, arguing that this class-based identity 
erased ethnic difference.  Most English-language scholarship cites a declaration that 
President Victor Paz Estenssoro purportedly made upon signing the 1952 Agrarian 
Reform Decree: “From now on you will no longer be Indians, but rather peasants!” Not 
only is this quote a fabrication, but the postrevolutionary politics of mestizaje were more 
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subtle, complex, and often contradictory than this image presents.49 By tracing the 
reciprocal relationship between national cultural formation and the production social 
scientific knowledge, this study deepens our understanding of the postrevolutionary 
politics of mestizaje.  Postrevolutionary mestizaje was founded upon two distinct, 
mutually-reinforcing images of indigenous Bolivians that were actively cultivated by the 
government: the “campesino” and the “indio.”  The following chapters trace the 
construction of these mutually reinforcing ideals, their deployment, and how they 
operated to produce new forms of ethnic exclusion.    
The second aspect of postrevolutionary racial formation examined in this 
dissertation explores the relationship between the construction of social scientific 
knowledge and shifting perception of indigenous alterity. The Revolution marked a 
paradigm shift in racial thought.  In Bolivia, as in much of the Andean region, 
constructions of race have historically been framed in cultural terms.  Being cast within 
distinct racial category such as “Indian” or “cholo,” for example, was not necessarily 
dependent on skin color or anatomical features. It was instead determined by a 
multiplicity of cultural “markers” including fashion, personal hygiene habits, rural or 
urban society, and even market participation.50  The postrevolutionary leadership 
dismissed biological theories of race, embracing instead the nonjudgmental (neutral) 
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concept of cultural difference.  The following chapters demonstrate how social scientific 
disciplines of sociology, history, anthropology, and archeology provided the “cognitive 
authority” to reinforce these emerging theories of human difference in postrevolutionary 
society.51  Although progressive for their time and place, these new ways of explaining 
human difference introduced new forms of ethnic exclusion.  Cultural relativism 
displaced racial hierarchies founded on biology, while at the same time reaffirming 
indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural 
evolution.  
 
CULTURAL POLITICS OF REVOLUTION 
Another objective of this dissertation is to provide the first comprehensive 
historical analysis of the cultural politics of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952.  When I 
began this project, I noticed a surprising discrepancy in the literature on 
modern Bolivia.  On the one hand, the general consensus was that the Revolution lacked 
a cultural component.  In his landmark study of the Revolution, for example, James 
Malloy argues that “aparte de un reducido número de palabras y conceptos básicos, el 
MNR no creo lenguaje revolucionario alguno.” 52  James Dunkerley similarly asserts that 
there was “a remarkable lack of rupture in cultural life and political style” following the 
Revolution, noting that “neither was there any sudden renaissance in literature or the 
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arts.”53  Most recently, Laura Gotkowitz remarks that “the party dreamed up no new civic 
ceremonies,” and that “the revolutionaries did not forge a novel repertoire of symbols, 
signals, gestures or words.”54  On the other hand, the literature on the Katarista 
movement cited the cultural practices of the postrevolutionary government as a central 
factor in motivating indigenous political activism during the 1960s and 1970s.55 Citing 
the homogenizing national culture model promoted by the postrevolutionary state, 
Aymara activists declared, in 1973, that “Somos extranjeros en nuestro propio país.”56 
This gap in the historiography prompted my primary research question: What 
were the cultural practices of the postrevolutionary state, and how did they contribute to 
the new forms of cultural and ethnic exclusion experienced by indigenous peoples?  I set 
off to Bolivia hoping to find documentary evidence that would allow me to answer this 
historical puzzle.  The quest took me not to the national archives in Sucre, but to the dank 
closets and forgotten storerooms of state ministries and museums in La Paz.  Archives 
long thought lost began to yield a coherent government project intended to forge a 
unifying national culture for the postrevolutionary republic.  Before long, it became clear 
that not only did the Revolution include a cultural element (and a substantial one, at that); 
but that the establishment of a unifying national culture for the integrated republic was 
one of the primary objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership.  A MNR Manifesto 
dating to 1946, for instance, indicates the privileged location occupied by national culture 
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formation in the revolutionary imagination.  “La Revolución Nacional, como teoría,” 
reads the document, “es un concepto orgánico completo, que abarca desde la economía 
del país hasta las más elevadas expresiones de su cultura.”57 Establishing an authentic 
national culture from vernacular expressions of popular culture was one of the primary 
means through with the MNR leadership pursued national unity after 1952.  
Still, such a discrepancy in the scholarship begs the question: Why have the 
cultural politics of the Revolution remained so misunderstood?  The primary explanation 
lies in a lack of archival evidence.58  In the tumultuous politics of the postrevolutionary 
period, archives were often destroyed as a result of antigovernment revolts, one salient 
example being in September 1956, when the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) initiated 
an urban revolt in La Paz that culminated in the destruction of the archives of the state 
propaganda ministry.  Other documents have been presumed lost or stolen—victims of 
Bolivia’s poor institutional memory practices.  Another explanation of the “silences” 
surrounding the cultural politics may be that the military government of the period 1964-
82 distorted the historical memory of the Revolution.  Finally, it seems that scholars have 
measured the Bolivian experience against other revolutionary episodes in the Americas, 
notably Mexico and Cuba, both of which carried out cultural programs exceptional in 
their scope and organization. Yet, rather than measuring 1952 against cultural specific 
and historically contingent revolutionary episodes in the Americas, the Bolivian 
Revolution should be judged within its own historical context.   
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Only recently have scholars turned their attention to the cultural politics of the 
1952 Revolution.59  What is becoming absolutely certain with increased scholarly interest 
in the topic is that the 1952 Revolution was marked by a massive cultural component, 
whose breadth and legacy is only now beginning coming to light.  The following pages 
build upon the pioneering research of Martha Lanza Meneses, Pablo Quisbert, Beatriz 
Rossells, Michelle Bigenho, and Fernando Rios to further reveal the institutional 
framework and discursive practices underlying the potent national cultural myth 
fomented by the postrevolutionary leadership.  To be sure, the Revolution did not 
represent an entirely new moment in the cultural history of modern Bolivia.  Nevertheless 
it did mark the consolidation of ascendant intellectual trends and social scientific thought 
into a distinct state project.  State intervention in cultural production was not entirely new 
either, though it did witness an unprecedented expansion after 1952.  
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This dissertation consists of seven thematic chapters, which follow a basic linear 
chronology.  Each chapter makes a particular argument while at the same time, 
contributing to the central, overarching argument of the work.  Chapter one locates the 
1952 Revolution in longer, deeper local-historical processes rooted to Bolivia’s colonial 
past.  Most scholarship tends to situate the Revolution within the specific episodic history 
of the post-Chaco period.  Yet recent historiography on the pre-revolutionary period calls 
for a critical reassessment of the Revolution and its origins.  In 1980, Silvia Rivera 
identified two distinct historical trajectories within grassroots indigenous struggle for 
territorial rights and justice: the “short memory” rooted in the post-Chaco syndicalist 
movement and the “long memory” of anticolonial rebellion forged in the 1781 Túpak 
Katari Rebellion.60  Since then, a generation of scholars have revealed the historical 
continuity of indigenous struggle.  Most recently, Laura Gotkowitz had traced this 
continuity up to the Revolution, making a provocative argument for the existence of an 
autonomous “rural revolution” that preceded the predominantly urban-based 1952 
Revolution.61  Taking both “long memory” and “short memory” perspectives into account 
necessitates situating the Revolution in a much longer historical trajectory.  Since the 
foundation of the Republic, and even before, indigenous-state relations have been 
contoured as much by state policy as by popular mobilization among Bolivia’s rural, 
indigenous majority.  By locating my study as the culmination of longer historical 
processes, I demonstrate how the experience of both long memory and short memory 
shaped the revolutionary process and contoured indigenous citizenship.   
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Chapter two explores the process of indigenous integration in postrevolutionary 
Bolivia.  Indigenous integration was founded on three specific reforms introduced during 
the first years of the Revolution: universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and rural education.  
To engineer these reforms, the state turned to sociologists, forging a critical relationship 
between social science and the government which would become a central component of 
the Revolution.  Tracing the economic policies, development strategies, and racialized 
thinking of policymakers affiliated with the postrevolutionary government, I examine the 
place of indigenous Bolivians in the revolutionary imagination.  Focusing on the making 
of the agrarian reform law and the rural education initiative, I then examine how that 
imaginary mapped the place of Indians in the postrevolutionary republic.  Indigenous 
integration was a modernization imperative, and its history cannot be understood apart 
from the development politics of the postrevolutionary leadership on the one hand, and 
the prevailing currents of racial thought on the other.      
Chapter three examines the contours of postrevolutionary state formation as the 
government defined the Revolution and set out to mobilize society for the most ambitious 
state-led modernization initiative in Bolivian history.  The celebrated Bolivian social 
theorist, René Zavaleta Mercado argues that the Revolution marked a new cycle in the 
historical formation of the Bolivian state.62  Before the Revolution, suffrage was limited 
to literate, property-holding males and framed by a classical liberal nineteenth-century 
constitution. The Revolution signalled the emergence of a new “national-popular” state 
characterized by mass political participation and a corporatist welfare state.63  I explore 
how the postrevolutionary government adapted to this novel relationship between state 
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and society.  I employ the term “popular statecraft” to define the particular way in which 
the MNR consolidated its position as the most powerful member of the postrevolutionary 
government and then set out to integrate diverse social movement into the state apparatus 
by way of their organization into vertical, hierarchized corporate structures such as the 
MNR and the COB.  As state officials set out to distinct urban and rural spaces 
incorporating groups, it also employed a propaganda campaign that served to project an 
aura of state power and orientate the revolution for national development.  This 
propaganda effort, which spanned roughly 1952-1956, provided the foundation for the 
more ambitious and centralized state cultural initiatives of the late 1950s and 1960s.   
The revision of national history provided not only the cornerstone of the cultural 
politics of the state, but also the very foundation for the postrevolutionary republic.  Since 
1941, MNR ideologues Carlos Montenegro, Juan Cuadros Quiroga, and Augusto 
Céspedes launched a concerted effort to revise national history.  Chapter four examines 
the construction of this narrative and the postrevolutionary state’s effort to commemorate 
it.  With monuments, murals, and national holidays, the postrevolutionary government 
infused civic time and space with a narrative of the revolution that reaffirmed its 
particular reading of the past.  In addition to contextualizing the Revolution, this 
revisionist narrative historicized the myth of national unity by linking middle class 
professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a common history 
of resistance to neo-colonial domination.  Although this narrative inserted Indians into 
the national community, it privileged creole and mestizos as agents of national history 
while denying Indigenous people an active role in the historical formation of the Bolivian 




the 1899 Federal War, for instance—were either subordinated to creole and mestizo 
struggles or enveloped in silence.   
If the postrevolutionary leadership looked to colonial and republican history to 
explain the revolutionary present, it was the pre-colonial past that provided a glimpse of 
the modern future.  Just weeks after the Revolution, the government launched an 
ambitious project to excavate and reconstruct the pre-Hispanic ruins at Tiwanaku. 
Chapter five examines this project as a lens onto the mutually-constitutive relationship 
that emerged between constructions of race, knowledge and national identity in 
postrevolutionary Bolivia.  One of the primary objectives of this project was the 
valorization of the Aymara past.  In the creole imagination, the Aymara were the most 
backward and savage of Bolivia’s indigenous population.  With carbon-dating and 
stratigraphic analysis, the postrevolutionary government turned to modern science to 
dispel prevalent ideas of Aymara inferiority by displacing a more recent, contested 
history of ethnic resistance with a glorious pre-Hispanic past rooted in Tiwanaku.  Yet 
the Tiwanaku restoration project also affirmed the role assigned to Indians in 
postrevolutionary national development initiatives.  “In Bolivia, archeological research 
implicitly carries a message of hope” wrote Carlos Ponce Sanginés, the director of the 
state archeology mission.  “If in the past, indigenous people were capable of notable 
feats, if they could erect buildings and outstanding cities, it is logical that their 
descendants, the Indians of today, will be able to master modern technology in the future 
and assist in the transformation of this backward country.”64   
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When it came to cultural patrimony, however, state efforts to preserve the Aymara 
past contradicted its vision of the modern future.  Chapter six explored the national and 
local dynamics of national cultural patrimony formation.  The establishment of a strong 
cultural patrimony regime was central component of postrevolutionary national culture 
formation.  Seeking to valorize long-marginalized expressions of indigenous popular 
culture, officials expanded the content of the national cultural patrimony to include 
indigenous dance, music, and art.  Yet as the government sought to protect archeological 
land bordering the Tiwanaku ruins, it came into conflict with Aymara communities that 
had been waging a fifty-year struggle for territorial restitution.  With the 1953 Agrarian 
reform law, archeological lands that had long been protected by virtue of private 
ownership were suddenly under the control of Aymara communities.  The struggles over 
land that ensued between state archeologists and indigenous communities not only 
indicated the divergent perspectives of the meaning of territory, history, and nationhood, 
but also played an important role in the formation of the postrevolutionary patrimony 
regime.   
Chapter seven examines the new forms of ethnic exclusion generated by the 
Revolution by tracing the development and institutionalization of anthropology.  National 
development presented postrevolutionary officials with a paradox.  Officials feared that 
the rural modernization initiative was causing the disappearance of the “authentic” 
indigenous culture that was central to postrevolutionary national identity.  In an effort to 
safeguard Bolivia’s indigenous heritage, the government created the Department of 
Ethnography and Folklore in 1956. In subsequent years, anthropologists traversed the 
countryside to observe, record, and then archive indigenous ceremonies, celebrations, and 




society.  Yet while modernization was the imperative for the creation of a state folklore 
mission in the 1950s, by the 1960s modernization became the goal of the anthropology 
itself.  In 1962, the government aligned its development initiatives with the U.S. Alliance 
for Progress and announced an ambitious ten-year rural development program.  Trained 
by Mexican, Peruvian, and U.S. social scientists, a new generation of Bolivian 
anthropologists set out to orientate indigenous communities toward extensive agricultural 
practices.  In so doing, it hoped to increase commercial agriculture while diversifying the 
national economy.  Alongside rural teachers, applied anthropologists served on the 
frontline of state initiatives to assimilate indigenous Bolivians into the modern republic 
imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. 
In the end, this dissertation makes valuable contributions to several different 
bodies of knowledge.  In terms of Bolivian historiography, it challenges the prevailing 
consensus that the sweeping socioeconomic reforms introduced by Bolivia’s 
postrevolutionary government were not accompanied by a parallel cultural initiative.  
Drawing on newly-discovered archival sources from research in Bolivia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, and the United States, I demonstrate how the cultural politics of national 
integration operated to reproduce colonial racial hierarchies.  In so doing, I dialog with 
broader currents on racial formation while underscoring the historical contingency and 
cultural specificity surrounding the production of social knowledge.  While scholarship 
on the Revolution remains largely confined to national borders, I situate the moment 
within the transnational flow of ideas.  Government officials employed U.S. 
modernization theory, anthropologists engaged Mexican social science, and indigenous 
activists evoked postcolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Malcolm X. This approach 




inserting Bolivia into the global decolonization movement.  As scholars continue to 
debate the legacy of Spanish colonial rule in the Americas, this study shows that not only 
was Latin America’s postcolonial predicament manifest in racial discrimination and 
economic inequality, but it was also deeply embedded in social scientific knowledge and 
state cultural practices.     




Chapter One   
Of Postcolonial Predicaments: Mapping the Contours of Indigenous-
State Relations, 1825-1952 
 
It seemed to me that the white people live in some fear of the Indians.  When the 
enormous predominance of the native element is considered, such an attitude is by no 
means unnatural; in fact, a traveler can only regard with astonishment and admiration 
the manner in which the millions of Indians are actually kept in order by the small white 
population.   
-Sir Martin Conway, upon visiting Bolivia in 1899 
 
En la gran perspectiva de la historia, cuando nosotros hayamos desaparecidos como 
seres humanos, cuando nuestras luchas se vean en su justa dimensión, lo único que se 
registrará con valor universal será la incorporación de los indios, de los siervos, de los 
oprimidos durante siglos a la vida civilizada, a la vida humana.  
-President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 1/5/1955  
 
Postcolonialism is a condition that Latin America shares with Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East, where European powers established imperial enterprises between the 
fifteenth and twentieth centuries.  Though Latin America’s “postcolonial condition” may 
not seem a particularly profound discovery in the historiography of the region, it is a 
relatively recent observation in the broader literature of postcolonial studies.65  To be 
sure, Independence for most Spanish American republics was strictly a political affair.  
The caste hierarchies that ordered colonial society continued into Republican life, 
shaping the social practices, economic relationships, and scientific knowledge of the 
fledgling American nation-states.  Societies, long segregated into two distinct republicas 
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and stratified by porous boundaries of caste not only had to “imagine” a nation, but also 
had to forge a state.66  Notions of citizenship, identity, and race became especially 
salient—and contentious—as elite and popular classes mobilized to define the emerging 
republics and establish their place within them.   
In Bolivia, the primary symptoms of this condition were manifest in indigenous-
state relations.  At Independence, Indians constituted approximately three quarters of 
Bolivia’s total population.67  Defining the status of this population proved a novel 
challenge for republican leaders.  In the sixteenth century, the Spanish crown had created 
two separate republics—one Spaniard, the other Indian—as the foundation for colonial 
governance, endowing each with distinct legal rights, social privileges, and financial 
obligations.68   Indeed, the Crown’s intention of maintaining separate and unequal 
republicas was promptly undermined by miscegenation and the emergence of the 
castas.69  Still, by the eighteenth century, after enduring for over three centuries, this 
institutionalized segregation was the natural order of things, and provided the foundation 
of the social hierarchies that shaped the republican period.  As Mark Thurner, David 
Nuggent, and others point out, however, the colonial laws also provided Indians across 
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the Andes with a language of rights before republican institutions.70  Generation after 
generation of republican leaders—whether presidential creoles or rural apoderados—
faced the challenge of abolishing colonial caste hierarchies and merging these distinct 
and unequal republicas into unified nation-states.  
True, this challenge was located at the heart of the postcolonial predicament 
across the Americas; but it was especially acute in Bolivia, which had the highest 
proportion of indigenous peoples in the hemisphere.  What would be the status of Indians 
in the new republic?   Would they enjoy the same rights as European-descendent 
creoles?  How would they fit into republican society?  For the ascedeant creole elite, 
indigenous integration necessitated the reconciliation of liberal precepts of universal 
equality with a colonial legacy of legally sanctioned inequality.  Like the postcolonial 
republics of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, but only earlier, Bolivians too struggled 
with the enduring tension between ethnic plurality and liberal democracy that lay at the 
heart of the modern nation-state.   
This chapter chronicles the evolution of Indian-state relations from the foundation 
of the Republic in 1825 to the 1952 Revolution.  The Revolution not only resulted from 
the political transformations and social reform that succeeded the Chaco War (1932-35), 
but its origins must also be situated in a longer history of interethnic struggle for 
autonomy, justice, and land.  Such a concern with the longue durée originates from two 
historiographical developments.  The first is Silvia Rivera’s emphasis on the “long 
memory” of highland indigenous struggle rooted in the anticolonial rebellions of the late 
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eighteenth century.71  The second is Steve Stern’s call for the need to “incorporate 
multiple time scales” in the study of peasant rebellion and its causes.72  Indigenous 
resistance to colonial and republican institutions was a constant and increasingly-
coordinated part of this story.  To exclude indigenous struggle, or to cast rural 
communities aside as passive actors or “vanquished victims” in republican history would 
silence a crucial component of republican nation-state formation.73  Rural resistance 
defined the terms in indigenous-state relations just as much as government policies, 
mapping the contours of nation-state formation for the entire period under examination. 
In order to understand the significance of the Revolution in terms of indigenous-state 
relations, the moment thus must be situated in deeper processes and longer historical 
trajectories that predate the foundation of the Republic.    
Condensing over a century of Republican history in a single chapter requires a 
very selective reading of Bolivia’s complex national past.  My particular intention here is 
to demonstrate the dynamic interplay between indigenous peoples and the republican 
state in order to underscore the deeper historical processes that underlie the 1952 
Revolution.  While tracing the history of these two historically-contingent social groups, I 
tie the particular political, social, economic, and cultural processes to changes in the 
global political economy.  Complex and messy historical episodes are abridged and 
situated on a seemingly linear historical trajectory.  And though historical processes are  
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rarely linear, I structure them chronologically for sake of clarity and brevity, examining 
key moments that that have shaped historical memory and contoured indigenous-state 
relations.   Most of these episodes—for example, the 1781 Tupak Katari rebellion, the 
1899 Federal War, the Chaco War—have rich historiographies which I discuss, often too 
briefly, in the footnotes.   
 
THE FORGING OF INDIAN-STATE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
On August 6, 1825, representatives from the provinces of Upper Peru declared 
independence not only from Spain, but from the newly-independent republics of Peru and 
the United Provinces of Rio de La Plata. Many observers, including Simón Bolívar 
himself, had expressed doubt as to whether the territory could constitute a legitimate base 
for an independent republic.75  The new republic would be carved from one of the most 
geographically-diverse and ethnically-fragmented regions in the entire empire.  Roughly 
twice the size of Spain, the territory straddled the rugged, often-impassable ranges of the 
central Andes before carrying on to the vast, subtropical lowlands to the east.  It was 
predominantly populated by Indians.  Transforming Upper Peru into an integrated nation 
state thus must have seemed a daunting undertaking to republican leaders.  In addition to 
the already burdensome challenges of demography and geography, they had to forge a 
state after fifteen years of civil war—a task that entailed the establishment of order 
among a fractured elite, the definition and protection of national borders, and the forging 
of state institutions that would unite the most diverse nation in the hemisphere.  
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Overcoming deep-seeded racial hierarchies in order to integrate indigenous people into 
national life would prove the most signifncant challenge confronting republican leaders.  
In a recent study on nineteenth-century nation-state formation in the Andes, 
historian Brooke Larson notes the particular spatial challenges facing republican leaders 
in Bolivia: there were no frontiers.  Unlike other nations in the Americas, creoles could 
not simply turn their back on the Indian population.76  Two thirds of Bolivia’s total 
population was concentrated in the western-most part of the country, along a north-south 
trading axis running from the Lake Titicaca basin to the mining centers of Oruro and 
Potosí, and also to the lush valleys of the Cordillera Oriental just to the east, home of the 
vibrant markets of Cochabamba.  The frontiers that did exist, particularly those in the 
eastern lowlands that today border Brazil, were poorly defined, undefended, unexplored, 
and populated by the Guaraní, Chiriguano, and other native peoples.  European advances 
in the eastern lowlands had been spearheaded by Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries.  By 
the nineteenth century, settlement was limited to commercial hubs of Santa Cruz and 
Trinidad and smaller outlying towns.  In the densely-populated highlands to the west, La 
Paz, Sucre, Potosí, and other creole centers of trade and administration were surrounded 
by indigenous communities.  Frontiers between the Andean and European populations 
were thus not defined by demarcated spaces or expanding lines of civilization.  Rather 
they were characterized by porous distinctions between rural and urban whereupon 
cultural norms—of language, dress, diet, or recreation—distinguished between 
civilization and barbarity.   
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The racialized hierarchies of the colonial caste system ordered republican society.  
As Laura Lewis and other colonial historians have demonstrated, the colonial caste 
system is best understood as a pyramid, in which whiteness was at the top, Indians at the 
wide base, and blacks, multatos, mestizos and other castas occupying the wide space in 
between.77  According to the first national population estimates, just over one million 
people lived in Bolivia in 1826.  At the top was the creole population, who numbered 
200,000.  This population included all Bolivians of European descent.  Thanks to the 
legacy of the colonial caste system, they enjoyed social privileges by virtue of limpieza 
de sangre, honor, and virtue.  Although the small creole minority may have retained a 
monopoly on republican political and economic institutions, they were by no means a 
homogenous lot. At the apex of republican society was the upper crust of the creole 
elite—large landowners, mine owners, wealthy merchants, and ranking civil and military 
officials.  Below them were middling creoles and blancoides who worked as merchants, 
small- and medium-estate owners, bureaucrats, artisans, lawyers, and soldiers.   
Beneath the creoles, occupying the middling sections of this complex, dynamic, 
and evolving social pyramid, was the castas. That is, those of mixed Andean and 
European heritage who existed in the murky legal space between the two republics.  In 
Bolivia, this group is most commonly referred to as cholos, whereas they are categorized 
as mestizos or ladinos in other parts of Spanish America.  Just as it had during the 
colonial period, their social position varied widely according to occupation, place of 
residence, and the degree to which they embraced European language and customs.  Even 
within this social group, there existed a vocabulary of distinction.  For example, Chu’tas 
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were partially acculturated urban Aymara.  Across the Andes, race was above all a 
cultural marker.78  Identity was not fixed, and social, economic, and cultural mobility was 
relatively widespread.  Cholos often “passed” as creoles, even ascending to some of the 
most prominent positions in government.79 Nineteenth century patriots like as Pedro 
Domingo and Andres Santa Cruz were of “mixed parentage,” as was Bolivia’s most 
notorious caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo.   
Located at the wide base of Bolivia’s postcolonial social pyramid was the 
indigenous population. At independence, indigenous Bolivians numbered some 
800,000.80  This estimate, which excluded the Guaraní, Chiriguano, and other lowland 
ethnic groups, reflected the population of the two primary ethno-linguistic groups in 
Bolivia, the Quechua and Aymara.  Anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie urges 
conderation of the shifting nature of such categories as ethnicity and language, mapping 
Bolivia’s human geography as a multiplicity of distinct albeit porous “cultural 
formations” defined in relation to locality before perceived ethnic or linguistic totality.81 
The only distinctions recognized by the Crown, however, were those socioeconomic 
relationships defined in realtions to the colonial state, such as comunario, yanacona, 
agregado, forestero, and so on.  One common aspect of these highland groups was their 
socioeconomic organization.  The cornerstone of the sedentary agricultural societies that 
characterized Andean civilization was the ayllu.  Porous kinship networks associated with 
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rights to a particular territory, ayllus structured family, community, ritual, and civic 
practices.  They embraced collective land holding and agricultural practices and deeply 
embedded customs of labor reciprocity and gender complimentarity.82  Before the 
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Spanish conquest, ayllus claimed lands located in distinct climate zones as a means to 
adapt to the diverse microclimates of the central Andes.83  The spatial logic of the ayllu 
was nevertheless lost on colonial officials, as the Crown awarded conquistadors grants of 
indigenous labor called encomiendas and transformed disparate rural settlements into 
settled hamlets called reducciones or concentraciones.  
Quechua-speakers were the larger of the two groups, populating the valleys of the 
Cordillera Occidental, which spans the departments of Cochabamba, Potosi, Chuquisaca, 
and parts of Oruro.  Their language lays testament to their origins as Inca colonists, or 
mitmaes, originally sent to populate the frontier of the forth realm of the empire, 
Kollasuyo. With the conquest, they were subsequently parceled off to emcomenderos.  
They worked colonial haciendas as agrarian labors to meet the demand for goods at the 
Potosí silver mines to the west.84 Others remained in semi-autonomous, tribute-paying 
communities.  Because of both the market and the climate, there was a higher prevalence 
of hacienda expansion in the central valley to the east of the altiplano, where corn, wheat, 
and other good flourished in the temperate environment.  It was here were, in the 
temperate valleys of Cochabamba, where mestizaje established its deepest roots in 
Bolivia.   
On the more arid altiplano to the west was the Aymara-speaking population. They 
populated the Lake Titicaca basin and the altiplano, as well as regions such as the Yungas 
on the subtropical valleys on the eastern slopes of the Cordillera Real—what are now the 
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departments of La Paz, Oruro, and part of Potosí.85  Still today, the providence of the 
Aymara remains a speculative subject in the historical, ethnographic, archeological 
literature.  Many agree that it was the Aymara who orginially constructed the  
 
Illustration 3:  Map of territories held by preconquest Aymara kindoms.86  
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monumental architecture of Tiwanaku, while others speculate that it was, in fact, the 
Aymara that conquered the pre-Incan Andean civilization (see chapter five).  Under 
Spanish colonial rule, rural Aymara-speaking communities were increasingly organized 
into reducciones to facilitate the extraction of tribute.  
Like the Quechua to the east, Aymara-speaking communities also had to meet 
royal tribute obligations by serving the mita, the onerous system of draft labor that 
required indigenous communities to provide workers to meet the constant labor demands 
of the Potosi silver mines.  Ethnohistorian John Murra found that while the Inca state 
only demanded labor from their subjects, the Spanish also demanded tribute in the forms 
of goods.87 To meet such demands, native Andeans remitted potatoes, barley, quinoa, 
and/or wool to the local corrigedor.  Across the region, local ethnic authorities—mallku 
in Aymara, kuraka in Quechua, cacique in Spanish—became intercultural brokers, as the 
crown charged them with meeting tribute obligations.  Many resisted the labor demands 
be fleeing their communities.  By Independence, members of autonomous communities, 
commonly referred to as comunarios, greatly outnumbered hacienda Indians or colonos. 
Foresteros, yanaconas, and others who had abandoned their communities of origin, 
moved to other communities or migrated to urban centers to become wage laborers.   
In the first half of the nineteenth century, as creole republicans reappraised the 
“Indian problem” through the lens of enlightened liberalism, the memory of the Túpak 
Katari rebellion of 1780-1782 remained a constant reminder of both the dangers and the 
necessities of maintaining minority rule.  While in Cuzco, Túpak Amaru had led a 
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multiethnic, cross-class alliance of creoles, mestizos, and Indians against the abuses of 
local colonial administrators in the name of the King, the dynamics of the Túpak Katari 
rebellion just outside of La Paz were much different.88  There, Aymara communities 
protesting the continued abuse and exploitation of local crown officials devolved into 
millenarian “caste war” that pitted Andean against European.89  Under the leadership of 
Julian Apasa Nina, who assumed the nom de guerre Tupak Katari, Aymara insurgents 
sought the complete overthrow of the Spanish colonial state, the expulsion of Europeans, 
and the reestablishment of autonomous leadership, communal autonomy, and social 
practices.  As historian Sinclair Thomson argues, their objective was, above all, self-rule.  
For six months during 1780 and 1781, Aymara insurgents besieged the city of La Paz 
from the heights of El Alto.  The Spanish ultimately succeeded in suppressing the 
insurgency, but the memory of the violent insurrection haunted creoles, for it ultimately 
illustrated the tenuous nature of ethnic minority90  In the creole imagination, Túpak 
Katari came to embody fears of race war—violent reprisal for three-hundred years of 
colonial rule. 
 
POSTCOLONIAL LEGACIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
It was thus with fears of race war and uncertainty as to how to define the place of 
Indians in the nation that creole leaders set out to construct the Republic of Bolivia.  In 
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1824 and 1825, as rebel armies waged the final campaigns for independence in the 
central Andes, Bolívar issued a series of decrees that redefined the relationship between 
Indians and the state.  He banished the mita, abolished tribute, and declared Indians 
owners of the land they occupied.  The August 1825 Declaration of Independence 
abrogated the colonial system of two republics in favor of universal citizenship and 
guaranteed the “sacrosanct rights of honor, life, liberty, equality, property, and security” 
to all Bolivians.91  Indigenous peoples thus entered into republican life freed from the 
institutional constraints and legal standing that had long predetermined their inferior 
social status.  The Constitution, ratified the following year, would nevertheless hinder 
indigenous equality by making literacy an explicit requisite for citizenship.  Race was 
never explicitly articulated as an exclusionary factor, but literacy requirements and 
subsequent property qualifications on the franchise disproportionately affected 
indigenous peoples and demonstrated that citizenship, in the strictest sense, would be 
limited to the exclusive domain of property holding, literate males (women would not be 
permitted to vote until 1952). For over a century, colonial legacies would remain deeply 
entrenched despite republican commitments to liberal principals of popular sovereignty, 
universal citizenship, and legal equality.  
If the constitution established the legal status and political rights of indigenous 
peoples in the new republic, it was ultimately the state’s lack of revenue that defined their 
social status. The silver mines at Potosí had provided one of the greatest sources of 
income for the Spanish empire.  Yet the progressive decline of silver output beginning in 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century placed the new national economy in a precarious 
                                                 




position.92 Making matters worse, fifteen years of war had resulted in de-capitalization of 
the mining industry, the flight of both specialists and technology, and depopulation, while 
new national borders closed important overland trade routes and access to seaports.  Cash 
poor and lacking revenue with no foreseeable source of income in the immediate future, 
Bolivia’s second President, Antonio José de Sucre, reinstated tribute in 1826.93  Levied 
on indigenous heads of household, tribute provided the primary source of government 
revenue until the 1900s, accounting for as much as sixty percent of national revenue 
some years.  Anthropologist Tristan Platt argues that tribute obligations provided one side 
of a “pact of reciprocity” that developed between indigenous communities and the 
republican state.94 Drawing on normative colonial legal precedents, communities 
expected to retain legal rights to communal lands in exchange for meeting tribute 
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obligations.  In this way, this “pact of reciprocity” served as the tacit recognition of 
indigenous communal land holding practices in spite of the government’s commitment to 
establishing a private property regime.  It moreover defined the expectations of national 
citizenship and the obligations of the republican state for indigenous communities.  
During the first decades following independence, Bolivia’s republican present 
thus remained remarkably similar to its colonial past.  Indeed, creole elites had won 
political and economic autonomy from the Spanish Crown, but social revolution did not 
accompany the changes in political leadership.  To be sure, the struggle for independence 
was a political affair, the result of insurgent creole patriotism and a desire for increased 
economic autonomy from the Crown, rather than from popular sentiment for social 
change. This was especially true in the central Andes, where the memory of the Túpak 
Amaru and Túpak Katari rebellions contributed to enduring creole loyalty to the crown 
well into the 1820s.  However committed to enlightenment precepts of fraternity, 
equality, and reason they may have been; however much they may have drawn 
inspiration from the United States and France during this “Age of Democratic 
Revolutions”; Bolívar, Sucre, and Santa Cruz had to reconcile their liberal principals with 
economic pragmatism, the need for social order, and perhaps their own racial biases.  As 
such, their own national project, Bolivia, seems to have been unevenly grafted onto 
Upper Peru—a messy amalgam of republican institutions and colonial practices.   And 
nowhere was this more apparent than in the social hierarchies that were naturalized 
during the nineteenth century.  
With the pact of reciprocity in effect and creole leaders attending to urgent issues 
of political and economic development, the question of indigenous inclusion remained 




1860, was marked by caudillo infighting, political rivalry, and gradual economic 
recovery.  It was also during this time that colonial social hierarchies crystallized as 
normative institutions of republican life. The republican state reaffirmed colonial notions 
of two republics on several different levels.  As Brooke Larson points out, “The strong 
continuities of the republican state with the colonial policies towards tribute and 
corporate landholding preserved the ideological underpinnings of traditional state-peasant 
relations”95  Colonial social relations reified the spatial divisions that characterized of 
republic society and extended in practices of daily life, from modes of production to 
market participation.96   
Beginning in the 1860s, economic recovery elevated the issue of indigenous 
integration to the fore of national debates.  In the 1860 budget, indigenous tribute still 
accounted for thirty-six percent of national revenue, but the discovery of guano and 
nitrate deposits on the Pacific coast began to shift the burden of taxation away from 
indigenous tribute and towards new sources of export income.97  Given the inability of 
Bolivian investors to provide the necessary capital to exploit these resources, however, 
the only why they could generate revenue was to sell concessions to foreign investors.  
Not just the mines, but related industries of railroads, shipping, and insurance began 
attracting foreign investment in the 1860s.  As British and Chilean capital flowed in, the 
1870s was marked by the revival of Potosí silver.  At the same time, national leaders 
began implementing the liberal economic reforms envisioned by Bolívar and Sucre.  The 
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period saw easing protective tariffs and ending state monopolies.  Integration into the 
global capitalist economy was slowly undermining the government’s dependence on 
indigenous tribute.   
With the recovering mining industry increasing demand for goods, the 
government began to undo the legal basis for corporate land holding privileges in 
exchange for a universal private property regime that would enable the expansion of 
commercial agriculture.  In 1866, Bolivia’s famed caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo 
introduced the first effort to repeal communal land holding rights with a law declaring 
that all Indians must purchase title to their land within sixty days or have it be taken by 
the state and sold at auction.  He passed a second degree in 1868, declaring all communal 
lands property of the state.   Laura Gotkowitz found that between 1866 and 1869, 
government auctioneers sold the land of 356 communities.98  The grand majority of the 
sales occurred in the densely populated rural provinces of La Paz, in the Aymara 
heartland of Omasuyos, Pacajes, Sicasica, and Muñecas.99  
Across the altiplano, comunarios rose up against local government representatives 
to protest the division of communal lands.  In their opposition to the Melgarejo regime, 
comunarios found an unlikely ally in the traditional landed elite, who not only resented 
the emergence of new landed class, but also opposed the patronage politics of Melgarejo.  
The rural insurgents were also joined by provincial mestizos who earned their livelihood 
collecting tribute.100  By 1870, this alliance succeeded in deposing the loathed caudillo; 
but not without a price—government forces massacred at least 1800 Aymara 
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comunarios.101  After the conflict, while the creole and mestizo rebels returned to their 
provincial towns and altiplano estates, indigenous comunarios refused to lay down their 
arms—or at least they kept them well within reach.  The 1866 and 1868 decrees had put 
comunarios in a defensive position and sparked a protracted movement for land rights 
and justice that would continue beyond the 1952 Revolution.102   
Local struggles to retain communal lands—and associated questions of 
citizenship, rights, and justice—defined the contours of indigenous-state relations for the 
century to come.  At the 1871 constituent assembly (convened after the overthrow of 
Melgarejo), political leaders swiftly repealed the 1866 and 1868 decrees. The rural 
uprisings had demonstrated that comunarios would not sit idly by while their way of life 
was undone by liberal state policy.  Yet the agrarian question lingered.  To liberal elites 
seeking to modernize the economy, the ayllus represented retrograde socioeconomic 
institutions; a hindrance to progress that had to be abolished in order to convert Indians 
into individual, landowning yeomen.  Progress hinged on the end of communal land 
holding practices, the institutionalization of private property, and the promotion of 
commercial agriculture.  In 1874, liberal elites introduced the legal foundation for the 
privatization of communal lands with the Ley de Exvinculación (Disentailment Law).   
Similar to contemporaneous efforts in Mexico, Peru, and the United States, the 
Bolivian government abrogated the legal foundation of communal land holding in order 
to institute a universal private property regime.103  Not only would such an effort open up 
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lands for commercial agricultural, as Nathaniel Aguirre and other proponents of the law 
believed, but it would also turn indigenous peasants away from the closed corporate 
communities and towards increased market participation.104 The law explicitly forbade 
collective land rights and ordered the partition of ayllu lands among its current 
inhabitants.  The War of the Pacific delayed the implementation of the law.  But once 
hostilities ceased between Chile and Bolivia in 1880, the government set the law into 
motion and initiated land surveys, called revistas, sending officials to rural provinces to 
partition communal lands into individual plots.  The law stipulated that Indians were 
required to purchase title to their new allotments.  If they were unable or if they refused, 
their lands would be forfeited to the state.  
Thus began the first wave of republican hacienda expansion.  Across the 
countryside, creole investors divested indigenous communities of territory through a mix 
of legal measures, fraud, and coercion. Confronted with growing rural resistance, the 
government issued two decrees that blunted the 1874 law.  The first, an 1881 presidential 
resolution, allowed communities the right to a proindiviso (undivided) title only if all 
members of the community agreed.  The second, an 1883 supreme decree, declared that 
communities that could provide cedulas de composición—colonial deeds that recognized 
communal land titles—were immune from the revistas.105  As a result of this provision, 
comunarios set out for colonial archival repositories in Lima and Buenos Aires—the 
                                                                                                                                                 
"Interpreting the Expropriation of Indian Pueblo Lands in Porfirian Mexico: The Unexamined Legacies of 
Andrés Molina Enríquez," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2002), pp. 69-117.  The 
United States government issued a similar law in 1887: the Dawes Allotment Act.  For a classic historical 
treatment of the law and its impact on Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations, see: 
Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1985 [1940]). 
104 For a discussion of the development of the law, and the ideologies underlying its creation, see 
Gotkowitz, A Revolution for Our Rights, pp. 19-42.  
105 Laws discussed in Gotkowitz, A Revolution for Our Rights, pp. 34-35; Choque Canqui, Historia de una 




former vice-regal capitals—in search of such titles.  Although these decrees attenuated 
the original law, the number of communities nevertheless continued to decline.  
Indian-state relations took a violent turn during the final decades of the century as 
resistance to land privatization became more organized and widespread.  In addition to 
outlawing communal land rights, the Disentailment Law undermined the legal status of 
the communities.  The measure indicated that communities now had to appoint an 
authorized legal agent, or apoderado, to appeal to government institutions. Across the 
countryside, communities selected local leaders to represent them before republican legal 
institutions.  Historian Pilar Mendieta found that apoderados were chosen for their 
leadership qualities and, most importantly, Spanish literacy.106 They worked with local 
attorneys—often provincial tinterillos who lacked formal legal training, but were familiar 
with the laws—to press their claims, resist revistas, and obtain legal guarantees from the 
state.     
Mounting rural unrest coincided with increasing strife between Liberals and 
Conservatives in the exclusive arena of national politics.  Across Latin America, the 
liberal-conservative split centered on church-state relations, the degree of state 
intervention in the national economy, and centralized versus federated political systems.  
In Bolivia, both political grouping initially supported centralism, free-market economic 
policies, and private property.107  It was ultimately the question of how to define the 
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peace after the War of the Pacific that distinguished the two ideological tendencies and 
led to their crystallization into distinct political parties in 1880, the Liberals and the 
Constitutionalists. The conservative Constitutionalists, based in Sucre and led by the 
traditional silver-mining oligarchy, called for a quick peace to reestablish overland trade 
routes. The La Paz Liberals, on the other hand advocated allying with Peru to regain the 
coastal territories that Bolivia had lost. As conservatives occupied the presidential palace 
and dominated parliament during the 1880s and 1890s, deeper distinctions emerged 
between the parties. Liberals began calling for a decentralized federal government, 
electoral reform, and social progress.  
The emergence of the two-party system coincided with the arrival of new 
intellectuals trends, primarily from Europe. Positivism was undoubtedly the most 
influential to arrive.108 The philosophy, developed by French intellectual Auguste Comte, 
posited that society, just as nature, evolved according to verifiable natural laws. 
Eschewing metaphysics, superstition, and unverifiable knowledge for scientific 
rationality, positivism was especially popular among secular-mined liberal intellectuals 
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such as Agustín Aspiazu and Benjamín Fernández.  And as positivism grew in popularity, 
science replaced religion as the source of legitimate authority in republican society—as 
evinced by the rapid proliferation of scientific societies in the last quarter of the 
century.109 Historian Marie Danielle Demalas demonstrates that this period also marred 
the arrival of Darwin’s theory of evolution, but more influential were popular theories of 
social evolution developed by Herbert Spencer and E.B. Tylor.110 They posited 
progressive model of human evolution, one beginning with “savagery,” followed by 
“barbarity,” and culminating in the final stage of human development, “civilization.”111  
This final stage of human evolution was, of course, synomous with contemporary 
Western European and North American civilizavion, and it was widely understood that 
the so-called “primitive” peoples of Africa or Latin America occupied an earlier stage of 
human evolution.  These ideas provided the foundation for the scientific theories of race 
and human difference that would greatly impact creole perceptions of indigenous peoples 
as Indian-state relations became increasingly strained in the following decades. 
In their bid to dislodge the Constitutionalists, Liberals sought to rekindle the 
indigenous-creole alliance that had been so successful in toppling the Melgarejo regime 
decades prior.  Across the highland departments of La Paz, Potosi, and Oruro, a broad 
grassroots movement was arising in the countryside as apoderados resisted hacienda 
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expansion by protesting revistas, acquiring colonial titles to disputed lands, and 
expanding networks of activists.112   One of the most prominent leaders of this movement 
was Pablo Zárate Willka, a literate Aymara comunario who became a popular and indeed 
powerful indigenous caudillo.  Zárate not only built a following among altiplano 
comunarios, but he also forged alliances with prominent Liberals, including Jóse Manuel 
Pando, a popular congressman and leader of the party. Following their electoral defeat in 
1896, Liberals realized that the only way to oust the Conservatives would be through 
military force. Hoping to ensure a decisive victory, Liberal leaders sought an alliance 
with highland communities—many of which were growing increasingly belligerent in the 
face of liberal land divestiture policies.  Pando appealed to Zárate with a promise to 
abrogate the land privatization laws of the 1870s and 1880s in exchange for indigenous 
support in campaign. Seeking to restore communal territories, Aymara communities 
across the altiplano joined Willka’s militia and fought alongside the Liberal army in the 
Federal War of 1898-99. 
Once the Liberals prevailed in 1899, however, the divergent interests of this 
interethnic alliance revealed a stark contrast in their visions for social and political 
change.  Liberal leaders reneged on their promise to restore communal properties. The 
ascendant paceño elite had staked their fortunes on acquisition of communal lands. The 
shift in the national economy from the Potosí-based silver mines to the Oruro-based tin 
mines created a new demand for agrarian goods and swung the axis of agricultural 
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production away from Sucre and towards La Paz. The privatization and subsequent 
acquisition of communal lands thus offered both wealth and status.  To discredit his 
Indian allies, President Pando accused Zárate and his lieutenants of fomenting race war, 
citing events in Mohoza, where an Aymara militia massacred a detachment of Liberal 
soldiers in February 1899.113 The accusations renewed fears of race war and turned the 
public against the Aymara militias.114 
 
Illustration 4:  Aymara guerrillas who fought alongside the Liberal Army in the 1898-99 
Federal War.  Zárate Willka may be the figure in the center.115    
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Though the motives underlying the Mohoza massacre remain unclear, the 
subsequent trail of Zárate and his followers revealed that indigenous participation in the 
war was motivated by an alternative vision of popular liberalism, one that was 
incompatible with creole visions of modern nationhood. 116  The Bolivian government 
charged 288 defendants, Zárate principle among them, with various crimes related to the 
Mohoza massacre.  The trial was a public spectacle that dragged on for two years in 
various venues across the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro. Depositions from 
the Zárate and other indigenous defendants showed that they were driven not only by 
territorial restitution, but also by visions of a new federal republic wherein indigenous 
people enjoyed communal autonomy and social equality. Zárate and his principal 
lieutenants were found guilty and hanged. The remaining defendants served lengthy 
prison sentences.  But their aspirations lived on in the memory of “el temible Vilka” as 
the indigenous political movements widened in the twentieth century.117    
 
THE “INDIAN PROBLEM” AND THE CACIQUES APODERADOS, 1899-1932 
The first decades of the twentieth century marked a new era of national 
consolidation and state building during which rising creole anxieties about the so-called 
“Indian problem” and mounting rural mobilization contoured indigenous-state relations.  
                                                 
116 For more on the trials, see: Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in 
the Andes, 1810-1910 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); See also Forrest Hylton, 
“Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian Communities, the Federal War of 1899, and the Regeneration of 
Bolivia” (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 2010).  In terms of “popular liberalism” more broadly, 
see Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995) and Guy P. C. Thomson and David G. LaFrance, Patriotism, Politics, 
and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
117 Forrest Hylton, “Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian Communities, the Federal War of 1899, and the 




After the Federal War of 1898-99, Liberals suppressed the apoderados movement with 
the Mohoza trails and the subsequent execution of Zárate Willka and imprisonment of 
other highland indigenous leaders.  Creole fears of race war nevertheless lingered and, in 
subsequent decades, increasing rural to urban migration, scientific theories of race, and a 
marked resurgence of rural resistance only exacerbated those fears. As Marxism, 
indigenismo, and nationalism arrived in the first decades of the century, reform-minded 
intellectuals, labor activists, and politicians began to reimagine Bolivian society and role 
of the Indians in it. By the eve of the Chaco war in 1932, howevr, society was fragmented 
by class and ethnicity and the postcolonial order was in crisis.    
The liberal era marked an unprecedented period of state consolidation, economic 
growth, and social reform, carried out first by the Liberal party from 1899 to 1920, and 
then under the aegis of the Republicans until the 1930s.  After the Federal War, Liberals 
moved the national capital to La Paz where they centralized state power despite their 
earlier commitments to Federalism.  A strong central state was necessary, Pando and 
others Liberal ideologues reasoned, in order to successfully modernize the country.  At 
the vanguard of the new liberal order was a group of mestizo and creole intellectuals, 
statesmen, and entrepreneurs who saw themselves as the harbingers of progress.  Tin 
would provide the motor for economic growth and social modernization.  They oversaw 
the construction of railroad lines linking expanding commercial markets to international 
ports, aggressively promoted land privatization, accelerated hacienda expansion, 
welcomed foreign investment capital, and abetted the consolidation of the tin-based 
mono-export economy.  
Heralding a new era of export-led growth and social modernization, the Liberals 




and development. The precise nature of the Indian problem changed over time, ebbing 
and flowing with evolutions in race science, shifting constructions of indigenous alterity, 
and demographic change.  Enduring at the heart of the issue was how to reconcile a vast 
indigenous majority perceived as racially inferior and culturally backwards with universal 
standards of modernity founded upon North Atlantic standards of progress.  True, the 
Indian problem had been a prevalent concern among political leaders since the foundation 
of the republic. As they set about consolidating a new modernizing state, creole 
politicians and intellectuals generally identified Indians as an impediment to progress.  
Commenting on the 1900 census—which reaffirmed Bolivia’s unchanging demographic 
reality—the prominent liberal intellectual and statesman, Manuel Vicente Ballivian 
lamented, “if there had been a retarding cause in our civilization, it is due to the 
indigenous race, essentially refractory to any innovation or to any progress, given that it 
had refused and refused tenaciously to accept any customs that have not been transmitted 
by tradition from its remote ancestors.”118  
Racial hierarchies, which had long been relatively fluid, hardened in the wake of 
the Federal War.  This was due, in no small part, to the highly-publicized Mohoza trials, 
which cast the Aymara in particular as a brutal and savage race.119  But it also resulted 
from the growing influence of European race science.  Historian Marta Irurozqui divides 
early twentieth-century racial thought into two distinct camps.120  The first tended to  
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Illustration 5:  Example of early twentieth century physical anthropology and racial 
thought in Bolivia.121 
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emphasize brutality, ignorance, and criminality as essential characteristics of the Indian 
race. It included Gabriel René Moreno, David Sanchez Bustamante, Bautista Saavedra, 
and other intellectuals who came of age in the last decades of the nineteenth century.  
They tended to subscribe to the classical evolutionary paradigms developed by Herbert 
Spenser and later E.B. Tylor, which were arriving from Great Britain and Chile.  Viewed 
through the lens of social evolutionism, Indians and mestizos were inherently inferior, 
occupying a lower level of human evolution.    
Another block of creole thinkers eschewed prevailing currents of European race 
science, locating racial difference not necessarily in biology, but in Bolivia’s physical 
geography.  While not disregarding notions of inherent biological difference, they 
accounted the uncivilized state of the Indians in the Andean landscape and subscribed to 
theories of racial degeneration and neo-Lamarckian notions of the inheritance of applied 
characteristics. While biologists, physicians, academics, and policymakers in Europe and 
the United States had generally accepted natural selection as the dominant evolutionary 
paradigm by the early twentieth century, Lamarckian perspectives prevailed as an 
influential evolutionary framework in much of Latin America well into the twentieth 
century—despite the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1905.  In accounting for the 
failure of Darwinian paradigms to take hold in Latin America, historian Nancy Leys 
Stepan is quick to point out that science was not ignorant, backward, or naïve.122  Rather 
local biologists, social scientists, and policymakers selectively drew from competing 
evolutionary paradigms emanating from Western Europe and North America and 
interpreted them in accordance with their own social, historical, and cultural 
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circumstances.  To reform-minded statesmen, politicians, and intellections Lamarckian 
evolutionary paradigms underscored the improvability of the Indians, while at the same 
time reaffirming their own racial supremacy.   
It was Alcides Arguedas and Franz Tamayo, two towering paceño intellectuals, 
who framed the Indian problem most prominently for liberal-minded policymakers.  
During the first decades of the century, Arguedas and Tamayo produced an influential 
body of ethnographic and sociological knowledge on Indians and their rural environment 
that literary scholar, Josefa Salmon argues revealed more about the creoles themselves 
than the Indians they studied.123  Both situated the Indian problem squarely within the 
physical geography and specific historical trajectory of the republic.  In his most famous 
work, Pueblo enfermo, for example, Arguedas provided a vicious commentary on 
Bolivian society, employing the metaphor of social illness to account for the country’s 
continued economic backwardness. The book spared no sector of Bolivian society, 
creoles were cast as corrupt and motivated solely by class interest.  Indians, while racially 
inferior, emerged as a noble savage, which, he explains, suffered at the hands of the worst 
sector of Bolivian society, rural cholos and urban mestizos.  Tamayo similarly rose up in 
defense of the noble savage, and though he was more merciful on mestizos and cholos, he 
still cast them as the enemy.  As Brooke Larson argues, together, they fashioned a “cult 
of antimestizaje,” disparaging cholos while providing a defense of Indians, situating rural 
folk in their “natural” environment and mapping their role in the nation as an agrarian 
workforce.124   
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Inspired by such lines of thinking, early twentieth-centry Liberal reforms 
introduced a careful series of measures intended to “improve” and “defend” the “Indian 
race” while constraining indigenous political participation.  President Ismael Montes 
introduced compulsory military service in 1907. Historian James Dunkerkly notes that 
“the rapid buildup and professionalization of the army was directed primarily toward the 
repression of the very peasantry which populated its lower ranks.”125 Yet undergirding 
the draft was a civilizing mission, evidenced by the literacy training and primary 
education courses created for Indian recruits.126   The government also introduced the 
prestación vital, a compulsory draft labor project that put Indians to work on road 
construction and infrastructure projects deemed vital to national development.  Yet the 
most ambitious of Liberal civilizing projects was indigenous education.  Tied to a broader 
commitment to universal education and inspired by the urgent need to transform Indians 
from “dead weight” into productive albeit unequal members of society, Liberals 
introduced the first indigenous education initiative in 1905.  The foundation of this effort 
were the escuelas ambulantes, mobile teaching teams that traveled to haciendas and 
communities where they taught Spanish literacy, basic arithmetic, and Christian 
morality.127  Such efforts, the reformers believed, would “civilize” Indians and prepare 
them for the responsibilities of republican citizenship perhaps someday in the future.   
Creole racial anxieties also arose from increasing rural-to-urban migration.  The 
period 1905-1915 marked the second great wave of highland hacienda expansion, 
brought about by the completion of railroad lines linking Bolivia’s expanding internal 
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markets to Pacific ports.128 Across the altiplano and eastern valleys, creoles began buying 
up land for commercial agriculture.  Most of the buyers hailed from the liberal elite, who 
used their political power and social clout to acquire communal lands.  Among those 
benefitting from land privatization laws were President Pando and his successor, Ismael 
Montes, who subsequently became two of the largest land owners in Bolivia.129 As 
hacienda expansion divested peasants of their ancestral lands, some stayed on the 
haciendas, becoming colonos, while others moved to the highland cities of Oruro, Potosí, 
and La Paz to try their hand in the free labor market.  It was a period of massive rural out-
migration and urban growth.  Between 1900 and 1930, the population of La Paz more 
than doubled, from 72,000 to 152,000. Similarly, the population of Oruro increased from 
13,600 in 1914 to 45,000 inhabitants by 1937.130  
Rural migration transformed cities from centers of creole civilization into vibrant 
hybrid spaces.131  By 1920, cholos constituted the majority of most highland cities.  In La 
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Paz and Oruro, most cholos were of Aymara descent, who since having moved to the 
city, adopted western styles of dress and learned Spanish.  They formed the backbone of 
the commercial economy and the small but growing manufacturing sector. They worked 
as artisans, carpenters, shopkeepers, domestic servants, and factory workers. Before long, 
distinct social hierarchies developed within this growing population as they settled in 
such neighborhoods as San Pedro, Villa Victoria, Munaypata, and Achachacilla.  To be 
sure, migrants often maintained strong ties to the countryside, returning to their 
communities to visit friends and relatives and to celebrate prestes and other traditional 
civic and religious festivals. These growing rural-urban linkages provided crucial routes 
for Marxist and anarchist ideas to spread into the countryside as rural political action 
mounted in the 1920s and 1930s.132      
As cholos and Indians increasingly occupied urban spaces traditionally dominated 
by the creole elite, government authorities reaffirmed the spatial order of colonial racial 
hierarchies with segregation laws.  Brooke Larson argues that the creoles elite “tried to 
fashion an informal system of apartheid” during the first decades of the twentieth century, 
as hacienda expansion continued apace with urban migration and increasing rural 
mobilization.133  With little exception, racial segregation was not national policy 
introduced and enforced by the central government; rather it was manifest in various 
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legal and extralegal forms in specific local contexts by municipal ordinances and 
quotidian social practices. Recent research reveals not only how widespread segregation 
was during the first decades of the century, but also the divergent ways in which local 
laws formalized racial apartheid.  Historian Waskar Ari found that between 1925 and 
1932 municipal, regional, and national authorities introduced no less than thirty-five 
segregation laws.134 In La Paz, for instance, municipal laws forbid Indians from entering 
public spaces such as parks and plazas, and to board street cars.  On the occasion of the 
centennial celebration in 1925, President Bautista Saavedra prohibited Indians from 
entering the central plazas of La Paz. In Oruro, the municipal government went as far as 
to prohibit Indians from entering the city dressed in traditional attire.135 Such laws 
underscore the ways in which both legal codes and cultural practices contributed to the 
construction of racialized identities.   
Municipal authorities also performed spectacular displays of violence to maintain 
social order. Martin Conway, a British explorer who arrived in Bolivia in 1899 for a 
mountaineering expedition in the Cordillera Real, was impressed at the creole elite’s 
ability to maintain minority rule.  His memoirs reveal that he was particularly struck by 
the public execution of an Indian convicted of murder.  It was not so much the execution 
that shocked him, but the coordinated effort to sow terror into the urban Indian 
population that accompanied it.  Before the execution, police fanned out across the city to 
round up all of the Indians they could find, assembled them in the Plaza San Pedro, and 
forced them to witness the execution. After the firing squad carried out its grisly task, 
Conroy recalled that the “body was left for many hours where it fell, and the Indians were 
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encouraged to go forward to inspect it, the object of the whole ghastly performance being 
to strike terror into them.”136 Such spectacular forms of violence projected creole power 
while at the same time revealing the weak coercive capacity of the state.    
In the countryside, where the vast majority of the population was concentrated, it 
was hacendados and their majordomos who carried out the quotidian social practices 
essential to maintaining minority rule.  As the hacienda frontier cut across the western 
highlands at an increasing pace, indigenous communities were swallowed up en masse by 
the expanding estates.  Driven by fraud and coercion, the acquisition of ayllu lands 
fragmented rural communities.  Increasing numbers of comunarios migrated to cities, 
others stayed on their land, and others still waged campaigns for territorial restitution.  
Those who chose to stay were granted usufruct rights to their family’s substance plot, or 
sayaña, in exchange for labor.  Colonos were required to till the fields, maintain the 
crops, tend to livestock, and harvest the crops.  They were also required to perform 
domestic chores in the hacienda house, or in the city, where most large estate owners 
spent the majority of their time.  In addition to labor, colonos were also bound by tribute 
obligations in the form of goods.  They had to remit a proportion of their own harvests, 
along with wool, meat, and eggs from their livestock.  Failure to meet tributary 
obligations was met with harsh punishment—which was most commonly meted out by 
cholo majordomos demonized by Arguedas, Tamayo, and other early indigenista writers.  
In provinces where hacienda expansion was less aggressive, and where free communities 
remained, authority rested with the provincial corregidor.137  In sum, though the precise 
nature of highland haciendas varied widely, it was an incredibly oppressive seigniorial 
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regime—perhaps the most exploitive in all of the Americas—and provided the coercive 
machinery not only to extract labor and goods, but to maintain social order. 
Despite their best efforts, Liberals were largely powerless to contain the rural 
insurgency sparked by the second wave of hacienda expansion.  The government had 
temporarily suppressed rural insurgency with the Mohoza trails, the execution of Zárate 
Willka, and the imprisonment of highland indigenous leaders. When expanding railroad 
networks initiated land grabs in previously unaffected regions during the 1910s, however, 
rural community leaders launched a renewed struggle against land divestiture.  The 
pioneering research of Roberto Choque, Esteban Ticona, and the Taller de Historia Oral 
Andina (THOA) revealed that Santos Marka T’ula and Nina Quispe, both Aymara 
community leaders, identified themselves as Caciques Apoderados, and set out to forge a 
national movement for indigenous rights.  Similar to the Apoderados before them, this 
new movement drew on colonial and republican legal precedents to contest liberal land 
divestiture policies in republican institutions.138  One of the most striking characteristics 
of the Caciques Apoderados movement was its expansive level of political 
coordination.139  Both Marka T’ula and Quispe forged a national network of indigenous 
activists that included local leaders from across the highlands.  They also benefited from 
the linkages forged as a result of increasing rural to urban migration.140  As anarchists, 
socialist, and syndicalist currents arrived in urban universities and rural mining camps 
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during the first decades of the century, they began to influence indigenous activists. In 
rural La Paz, the fledgling anarchist labor organization, the Federación Obrero Local 
(FOL) established relationships with notable cacique apoderados.141  The caciques 
apoderados also widened their demands, moving beyond land rights to embrace key 
issues of justice, discrimination, and education.   
The Caciques Apoderados tried to stop land divestiture by blocking revistas and 
sought to restitute usurped communal lands on established haciendas by petitioning local, 
regional, and national officials.  Many could read and write, and meticulously studied the 
law. They no longer relied on scribes, sympathetic urban attorneys, and provincial 
tinterillos to draft their legal petitions.  They recognized the power of the written word, 
and the need to master it in order to contest republican policies.  The also actively 
promoted Indian literacy by establish schools in rural communities.  While the state may 
have lacked a physical presence in most rural areas, it remained a potentially benevolent 
guardian of legal rights.142  Only when legal strategies failed did caciques turn to armed 
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insurgency, as illustrated by rebellions in Jesus de Machaca in 1921 and in Chayanta in 
1927.    
The cacique apoderados found tacit support in dissident politicians as rising intra-
elite strife weakened Liberal hegemony during the 1910s.  In 1914, reform-orientated 
elites rallied around Bautista Saavedra—the paceño attorney of Mohoza fame who had 
since become an influential congressman—to found the Partido Unión Republicana. The 
Republicans differed little from the Liberals. In fact, several members of the new party 
had formerly been prominent Liberals themselves, including former party boss and 
President, José Manuel Pando.  The Republicans represented the rising frustrations of 
with Liberal rule in general, and with its free-market economic policies and fraudulent 
electoral machine in particular.  Rather than a new political horizon, the Republicans 
called for a return to the original goals of the Liberal party, as articulated in its late-
nineteenth century charter.143  Nevertheless, the party did represent change, and as such, 
it attracted Bolivia’s nascent Marxist left, cholo artisans, and workers.  The cacique 
apoderados also supported the Republican Party. During the late 1910s, Saavedra 
provided legal counsel to Santos Marka T’ula and other caciques, and he even supported 
legislation ending the fraudulent sale of communal lands.  In July 1920, when Saavedra 
led the Republican Revolution, ending two decades of Liberal rule, he did so with the 
support of many highland communities.144     
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A closer examination of the Republican Era nevertheless reveals that Saavedra’s 
policies were fraught with inconsistencies.145  Even while introducing a law that limited 
the ability of creoles to usurp communal lands, he ordered the massacre of upstart 
indigenous communities in Jesus de Machaca and several other ayllus in the La Paz 
province of Ingavi in 1921.  He recognized the need for indigenous integration while 
simultaneously enforcing urban segregation laws.  He advocated the “cholification” of La 
Paz’s indigenous population, while at the same time subscribing to degenerative theories 
of racial mixture.  Such a posture of coercion and consent, of rapprochement and 
repression underscores the contradictory logic of Bolivia’s evolving postcolonial order.  
The brutal suppression of rural uprisings at Jesus de Machaca in 1921, and again, at 
Chayanta in 1927 revealed not simply the limits of Republican sympathy for the caciques 
apoderados, but the violent nature of creole minority rule as it struggled to contain rural 
insurgency.   
The inconsistent logic of the Republic era became especially salient in creole 
proposals for indigenous education.  Education and literacy were paramount among the 
demands of the cacique apoderados, who continuously petitioned government authorities 
for teachers and schools.  During the 1920s, with hacienda expansion largely halted by 
Saavedra, education became the unifying cry of the caciques apoderados.  In 1919, 
Saavedra, still a congressman, sponsored legislation to create separate rural schools for 
Indians.  The proposal differed markedly from earlier Liberal proposals for indigenous 
education.  As part of their pledge of universal education, the Liberals had created teacher 
training schools (escuelas normales rurales) in the countryside to teach Spanish despite 
                                                 





opposition from hacendados who feared that education could upset their fragile hold on 
power.  Motivated by the threat of rural insurgency on the one hand, and the need to 
transform the “dead weight” of the indigenous population into a productive labor force on 
the other, Saavedra linked education to economic progress by proposing separate Indian 
boarding schools that eschewed universal education, emphasizing instead agrarian 
technical training, Spanish literacy, and western civilization. 146 Emphasizing Indians’ 
natural relationship to the pristine albeit unforgiving altiplano, rural education was 
intended to civilize Indians and insert them into the nation as agrarian producers while 
simultaneously maintaining their political exclusion.147   
Rural education fell into a diverse matrix of creole proposals aimed at the 
resolution of the Indian problem.  Many national elites doubted the efficacy of state-led 
civilization initiatives—particularly those who continued to subscribe to biological 
theories of race.  In one particularly pessimistic example, Agustin Iturricha, a prominent 
Sucre Liberal, pondered “Como se puede incorporar al indio a la vida de civilización si 
sociológicamente, psicológicamente y moralmente es imposible?”148 In addition to 
education, national elites also promoted European immigration in an effort to “whiten” 
the population through miscegenation, but the immigrants and their ideal “racial stock” 
never arrived in the numbers required.149  Though, in Bolivia, eugenics did not enjoy the 
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widespread popularity among social scientists and statesmen as it did in Argentina and 
Brazil, the global racial hygiene movement had several adherents by the 1930s.150  As 
historian Ann Zulowski demonstrates, however, Bolivia eugenicists fixated on women’s 
health, morality, and reproduction rather than racial improvement.151  This is not to say 
that Indians were not the focus of eugenics policies, as they certainly were; but it seems 
that most eugenics-orientated social legislation was primarily directed towards women, 
the family, and reinforcing traditional gender norms.152  
As elites continued to debate indigenous education into the 1930s, communities 
began initiating their own grassroots education efforts across the countryside.  The 
movement started in a remote altiplano village called Warisata, where Avelino Siñani, a 
self-taught literate Aymara comunario, began teaching his fellow comunarios how to read 
and write.  The effort gained the attention of the progressive creole educator, Elizardo 
Pérez. One of the first graduates of the National Teachers Academy (founded in 1909), 
Pérez was inspired by the international indigenista movement and interested in rural 
education.  In 1931 Pérez and Siñani established the escuela unica at Warisata, a radically 
distinct rural education initiative that emphasized Aymara cultural traditions and social 
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norms. They promoted ethnic rejuvenation through Spanish literacy, valorizing the ayllu, 
community, and language in the process. This model that emerged at Warisata was soon 
copied and implemented in other parts of the highlands as escuelas nucleares rurales—at 
Vacas in Cochabamba and Caiza D in Potosí, for example.  In subsequent decades, the 
state would gradually co-opt these grassroots efforts as the foundation for one the most 
ambitious rural education initiatives in the hemisphere.153 
It was during this time when a younger generation of reform-minded creoles 
revisited the Indian problem through the novel lens of critical Marxism. The ideas of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky arrived by way of Argentina, Chile, and Peru during 
first decades of the twentieth century.154  They were popular among workers, urban 
intellectuals, and university students in La Paz, Sucre, and Cochabamba, and in the 
mining camps around Oruro and Potosi.155  By the 1920s, Marxism had largely displaced 
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the positivism that had hitherto dominated Bolivia social thought. Historian Guillermo 
Francovich writes, “las obras de Lenin, Bujarin, Plejanov, etc., circulaban por todas 
partes en ediciones populares hechas en la Argentina y en Chile, recibiendo la misma 
adhesión que las de Comte, Renán, Spencer, etc., cuarenta años atrás.”156 Also popular in 
Bolivia were the works of Argentine Sociologist, Jose Ingenieros, Chilean labor activist, 
Luis Emilio Recabarren, and Jose Carlos Mariátegui and Victor Haya de la Torre from 
neighboring Peru.157  Coupled with prevailing constructions of race founded on telluric 
and neo-Lamarckian ideas, the structuralism underlying Marxist dialectics offered a new 
perspective on the Indian problem.  Some began to see it not in biological, but it 
environmental and structural terms.   
These concepts were at the center of another ideological current that was growing 
in influence in Bolivia called indigenismo.  A creole ideology that sought the 
glorification and revitalization of indigenous populations, indigenismo is rooted in the 
protectionist legal culture of the colonial state. 158 After independence, it emerged in 
distinct republican contexts as creole leaders embraced positive aspects of pre-Hispanic 
civilization as unique national symbols.159  Artists and writers identified Indians as the 
foundation for distinct national literatures, some even writing in native languages.  In 
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Bolivia, literary indigenismo dates to independence with the Quechan poet, Juan 
Wallparrimachi, and later in the century, with Nataniel Aguirre’s Juan de la Rosas or 
Emeterio Villamil de Rada’s Legua de Adan.  The genre grew in the twentieth century, as 
evidenced by the popularity of Alcides Arguedas’ Raza de Bronce.  It was also during 
this period that indigenismo began to orientate social scientific knowledge—Bautista 
Saavedra and Manuel Rigoberto Paredes stand as prominent examples—and pedagogy, 
demonstrated most saliently by Franz Tamayo and, later, Elizardo Pérez.160  
One of the primary means through which reform-minded creoles entering public 
life in the turbulent 1920s and 1930s were introduced to the idea was the famed Peruvian 
Marxist intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui—particularly his landmark, Siete ensayos de 
interpretación de la realidad peruana (1928).161 His ideas were popularized in Bolivia by 
Gustavo Adolfo Navarro who, writing as Tristán Marof, published La Justicia del Inca 
and La Tragedia del Altiplano (1934) to bring attention to the plight of the colono.  His 
call for “tierras al indio, minas al estado” precipitated the rising political generation.  For 
many reform-minded intellectuals, indigenismo provided not only a unique symbol of 
national identity, but a new perspective on the relationship between Indian and the nation.  
During the 1920s, these two currents, Marxism and Indigenismo, were also 
infused with nationalism. Though nationalism and liberalism are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive ideologies, the former emerged in Bolivia as a reaction to the latter—
particularly in the context of the early twentieth century, with the centennial celebrations, 
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the Mexican Revolution.  Though nationalism was articulated in a variety of ways 
(indigenismo among them), economic nationalism was the particular thread that emerged 
in the 1920s and predominated for decades. Economic nationalism represented a rejection 
of the unfettered free market policies and export led growth model embraced by a 
generation of liberal statesmen, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs.  Particularly when 
viewed through critical Marxist paradigms, liberal policies had resulted in the 
concentration of resources, land, and capital in the hands of small elite while the masses 
suffered poverty, hunger, and destitution.  Bolivia’s tin-based monoculture economy 
provides a particular salient example of such a phenomenon.  Seventy-five percent of 
Bolivia’s tin—and export revenue—was owned by just three individuals, Félix Avelino 
Aramayo, Mauricio Hochschild, and Simon Patiño.  While all Bolivian citizens, their 
profits ended up in foreign banks, with very little being remitted to the state thanks to a 
lax tax code and the enormous influence they commanded of their Liberal, Conservative, 
and Republican friends and colleagues.  To counter the disproportionate influence these 
individuals exercised on the national government and economy, the emerging nationalists 
advocated trade protectionism, industrialization, increased attention to social welfare, and 
the reversion of natural resources to the state. 
By the end of the decade, all three of these currents had become manifest in the 
national political scene, shaping dominant issues of national development and the Indian 
problem.  In 1927, two young radicals from Cochabamba, Augusto Céspedes and Carlos 
Montenegro joined more seasoned politicians to found the Partido Nacionalista (PN). 
Indicating the rising influence of economic nationalism, they advocated increased 




and more progressive social policies (though it did not mention the Indian problem).162  
The party attracted a host of reform-minded intellectuals and statesmen from across the 
ideological spectrum—including Saturnino Rodrigo, Alberto Mendez Lopez, Victor Paz 
Estenssoro, Ricardo Anaya, and José Antonio Arze—who would fundamentally reshape 
national politics in succeeding decades.163  Meanwhile, the Partido Socialista (PS) 
attracted more radical social reformers from the left, including Roberto Hinojosa and 
Gustavo A. Navarro (aka Tristán Marof) who, in the years that followed, would meld 
Marxist and indigenismo paradigms in their political position.164  The great depression, 
which did not hit Bolivia especially hard until 1931, only served to further entrench these 
ideological currents in Bolivian political life.  A new era was indeed dawning, one that 
would a have profound impact on national development and Indian-state relations in the 
decades to come.  
 
THE CHACO WAR AND THE RISING TIDE FOR REFORM, 1932-1952 
By the 1930s, Bolivia’s postcolonial order was teetering on the brink of collapse.  
Worker and peasant mobilization was mounting.  The great depression had revealed the 
shortcomings of the export-led growth model.  And elite hegemony was fracturing with 
new ideological and political currents.  The Chaco War (1932-1935) would push the 
postcolonial republic into the historical abyss, initiating an unprecedented period of 
political change, social reform, and grassroots mobilization that would fundamentally 
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transform the status of indigenous Bolivians.  Following Bolivia’s defeat to Paraguay in 
1935, the question of indigenous integration became tied into broader debates over 
national unity and economic development.  Indigenismo, Marxism, and nationalism, 
which began to influence national politics the previous decades, provided the ideological 
underpinning for an emerging left.  In the post-Chaco era, these new ideological currents 
would meld to provide the foundation for new political groupings.  Between 1932 and 
1952, indigenous integration became one of the most pressing issues facing a rising 
generation of reform-minded politicians.  How could the republic modernize without 
national unity?   
The Chaco War marked a major turning point in Bolivian history.  Fought with 
Paraguay over the disputed Chaco Boreal territory, the War proved disastrous for Bolivia.  
Despite advantages in manpower, armament, resources, and logistics, Bolivia suffered a 
humiliating defeat.  Fifty thousand soldiers were killed and another 21,000 taken 
prisoner—a total of 61,000 casualties in a country of only three million.165  Bolivia also 
lost an eighth of its national territory.  Many contemporaries saw the War as nothing 
more than President Daniel Salamanca’s desperate effort to maintain oligarchic privilege.  
Others perceived it as an imperial conflict between Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell 
over the purportedly oil-rich territory.  Regardless of its causes, the War produced a 
pervasive sense of national disillusionment among Bolivia’s small but growing middle 
class and enflamed growing unrest among workers, miners, and indigenous peasants.166 
                                                 





Not only was the Chaco War the most important factor in forging a modern Bolivian 
nationalism, but it marked the dawn of a new era of political and social reform.167    
The war left an especially contested legacy for indigenous veterans.  On the front, 
the military hierarchy mirrored the caste divisions that characterized postcolonial society.  
Indians served as the front-line solders and subsequently sustained the highest rate of 
casualties. Most were conscripts who knew little, if any, Spanish.  They succumbed to the 
unforgiving heat of the Chaco, suffering from heat stroke, exhaustion, and, most 
commonly, disease.  With the cessation of hostilities, some veterans returned to their 
communities or haciendas. Others, refusing to return to the exploitive seigniorial regime, 
migrated to La Paz or Cochabamba seeking employment.168  Many brought their firearms 
with them.  Fighting for what had long been an abstract and exclusionary entity called 
Bolivia, indigenous soldiers developed a sense of nationalism.  The reproduction of 
postcolonial caste hierarchies within the ranks, moreover, ha made especially salient their 
status as second class citizens, confirming for some and revealing for others a condition 
they shared with other ethnic groups.  Many colonos and comunarios felt that their 
sacrifices in the Chaco entitled them to land, to justice, to citizenship.  Their experience 
would shape their interaction with the state, as a new generation of indigenous activists 
redoubled the efforts initiated decades prior.   
Post-Chaco rural mobilization varied widely. In Cochabamba, syndicalism 
established its deepest roots.  Colonos in Ucureña organized the first rural sindicates as 
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early as 1936.169 On the altiplano, colonos and comunarios revived the pre-Chaco 
networks.  Andrés Marka T’ula, son of the prominent Cacique Apoderado, was among 
those who sought to revive the national network of rural activists that his father had 
forged before the War.170  Although he seems to have succeeded, the post-Chaco network 
paled in comparison to its previous size and coordination.  Historian Waskar Ari found 
that many of those formally involved in the cacique apoderados movement of the 1920s, 
joined a burgeoning network of Aymara and Quechua activists affiliated with the 
Alcaldes Mayores Particulares (AMP). The AMP movement was founded in 1936 by 
Gregorio Titiriku, a literate Aymara activist from the Lake Titicaca region who had 
participated in the caciques apoderados movement in the 1920s.171  He and his followers 
promoted ethnic rejuvenation through literacy and spirituality.   Drawing on colonial laws 
of two republics, they sought to establish an independent indigenous nation.  A national 
network consisting of 480 cells, the AMPs participated in the grassroots rural education 
movement, establishing several escualas rurales particulares (rural private school) similar 
to the Warisata model.172       
 Indigenous Bolivians were not alone in their frustration.  Appalled at the 
racialized hierarchy of the military and the disproportionate slaughter of Indians, the 
workers and middle-class professionals who had served as lower-ranking officers, 
recognized that they shared much in common with indigenous Bolivians.  Furthermore, 
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the failure in leadership, the enormous casualty count, and the loss of territory to 
Paraguay caused many who previously supported the traditional parties to question the 
inherent inequalities of Bolivian society and the nature of national politics.  Following the 
war, a profound sense of malaise settled over a broken and disgraced nation.   From this 
malaise arose an entire generation of reform-minded political activists, intellectuals, and 
politically-conscious university students—the “Generación del Chaco”—who drew from 
a variety of ideological currents to remake Bolivia in subsequent decades.173   
Rising frustration among workers, miners, and the middling sectors of society 
crystalized in a host of new political grouping in the post-Chaco period.  Alongside the 
veterans, urban merchants, industrial workers, artisans, and university students joined the 
emerging political parties and labor confederations.  The radical left, which had been 
persecuted and exiled during the war, enjoyed a marked resurgence.  In 1934, Tristán 
Marof—famous for his credo “tierras al indio, minas al estado”—and José Aguirre 
Gainsborg founded the first revolutionary leftist party of the post-Chaco era, the Partido 
Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers Party, POR).  Drawing inspiration from 
the APRA in neighboring Peru, the party advocated “forming a new Bolivia” by 
nationalizing Bolivia’s natural resources and enacting agrarian reform.174  Its ranks soon 
swelled with workers from the recently-organized national labor union, the 
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB).  
The white-collar workers, teachers, attorneys, artisans, and urban professionals of 
the middle class on the other hand gravitated to a new moderate leftist party, the 
Confederación Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Confederation, CSB).  Founded in 
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October 1935 by Carlos Montenegro, José Tamayo, and others from the pre-War Partido 
Nationalista, the CSB hoped to appeal to the middle-class professionals and veterans.  
Deriding the traditional parties for their irresponsible management of the national 
economy and disastrous conduct of the war, they demanded increased state intervention 
in the economy, the nationalization of the oil fields, and protective tariffs to encourage 
domestic industry.175  The party also supported women’s suffrage, a labor code, universal 
education, and public health. Though the CSB advocated indigenous integration and 
recognized the need to abolish ponguaje, it did not advocate full-scale agrarian reform.176      
The rising tide of reform appealed to a cadre of reform minded military officers 
who enjoyed popularity as a result of their leadership during the war.  In May 1936, 
following an unprecedented general strike, progressive military reformers ousted civilian 
interim president, José Tejada Sorzano. Supported by the middle class, labor, and 
veterans, first Coronel David Toro and then Major Germán Busch launched an 
unprecedented populist experiment.  Military socialism, as its progenitors dubbed it, was 
advocated for the expansion of the state’s role in the national economy and for ensuring 
the social wellbeing of the population.  During their three years in power, they introduced 
a new labor code, public health initiatives, and social welfare laws.  They also 
nationalized Standard Oil’s natural gas and petroleum fields, creating Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), a state corporation to ensure that the wealth 
generated would benefit the nation. They carried out their reformist agenda under the 
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leitmotif of national unity—a concern which hinged to no small extent on the Indian 
problem and related issues of land, citizenship, and justice.177  
One of the most significant achievements of the military socialists was the 1938 
constitutional convention.  Seeking to promote more progressive social legislation, 
political parties, labor unions, and university students all called constitutional reform.   
Toro’s acquiescence to social mobilization reflected not only the military socialists’ 
dedication to moderate reform, but also their desire to channel grassroots demands into 
orderly, state-led initiatives.178   Once the convention convened in La Paz in May 1938, 
the 122 delegates—most representing the reformist political currents of the day—took up 
a diversity of pressing issues, from state centralization to citizenship.  Yet none of the 
topics were as contested as those that dealt with land and Indians.179  Through the Indian 
problem turned up in discussions on citizenship, property rights, and the agrarian 
economy, it was the question of “Agrarian and Peasant Regime” where the most 
contentious proposals were deliberated.  In line with the idea that property must serve a 
social function, future MNR leader, Vctor Paz Estenssoro called for the partition of large, 
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unproductive estates among indigenous peasants and veterans.  Walter Guevara Arze, 
another future MNR leader, took an even more radical position, asserting that 
unproductive hacienda lands should be returned to indigenous communities.  He located 
the Indian problem not in biology, but in the socioeconomic structures maintained by the 
landed and mining elite.  Providing “backwards” Indians with land, education, and 
clothing would result in their “improvement” and gradual incorporation into republican 
nationhood.   
Although land reform ultimately failed, delegates did succeed in removing some 
existing legal barriers to indigenous citizenship. They guaranteed communal land rights, 
thus overturning the 1874 Ley de Exvinculación.  They also outlawed Indian servitude by 
stipulating that all workers must be paid for their labor.180  Though it would be decades 
before such guarantees were actually met, in the end, the 1938 charter provided the legal 
foundation for a modern welfare state.  It establishe social responsibility of property 
rights, increased the role of the state in the national economy, and established family, 
health, and social welfare laws that charged the government with maintaining the social 
wellbeing of its citizens.181  While the Indian problem would remain unresolved for the 
time being, the debates surrounding such issues as citizenship and land indicated the 
rising tide of reform sweeping over the nation and the widespread commitment not 
necessarily to racial equality, but to economic development and social modernization.  
Such sentiment perhaps helps explain why Busch ultimately delayed implementation of 
the constitution and why, after his mysterious suicide in 1939, the charter posed an 
enduring threat to the power of the landed and mining oligarchy.   
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The electoral contest of 1940 revealed the growing sentiment for social and 
political change in Bolivian society and marked a turning point in the balance of formal 
political power.  To counter the rising tide of reform, the oligarchy established an 
electoral coalition, La Concordancia, from the remnants of the Liberal and Republican 
parties.  This pact “marked the end of the political system which had ruled national life 
since 1880 and of the traditional intra-class party structure,” observes Herbert Klein, “and 
the real beginning of the class-oriented and socially disruptive political party structure 
based on the socio-economic reality of the nation.”182  The Concordancia backed 
conservative General Enrique Peñaranda for the presidency, while the left threw their 
support behind leftist independent and former student radical, José Antonio Arze.  
Though Arze lost the election, the fact that he won 10,000 votes (in a total electorate of 
58,000) startled the traditional elite.183 The outcome of the congressional elections was 
equally alarming, as several new deputies from both the radical and moderate left were 
elected.  Though the radials and the moderates were united in their commitment to the 
reforms instituted by Toro and Busch, they remained fundamentally divided on several 
issues which would distinguish them in the coming years.   
The early 1940s witnessed the emergence of the two most powerful popular 
parties of the era.  Energized by the outpouring of electoral support, Arze established the 
Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) in July 1940.  Not only was the Leninist 
orientation of the party apparent in its founding manifesto, but the document also 
revealed an unprecedented proposal for indigenous integration and social uplift 
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reminiscent of Mariátegui.184  The PIR fashioned itself as the representative “of the most 
oppressed classes” and its plan for bringing about a more just and equitable society 
consisted of undermining “Yankee imperialism” by nationalizing all natural resources 
and essential infrastructure; promoting domestic industry; and establishing a state export 
monopoly.185  Its social programs advocated gender equality, public health and sanitation 
initiatives, and universal education.  As for the Indian problem, Arze asserted that “the 
only real solution is Agrarian Revolution."186  Once given land and education, indigenous 
Bolivians would quickly insert themselves into national life.187 Together with its appeal 
to the radical left and labor, the PIR soon emerged as the most powerful political party in 
Bolivia.188    
The second major political force to emerge during this period was the MNR.  It 
was founded in November 1941, by the moderate block of congressional deputies led by 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Carlos Montenegro and Augusto Céspedes, their former 
colleagues in the PN and the PS who has since gone on to found the popular La Paz daily, 
La Calle.189  Founding members also included Hernán Siles, Walter Guevara Arze, and 
Alberto Mendoza López.  Montenegro and Céspedes embraced European fascism, 
manifest in the MNR commitment to establishing a welfare state, their support of the 
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Axis powers in Europe, and the blatant anti-Semitism that pervaded early MNR 
manifestos.   As some author points out, however, that it was the fascism of Mussolini’s 
Italy not of Hitler’s Third Reich.190   As for ideology, the MNR eschewed the dogmatic 
Marxism of the Leninist PIR and the Trotskyite POR, arguing that foreign theories in 
themselves were inadequate to explain Bolivia’s national reality.  They did not 
completely disavow Marxist paradigms, however. They adopted a structural 
interpretation of national history, rooted in Lenin’s theory of imperialism, to explaining 
Bolivia’s backwardness as a result of the “superestado mineral” that monopolized both 
the state and the nation’s finite natural resources for their own personal enrichment.  
The MNR’s concerns with the nation were economic before social and generally 
reformist rather than revolutionary.  While both the PIR and the POR demanded nothing 
less than the nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian reform, the MNR took a more 
moderate position.  Instead of nationalizing the tin mines, its 1942 manifesto called for 
“la subordinación absoluta de las grandes empresas que operan con el exterior al Estado 
Boliviano.”191  The party’s position on “el problema agrario indígena” was equally 
moderate.  Despite earlier commitments to agrarian reform expressed by Paz, Guevara, 
and Siles the, party did not officially endorse the measure—an indication of its desire to 
appeal to the moderate reformers in the middle class.  It recognized the need “incorporar 
a la vida nacional a los millones de campesinos marginados de ella.” It nevertheless 
stopped short of dismantling the socioeconomic system that would break down the 
barriers to citizenship, advocating instead “una ley que reglamente el trabajo del 
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campesino” that would guarantee basic rights to hacienda colonos.192  The MNR’s 
revolution rested not on the forced redistribution of wealth, but upon expanding the 
state’s role in both the economy and society.  
Alongside the social and political changes that were transpiring during the 1940, 
were important transformations occurring in social scientific thought that would 
eventually transform prevailing ideas of racial difference.  The biological assumptions 
underlying indigenous alterity and theories of racial degeneration were slowly under 
assault by progressive theories of human difference rooted in the culture concept.  
Resulting from the ethnographic insights of celebrated Austrian-American 
anthropologist, Franz Boas, cultural relativism provided a novel theory of human 
difference linked to a rejection of the classical evolution model that was especially 
prevalent in the English-speaking academy.193  Espoused by such thinkers as E.B. Tylor 
and Herbert Spencer in England and Lewis Henry Morgan in the U.S., it was widely 
understood that the so-called “primitive” peoples of Africa or Latin America occupied an 
earlier stage of human evolution.   At the heart of Boas rejection of this model was the 
culture concept itself.  As conceived of within the social evolutionists, culture was a 
singular concept, synonymous with civilization, something to be achieved. As George 
Stocking shows, Boas reframed the culture concept as intrinsic to all human civilization 
and thus multiple, arguing that what was understood as different stages of human 
evolution according to the progressive teleology advocated by the social evolution theory 
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were actually distinct, bordered albeit pourous “cultural groups” that needed to be studied 
objectively and ahistorically.194  Boasnian historicism undermined prevailing theories of 
social evolution and, for students such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, provided a 
new language to discuss human difference.  
Across Latin America, cultural relativism caused a reconsideration of the 
biological assumptions of social evolutionism, marking what many scholars had 
identified as the cultural turn of race in the region.195  Since at least the 1940s, 
progressive Bolivian intellectuals had been exposed to the concept through their 
engagement with Mexican and U.S. social science.  Popular journals as the Revista 
Mexicana de Sociología and América Indígena, which often published Bolivian social 
thinkers, also featured Manuel Gamio, Moisés Sáenz, Juan Comas and other Mexican 
academics who interpreted cultural relativism through their own historical-social 
experience of postrevolutionary nation building. Gamio, who studied anthropology with 
Boas at Colombia, returned to Mexico with the culture concept, downplaying race for the 
existence of cultural groups. Sáenz, the celebrated Mexican educator who studied with 
both Boas and John Dewey at Colombia, also promoted cultural relativism, and was 
widely read by Bolivian intellectuals.196  Comas, a Spanish physical anthropologist who 
had migrated to Mexico during the Spanish Civil War, also integrated cultural relativism 
into his thinking about race and human difference.  During the 1940s, in fact, he had 
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singled out towering Bolivian intellectual, Arturo Posnansky for the racial theories that 
underlie his anthropological research on Altiplano Indians. Cultural constructions of race 
slowly emerged in the 1940s within reformist political groupings and would emerge at 
the core of postrevolutionary Indian policy. 
The rising tide for reform became manifest once again in December 1943, when 
an otherwise obscure reform-minded major, Gualberto Villarroel led a group of junior 
officers to oust President Peñaranda.  Villarroel and his coconspirators were members of 
Razón de Patria (RADEPA). A clandestine military lodge founded by of junior officers 
while prisoners of war in Paraguay, RADEPA resented the incompetent civilian 
leadership of the government. After taking power in 1943, Villarroel invited MNR 
leaders Montenegro, Céspedes, and Paz Estenssoro to occupy key cabinet positions 
within the new regime.   Though retaining fascist sympathies, the Villarroel-MNR 
government signaled a continuation of the reformist agenda of Busch and Toro.  
Villarroel’s commitment to bettering the life of workers, peasants, and the poor was 
summed up in his famous declaration: “We are not enemies of the rich, but we are better 
friends of the poor.”197 The regime increased rights for workers, bolstered the middle-
class, and sought the gradual integration of indigenous peasants into national life.198  
The MNR-Villarroel regime continued the pro-labor stance of the military 
socialists.  In 1944, the first national miners congress convened at Huanuni to found the 
Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB).  Not only was the 
FSTMB the largest union, but the central position of tin exports in the national economy 
made the miners confederation especially powerful.  It could shut down the national 
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economy with work stoppages or strikes. The general secretary of the FSTMB was a 
popular clerical employee and MNR supporter named Juan Lechín Oquendo.  Lechín 
would prove an indispensable ally for the MNR, providing the party with inroads into the 
POR dominating mining camps.  
Perhaps the most notable achievement of the short-lived Villarroel-MNR coalition 
was the 1945 National Indigenous Congress.  The Chaco War transformed the traditional 
politics and the framed a new debate in the urban centers predominantly populated by 
creoles, mestizos, and cholos.  It also influenced grassroots political mobilization among 
colonos and comunarios.  True, the war had weakened the caciques apoderados 
movement, but the growing connections between urban activists and indigenous leaders, 
provided a generation of rural activists with a new language to frame decades-old 
demands for land, rights, and justice.  The discourse of class-struggle resonated with the 
growing left as well, providing a common language of rural exploitation and its causes. 
199  While colonos and comunarios in the Cochabamba valley turned to class struggle, in 
other regions, particularly the Aymara altiplano, they revived the a cacique apoderado 
network, fractured and broken after the death and dislocation of the Chaco War. If the 
1945 indigenous congress represented a radical manifestation of the progressive reform 
embraced by the Villarroel-MNR government, it also resulted from mounting rural 
mobilization during the 1930s and 1940s.  
Growing rural activism precipitated the May 1945 Indigenous Congress. Labor 
demands increased for hacienda colonos during the 1930 and 1940s, intensifying 
communal resistance and culminating in a wave of colono sit-down strikes (huelgas de 
brazos caidos) on haciendas in Cochabamba and Oruro. The intensification of rural 
                                                 




mobilization had as much to do with the burgeoning network of rural and urban activists, 
as with the progressive labor laws introduced by the military socialists.  In an effort to 
channel the energies of increasingly interconnected indigenous movements toward real 
improvement for Indians within the legal framework of the state, representatives from 
across the country established the Comité Indigenal Boliviano during the late 1930s. 200  It 
was not until the reform-minded Villarroel-MNR regime that they received an official 
audience.  
The congress marked a watershed moment in indigenous-state relations.  For a 
week in May 1945, 1,659 indigenous delegates representing colonos and comunarios 
from across the nation descended upon La Paz.  There, they deliberated with government 
officials the exploitive seigniorial economy, rural modernization, and indigenous 
education.  Silvia Rivera found that in preparation for the Congress, Villarroel repealed 
the segregation ordinances introduced during previous decades so Indians could freely 
walk in the streets and plazas without being harassed by officials.201  Official delegates 
issued surprisingly progressive calls for reform.  MNR delegate Hernán Siles Zuazo 
declared that “the land should belong those who work it.”202 Though rural society would 
remain unchanged, Villarroel closed the congress witha series of unprecedented legal 
reforms.  The first abolished the personal service obligations of hacienda colonos, 
stipulating that campesinos must be paid for their labor.203  The second explicitly 
abolished “ponguaje and mitanaje,” the exploitive practice of requiring colonos to 
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provide personal service to the landlords.204 The third declared that all haciendas must 
provide free education to the campesinos employed by and living on their estates.205  
Finally, Villarroel ordered the creation of a rural labor code to ensure fair labor practices, 
establishing in the meantime, maximum labor allowances and minimum salary 
requirements.206  Though most hacendados disregarded the laws and the weak state 
remained largely powerless to enforce them, they provided indigenous Bolivians with 
novel legal channels to press the state for rights.  
Despite his popularity among workers, miners, and peasants, Villarroel embodied 
revolutionary excess to the landed and mining elite, and fascism to the radical left.  The 
1945 decrees sparked the ire of the rural elite, and the traditional political leaders they 
backed. Moreover, the regimes’ unprecedented use of violence to suppress political 
opposition had caused even the more progressive blocks of society to oppose the 
Villarroel-MNR government.207  In early 1946, the traditional political parties allied with 
the PIR, establishing the Frente Democrática Antifascista (Democratic Antifascist Front, 
FDA), forging a unified front against the Villarroel-MNR regime.  On July 21, 1946, 
after weeks of growing social unrest and escalating political repression, a mob stormed 
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the presidential palace, lynched Villarroel, and hanged his lifeless body from a lamppost 
in the Plaza Murillo.  The government declared the MNR illegal and issued a general 
arrest warrant for all party leaders. In subsequent weeks, as the party rank and file were 
persecuted, the MNR leadership sought political exile.  Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Carlos 
Montenegro, and Augusto Céspedes took refuge in Buenos Aires, where they were 
granted safe haven by the sympathetic government of Juan Perón.  Juan Lechín, Ñuflo 
Chávez, and others sought exile in Chile. With their ability to organize severely curtailed 
during these initial years of exile, the MNR fought for its very survival and set out to 
reconfigure its political strategy.208    
The years 1946 to 1952 mark one of the most turbulent periods in Bolivian 
history.  A succession of rightwing civilian and military governments seemed set on 
reversing the reforms instituted in the previous decade. They discouraged rural labor 
organization, limited the rights of existing labor organizations, and supported mine 
owners in their massacre of striking workers.   Confronted with the revival of the right, 
labor militancy markedly increased in the late 1940s. Dominated by the Trotskyite POR, 
the FSTMB had emerged as the most powerful and militant labor organization in the 
nation.  The PIR, once the strongest party among labor, lost support for conspiring with 
the oligarchy and began its slow fade into obscurity.  As the POR and its leader, 
Guillermo Lora, tightened their grip on the labor movement, it developed a radical 
agenda. At the fourth national miner’s conference held at Pulacayo in November 1946, 
Lora identified the miners as the vanguard of the working class, advocating social 
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revolution, co-gobierno of the mines, the creation of armed workers cells.209  Lora’s 
“Thesis of Pulacayo” subsequently became the official ideology of the FSTMB.   
Meanwhile, the countryside exploded in violence.  Landlords simply refused to 
implement the 1945 decrees.  Perceiving landlord reticence as illegitimate and their 
continued subjection to ponguaje clearly unlawful, colonos unleashed the most 
significant wave of grassroots rural mobilization in Bolivian history.  In Cochabamba, 
Chuquisaca, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, hacienda colonos waged sit-down strikes, 
engaged in work stoppages, demanded their right to organize, petitioned government 
officials for the enforcement of the Villarroel decrees, and employed physical violence, 
brandishing Chaco-era rifles.210 The violence reached its highest point in Ayopaya, the 
easternmost province of the department of Cochabamba, where some 10,000 armed 
peasants ran off landowners and razzed several estates before government forces 
violently suppressed the uprising.211  Despite the concurrence of violence in disparate 
areas across the countryside in 1947, Silvia Rivera is careful to point out that, that “no se 
trate de una rebelión organizada bajo mando único, ni ocurre en forma simultanea o 
coordinada.”212 Rather, while the episodic conflict may have been rooted in landlord 
resistance to the 1945 decrees, it exploded in various local contexts and was shaped as 
much by the particular histories, as by the specific circumstances in which it occurred. 
And as Laura Gotkowitz has recently demonstrated, “el ciclo rebelde de 1947” was 
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significant not simply for the scope of the conflict, but for the fact that for most rural 
communities it was rooted in a much longer struggle for lands, rights, and justice.    
For the MNR, 1946-1952 represented the nadir of its revolutionary struggle and 
would be immortalized as the “sexenio” by party propagandists following the Revolution.  
It was also during this period that the MNR adopted a more radical position and defined 
its stance on several key issues that it had purposely remained vague in order to retain its 
traditional middle-class base.  James Malloy writes when the MNR “was slowly 
converting itself from an elite faction oriented toward reform form above into an elite-led 
movement pursuing revolution from below.”213  The MNR had been trying to expand its 
base to include workers and, less so, peasants since 1941.  But the urgency of 
incorporating these burgeoning and increasingly militant social movements increased 
during the late 1940s.  As the party refashioned itself, it developed a more radical stance 
to appeal to a wider base of the population. The pro-MNR leader of the FSTMB, Juan 
Lechín provided the party with critical inroads into the mining camps, where its 
popularity grew in the late 1940s as it declared its commitment to nationalization of the 
tin mines.  As labor unrest mounted in the late 1940s, the MNR leadership issued formal 
proclamations in support of general strikes and work stoppages, while local party 
apparatchiks provided logistical support for the efforts and organized general strikes in 
support of them.  During the rural violence of 1947, MNR officials organized upstart 
peasants, creating the first células campesinos.214  
Politics continued to devolve into violent struggle.  In May 1949, the MNR 
launched a coup attempt from its base in Santa Cruz in yet another effort to dislodge the 
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oligarchy from power.   The effort devolved into a full scale civil war that lasted from 
May to August 1949.  The government narrowly succeeded in suppressing the rebellion.  
But to all but the most stubborn observers, it had become unmistakably clear that the 
oligarchy had lost whatever claim to political legitimacy that remained.  Late in 1950, 
President Urriolagoitía announced open elections for May 14, 1951.  The MNR 
nominated party boss and chief ideologue Paz Estenssoro for president and named 
Hernán Siles Zuazo as the candidate for vice president.  Although Paz and Siles received 
the most votes, they lacked the majority necessary to win the contest free and clear.  
Instead of convening Congress to resolve the contested election, Urriolagoitía handed 
over the government to the military.  Under the command of General Hugo Ballivian, a 
military junta annulled the election, declared a state of siege, and declared the MNR 
illegal. Yet the junta could not maintain power for long.   
On April 9, 1952, the MNR, with the assistance of the national police forces and 
the critical support of the FSTMB, initiated a popular insurrection that toppled the 
oligarchy.  The Bolivian National Revolution had begun.   Drawing on their 1951 
electoral victory as a source of constitutional legitimacy, the MNR assumed control of the 
postrevolutionary state, placing Paz Estenssoro in the presidency and Siles the vice-
president.  But it would have to share power with the powerful radical left which had 
ensured the success of the Revolution by provided the urban insurrection with critical 
logistical support and much-needed personnel.  While political moderates and the 
nationalist left backed the MNR, the Trotskyite dominated FSTMB and other radical 
urban labor groups sought to establish their own block of revolutionary power and 
ultimately to radicalize the revolution by gradually taking control of the 




Lechín, the powerful leader of the FSTMB and newly-appointed Ministro de Minas y 
Petróleo, convened a national congress of leaders from industrial, artisan, and public 
sector unions and leftist political parties to found the Central Obrero Boliviano (Bolivian 
Workers’ Central, COB).215  This new national labor confederation sought to ensure the 
depth of revolutionary change and to provide an institutional counterweight to balance 
the more conservative and essentially reformist right-wing of the MNR coalition.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 represented the culmination of two distinct 
historical struggles.  The first is rooted in the grassroots struggles of indigenous Bolivians 
for land, justice, and eqality, and traces its memory to the anticolonial rebellions of the 
eighteenth century.216  Confronted with increasingly aggressive liberal land privatization 
laws and subsequent hacienda expansion in the late nineteenth century, Aymara 
comunarios developed new strategies of resistance to protect communal lands and 
guarantee their rights.  Appointing apoderados, rural communities merged colonial and 
republican legal discourses to press the land claims on the republican state.  Following 
the Liberal Revolution, and the subsequent repression of highland apoderados and other 
rural leaders, comunarios adapted their struggle. The next generation of Caciques 
Apoderados increasingly recognized the power of the law and republican legal 
institutions emerged as the primary venue for justice.  Though the Chaco War marked a 
setback for rural mobilization, many veterans returned to their communities and 
redoubled the struggle for land, justice, and equality. The 1945 Indigenous Congress—
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which resulted, in part, from mounting rural activism—provided indigenous Bolivians 
with new legal rights and lay at the center of the unprecedented “cycle of violence” that 
exploded in 1947. By 1952, as Laura Gotkowitz argues, there was already a revolution 
underway in the countryside that would contour the politics of the postrevolutionary state 
after 1952.217    
The second historical struggle underlying the 1952 Revolution is rooted in the 
social malaise and political transformations that succeeded the Chaco Wa, and was 
primarily articulated in terms of class struggle.  In the urban centers and mining camps of 
the western highlands, emerging elements of the radical and moderate left established 
new political groupings such as the POR, the PIR, and the MNR.  Urban professionals, 
junior military officers, industrial workers, and tin miners increasingly recognized the 
economic policies of the government as inconsistent with the national interest and the 
popular aspirations of the Bolivian people.  In the Cochabamba countryside, hacienda 
pongos began to organize their own grassroots labor movements.  As Silvia Rivera 
argues, while the highland struggles were rooted in ethnic struggles and territorial rights 
dating to the late eighteenth century, in Cochabamba class provided the primary language 
of struggle for peasant mobilization.218   
The popular insurrection of April 1952 itself belies the conflictive nature and 
heterogeneous visions embraced by the various forces that confronted the postcolonial 
republica and ultimately set into motion the Bolivian National Revolution. All 
revolutionaries were not necessarily movimentistas fighting for the MNR as the popular 
narrative of the Revolution has long asserted. The Revolutionary meant different things 
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to different people. Commenting in the nature of the revolutionary historiography, 
sociologist Mario Murillo writes, “acercamiento convencional al 52, no hay espacio para 
los actores anónimos.”219 Yet, as he points out, it was precisely these anonymous actors 
who made the insurrection successful. They were not movementists or mineros or 
fabriles, they were veterans of the Chaco, fighting in the streets, some simply “para 
joder.”   Regardless of their aims, the make-up of the forces that ensured the success of 
the April insurrection belies the divergent actors and different unities that underlie the 
revolutionary project.  It is to that project that we now turn. 
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Rearticulating the Indian Problem: National Development, Social 
Science, and Indigenous Integration 
 
El pensamiento del Gobierno de la revolución nacional es, primero, aumentar la 
producción y, luego, hacer justicia a los campesinos. 
-José Fellman Velarde, 8/8/1953 
 
Exigimos la identificación de todos los bolivianos con los anhelos y necesidades del 
campesino y proclamamos que la justicia social es inseparable de la redención del indio 
para la liberación económica y soberana del pueblo de Bolivia.  
-MNR Manifiesto, June 1942 
 
No sooner had Víctor Paz Estenssoro settled into the Palacio Quemado in April 
1952 than he was flooded with petitions from rural indigenous communities.  Some wrote 
to congratulate the President and express their commitment to the Revolution.  Others 
pressed the government to enforce the Villarroel decrees.  Still others highlighted their 
part in the revolutionary struggle.  The National Archives in Sucre are filled with such 
petitions.  And despite their disparate origins, all expressed a great deal of hope and 
certainty that the Revolution represented a true moment of social change.  Agapito 
Vallejos Rocha, “Dirigente Indigenal de Cochabamba,” wrote, “hoy pediremos pan con el 
mismo derecho que los blancos y tendremos justicia y derecho a todo.”220 Another 
petition, from a national network of rural apoderados calling themselves “Los principales 
caciques de la Republica en representación de la Raza Indígena” urged the President to 
introduce “leyes favorable a nuestra raza, para así incorporarnos a la sociedad.”221  Santos 
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Cornejo, “Cacique Principal del Departamento de La Paz” wrote, “esperamos señor 
Presidente que vele por esta raza indígena.”222  Mariano Mayta, from Huarina confided in 
Paz that he understood the Revolution as “la época de la verdadera recuperación de 
indígena,” assuming him that “la clase indígena persigue siempre la solución del 
problema, mal llamado del Indio y si de la Nacionalidad misma.”223   
Presiding over the first, and indeed most radical, phase of the Bolivian National 
Revolution, Paz, it seems, took such petitions to heart.  In July 1952, his government 
decreed universal adult suffrage, extending voting rights to Indians for the first time.  In 
August 1953, his government institutionalized agrarian reform—a process that was 
already well underway, albeit extralegally, in large parts of the countryside—definitively 
ending colonaje and providing Indians titles to their lands.  The Education Code of 1955 
expanded the rural education initiative, ensuring that all Indian children had schools and 
teachers and all adults had access to Spanish literacy.  Not only did the postrevolutionary 
government break down the legal and institutional barriers to indigenous citizenship, but 
it also set out to actively incorporate indigenous Bolivians into a modern society of its 
own making.   
Despite the progressive policies embraced by the postrevolutionary government, 
many indigenous Bolivians continued to feel excluded from the national community. 
Two decades after the Revolution, indigenous activists could still protest, “somos 
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extranjeros en nuestro propio país.”224  The question thus arises, what happened?  The 
postrevolutionary state guaranteed indigenous Bolivians universal citizenship, legal 
equality, access to education, and legal title to their land—all key demands of rural 
activists since the eighteenth century.  Why then did they continue to feel apart from the 
nation?  This chapter sets outs to understand the contested legacy of indigenous 
citizenship in postrevolutionary Bolivia by examining the underlying logic of national 
integration.  What motivated indigenous integration?  Was it simply a manifestation of 
the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice and participant 
democracy, or were there deeper motives behind the process? 
The search for answers begins in the economic policies, development strategies, 
and racialized thinking of policymakers affiliated with the postrevolutionary government.  
Since 1941, the MNR leadership had protested that the export-led growth model and free-
market policies of the oligarchic elite perpetuated socioeconomic inequality, inhibited 
economic development, and undermined national sovereignty. Their goal was to establish 
a politically sovereign and economically self-sufficient social democracy.  To achieve 
this goal, they advanced a hybrid socialist-capitalist model of state-led national 
development. They would convert the state into an instrument of capital accumulation 
that would responsibly manage finite natural resources, ensure the wellbeing of society, 
and establish an authentic national culture to unify the nation.  After 1952, the MNR 
leadership assumed control of the state and transformed this revolutionary vision into 
reality with the most ambitious national development program in Bolivian history.  With 
an influx of capital, science, and technology, postrevolutionary officials were confident 
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that, one and for all, they could succeed in transforming Bolivia from a backwater 
postcolonial republic into a modern, integrated nation state.225 
Postrevolutionary indigenous integration was predicated upon the economic 
policies of the MNR leadership and carried out according to the developmental strategies 
of the postrevolutionary state. The MNR identified the seigniorial order as the principal 
impediment to domestic economic development.  Not only did the haciendas monopolize 
both land and labor in an unproductive, inefficient, and exploitive land tenure system, but 
they also impeded economic growth by keeping over half the population outside of the 
monetary economy. Only when Indians were unconstrained producers and consumers in a 
modern capitalist society would the republic be able to develop its full potential.  The 
agrarian reform created a massive new base of independent consumers and producers free 
to use their purchasing power and labor to assist in national modernization. As the 
postrevolutionary government fixated on commercial agriculture as Bolivia’s economic 
salvation, it identified indigenous Bolivians as the motor of national development.  It was 
upon their active participation in national society as producers and consumers that 
national development rested.   
Modern social science rendered postrevolutionary development imaginable.  A 
modernization scheme of the magnitude envisioned by the postrevolutionary government 
would have been simply unthinkable a half century before, purely on account of the 
central role it assigned indigenous Bolivians.  The oligarchy had long essentialized the 
Indian as a noble savage, uniquely suited for agricultural labor, yet unprepared for 
modern nationhood, resistant to market participation, and unfit for republican 
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citizenship—as if biology and geography had conspired against the republic. The MNR’s 
generation, on the other hand, generally disentangled the national problem from the 
Indian problem. They instead identified imperialism as the source of underdevelopment 
and feudal modes of production as the cause of indigenous backwardness.  This 
structuralist interpretation fundamentally rearticulated the Indian problem—it was no 
longer the cause of underdevelopment, but its primary effect.  In the 1940s, structuralism 
merged with the novel concept of cultural relativism, which was arriving piecemeal by 
way of Mexican, Peruvian, and U.S. social science—often through the growing 
institutional networks of the Inter-American Indigenista movement. If structuralism lifted 
the burden of biology from the Indian problem, cultural relativism liberated it from 
geography and hereditary. Positing that centuries of agrarian exploitation had retarded the 
evolution of Andean civilization, cultural relativism provided the rationale for indigenous 
“improvability” while simultaneously affirming their alterity. After 1952, as government 
officials recruited policymakers from an ascendant generation of progressive sociologists 
to design the central developmental reforms, structuralism and cultural relativism 
converged in the postrevolutionary imagination to transform the place of the Indian in the 
nation—from “peso muerto” as hacienda colonos and subsistence-based comunarios into 
modernized, market-orientated campesinos. 
The developmentalist orientation of the MNR leadership and the modernizing 
agenda of the National Revolution have long preoccupied the scholarship on post-1952 
Bolivia.226  This chapter contributes to this literature by exploring the place of indigenous 
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Bolivians in the modernizing imagination of the postrevolutionary leadership. The first 
section examines the relationship between indigenous integration and domestic economic 
reform in the thinking of the MNR leadership in the years prior to the Revolution. The 
next section lays out the legal and institutional measures that the postrevolutionary state 
introduced to incorporate indigenous Bolivian into the social, political, economic, and 
cultural structures of the nation, focusing on the universal suffrage and political amnesty 
laws of July 1952 and the creation of the Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos (Ministry of 
Peasant Affairs, MAC). The remainder of the chapter traces the emergence of the 
mutually constitutive relationship that developed between the state and social science by 
exploring collaboration between government officials and national sociologists in the 
formulation of the agrarian reform and rural education decress.  These were critical 
measures affecting indigenous citizenship.  Designed in accordance with the national 
development strategy, they mapped the role of the indigenous Bolivians in the 
postrevolutionary republic.   
 
THE MNR AND INDIGENOUS INTEGRATION 
Indigenous integration was a modernization imperative, and its history cannot be 
understood apart from the MNR’s revolutionary imagination on the one hand, and the 
economic policies embraced by the party leadership on the other.  The MNR leadership 
consisted of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Walter Guevara Arze, Hernán Siles Zuazo, and 
several other individuals who occupied ranking positions within the party hierarchy.  This 
first section focuses specifically on these three individuals—and the place of the Indian 
problem in their revolutionary imagination—for three reasons.  For one, they were the 




all of them assumed key leadership positions in the postrevolutionary state after 1952—
Paz as President, Siles as Vice President, and Guevara as Foreign Minister.  Finally, 
before the Revolution, there was a marked discrepancy between the policies embraced by 
these individuals and the official party agenda.  In order to understand the logic 
underlying indigenous integration, it is therefore necessary to consider their individual 
thinking alongside official MNR policy.    
The economy loomed large in the MNR’s revolutionary imagination. The party 
fixated on the grand irony that Bolivia possessed great mineral wealth yet remained the 
poorest republic in the continent.  The party located the cause of such irrational 
impoverishment in the cabal of “antinational” capitalists— called “La Rosca” in the post-
Chaco political lexicon—which consisted of the “big three” tin interests of Aramayo, 
Hoschild, and Patiño (who, together controlled over half of tin exports) and the large 
estate owners who supported them.  This oligarchy monopolized not only the nation’s 
finite natural resources, but the mechanisms of state, creating a “superestado mineral” 
that governed solely in the interests of international capital.  The nation’s natural 
resources enriched the oligarchic elite at the expense of Bolivia’s national development, 
as exemplified by the contrast between the highly-industrialized mining sector and the 
feudal modes of production that characterized the seigniorial order.  “El progreso,” 
proclaimed the party’s June 1942 founding manifiesto, “nos ha hecho daño y no 
beneficio.”227   
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Paz provided the economic theory behind the MNR’s political agenda.   In 
addition to his political career, he was one of the most prominent economic thinkers in 
Bolivia.  Like most economists of his time, he studied law and then gained practical 
experience in the public sector and private industry.228 He clerked for Aramayo Mines 
before assuming a post in the Oficina Nacional de Estadística, and then went on to 
preside over the Banco Mineral under Busch, and briefly served as the Minister of 
Economy under Peñaranda.229  He also taught economics at the Universidad Mayor de 
San Andrés in La Paz.  In 1945, while serving as President Villarroel’s Minister of 
Hacienda y Estadística, he published an essay on the economic history of Bolivia which 
critically examined the export-led growth model’s impact on the Bolivian economy.230   
He criticized not only the oligarchy, but also the ruling class for failing to adequately tax 
the companies. He cited increasing dependence on imports and negative balance of 
payments as indicative of Bolivia’s “semicolonial” status in the international political 
economy.   “Es necesario diversificar la producción boliviana,” he argued, in order to 
strengthen the national economy.  “Este planteamiento implica una política proteccionista 
y de industrialización fomentada por el estado, en oposición a la tesis de los que quieren 
que Bolivia sea exclusivamente un país minero y que importe todos los productos 
alimenticios y las manufacturas que requiere para su vida.”231 
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His thinking reflected a broader trend emerging across Latin America.  The great 
depression had made especially salient the disadvantages of the export-led growth 
model.232 Decreasing consumer spending and industrial output in Western Europe and 
North American had resulted in curtailed demand for raw materials and rising import 
prices, depressing export-oriented economies.  Reform-minded leaders across the region 
implemented more restrictive trade policies and promoted domestic industry in an 
attempt to substitute foreign imports with domestic manufacturing.  Import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI), as the Keynesian policy came to be known, was intended to 
increase economic self-sufficiency for non-industrialized resource-rich countries on what 
influential Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch identified as the “periphery” of a 
globalized capitalist economy.  The model of an industrialized center and a resource-rich 
periphery provided the foundation for the structural school of economics that Prebisch 
promoted as head of the UN Economic Council on Latin America after 1948.  He cited 
capital accumulation in the center coupled with rising imports prices on the periphery as 
indicative of the inherent disadvantage of export-dependent growth.  His terms-of-trade 
thesis gained wide influence across the region and provided the economic policy 
justification for nationalist economic policies such as ISI.233   
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During the 1940s, the MNR integrated ISI as the cornerstone of its revolutionary 
economic policy.  The MNR leadership sought to establish national economy that was 
both sovereign and self-sufficient.   Under the banner of economic nationalism and in the 
name of national sovereignty, they demanded that finite natural resources be exploited to 
the benefit of all Bolivians, not just a select few.  They envisioned transforming the state 
into an instrument of capital accumulation to finance domestic development.  Writing 
from exile in Buenos Aires in 1947, Paz outlined the MNR’s position. “Nuestras 
fundamentales proposiciones revolucionarias antitéticas de esta política de servidumbre, 
consisten, fundamentalmente en sostener la necesidad de que las riquezas nacionales se 
exploten en beneficio de la nación y en elevar el nivel de vida de sus granes masas,” he 
explained.234 The key was to create a sovereign state, “realmente independiente del 
Superestado”—that governed in the interests of the population at large.  Then, Paz wrote, 
“hay que diversificar la economía nacional, superando la actual etapa de monoproducción 
y de simple extracción de materias primarias y desarrollar todas las zonas del país.” 235  
For Paz and the rest of the MNR leadership Revolution was synonymous with national 
development.   
The MNR’s stance on indigenous integration lies tangled within its broad matrix 
of proscriptive economic reforms and national development proposals. Most scholarship 
on the Revolution privileges the export sector in examining the economic policies of the 
MNR leadership, devoting little to the place of the domestic economy in the 
revolutionary imagination.  After all, it was nationalization of the “big three” tin mines 
that came to symbolize the Revolution and the MNR’s nationalist agenda in the popular 
                                                 
234 Víctor Paz Estenssoro, “Proceso y sentencia contra la oligarquía boliviana,” [1947] in Discurso y 





imagination. Moreover, the historiography has traditional cast rural society as playing 
little role in the immediate pre-revolutionary period.  Yet it is precisely in their approach 
to domestic economic reform where the MNR leadership’s commitment to indigenous 
integration lies.  
Postrevolutionary indigenous integration was not the result of a single reform.  
Rather, it constituted a series of measures that included universal suffrage, agrarian 
reform, and rural education. Universal suffrage—which, by extending political 
citizenship to indigenous Bolivians for the first time, seems the most drastic measure 
towards indigenous integration—was rooted in the party’s commitment to social justice 
and participant democracy.  A MNR comunicado from 1946, for instance, declared 
“seguramente el máximo problema boliviano es el referente a la incorporación del indio a 
la Nación.”236 Hoping to disavow its fascist past in an era marked by liberal-democratic 
triumphalism, the MNR embraced the cause of social justice, identifying the popular 
struggles of miners, workers, and indigenous peasants as one with their own. The MNR, 
moreover, decried the “comedy” of Bolivian democracy and embraced popular political 
participation as consistent with its vision of modern nationhood. 237  Whereas universal 
suffrage was motivated by social justice and democracy, agrarian reform and rural 
education—the two most significant measures that reconfigured the place of indigenous 
Bolivians in the socioeconomic hierarchy—were motivated by the exigencies of national 
development.  
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It is the question of agrarian reform whereupon the discrepancy between the MNR 
leadership and the official party position was most marked. Although Paz, Siles, Guevara, 
and other MNR leaders had advocated agrarian reform since the 1930s, astute political 
considerations precluded the incorporation of the measure into the official party platform. 
Agrarian reform was one of the most contested social issues of the era, becoming the 
point of convergence for social reformers on the left and the right. The issue also seems 
to have distinguished the radical from the more moderate political forces, with radical 
leftists parties like the Trotskyite POR and the Leninist PIR demanding land reform.  The 
official party position on agrarian reform in the pre-revolutionary period can be 
characterized as vague at best.  For the MNR during the turbulent 1940s, embracing 
agrarian reform threatened to undermine its traditional base of middle-class support.  
Many middle-class members of the party (or their relatives) owned small and medium 
size estates.238 While this group of modest landowners distinguished themselves from the 
landed elite, they too depended on colono labor and jealously guarded their land rights. 
Official party statements thus demanded indigenous integration while calling for the 
introduction of new laws to protect agrarian laborers.  The MNR divorced indigenous 
political inclusion from the agrarian question all together.   
Independent from the official party position, the MNR leadership firmly 
supported agrarian reform. As a delegate to the 1938 constitutional convention, Paz 
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asserted that unproductive estates should be put to productive use by the Indians who 
worked them.  Guevara, who also supported agrarian reform at the 1938 convention, 
advocated transforming unproductive estates into agricultural cooperatives founded upon 
existing forms of Andean socioeconomic organization. Their thinking was motivated by 
their view that property must serve a “social function.” They believed, moreover, that 
hacienda lands would be more productive under the control of Indians who lived and 
worked on the land.  Indigenous Bolivians, they argued, were biologically predisposed to 
the harsh highland climate and uniquely suited for agricultural labor—“como la raza 
inseparable de la tierra” noted the MNR’s 1942 manifesto.239 This trope situating Indians 
in their natural environment as agrarian producers enjoyed widespread popularity among 
the Liberals, providing moral justification for highland hacienda expansion. The MNR 
deployed the discourse for similar ends.   
This discrepancy between the official party line and the position of the MNR 
leadership on the agrarian reform has been the cause of much debate in the historiography 
of the Revolution.  With little exception, most scholarship casts the MNR leadership as 
“reluctant revolutionaries” who hesitantly embraced agrarian reform in order to gain 
indigenous political support, contain rural insurgency, and/or appease the party left and 
labor militants within the postrevolutionary governing coalition.240 These factors 
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certainly contributed to the making of the agrarian reform, yet they do little to underscore 
its origins.  In privileging the sociopolitical dynamics of the postrevolutionary state, 
moreover, scholarship has tended either to obscure the MNR leadership’s position on the 
matter, or simply to dismiss it all together.  While the MNR, as a political institution, may 
not have embraced the measure during the pre-revolutionary period, the party leadership 
remained deeply committed to agrarian reform. As James Kohl points out, the MNR 
sought “the order of agrarian reform,” and not the “anarchy of agrarian revolution.”241 
That such sentiment was shared by the MNR leadership was best exemplified by Guevera 
Arze, who during the height of peasant conflict in 1952 confided in UN technical adviser, 
Carter Goodrich, “we want to make a Mexican revolution, without ten years of Pancho 
Villa.”242  
The primary factor motivating the MNR leadership’s commitment to indigenous 
integration in general and agrarian reform in particular was domestic economic growth.  
If the “superestado mineral” had disadvantageously integrated Bolivia into the global 
capitalist economy, the haciendas constrained the potential for domestic economic 
growth.  The primary problem with the landed estates was that they were grossly 
unproductive.  Since the turn of the century, Bolivia had become increasingly dependent 
on imports of not only manufactured goods, but also of basic consumption goods.243 The 
majority of imports consisted of basic food items traditionally produced domestically 
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such as wheat, rice, and sugar.  One widely-cited reason for declining domestic 
production was the fact that given the high costs associated with internal transport, it was 
cheaper to import goods from neighboring Chile and Argentina. 244  Historian Herbert 
Klein points out that another reason for declining production was that landowners lacked 
incentive to increase output to meet the rising demand.245  Their narrow profit margin 
hinged on the free labor that colonos provided in exchange for usufruct rights to estate 
lands.  Increasing agricultural production entailed costly investments in equipment, 
training, and resources. That most landowners were unwilling to make such investments 
is evinced by the 1950 agrarian census, which revealed that while 72 percent of the 
population was engaged in agriculture, the sector only produced 33 percent of the 
GNP.246  
Agrarian reform was not necessary directed at indigenous Bolivians, but at 
abolishing the seigniorial order.  Guevara argued that the primary reason for agrarian 
reform was “Liberar la nación del peso muerto que significan los indios.”247  The 
assertion that agrarian reform would free the nation from the “dead weight” of the 
indigenous population belies the economic logic underlying the MNR leadership’s 
approach to the Indian problem.  Indians were not the national problem, as the oligarchy 
had long maintained.  Rather, it was the socioeconomic structures imposed on Indians by 
the hacienda regime that was the primary impediment to national development.   Not only 
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had it impeded national economic development, but it was also responsible for 
obstructing the natural evolution of Andean civilization.  Agrarian reform, following 
Guevara’s thinking, would remove the structural constraints that maintained indigenous 
Bolivians in the miserable, uncivilized, and pre-Modern condition.  By freeing both labor 
and land from the oppressive seigniorial order, Guevara hoped to awake the vast 
economic potential of the Indians.   
Even more problematic in the eyes of the MNR leadership was the fact that the 
haciendas intrinsically limited domestic economic growth.  Over half the population 
remained excluded from the market economy because colonos did not receive cash for 
their labor and most free communities were subsistence based.  Richard Thorne estimates 
that the pre-reform monetary economy “consisted of not more than six hundred thousand 
persons with a purchasing power of less than that of an American city the size of 
Charlotte, North Carolina, with a population of one hundred thirty-four thousand 
persons.”248   This is not to say that Indians existed completely apart from the monetary 
economy, and to be sure, there were great differences between market participation in 
Cochabamba (with its tradition of piqueros and peasant-small holding) on the one hand, 
and on the altiplano, where latifundio prevailed, on the other. Still, peasant market 
participation was severely limited.249  Economist Ronald Clark discovered that in many 
cases, hacendados explicitly restricted peasant market participation fearing loss of labor 
supply to urban markets.250  Manufactured goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, matches, 
                                                 
248 Richard S. Thorn, “The Economic Transformation,” Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952, James 
M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 157-216, p. 
158. 
249 Brooke Larson, Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia, 
Expanded Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Gotkowitz, A Revolution for Our Rights. 
250 Ronald James Clark, “Land Reform and Peasant Market Participation on the North Highlands of 




and cookware were usually bartered, provided by the landlord, or acquired in commercial 
markets, with the little cash colonos acquired from selling wool and/or mutton.   
The MNR publically identified domestic economic stagnation with the haciendas.  
“El mercado no existe casi por esta exclusión de millones de bolivianos de la vida 
nacional,” declared the MNR’s 1942 manifiesto.  “Así el país se mantiene en el 
estancamiento.”251  Although MNR documents identified the problem of the haciendas in 
the national economy, official party statements stopped short of providing a tangible 
solution.  Yet Paz’s thinking, seeminly independent from official party policy, reveals the 
party leadership’s thinking on the matter. Addressing parliament as a congressman 
representing his home department of Tarija in 1944, Paz declared that “Para solucionar el 
problema del indio, es necesario, fundamentalmente, encauzar una reforma, una 
estructura económica-social.”252  He did not advocate the forced redistribution of land.  
Rather, his vision for agrarian reform rested upon integrating rural laborers into the 
monetary economy by allowing them to sell their goods to the market instead of remitting 
them directly to the landowner and subsisting off the land.   
The measure was intended to integrate peasants into the market. Campesinos, he 
argued should “vende su cosecha a quien quiere; con el dinero obtenido por la venta de 
sus productor paga el canon de arrendamiento.”253  Thus instead of usufruct right in 
exchange for tribute in the form of labor and goods—the foundation of the hacienda 
regime—he advocated making campesinos pay currency to rent the land.  “La reforma 
agraria no implica necesariamente un criterio socialista,” he assured his collegues, “es un 
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criterio liberal representa salir del régimen feudal.” 254   By paying campesinos for their 
labor in cash, Paz envisioned expanding both the monetary economy and the domestic 
market while providing incentives for landlord and colono alike to increase production.  
 
INTEGRATING BOLIVIA 
Following the April insurrection, the MNR leadership organized a new 
government and set about mobilizing both state and society for the sweeping reforms 
necessary to transform Bolivia into a modern nation.  Indigenous integration was 
paramount among this platform of modernizing reforms.  Not only was social justice and 
participant democracy consistent with the MNR leadership’s vision of modern 
nationhood.  But perhaps more importantly, the success of national development was 
predicated upon the active participation of indigenous Bolivians as both producers and 
consumers in a vibrant commercial economy fomented by the postrevolutionary 
government.  By integrating Indians into the monetary economy, the MNR leadership 
sought to double the size of the domestic market, providing employment, goods, and 
services, while working toward the goal of established a soviergn, self-sufficient national 
economy. To be sure, national integration was to be a gradual process predicated upon 
the transformation of the indigenous peasantry into a modernized, commercial orientated 
class of peasant producers.  Social change, to the extent possible, would be channeled by 
the state toward the particular goals of the postrevolutionary modernization.  
Within days of the Revolution, the MNR leadership established both the 
institutional framework and legal foundation for national integration.  On April 12, 1952 
the postrevolutionary government created the Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos  
                                                 




Illustration 6: President Víctor Paz Estenssoro dancing with indigenous woman, c. 1952. 
Historian Laurence Whitehead writes: “President Paz chaired many 
cabinet meetings and engaged in a lifetime of political intrigues, but one 
of the greatest shocks to his entourage came shortly after his return from 
exile, in April 1952, when he instructed his ministers to dance with the 
cholas who had been invited into the presidential palace from the nearby 
central market.”255 
(Ministry of Peasant Affairs, MAC), a novel government office that would tend 
specifically to the integration of Indians into the economic, social, and culture fabic of the 
nation.256  That the MNR dedicated an entire state ministry to rural affairs was in itself 
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unprecedented.257  That the creation of the ministry was one of its first measures taken by 
the government underscores the urgency accorded to the prompt resolution of the Indian 
problem.  The faster that Indians were freed from the feudal economy, the sooner the 
government could realize its objective of establishing a self-sufficient, sovereign national 
economy.   
The new ministry would oversee the gradual incorporation of indigenous Bolivian 
into the postrevolutionary republic.  The primary objective of MAC, as stated in its 
original charter, was “incorporar las masas campesinos a la vida económica, política y 
cultural de la Nación.”258 The additional objectives listed in the charter further underscore 
the economic imperatives underlying indigenous integration. They included coordinating 
rural economic policy with national development strategy, researching rural production, 
identifying the needs of rural workers, and organizing rural society into collective 
organizations orientated toward national economic production—whether rural sindicatos 
or agrarian cooperatives.259  Over the course of the next decade, MAC would provide the 
personnel, knowledge, and planning required to transform subsistence-farming Indians 
into a modernized agriculture workforce.  
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The MAC was a massive state bureaucracy, rivaled in size perhaps only by the 
Ministries of Government or Education.  Aside from the administrative offices, it 
consisted of four departments.260  The Dirección General de Comunidades y Cooperativas 
was charged with local agrarian development—including planning, transforming rural 
communities into agrarian cooperatives, and carrying out statistical studies of agricultural 
production.  The Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina was in charge of 
drafting defensive legislation and providing indigenous communities with free legal 
counsel.  The Dirección General de Educación Fundamental took over the rapidly 
expanding rural education programs from the Ministry of Education.  Following the 
Education Reform of 1955, it would oversee rural education and adult literacy 
campaigns.  Finally, the Instituto Indigenista Boliviano, which was originally created in 
1949 as a national branch of the III—yet lacking funds and perhaps initiative, it seems 
that the office existed in name only.261 Now integrated in MAC, it would carry out social 
scientific research on Bolivia’s indigenous population.   
The postrevolutionary leadership appointed Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz to lead the new 
ministry.  From Santa Cruz, Chávez had joined the MNR in 1945 while the party was a 
junior partner in the Villarroel regime.  After the violent overthrow of Villarroel and the 
exile of the MNR leadership, Chávez laid low in Santa Cruz.  He helped orchestrate the 
failed MNR putsch of August 1949 and was imprisoned during the brief but bloody Civil 
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War that followed.262  Inspired by socialism, nationalism, and indigenismo, he was a 
committed labor activist who, in April 1952, was instrumental in the foundation of the 
Central Obrero Bolivia (COB). As Minister of Peasant Affairs, he swiftly set bureaucracy 
in motion.  He tasked the Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina with 
enforcing the May 1945 laws abolishing ponguaje and establishing wages for rural 
workers. The department also provided official support for the sit-down strikes and work 
stoppages occurring across the countryside.  He dispatched teams of labor activists to 
haciendas to organize peasants into rural labor unions affiliated with the state—a measure 
that would enable the government to gain a modicum of control over the rising unrest in 
the countryside.  He also appointed Félix Eugino Zaballa as director of the IIB, 
announcing that the office would enjoy a “true and effective boost” (verdadero y efectivo 
impulse) under the new government.263  According to a circular Chávez sent to all state 
ministries in June 1952, the IIB “will have the essential function of not only promoting a 
body of legislation applicable to the Bolivian peasantry, but of uplifting the spiritual and 
cultural level of the peasant masses, as well as preserve and conserve the treasures of our 
vernacular culture, that the Bolivian soil possesses.”264 
As MAC turned to the social and economic aspectis of indigenous integration, 
postrevolutionary government tuned to the legal foundation for indigenous political 
exclusion.  On July 21, 1952, it introduced the universal suffrage law.  One of the most 
celebrated accomplishments of the revolution, the decree abolished literacy and property 
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qualifications on the franchise and guaranteed voting rights to all adults, regardless of 
race, class, or gender.  As a result of the law, the electorate immediately quintupled from 
200,000 to over 1,000,000.265  To ensure widespread political participation—and perhaps  
Illustration 7: Aymara woman voting as a result of the 1952 universal suffrage decree. 
                                                 






to guarantee the political longevity of the MNR—the law decreed voting compulsory. 266   
Paz also decreed a general amnesty for all campesinos involved in the rural insurgency of 
the late 1940s, contending that theirs was a legitimate struggle against the unjust 
seigniorial economy.267  
With MAC attending to urgent social problems of the countryside, government 
leaders turned their attention to the nationalization of the tin mines. With a succession of 
supreme decrees issued in 1952, the government placed the nation’s mineral wealth in 
government hands. Though the MNR leadership had only recently come to embrace 
nationalization—a decision that most historians argue represented a concession to the 
FSTMB and the COB—the measure was consistent with their nationalist political agenda 
and compatible with the state-capitalist model.  First, on June 2, it announced a state 
monopoly on mineral exports and granted the government-owned Banco Mineral sole 
authorization to export tin.  Then, on October 2, it created the Corporación Minera de 
Bolivia (Mineral Corporation of Bolivia, COMIBOL), the state enterprise that would 
manage the expropriated tin-mines.  Finally, on October 31, the government nationalized 
the mines owned by Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild—the “big three” responsible for 
half of tin output—and placed them under control of COMIBOL.  The act, hailed as the 
“acto del la independencia económica de Bolivia,” would provide the government with a 
lucrative source of capital to invest in the development of alternative sectors of the 
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economy and for Bolivia to finally become self-sufficient.268 To the chagrin of the left, 
however, Paz agreed to indemnify the affected parties—an action was necessary for U.S. 
recognition in the emerging Cold War.   
 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
While MAC provided the institutional framework for national integration and 
universal suffrage cleared the legal obstacles for indigenous political citizenship, national 
development mapped the place of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic.  
The postrevolutionary development strategy was principally designed by Walter Guevara 
Arze. During the opening months of the Revolution, he began working to translate the 
MNR leadership’s economic objectives into concrete state policy.  As he devised the 
postrevolutionary development strategy, he imagined transforming Bolivia’s human and 
geographic diversity—long recognized as insurmountable obstacles to national 
progress—into one of the nation’s “greatest advantages.”269  “Que acaso pueda 
encontrarse una interpretación mas racional de nuestra geografía,” he reasoned in July 
1952, “si combinamos su aspecto puramente físico con su contenido humano.”270  By 
aligning population and resources in a rational development strategy, Guevara remained 
confident that the revolutionary government could once and for all transform Bolivia 
from a semicolonial republic into a modern, integrated nation-state.  Within the 
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postrevolutionary imagination, development determined the role on indigenous Bolivian 
in the newly-integrated republic.  
In August 1953, Guevara presented the Plan de diversificación de la producción, 
which was then vetted by national and international experts, and subsequently revised, 
updated, and expanded as the Plan inmediata de política económica de la Revolution 
National in 1955.271  As Richard Thorn points out, in devising his strategy, Guevara drew 
on recommendations proposed a decade earlier by an U.S. economic mission to Bolivia  
 
Illustration 8:  Foreign Minister and State Planner Walter Guevara Arze at the United 
Nations, December 1953 (UN Multimedia Photo # 122999). 
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headed by Merwin L. Bohan.272 After surveying the economy in 1942, the Bohan Mission 
had recommended cutting deficit spending by promoting domestic production.  The key 
was to construct a road between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, thus linking the vast, 
fertile, and sparsely-populated eastern lowlands—where commercial agriculture could 
thrive—to the principal centers of trade, population, and consumption in the west.  Upon 
Bohan’s recommendations and with a generous loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, 
the government created the Corporación Boliviana de Fomento (CBF, Bolivian 
Development Corporation), a joint Bolivia-U.S. venture that would oversee the highway 
construction while promoting migration, settlement, and commercial agriculture in the 
lowlands.  Aside from initiating construction on the road (which did not begin until 1947) 
and promoting a modest lowland colonization effort, the recommendations were largely 
disregarded.273 Guevara integrated the Plan Bohan as the foundation for the most 
comprehensive state-led development initiative in Bolivian history. 
The primary objective of the postrevolutionary development strategy was to 
establish a sovereign national economy.  Reliant upon tin for 97 percent of its foreign 
exchange, Bolivia’s economy was grievously prone to market vicissitudes.  Economic 
sovereignty thus meant shielding the domestic economy from external shocks by 
redefining Bolivia’s relationship with the international economy.  In this, Guevara turned 
to export diversification.  Because COMIBOL, the fledging state mining enterprise, 
provided the majority of foreign exchange, Guevara strove to make the enterprise more 
profitable by increasing both output and efficiency.  He nevertheless placed more 
emphasis on fostering alternative sources of export income, primarily by increasing 
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petroleum production.  Since President Toro had nationalized the oil industry in 1936, 
YFPB enjoyed modest output—though never exceeding 1000 barrels in a day.274  
Guevara called for a tenfold increase in output at the proven fields at Camiri and large-
scale exploration of another field to the south, at Bermejo.  Increasing oil production 
would free up import capital by meeting national consumption levels and generating 
much-needed revenue.   
Economic sovereignty also implied self-sufficiency.  Imports represented a 
constant drain on the balance of payments.  By 1951, a quarter of export revenue went to 
imports.275  That figure doubled with the nationalization decree, however, as the state 
now had to cover the operating costs of the previously privately-owned mines.276  Not 
only did imports include manufactured goods, but they increasingly included basic food 
commodities of domestic origin.  “Es cada vez mayor la urgencia de producir en Bolivia 
en condiciones económicas, los alimentos que el país consume y que hoy se importan con 
dólares.”  Doing so, he warned “se impone como condición de supervivencia 
organizada.”277 By using export surplus to finance domestic production—from 
manufacturing and industry to agriculture and artisanry—Guevara envisioned generating 
new sectors of economic growth capable of meeting national consumption levels.  Such 
sn effort would free-up development capital for the state, expand the monetary economy, 
and provide employment for tens of thousands as rural peasants mobilized for national 
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production.  The state would do its part.  It would coordinate economic planning; 
rationally manage finite natural resources; build and maintain essential infrastructure; and 
ensure the security of both individuals and investments.  The market would do the rest.  It 
would unleash its modernizing magic, providing widespread economic opportunity and 
social mobility.  What was envisioned by Guevara was nothing short of a market 
revolution.   
If tin served as the engine of economic growth for the pre-revolutionary economy, 
commercial agriculture would drive postrevolutionary development.  In addition to tin 
and petroleum, land was Bolivia’s most abundant natural resources.  Commercial 
agriculture, moreover, would decrease Bolivia’s dependence of imports.  Guevara found 
that 35 percent of imports consisted of non-manufactured goods of domestic origin, 
including sugar, beef, dairy products, rice, wheat, flour, cotton, and vegetable oil.278 By 
aligning Bolivia’s human and physical geography, Guevara sought not only to meet 
domestic demand, but to produce surplus agriculture for export. Sugar, for example, 
which accounted for a significant percentage of imports, could be produced in Santa 
Cruz, where the sparsely-populated plains and long growing seasons provided ideal 
conditions for commercial agriculture.  Corn, which was traditionally produced in 
Cochabamba, could also be produced in Santa Cruz, along with rice and soy (for 
vegetable oil).  Instead of corn, Guevara would induce Cochabamba farmers to grow 
wheat and while promoting the light industry necessary to produce milk, butter, and 
cheese.  The large semi-tropical savannahs of Beni were ideal for livestock and could 
substitute beef imports from Argentina.279   
                                                 
278 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 




The natural obstacle to this plan was, of course, the seigniorial order, which 
monopolized both the land and labor necessary for national development.  The agrarian 
reform law, which was in its most advanced stages of planning while Guevara drafted his 
development strategy, would change that.  Designed in accordance with the development 
objectives of the postrevolutionary government, the measure would redistribute large, 
unproductive estates to the peasants who worked them.  Once the agrarian reform law 
unshackled land and labor from the unproductive seigniorial order, Guevara proposed 
boosting production on the altiplano and valleys of the western higlands.  This effort, he 
asserted “tendrán como consecuencia, a la vez que un ahorro de divisa, un cambio 
favorable en el nivel general de alimentación de pueblo de Bolivia.”280 By introducing 
modern farming machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, new varieties of seed and livestock, 
the highlands could provide wheat, barley, and potatoes to La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí.   
Yet it was in the eastern lowlands, in the departments of Santa Cruz and Beni 
where the future of commercial agriculture lie.  The traditional centers of population and 
commerce in the western highlands were generally overcrowded, constituting only 33 
percent of the national territory yet holding 72 percent of the population.  The lowlands, 
on the other hand, which constituted 67 percent of the national territory, were scarcely 
inhabited, having only 28 percent of the population.281  Unlike the dry climate, shorter 
growing seasons, and acidic soils of the altiplano, the lowlands were ideally suited for 
extensive agriculture: there was abundant land, rich soil, an ideal growing climate, and 
favorable topography. Guevara estimated that meeting national consumption levels of 
sugar, rice, dairy, corn and other imported commodities would require about 87,000 
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hectares, or about 336 square miles, of land.282  The Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway, 
opened in 1954, finally linked highlands markets and lowland production, making very 
real the possibility of economic integration. In addition to transporting goods more 
cheaply and efficiently, the highway would allow the government to realize the lowland 
colonization in order to meet the burgeoning demand for agricultural workers. 
Guevara identified two sources of labor for lowland commercial agriculture.  “Se 
considera conveniente recibirla,” he wrote, “principalmente de países europeos.”283 
Though it remains unclear as to what motivated this statement, European immigration 
had long been seen as a means to improve Bolivia’s racial stock by “whitening” the 
predominantly indigenous population.  Perhaps realizing the unfeasibility of such an 
effort, however, Guevara conceded that internal migration would have to suffice.  
Working with the CBF, he sought to colonize the lowlands with campesinos recently 
freed from the highland estates.  Indian labor would drive large scale commercial 
agriculture orientated towards national production.  The effort would provide labor for 
ex-colonos and ex-comunarios from the highlands while simultaneously integrating them 
into the monetary economy.  Already in 1953, the government set the CBF to work on 
internal colonization.  The CBF initiated projects to resettle peasants from the La Paz 
altiplano and the valleys surrounding Cochabamba in agriculturally rich areas in Santa 
Cruz.284  Lowland colonization would also solve the problem of minifundio. As already 
limited parcels of land were further subdivided by generations of peasants, they would 
have little land left for cultivation and the economy would continue to stagnate as 
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highland production dwindled.  Lowland colonization thus offered a socioeconomic 
release valve.  It would redistribute land, people, and goods in postrevolutionary 
economy that was rationally planned and carefully planned by government technocrats.   
The success of postrevolutionary development was ultimately predicated upon the 
active participation of indigenous Bolivian in the commercial economy.  Their labor 
would drive the commercial agricultural economy, creating self-sufficiency by meeting—
and perhaps even exceeding—domestic demand.  It was not just their production that 
would transform the domestic economy, however, but their consumption as well.  By 
freeing 63 percent of the population from the seigniorial order, the agrarian reform would 
create the labor necessary to realize this goal. More importantly, it would double the size 
of the domestic market by integrating Indians into the monetary economy.  Once 
indigenous workers received cash for their labor, the government would transform over 
half the population traditionally marginalized in the national economy, into consumers, 
thus creating new opportunities for all sectors of the market.  If commercial agriculture 
was Bolivia’s economic salvation, then it was indigenous Bolivians who would realize 
national development.  Development thrust indigenous Bolivian into the center of the 
postrevolutionary imagination and fundamentally reconfigured their role in the nation.   
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE, RACE, AND DEVELOPMENT 
The postrevolutionary development strategy was designed according to the 
economic policy imperatives of the MNR leadership, but it was social science that 
rendered the entire undertaking credible.  Social scientific knowledge was an essential 
component of the modern development enterprise. Sociology, economics, anthropology, 




and indeed scientific approach to applied socioeconomic change.  They provided the 
information necessary to identify national problems, the data needed to measure their 
severity, and the knowledge required to effectively mitigate them. After April 1952, 
officials appealed to the revolutionary patriotism of the nation’s social scientists, calling 
on them to assist in postrevolutionary modernization.   
Sociology was particularly attractive to postrevolutionary officials. Not only was 
it the most developed social scientific discipline in Bolivia, but officials also agreed that 
sociologists were best prepared to confront the challenges posed by rural modernization. 
The Revolution, moreover, coincided with an on-going effort to professionalize Bolivian 
sociology by institutionalizing standard of sources, methods, and language in an 
academic setting.   The first national Bolivian Sociology Congress, in the works since 
March 1952 and planned for July 1952, would mark the beginning of an unprecedented 
collaboration between the state and sociologists—an important, though largely 
overlooked, relationship that would play no small part in shaping the Revolution and the 
role of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic. It is particularly notable as 
a site where changing ideas of race were both debated and consolidated.   
As an academic discipline, sociology was born of nineteenth-century 
positivism.285 Across Latin America, it emerged in a dynamic era of social change and 
economic modernization as intellectuals struggled both to understand and to order the 
increasingly complex societies within which they lived. 286  In Bolivia, it was Daniel 
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Sánchez Bustamante, Bautista Saavedra, and Alcides Arguedas who had shaped the 
disciple in the crucible of early twentieth century liberal modernization.287  Influenced by 
Comte, Le Bon, Spencer, as well as lesser-known continental and American thinkers, 
they applied theories of racial degeneration, moral decay, and social illness to Bolivia’s 
social reality. Ultimately, the body of knowledge they created served to justified creole 
minority rule by reaffirming the myth of European cultural and racial supremacy 
grounded in the secular authority of science.   
By the 1920s, however, a new generation of sociologists began to eschew 
positivism for the novel intellectual currents of Marxism and indigenismo. Most notable 
among this group of young political activists were Arturo Urquidi, Ernesto Ayala 
Mercado, and José Antonio Arze.  They merged their activism with their intellectual 
curiosity, emerging as important leaders (Arze and Urquidi in the PIR, Ayala in the POR) 
who, in subsequent years, would bridge social scientific research with their political 
activism.   
Arze was perhaps the most important figure among this emerging generation of 
Marxist sociologists.288  Born in Cochabamba in 1904, he studied both Letters and 
Science and Law at the Universidad Mayor de San Simón. He read José Ingenieros, 
Chilean labor activist, Luis Emilio Recabarren, and Italian-Argentine sociologist Victorio 
Codovilla.289  Alongside Urquidi, he played a leading role in the university reform 
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movement of the 1920s.290  He spent much of the 1930s in Peru and Chile.  It was during 
this time that he translated Louis Baudin’s and Georges Rouma’s scholarship into 
Spanish.291  Upon returning to Bolivia in 1940, he founded the PIR and also taught 
sociology at the University of San Francisco Xavier in Sucre.  He essayed on a variety of 
topics, spanning literature, Marxist philosophy, and intellectual history.  Exiled once 
again in the mid-1940s, this time to the U.S., he taught at Williams College in 
Massachusetts and at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an adult vocational school 
in New York funded by the U.S. communist party.292  In New York, Columbia University 
professor, Frank Tannenbaum invited him to participate in his famed Columbia 
University Seminars.  The two established a lasting friendship.  Indeed, they shared a 
similar intellectual trajectory, their academic careers deeply entwined with their political 
activism—Tannenbaum in U.S. anarcho-syndicalism, Arze in the Bolivian student and 
labor movement.293   
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Professionalizing sociology within the Bolivian academy was Arze’s career 
aspiration. Although most universities had established sociology departments by mid-
century, the discipline remained vaguely defined, politically subjective, and theoretical 
(as opposed to practical) in orientation.  Hoping to institutionalize standards of language, 
knowledge, and methodology, Arze founded the Instituto de Sociología Boliviano (IBSO) 
in Sucre in 1940.294  With Arze absent from Sucre for much of the decade, however, the 
ISBO disappeared.  In March 1952, Arze revived the effort, creating the Sociedad 
Boliviana de Sociología (SBS) at the Universidad Mayór de San Andrés (UMSA) in La 
Paz.  The SBS would provide the institutional framework necessary to professionalize 
Bolivian sociology according to standards recently established by the Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Sociología (ALAS).295  In April, just weeks after the Revolution, 
Arze announced the first national sociology conference to convene in La Paz in mid-July.  
The event was intended to assemble sociologists from all nine departments of the 
republic.  Their assigned task: identify the subjects of sociological inquiry, develop a set 
of questions to frame future research, establish a standard university curriculum, 
determine available resources for research, and to instill objectivity by explicitly 
detaching scientific inquiry from political persuasion. 296   
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The fledgling postrevolutionary government enthusiastically supported the 
congress.  President Paz praised the initiative and even provided state funds to finance it.  
Like other officials, he understood the important role that social science could render to 
postrevolutionary modernization.  “Es deber del Gobierno Nacional fomentar la cultura y 
actividades científicas particularmente con relación a la realidad social de nuestra país,” 
Paz explained as he signed the law.297 The government also provided free postal and 
telegraph services for conference planning and coordination.298  Guevara, himself a 
sociologist on the SBS board, used his influence as Foreign Minister to secure the 
attendance of notable foreign scholars, including his former University of Chicago 
advisor, Louis Wirth; UNAM sociologist, José Medina Echavarría; the ALAS President, 
Argentine sociologist Alfredo Poviña; and Frank Tannenbaum from Columbia.299 Only 
Tannenbaum and Porviña were able to attend.   
The July 1952 congress inaugurated an era of unprecedented collaboration 
between social scientists and the state.  Attending were government officials, labor 
leaders, foreign dignitaries, as well as the academic intellectual elite.  Notable 
participants included sociologists Arturo Urquidi Morales and Teddy Hartman, Félix 
Eguino Zaballa from the IIB, and several others who would go on to work for the 
postrevolutionary state.300  Walter Guevara Arze opened the event, remarking on the “útil 
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coincidencia” of its timing before encouraging increased cooperation between 
sociologists and government officials.301  “Las conclusiones a que pueden llegar, con 
respecto a los problemas de Bolivia, serán útiles al país de un modo general  y 
particularmente en las presentes circunstancias,” he explained. “Es por ello que el 
Gobierno ha prestado a esta reunión, efectiva ayuda y mira con la mejor voluntad la obra 
científica en la cual están ustedes empeñados.”302  In such transformative times, “nada 
más útil al país que una reunión de Profesores de Ciencias Sociales para estudiar tales 
problemas.”303   
Participants agreed.  Arze, in fact, recognized in the Revolution an opportunity to 
push sociology away from mere description and theory, towards a modern applied 
science.304 Urquidi felt the same. As rector of the Universidad de San Simon in 
Cochabamba, he had published several important tracts on the indigenous community 
since 1940.305  “Hasta hoy en Bolivia… se ha cultivado la sociología solamente en su 
aspecto teórico,” he observed. “Ahora se trata, al través de las entidades que se vienen 
formando, de imprimir una función practica a los principio y normas consagrados por la 
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ciencia sociológica.”306  Leading sociologists and government officials both sought to put 
sociology to the service of the state.  They would identify the underlying social problems 
affecting the republic, study them scientifically, and design prescriptive reforms in 
accordance with the broader modernizing objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership.   
Of all the challenges confronting the postrevolutionary republic, most concurred 
that it was the question of rural modernization where sociologists could be most helpful.  
Aside from issues related to the professionalization of sociology, the “Indian problem” 
was the most widely discussed topics at the congress.  In his inaugural address, Guevara 
had emphasized the issue, reminding the audience that “sobre tres millones y medio de 
habitantes, algo más de dos millones son indios.” He continued, “su desnutrición, su 
atraso cultural, su ausencia casi completa del mercado, al menos como consumida 
constituyan temas que sin duda han de ser planteados y estudiados por ustedes.”307  
Josermo Murillo Vacareza, essayist and ex-director of the Universidad Técnica de Oruro, 
presented several papers, including “El indio, el cholo, y el blanco,” “La higiene mental y 
le eugenesia en Bolivia,” and “Etiología de las sublevaciones indígnales.”  UMSA 
sociology profesor, Teddy Hartman, discussed “El Indio y su complejo de inferioridad.”  
Frank Tannenbaum presented, “El problema del negro en los Estados Unidos,” the first of 
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a four part lecture series sponsored by the SBS on comparative race relations in the 
Americas drawing from his recently-published landmark, Slave and Citizen.308   
Because several participants would go on to serve as key policymakers for the 
postrevolutionary state, the SBS congress provides a window onto the prevailing 
constructions of race in Bolivian social science while revealing the racial ideas that 
underlie the Revolution itself.  Tannenbaum’s lectures seems to have disappeared from 
the historical record, but Arze’s discussion of their inherent relevance for 
postrevolutionary Bolivia provides a glimpse upon the way in which Bolivian 
intellectuals framed their own problems of interethnic relations in a comparative context.  
Arze recognized that “el problema de negrismo” existed in Bolivia, but given the small 
afro-descendent population it was not “un problema de tan vital importancia como lo es, 
por ejemplo, en el Brasil o algunos países del Caribe.”  Nevertheless, Arze noted that 
“para nosotros” Tannenbaum’s essay was particularly relavant as the racial tensions in 
the United States “significación de primer plano el problema de nuestros indios Aymaras 
y quechuas, que constituyen más de dos tercios de la población total con respecto a los 
sectores mestizos y blanco.” Reviewing the history or race relations in the Americas, 
Arze argued that “habrá de excitar necesariamente nuestra curiosidad porque si en 
algunos países con porcentaje de población negra, hay una política de discriminación 
anti-negrista, en los países que tenemos grueso porcentaje de indios,” he pointed out, 
“hay una similar política de discriminación anti-indianista.”  Such thinking was “sin 
duda, incivilizadas y condeables.” 309   
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Arze’s engagement with Tannenbaum also reveals one of the channels through 
with Bolivian intellectuals began engaging cultural relativism at mid-century.  Arze 
explained to his Bolivian colleagues that Tannenbaum stood alongside “Franz Boaz y 
Ruth Benedict” as a new generation of progressive social scientists that “negar todo valor 
científico a aquella teoría racista que pretenden clasificar a los grupos étnicos en 
superiores e inferiors.” Arze melded cultural relativism with his own structural critique of 
race rooted in dialectical materialism.  He stated “la supuesta inferioridad cultural de 
aquellos grupos étnicos que solemos clasificar de ‘inferiores’ –como sucede con los 
negros a juicio de los blancos–, es una inferioridad que deriva de la estructura 
institucional –y especialmente de la económica– más bien que de presunto coeficientes 
biológicos o psicológicos atribuidos arbitrariamente a tal o cual raza.”310 Like other 
cultural relativists of his day, he saw culture as a bounded and distinct entity, which was 
determined by the economic and institutional structures of the state.   
Cultural relativism provided postrevolutionary intellectuals with a novel language 
of racial difference rooted in what Nancy Leys Stepan calls the “cognitive authority” of 
science.311 Since at least the 1940s, progressive Bolivian intellectuals had been exposed 
to the concept, primarily through their engagement with Mexican and Peruvian social 
science.  As Arze comments demonstrate, with the Revolution, cultural relativism 
assumed a central role in devising state policy. The idea eschewed the biological 
essentialism that had prevailed in Bolivian social thought since the beginning of the 
century, providing revolutionary leaders with new explanations of race and human 
difference that reaffirmed postrevolutionary national development and provided the 
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scientific rationale for indigenous improvability. The idea, moreover, affirmed the MNR 
leadership belief in the structural causes of indigenous backwardness and the inherent 
improvability of indigenous Bolivians.   Yet, while cultural relativism displaced racial 
hierarchies founded on biology, it simultaneously reaffirmed indigenous inferiority by 
locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution.312  According 
to such lines of thought, it followed that by uprooting, or at least reconfiguring such 
structures, the Revolution would once and for all establish a semblance of racial 
equality—at least in the legal sense.  
The SBS congress marked the beginning of a mutually constitutive relationship 
between sociology and the postrevolutionary state. As a result of their initiative as well as 
their high intellectuals standing, state officials increasingly called on social scientists to 
occupy important posts in the postrevolutionary state.  Arturo Urquidi would serve as a 
leading member of the agrarian reform committee.  Arze would chair a committee on the 
Education Reform Commission.  They were but two of several progressive intellectuals, 
who came of age in the post-Chaco generation of political upheaval and social reform, 
who would work tirelessly to transform the MNR leadership’s revolutionary vision into 
social policy. Scholarship commonly cites the participation of Urquidi and Arze as an 
indication of the labor left pressuring the MNR center to radicalize the revolution.313  Yet 
when explored in the context of Bolivian intellectual history, it becomes clear that Arze 
and Urquidi were the most established sociologists of their day, who, in some capacity or 
                                                 
312 This new “cultural racism” is dicussed at length in Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous Mestizos: The 
Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000;  See also 
Laura Gotkowitz, “Racisms of the Present and the Past in Latin America,” Histories of Race and Racism: 
The Andes and Mesoamerica form Colonial Times to the Present (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 
pp. 1-56.    
313 See, for example, Luis Antezana E., Proceso y sentencia a la reforma agraria en Bolivia (La Paz: 




another, had been studying “el problem indígena” for decades.314 Their incorporation into 
the revolutionary project was motivated not by ideological struggles within the 
postrevolutionary leadership, but by a pragmatic recognition that they were the best 
qualified to attend to the most pressing socioeconomic question of the day.  In a personal 
letter to Minister of Peasant Affairs Ñuflo Chávez, for instance, Arze wrote, “han 
proyectado invitarnos a integrar la Comisión de la reforma agraria, ha sido en visto de 
nuestros antecedentes de profesores de Sociología.” He reminded the minister that 
although “somos comunistas” they were uniquely prepared to “servir el patria”—
especially given their training in rural sociology.315 In the coming years, as they devised 
the most important reforms affecting indigenous integration, they would move cultural 
relativism to the center of state policy, where it would become the pillar of the “raceless” 
society imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.  
 
AGRARIAN REFORM 
On January 20, 1953, President Paz established the Comisión de la Reforma 
Agraria (Agrarian Reform Commission, CRA) to draft a land reform law consistent with 
the postrevolutionary national development strategy. Though nominally led by Vice 
President Hernán Siles, it was Arturo Urquidi Morales and Ernest Anaya Mercado, who 
carried out the majority of the research necessary to study the problem and prepared the 
committee’s final recommendations.  Their objective: “hacer todo cuanto fuere necesario 
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para superar la etapa feudal del agro boliviano, incorporar a las masas campesinos a la 
vida económica, política, social y cultural de la nación y dirigir mediante planificación la 
económica agraria.”316  In addition to policy statements made by leading government 
officials, the committee was also guided by historical precedents.  CRA officials 
referenced agrarian reform laws passed in China, Guatemala, Mexico, and the Soviet 
Union.317  Responding to the exigencies of rural modernization, the CRA mapped the 
critical role of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic.  The making of the 
agrarian reform decree demonstrates how economic policy converged with prevailing 
currents of cultural relativism to shape one of the most important measures affecting 
postrevolutionary citizenship for indigenous Bolivians. 
In explaining agrarian reform to the public, Paz emphasized the economic benefits 
that it would bring not only to Indians themselves, but the middle-class.  On February 13, 
1953, at the opening of the sixth MNR convention, he reasoned that land reform “va a 
abrir las posibilidades para la burguesía boliviana, crezca y se enriquezca como no ha 
podido hacerlo bajo el dominio de la rosca.” To demonstrate how, he pointed to Mexico.  
He related the story of a small theater owner in Torreón who worried that agrarian reform 
would drive out his customers—members of the local landed class—and destroy his 
business. Seeking to assuage his concerns, a government official explained that to the 
contrary, agrarian reform, “iban a crearse condiciones económicas tales que para los 
hombres de empresas progresistas como el iban a haber mucho mejores posibilidades de 
hacer negocios en Torreón.” Some years later, when the theater owner ran into the same 
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government official, he thanked him and told him that he now owned four movie theaters.  
“Y eso sucedió así porque antes de la Reforma Agraria había solamente quince miles 
habitantes que podían ir al cine en Torreón,” Paz explained. “Con la Reforma Agraria la 
población había crecido a ciento cincuenta mil habitantes y miles y miles de campesinos 
tenían ya el suficiente poder adquisitivo como para poder ir al cine.” After applause, the 
President stated, “Esto es la reforma agraria, compañeros, y de ahí por que no deben 
asustarse, y mas bien ser grandes partidarios de ella, los campañeros de la clase media, 
pequeña burguesía y burguesía nacional.”318  As Paz and other MNR leaders had been 
arguing for over a decade, agrarian reform was a necessary measure that was compatible 
with capitalist development and intended to expand the domestic market.   
As head of MAC, Ñuflo Chávez also played a central role in orientating the CRA 
as they set out on their task. In January 1953, Chávez drafted a policy piece, “El 
problema indigena en Bolivia,” and circulated it to state ministers, the MNR leadership, 
the COB leadership, as well as sociologists working with the CRA.319  Chávez situated 
the contemporary Indian problem within a much longer history of the development of 
Andean civilization, from migration from Asia, through the phases of Tiwanaku, Inca 
rule, the Spanish Conquest, and finally, the Republican era.  The essay provides insight 
into the way influential MNR policymakers understood the Indian problem, its origins, 
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and its resolution. The essay also provides a vivid example of how the structural and 
telluric explainations of indigenous alterity merged with cultural relativism in the 
postrevolutionary imagination to contour ideas of race, development, and nation.    
Chávez opened the piece by repudiating an influential body of sociology that had 
cast the Indian problem in racial terms, which he lamented, had led to “falsas conclusions 
de inferioridad racial de nuestros indios.”320 He eschewed biological difference, 
articulating race instead in terms of ethnicity and culture. “Es evidente que resulta 
diferencias étnicas entre grupos humanos,” he ceded. “Pero ellas más que a una relación 
de inferioridad o superioridad determinada por el color o la morfología, obedecen a una 
relación de aptitudes por la especialización de funciones configurada por el medio en que 
viven.”321  In this way, he continued, “la diferencia raciales son solo diferencia de 
aptitudes, podemos hablar de la particular importancia que tiene el facto étnico en el 
desarrollo de los pueblos, influye en las diferencias de culturas, determinadas por el 
medio y los elementos de la técnica que van descubriendo los grupos en el proceso de su 
desarrollo.”322 For Chávez, the environment was the primary factor in determining 
indigenous culture.   
True, environmental explanations of indigenous backwardness loomed large in 
the writings of Saavedra, Sanchez, Arguedas, and other early-twentieth-century social 
thinkers, who framed the “Indian problem” in telluric and neo-Lamarckian terms.  
Chávez’s discussion demonstrates how postrevolutionary social thought diverged from 
earlier official constructions of race. The primary concern of Chávez was not necessarily 
how the environment shaped people (and how those traits were subsequently passed 
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down), but rather how it determined technological innovation—that is the level of 
achieved culture.  Thus it was not the effect of climate and geology on human evolution 
that determined the backward state of Indians, but the ways in which these factors 
determined the development of Andean culture by way of technology. When humans first 
settled on the sweeping altiplano—an arid and treeless landscape lacking large mammals 
such as bison or cattle—agriculture was the only means to sustain themselves. As they 
adapted to their new sedentary societies, they developed specific technologies determined 
by the landscape in which they lived.  Andean civilization failed to invent the wheel not 
out of ignorance, Chávez reasoned, but because there were no trees in the region.  Indians 
lived in thatched-roof adobe huts because mud, gravel, and grass were the only things 
available to construct shelter. The development of Andean society thus had nothing to do 
with biology and everything to do with culture—that is nurture, as opposed to nature.  
Adaptation to sedentary life on the altiplano not only determined the level of 
achieved culture through the technology available to Indians, but it also determined the 
socioeconomic organization of Andean civilization.  Chávez dismissed the work of Louis 
Boudin and others who idealized the Andean ayllu as incipient communism characterized 
by a lack of private property and communal land holding. 323  Although Andeans may 
have practiced communal land holding, Chávez demonstrated that notions of private 
property were firmly embedded in highland socioeconomic practices.  Delving into a 
gendered exploration of Andean family, he asserted that the private property was a 
natural phenomenon, resulting from a sedentary patriarchal order in which fathers passed 
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property to their sons. It was this formative moment that shaped pre-conquest Andean 
civilization, he argued, stating that “es pues una cultura producto de la tierra y da la falta 
de técnica.”324 Understanding this formative period in the development of Andean 
civilization was, he asserted, was absolutely critical to understand the present state of 
rural social in Bolivia. First the Inca, then the Spanish, and finally the Republican state 
maintained Indians in a state of backwardness because they were interested in nothing but 
extracting tribute in the form of goods and labor.  Indians never had an opportunity to 
develop more advanced technologies or cultures because the structures of colonial and 
neo-colonial rule impeded their evolution.    
Chávez concluded the essay by outlining a broad strategy for agrarian reform.  “El 
problema del indio es pues sencillo de fijar en sus raíces,” wrote Chávez.325 Eching 
arguments made by Arze at the SBS conference, he asserted that, “lo complejo es la 
superestructura creada por la dominación; en sus raíces este problema es el problema de 
la desposesión de la tierra y de desconocimiento de la rueda.”326 If Indians were not 
racially inferior, if the Indian problem was merely the result of technological 
backwardness rooted in ancient times and maintained by colonial and neocolonial rule, 
then once freed from the structures of the hacienda regime, Indians were capable of 
becoming a progressive force of national development.  “Plateando así el problema, como 
problema de dominación feudal, merced a la propiedad de la tierra y el atraso de la 
técnica, toda reforma agraria en Bolivia, debe tocar ambos aspectos fundamentales.” 327 
Only by addressing the root questions of “property” and “technology, could “la 
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superación de la etapa feudal” be achieved.328  He advocated reverting ownership of large 
unproductive haciendas to the state, which would then rent it to the peasants who worked 
them.  While the ayllu had long been dismissed as an atavistic socioeconomic institution 
that impeded progress, Chávez proclaimed that the land “debe revertir al domino de 
estado para ser entregado a los trabajadores con propiedad común.” To return to private 
property “seria dar un salto atrás,” he argued. “Es preciso ver en las bases de la 
comunidad, las bases para una posición exploración colectiva con fondos cooperativos 
que justifique económicamente la inversión de capital en maquinarias para mecanizar el 
campo y romper al atraso técnico de los Incas que pervive hasta nuestros días.” 329    
For five months, from March to July 1953, the CRA worked tirelessly to devise a 
reform that was consistent with the objectives of national development.  As the 
committee set to work, they were guided not only by Chávez’s policy statement on the 
Indian problem, but also by statements by Paz and Siles, who emphasized the need to 
increase domestic production and diversify the economy. “El objetivo primordial de la 
Reforma agraria,” explained Siles upon his appointment as president of the CRA, “es la 
emancipación económica y social del campesino para que liberado de las cadenas 
feudales se incorpore plenamente a la dinámica nacional y concurra como productor en 
vasta escala.”330 The goal of the agrarian reform, as imagined by the postrevolutionary 
leadership, was to transform subsistence-based indigenous communities into producers 
and consumers in a modern, integrated economy.  
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In designing an agrarian reform intended to transform an unproductive and feudal 
agricultural structure into a modern commercial economy, the CRA was divided on two 
primary issues.  The first was property rights.  The MNR leadership remained committed 
to private property—which it had demonstrated with its willingness to indemnify the 
mine owners after the nationalization against the objections of the COB and the party left.  
In terms of land, the guiding principle, enshrined in the 1938 constitution, was that 
property must serve a “función social.”  The CRA agreed, stating “la grandes propiedades 
rurales, por los sistemas arcaicos ampliados en su explotación y las formas de 
servidumbre en el trabajo, no han cumplido su función social y se han convertido, más 
bien, en un obstáculo para el progreso del país.”331  While most seemed generally to 
agree on what constituted a latifundio, the question was whether or not the property 
owners should be indemnified, and who—the state or the new owners—should pay for 
the properties.  Ayala argued that the latifundios should be expropriated “sin 
indemnización” and that the land should be distributed “a los campesinos que la 
trabajen.”332  Urquidi disagree, asserting that land owners should be compensated for 
their lost lands according to the 1950 cadastral survey. Campesinos themselves should be 
responsible for payment, to instill “un concepto de responsabilidad social y obligarles a 
que produzcan por encima de sus necesidades y concurran al mercando para abastecer a 
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los central urbanos.”333 Indemnification would teach indigenous Bolivians not only the 
value of money, but it would instill a sense of financial responsibility within them.   
The second issue that divided the CRA was the indigenous community, or ayllu.  
The committee generally agreed that both the latifundio and the ayllu were pre-capitalist 
socio-economic institutions incompatible with the commercial agricultural economy 
imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. Urquidi studied the historical development 
of Bolivia agrarian economy drawing from Marx, Engles, Lenin as much as Darwin, 
Boas, and Durkheim to place the particular experience of rural Indians in universal 
paradigms of social and economic development. Like Chávez, he argued that first the 
Inca, then the Spanish, and finally the republican hacienda regime had stunted the 
historical evolution of Andean civilization. In order “ingresar en un regimen capitalista,” 
he argued that was necessary to abolish “estas formas arcaicas y feudales de 
producción.”334 He remained pragmatic, however; recognizing the impossibility of 
abolishing the hard-fought legal rights of the community and the important role played by 
the ayllu in structuring rural social relations. He argued that “la cuestión de las 
comunidades indígenas tiene que ser encarada con criterio practico y realista, sujeto a los 
imperativos históricos del momentos.”335 Rather that abolish the ayllu, he posited that 
“sus miembros tienen que ser protegidos en su calidad de campesinos, de trabajadores 
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agrícolas, e incorporados al movimiento de liberación social y nacional en que se halla 
empañado el pueblo boliviano.”336  Just as early liberal reformers had proposed decaded 
before, the postrevolutionary government would protect Indians in their natural 
environment as agricultural workers.  
If such a statement resembled earlier sentiments of the liberal reformers who 
sought to place the Indian in their natural environment, it departed from such views in 
that he argued that the community could serve as a progressive unit of capitalist 
development.  The solution was to transform rural indigenous communities into agrarian 
cooperatives, which would “facilitaría en mucho la concesión de créditos, la tecnificación 
de los cultivos y la acción educativa del Estado sobre la población campesina 
concentrada en dichas comunidades.”337  In so doing, the government would orientate the 
communities “hacia una organización de tipo capitalista, con todas las consecuencias 
inherentes a este sistema de producción.” He concluded, “ya es tiempo, en efecto, de que 
estas organizaciones abandonen de una vez su producción de mera subsistencia y se 
incorporen a una economía francamente mercantil o de cambio.”338   Anaya similarly 
argued that the ayllu must be conserved as a unit for rural socioeconomic development, 
and the postrevolutionary state should take advantage of “su unidad económica y moral, 
tanto en el trabajo colectivo como en la cooperacion de brazo y voluntades que ella 
entraña.”339  Like Urquidi, he also argued that the state “debe tenderse a su 
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transformación efeciva [sic] bajo el sistema cooperativo, modernizándola y tecnificándola 
en todos los aspectos.”340    
At the same time, however, the committee urged patience.  “Naturalmente, no se 
puede esperar que dicha transformación se apere en forma espontanea,” Urquidi warned, 
“dada la ignorancia y el espíritu esencialmente conservador del indígena.”  Even as 
officials subscribed to cultural constructions of human difference, they continued to 
assign indigenous Bolivians essential characteristics associated with biology.  National 
integration would thus take time and the state would have to assume an active role in 
shepherding indigenous Bolivians into modern society.  “Será, pues, indispensable que el 
Estado se preocupe de elevar las condiciones de existencia y de cultura de estos nucleos 
aborígenes, a fin de promover, en ellos inquietudes superiores e inculcarles una nueva 
concepción de la vida, de tal manera que al sentir la precio de necesidades poco 
habituales, se vean precisados, por si mismos, a vencer la inercia de sus costumbres y 
ponerse al ritmo de la marcha social de nuestros días.”341 The CRA shared with state 
official the belief that the state could not assume a passive role in acculturating Indians as 
they assumed their new role in the postrevolutionary republic, compelling them to 
overcome their cultural “inercia” in order to embrace western cultural norms and modern 
technology.  “No podemos, en una época en que el mundo utiliza el avión supersónico, la 
televisión, el radar, seguir trabajando las tierras dentro de un sistema que correspondía a 
una época anterior a la invención de la imprenta,” Paz had told the CRA as they set to 
work.342  Agrarian reform would only succeed only if accompanied by technical 
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education that emphasized technical agriculture practices, promoted market participation, 
and encouraged modern forms of socioeconomic organization.   
President Paz signed the resultant agrarian reform decree into law on August 2, 
1953, before over 100,000 campesino at Urcereña, the site of widespread grassroots 
peasant mobilization.  Paz announced that “Hoy, se abre un periodo absolutamente nuevo 
en la historia de nuestro país; más que dos millones y medio de campesinos se incorporan 
a la vida nacional, con una nueva situación económica que les permitirá desarrollar todas 
las cualidades de la personalidad humana” The decree recognized communal property 
rights, redistributed large, unproductive estates to the colonos who worked them, and 
decreed indemification in the form of twenty-five year bonds.343  Later that afternoon, 
Paz returned to La Paz to speak at a popular rally in support of the measure. There, he 
emphasized the measure as necesary for economic progress.  He stated “Hemos levantado 
de nuestro camino la traba que impedía nuestro progreso, porque el régimen feudal que 
imperaba en el campo obstaculizaba el desarrollo de nuestra agricultura, limitaba las 
posibilidades de la industria y, era en fin, la causa del malestar general, de la miseria, del 
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atraso en que vivía el pueblo de Bolivia.”344 Not only would the agrarian reform attend to 
the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice by granting colonos 
titles to the lands they worked. But, more importantly, it would free both land and labor 
from the unproductive haciendas, thus integrating Indians into the monetary economy.  It 
would abolish one of the most entrenched structural obstacles standing between Bolivia 
and modern nationhood.  
 
RURAL EDUCATION AND INDIGENOUS CITIZENSHIP 
While the agrarian reform law reconfigured the relationship between Indians and 
the national economy, it was rural education that would assure their integration into the 
republic as the active consumers and producers imagined by the postrevolutionary 
leadership.  Although the government had eliminated the structural barriers of indigenous 
citizenship, integration would be a gradual process, predicated upon the embrace of so-
called “western” civilization.  “No es cuestión de pocos años,” responded Felíx Eguino 
Zaballa—(who as director of the IIB directly participated in the postrevolutionary rural 
education initiative) to an inquiry into the social status of indigenous Bolivians after the 
Revolution.  “Pero por medio de los Núcleos de Educación Campesino, y la Dirección 
General de Educación Fundamental, el indio se irá integrando gradualmente en la masa 
integra de la nacional espiritualmente.”345  The intent of rural education was to provide 
the newly-integrated indigenous population with the Spanish literacy, basic arithmetic, 
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and agrarian technical training required for economic development and social 
modernization.  They would have to be shepherded away from subsistence-based 
communities towards extensive agriculture.  Postrevolutionary proposals for rural 
education provide some of the most striking examples of how progressive conceptions of 
social difference contributed to new forms of ethnic exclusion.346 Rural curricula, 
moreover, illuminates the idealized image if the campesino within which officials aspired 
to remake indigenous Bolivians.  Rural education served as the primary site of indigenous 
assimilation into the postrevolutionary republic.       
In April 1952, rural education was already well underway.  In the reformist 
atmosphere of the post-Chaco era, the government had supported grassroots education 
initiatives at Warista, Vacas, Caiza D, where local activists devised a grassroots 
pedagogy derived from existing forms of rural communities, centered on the ayllu, and 
respecting indigenous language and culture.  During the 1940s, the Villarroel-MNR 
regime began to co-opt grassroots rural education initiatives, placing them under the 
official purviews of the Ministry of Education.  By the eve of the Revolution, Bolivia had 
one of the most developed rural education programs in the Americas.  Despite such 
efforts, the national illiteracy rate continued to soar at 68 percent.  In the countryside 
where Spanish was often unknown and Aymara and Quechua remained the dominant 
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languages, illiteracy was even higher. In La Paz, for example, only 32.7 percent of the 
population spoke Spanish, in Potosí, that figure decreased to 21.2 percent. 347  Asthenio 
Averanga, Director General de Estadística y Censo for MAC, commented in El Diario in 
1954 that, “The problem is to transform the 63% of the national population that is 
indigenous into modern economic types.” He remarked that “This is like repopulating the 
country.”348  Rural education would provide the means to repopulate Bolivia with a 
Spanish-speaking and modernized campesino orientated toward national economic 
production.   
Rural education was but one component of the sweeping education reform that the 
postrevolutionary government introduced in 1955.  In line with its broader vision of 
expanding the role of the state to ensure the well-being of society, the officials saw 
education not as a privilege reserved for a small creole minority, but as a right to be 
shared by all citizens.  Under the oft-repeated slogan, “en vez de educación de castas, 
educación de masas,” the government sought to create a national curriculum that would 
transcend regionalism to unify the postrevolutionary republic, promote nationalism, and 
prepare a new generation of technical experts to assist in national development.  Paz 
established the Comisión de Reforma Educativa (Education Reform Committee, CRE) in 
July 1953 and appointed Fernando Diez de Medina—essayist, literary critic, and 
occasional politician—to preside over it. Diez de Medina saw it as his responsibility to 
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prepare a traditional, backward, and fragmented society for a new era of national unity, 
economic development, and social modernization.  The “formación integral del hombre 
boliviano,” he argued, necessitated the creation of a national education system “de 
filiación Cristiana, de forma democrática, de contenido nacionalista y revolucionaria”—
one that inculcated morality, ethics, aesthetics, responsibility, civic duty, and 
patriotism.349 Diez de Medina broke the committee broke into several sub-commissions, 
assigning rural education reform to Vicente Lema from the Educación Fundamental 
office of MAC, Lionidas Calvimontes from the Ministry of Education, and José Antonio 
Arze representing teachers unions.  
In devising postrevolutionary rural education reform, the CRE was advised by a 
host of international assistance missions that had emerged as part of the broader post-war 
development enterprise.  The Servicio Cooperativa Interamericana de Educación 
(SCIDE) had been working on rural education in Bolivia since the 1940s.350 By the mid-
1950s, the UN had partnered with other prominent international bodies, including the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
to coordinate developmental assistance programs for Bolivia and other Andean republics.  
In 1950, it established the Andean Mission to channel social scientific expertise—often 
lacking in the host countries—and development capital to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.  
“Educación Fundamental” was a central component of this effort.  Educación 
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Fundamental encompassed a broad range of prescriptive reforms intended to socially 
uplift indigenous peoples across the Americas and mobilize them for socioeconomic 
development.351  It worked to improve the lives of indigenous peoples in five key areas: 
“1) Defensa y mejoramiento de la salud; 2) mejoramiento de la vida economica; 3) 
mejoramiento del hogar; 4) Recreaciones y mejor empleo del tiempo libre, y 5) 
conocimientos básicos.”352  
Officials adopted the objectives of Educación Fundamental as the foundation for 
postrevolutionary indigenous education.  Even before the CRE was established, MAC 
officials set to work with SCIDE and ILO to study the educational needs of the newly 
integrated indigenous population that would prepare them for their role in economic 
development. The government revealed its commitment to this effort in May 1952 with 
the creation of the Dirección de Educación Fundamental within the MAC bureaucracy. 
Luis Carrasco, director of the new office, observed that with the Revolution, “el problema 
del indio se ha traslado de la periferia al centro” of the national consciousness.353 “Sabían 
ya,” he continued “que esos seres, no solo precisaban saber leer y escribir, sinos que lo 
mas fundamental, era elevar su nivel de vida, mediante practica de agropecuaria, higiene 
y convivencia social, para después recién incorporales como miembros activos de la 
comunidad.”354  Working in conjunction with the III and individual governments, the UN 
founded the Centro Regional de Educación Fundamental para el Desarrollo de la 
Comunidad en American Latina (CREFAL) in 1951. It established its headquarters in 
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Patzcuaro, Michoacán, Mexico, the site of the first Inter-American indigenous congress 
in 1940 and the emerging epicenter of research into the so-called Indian problem.  By 
focusing on key areas of agricultural technology, rural industry, Spanish literacy, 
hygiene, sanitation, dress, home maintenance, and alimentation, Educación Fundamental 
was intended to transform indigenous Bolivians into a modernized and integrated 
peasantry orientated toward national development.355   
Working in conjunction with a host of international specialists, the CRE set out to 
identify the shortcoming of indigenous education and develop a curriculum particularly 
suited for rural modernization.  Because the goals of rural schooling remained distinct 
from those of urban education, the CRE decided to maintain a segregated education 
system.  Once the reform was enacted, the MAC’s Dirección General de Educación 
Fundamental would administer rural schools while the Ministerio de Education would 
oversee urban schooling.  Asserting that classical pedagogy was ill-suited for the realities 
of rural life, rural teachers had, since at least the 1940s, emphasized agrarian technical 
training, hygiene and sanitation, and basic literacy and arithmetic skills necessary for 
social uplift and market integration.  Yet the schools proved ineffective.  In his report to 
the CRE, for instance, Vicente Lema lamented that despite efforts to reform the 
curriculum, rural teachers continued to teach “un conjunto insípido, inconexo, teórico y a 
menudo estéril de ‘conocimientos,’ informaciones o noticias que en muy poco o en nada 
contribuye a hacer de nuestros niños campesinos mejores niños de los que son y mejores 
hombres y mujeres de lo que actualmente son sus padres.” 356 Despite the advances made 
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in rural education during previous decades, he concluded that “nuestros actuales 
programas de educación rural no facilitan, en suma, el proceso de liberación cultural, de 
civilización y de mejoramiento del nivel de vida de nuestra masa mayoritaria de la 
población nacional, sino que, pro el contrario, lo entrapacen y postergan.”357 
The CRE was not so much concerned with devising a new curriculum for rural 
schools. With its emphasis on modern agricultural methods, basic literacy and arithmetic, 
hygiene and sanitation, and the domestic household, Educación Fundamental already 
provided the basic outline for the postrevolutionary government’s modernization 
fantasies and attended to the goals of indigenous integration.  Rather, the CRE had to 
determine what reforms were necessary to make the system more effective, more 
efficient, more cost-effective, and to ensure that the program reached every corner of 
rural society.  To this end, in its final report, the sub-committee on rural education 
recommended increasing the number of teacher training schools (Escuelas Normales 
Rurales), rational geographic distribution of schoolhouses, more effective bureaucratic 
organization, oversight system to ensure the effectiveness of individual teachers and 
specific schools, and devising a standardized curriculum for all teacher training 
colleges.358   
The most contentious issue was whether or not Spanish, the official national 
language, should be the primary language of rural education.  The grand majority of the 
rural population remained monolingual in Aymara and Quechua.  Only 36 percent of the 
total population spoke Spanish.  In the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro, 
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Spanish was spoken by only 30 and 32 percent of the population, respectively.  The 
figures were lower still for the departments of Cochabamba and Potosi, where only 20 
percent of the population knew Spanish.359  Lema, for example, advocated monolingual 
instruction in Spanish.  “Utilizar procedimiento pedagógicos lingüísticos que sin 
disminuir, y si mas bien, exaltar y desarrollar los valores culturales nativos,” he stated, 
“faciliten una evolución necesariamente rápida del hombre del campo y una asimilación 
racional de los valores y practicas de la cultura nacional.”360 Only in rare cases where “la 
escuela funcione en centros donde el castellano aun no tiene un uso funcional apreciable 
en la población” would instruction in indigenous languages take place.361 Lema, however, 
was apparently overruled.  In accordance with the recommendations of the III on the 
efficacy of bilingual education—particularly in rural primary schools—the final draft of 
the law advocated teaching in both Spanish and native tounges. 
The resultant Education Code of 1955 provided a comprehensive reform for rural 
education that would prepare indigenous Bolivians for their role as modernized producers 
and consumers in postrevolutionary society.  From Spanish literacy to the basic 
arithmetic required for market transactions, from hygiene, sanitation, and personal health 
to maintaining a modern household, rural education would slowly and meticulously teach 
indigenous children to become modern citizens.  The primary objectives outlined by the 
committee revealed are worth quoting at length: 
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1) Desarrollar en el campesinos Buenos hábitos de vida con relación a su 
alimento, higiene y salud, vivienda, vestuario y conducta personal y social; 2) 
Alfabetizarlo mediante el empleo funcional y dominio de los instrumentos básico 
del aprendizaje, la lectura, la escritura y la aritmética; 3) Enseñarle a ser un bueno 
trabajador agropecuario, ejercitándolo en el empleo de sistemas renovadas de 
cultivos y crianza de animales, y realizando los principios de la educación 
fundamental; 4) Estimular y desarrollar sus aptitudes vocacionales, ensañándole 
los fundamentos de las industrias rurales de su región, y capacitándolo para 
ganarse la vida a través del trabajo manual productivo; 5) Cultivar en el 
campesinado el amor a las tradiciones y al folklore nacionales.  Desarraigar las 
practicas del alcoholismo, del uso de la coca, las supersticiones y los prejuicios 
dominantes en el agro, mediante una educación científica; 6) Desarrollar en los 
campesinos una conciencia cívica que les permita participar activamente en el 
proceso de emancipación económica y cultural de la comunidad rural.362   
 
It was nothing short of a utopian social engineering program meant to assimilate 
indigenous Bolivia and prepare them for their central role in economic development. 
Adults would also benefit from the expanded Educación Fundamental program, which 
included an aggressive national literacy campaign that intended to enable rural folk to 
communicate in Spanish, if only for market transactions.  Rural schools would be 
established to provide night classes for adults to teach proper sanitation and hygiene and, 
of course, modern agricultural practices.363   
Though not necessarily novel, the postrevolutionary rural education initiative 
addressed the shortcomings of the existing system.  Indeed, universal suffrage and 
agrarian reform had made rural education reform more urgent than ever, and through 
expanding the teacher training programs, reforming the existing bureaucracy to be more 
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efficient, and a establishing a more rational geographical organization of school, the rural 
schoolhouse would emerge as the primary site of indigenous assimilation and rural 
modernization.  Education was the key to resolving the indian problem.  And as one 
participant of the CRE noted, “El problema del indio es el problema de la república y su 
rendición, la rendición nacional.364  Rural education would provide the postrevolutionary 
republic the means necessary to overcome the traditional past and to construct a new, 
modern nation. It also represented the primary site of indigenous acculturation and state-
directed social uplift. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Returning to the questions that opened this chapter: what were the underlying 
motivations of indigenous integration?  Was it simply a manifestation of the 
postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice and participant democracy, 
or were there deeper motivations underlying the process?  By revising the place that 
indigenous Bolivians occupied in the economic policies and development imagination of 
the MNR leadership, how those ideas were put into practices after 1952, and the racial 
logic underlying them, this chapter reveals that indigenous integration was a 
modernization imperative.  It was motivated by the need to create an integrated and 
diversified market economy, and ultimately to establish a sovereign, self-sufficient 
economy, which was, after all, the primary objective of the postrevolutionary 
development strategy. 
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After 1952, postrevolutionary officials translated the state-capitalist model 
imagined by the MNR leadership into the most ambitious national development program 
in Bolivian history. In designing the strategy, Guevara hoped not simply to overcome 
traditional obstacles of democracy and geography, but to transform them into an 
advantage. Aligning population and geography in a rational, state-directed economic 
development strategy, Guevara staked the success of economic development on lowland 
commercial agriculture. In so doing, he simultaneously mapped the place of the 
integrated Indian in the postrevolutionary republic.  The making of the agrarian reform 
and rural education laws—indeed the principal measures attending to indigenous 
integration—reveals that Indians would not be integration as “Indians,” but rather as a 
modernized peasantry—the campesino—whose production and consumption would drive 
economic growth and assure postrevolutionary modernization.  The postrevolutionary 
government thus staked the success of postrevolutionary development upon the active 
participation of indigenous Bolivians.   
The modernization fantasies of the postrevolutionary leadership were founded on 
changing currents of racial thought. In the 1920s, the structural interpretations that would 
come to characterize the post-Chaco generation, lifted the burden of biology from the 
Indian problem by locating the source of indigenous backwardness not in biology, nor in 
geography, but in the socioeconomic structures of the capitalist economy in general and 
the hacienda regime in particular.  In the 1940s, structuralism merged with cultural 
relativism—which was arriving by way of Mexico and the United States—in the thinking 
of reformist intellectuals.  Instead of racial type rooted in biology, Indians were 
understood as belonging to distinct cultural formations, each being the result of specific 




uplift that that was central to the successful implementation of the national development 
strategy. After the revolution, cultural relativism and national development converged in 
the revolutionary imagination. Cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on 
biology, while at the same time reaffirming indigenous inferiority by locating Andean 
civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution.  
 It was ultimately the relationship between the postrevolutionary government and 
social scientists that marked the consolidation of novel, though equally exclusive, racial 
paradigms founded on cultural, rather than biological or environmental, factors.  Social 
scientific knowledge was critical to the post-War development enterprise as it emerged in 
a new international order.  Recognized the important role that sociologists in particular 
could provide to the national development initiative, state officials sponsored the July 
1952 SBS conference.  The conference marked the beginning of the collaborative 
relationship between social scientists and the state, as progressive sociologists such as 
Arturo Urquidi and José Antonio Arze who became affiliated with the state and would 
play an important role devising the rural modernization policies of the postrevolutionary 
state.  As the chapters that follow demonstrate, this relationship between social science 
and the state would play no small part in rearticulating postrevolutionary indigenous 








Popular Statecraft: The Mechanics of Postrevolutionary Nation-State 
Formation 
 
The first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory. Destroy its books, its culture, 
its history. Then you have somebody write new books, manufacture a new culture, invent 
a new history. Before long the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was. 
-Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 
 
Si hablamos de educación y revolución cultural en el campo, no existe mejor invento que 
el de la radio. 
-Ministry of Peasant Affairs Official, 1954 
 
A partir de 1952, todo deberá resolverse teniendo en cuenta a los indios, que se vuelven, 
por vez primera y para siempre, en hombres interiores al marco del estado, hecho que 
implica una vasta democratización de la sociedad boliviana. 
-René Zavaleta Mercado 
 
On September 23, 1956, when the Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian 
Socialist Flange, FSB) attempted, yet again, to overthrow the postrevolutionary 
government, they chose an unlikely target.  The presidential palace, the coveted prize for 
most anti-government rebellions, was not their objective on this particular Saturday.  The 
FSB instead targeted the mass media and propaganda offices of the postrevolutionary 
state.  Armed right-wing insurgents led an angry mob first to the offices of the official 
newspaper, La Nación, where they sacked the place and destroyed the printing presses.  
The growing mob then made its way to the headquarters of the Subsecretaría de Prensa, 
Informaciones y Cultura (SPIC), the government propaganda office, where they roughed 
up employees, destroyed the studios of Radio Illimani, looted the building, and then set 
fire to the whole mess.  In the course of a single afternoon, the FSB destroyed the entire 




governing apparatus.365 Hernán Siles, just recently inaugurated as President, declared a 
state of siege, the first of the many that would define his conflictive leadership of the 
postrevolutionary republic.  
The FSB recognized something in the postrevolutionary government that 
continues to elude the historiography of the Bolivian National Revolution: that mass 
media and propaganda were not just integral to the MNR’s governing style and political 
legitimacy, but they were at the very heart of postrevolutionary statecraft. Following the 
April insurrection, the MNR leadership inherited a weak state with a limited institutional 
capacity.  To compensate for what it lacked in physical presence, the postrevolutionary 
leadership turned to propaganda.  It was a strategy that the MNR had refined during in 
the 1940s during its years in opposition and exile and, once it took control of the state, it 
transformed party politics into government policy.  The MNR created a host of state 
institutions through which it created a virtual state presence through a constant stream of 
news, information, symbols, slogans, and images.  This is not to suggest that the 
quotidian negotiation of rule between the national and the local was carried out solely on 
the basis of propaganda.  Rather, it was part of a diverse matrix of practices that the MNR 
leadership employed to consolidate the state and steer a heterogeneous revolution with 
varying and oftentimes competing goals in the particular direction of national 
development. 
This chapter examines the government’s efforts to construct a strong, centralized 
state between 1952 and 1957, a critical period during which the MNR solidified its 
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dominant position within the postrevolutionary state and mobilized society for the boldest 
national development initiative in Bolivian history.  Social theorist, René Zavaleta 
Mercado posits that the 1952 Revolution initiated a new cycle in the historical formation 
of the Bolivian state.366 If the pre-Revolutionary state was characterized by the 
dominance of an oligarchic elite and restricted political participation, the Revolution 
marked the emergence of a “national-popular” state composed of the diverse social forces 
that had emerged following the Chaco War.  The “Estado de 1952,” as Zavaleta 
christened it, was typified by the integration of new social classes—specifically, miners 
and campesinos—into the state apparatus and mass political participation.367  But the 
most important component of this “nuevo sistema estatal,” he emphasizes, were the 
“estructuras de mediación” that emerged within it—that is, those individuals who 
brokered politics between divergent social groups to ensure the success of the coalition 
government.  Building on this work, this chapter examines both the structural and 
symbolic mechanisms that the postrevolutionary state employed to mediate state-society 
relations.  
I employ the term “popular statecraft” to describe the way in which the MNR 
leadership consolidated the postrevolutionary state in the aftermath of the Revolution.  
Popular statecraft rested on two interrelated strategies.  The first was structural.  It was 
predicated upon ordering civil society into centralized and hierarchized corporate groups 
that were not part of the formal state apparatus, but affiliated with it in some degree or 
another, depending on historical and political circumstances. Following the April 
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insurrection, the MNR leadership incorporated the most powerful corporate groups—the 
MNR and the COB—into the corporatist apparatus.  The state projected power downward 
through the bureaucratic structure of these centralized and hierarchized corporate groups.  
The second strategy of popular statecraft was symbolic.  The MNR utilized mass media 
and appropriated popular culture like never before in an effort to define the Revolution 
and to orientate society towards the developmentalist objectives underlying it.  These 
efforts served as the ideological glue between state and society for the first years of the 
revolution, of the national popular government.  By 1957, with party unity fractured and 
the labor movement divided, an increasingly authoritarian state replaced popular 
statecraft with centralized bureaucratic power.     
Popular statecraft functioned differently in rural and urban areas.  In the cities, 
provincial capitals, and mining camps, where society was, by and large, already 
organized along corporate lines (labor organizations, political parties, mutual aid 
societies, veterans’ organizations, and the like), was literate, and had ready access to film, 
radio, and print media, the party emphasized propaganda. The countryside, where seventy 
percent of the population resided, presented a different set of challenged to the 
postrevolutionary leadership.  For one, it largely lacked the social organizations that 
prevailed in urban society.  It was moreover populated by predominantly illiterate 
indigenous peasantry that spoke primarily Aymara and Quechua and often retained a 
rudimentary knowledge of Spanish, the official national language, if any at all. Finally, 
rural areas were marked by an especially weak state presence and most lacked basic 
services (running water and electricity) and essential infrastructure.  The MNR leadership 
thus not only had to organize rural society, but to develop specific modes of 




they set out to incorporate rural folk into the structures of the corporate state, while 
reminding rural campesinos of their patriotic duty to boost agricultural production and 
maintain social order.     
The propaganda efforts initiated by the MNR leadership during this first phase of 
revolutionary consolidation provided the foundation the massive state cultural 
bureaucracy that emerged later in the decade. The Educational Reform Committee, which 
convened between 1953 and 1955, agreed that the Ministry of Education was better 
equipped to manage national cultural production than the Office of the Presidency.  The 
head of the commission, Fernando Diez de Medina was not a party insider, and it seems 
that not only did he resent Fellman, Céspedes, and other MNR leaders, but he felt that 
they had politicized culture.  Thus, as party of the 1955 Education Reform Code, he 
established the Oficialía Mayor de Cultura (OMC) as part of a new and expanded 
Ministerio de Educación and Bellas Artes (MEBA).  After the destruction of the SPIC 
offices in September 1956, the government never recovered.  With the economy beset 
with skyrocketing inflation and party unity irreparably fractured, the postrevolutionary 
government had neither the resources nor the mandate to reestablish the office and in 
1957, they closed it.  President Siles transferred the cultural offices of the SPIC to the 
MEBA, where Diaz de Medina centralized state cultural production.  By the 1960s, the 
OMC was the main cultural office of the postrevolutionary state, overseeing projects in 
archeology and  anthropology while sponsoring state folklore and popular music 
festivals.  And the new generation of intellectuals, artists, and social scientists that staffed 
its offices emerged as the architects of the myth of ethnic unity that underlie the Bolivian 





THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSTREVOLUTIONARY STATE FORMATION  
Zavaleta established a basic theoretical foundation for the Estado de 1952, but we 
know little of its interaction with civil society during the initial phase of national-popular 
unity that marked the first years of the Revolution.  Although he worked out his theory of 
“lo nacional-popular” in the period of Bolivian history spanning 1825 to 1935, the work 
was ultimately left unfinished with his untimely death in 1985.  Zavaleta’s earlier works 
show that he understood 1952 as a new phase of socio-political organization in which 
national politics moved away from exclusionary liberalism and toward a coalition 
strategy founded upon expanded political participation and a corporatist state. It was a 
fundamental change in the sociopolitical structure of the nation-state, that expanded the 
limits of popular participation across this diverse and conflictive society—described by 
Zavaleta as the “abigarramiento”—and fundamentally transformed political culture.  The 
idea of “lo nacional-popular” has resonated particularly strongly in a new wave of 
historiography on the revolution, providing a useful framework for studying the 
relationship between state and society.368  Yet beyond a general theoretical overview, we 
know little on how the Estado de 1952 was constructed and how it functioned.369   
Prevailing interpretations of the postrevolutionary government focus on class 
struggle and party politics.  They are rooted in the work of historian Robert Alexander 
and were subsequently popularized by political scientist, James Malloy.370  In what has 
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since become the “revisionist” interpretation of 1952, Malloy argues that the state was 
dominated by a “pragmatic nationalist center” consisting of MNR party leaders like 
Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and Walter Guevara Arze who had to balance the 
demands of the militant labor organizations grouped into the COB, with more 
conservative middle-class elements within the party core.  In the immediate aftermath of 
the Revolution, the most important aspect of this new power configuration was the strong 
influence that labor gained via the COB. Through co-gobierno, he argues that the COB 
pushed the revolution beyond the “national-developmentalist” paradigm of the MNR 
core, ensuring the nationalization of the tin mines, workers control, and agrarian 
reform.371  Though a useful model for understanding the political dynamics of 
postrevolutionary rule, this model nevertheless conflates party and government to a point 
that it remains unclear what the state was, how it functioned, and who (beyond those in 
the top leadership positions) occupied it.  Leaving out the state as a unit of analysis, we 
only see party politics, and the conflict is seen within the party, not within broader 
mediating organizations such as state institutions.   
In terms of understanding the mechanics of postrevolutionary state formation, the 
work of Christopher Mitchell proves more instructive.  Like Malloy, Mitchell places the 
MNR at the center of the postrevolutionary state. Yet where Malloy sees the MNR party 
bureaucracy as the locus for inter-group conflict and resolution, Mitchell on the other 
hand sees the state at the site of negotiation between the MNR, as the dominant political 
force, and other sectors of society—from the massive, miner-dominated COB, to smaller 
regional and local interests. He describes the government as a “multigroup coalition,” and 
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he explores the way in which the MNR leadership “parceled out” power (in the form of 
government appointments and weapons) to powerful interest groups to maintain support 
for the regime.  This vision of the postrevolutionary government proves more dynamic 
that Malloy’s MNR-centered interpretation, for it casts the state as a set of mediating 
institutions, wherein different groups struggled for control and domination.372      
Recent research on the pre-revolutionary period has created an urgent need to 
reassess the processes underlying postrevolutionary state formation.  If we see the 
revolution as a heterogeneous and messy historical affair, one made possible by various 
anti-elite social movements organized in shifting, loosely-aligned political alliances, then 
we need to reconsider how the MNR leadership integrated these movements into the state 
apparatus after the revolution and attempted to shape, integrate, or co-opt their political 
agendas to align with its own goals. A rich and developed historiography of organized 
labor demonstrates the extent to which the radical left shaped the revolution, but what 
about indigenous Bolivians?   While the historiography has traditionally recognized the 
role of the peasantry in radicalizing the Revolution in terms of the agrarian reform, it 
nevertheless fails to draw connections between pre- and -post 1952 rural mobilization. 
Malloy states, for example, that “Indian peasants played no role in the insurrection of 
1952.”373 Historian Laura Gotkowitz has recently challenged such claims, making a 
forceful case for a rural revolution that preceded the predominantly urban Revolution of 
1952.374 As such, she broadens the dynamics of immediate pre-insurrectionary society 
and encourages a reconsideration of state-society relations in postrevolutionary Bolivia.  
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Still, her works leads us to question, how did the MNR leadership define the Revolution 
to these highly politicized rural actors?  How were corporate entities formed were none 
previously existed?  How did the government organize rural society into the 
postrevolutionary state apparatus?  How did it strive to impart a unitary goal for 
heterogeneous groups integrated into the revolutionary coalition?    
Recent scholarship has shifted away from studying the state as an identifiable 
object—that is, as a thing—, seeing it instead as a site of mediation between local, 
regional, and national actors.  In this way, Philip Corrigan points out that “key questions 
become NOT who rules, but how rule is accomplished.”375  Although scholarship on 
postrevolutionary state formation is rich in its detail of party politics and coalition 
building, we still know little on the mechanics of postrevolutionary nation-state 
formation. Commenting on the nature of Latin American historiography, Joseph and 
Nugent assert that “the dynamics of the state’s day to day engagement with grassroots 
society have been largely ignored.”376 In studying postrevolutionary nation-state 
formation, we need to go beyond the MNR, for as we will see, many of those individuals 
who joined the the postrevolutionary state were affiliated neither with the party, nor the 
COB.  In this chapter and those that follow, I hope to illuminate the dynamics of 
postrevolutionary state formation against the backdrop of changing state-society 
relations.   
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“EL ESTADO DE 1952” AND POPULAR STATECRAFT 
The 1952 Revolution marks a new moment in the development of the Bolivian 
state.  The MNR leadership recognized the urgency of consolidating a strong central 
state, one that was not only capable of carrying out the sweeping series of reforms 
necessary for national development, but that could also maintain its legitimacy in a new 
democratic era marked by widespread political participation. The old order largely 
deteriorated after the April 1952 insurrection, and along with it went the state apparatus 
established after the 1899 Federal War.377 The insurrectionaries overhauled the executive 
branch, created a series of new state ministries, and appointed leaders from the MNR and 
the COB to lead them.378  Universal adult suffrage undermined the democratic machinery 
of the liberal rule, while the nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian reform 
diminished the economic base of oligarchic power.  The new government also 
eviscerated the military, which had long served as the repressive apparatus of liberal-
oligarchic state, and distributed arms to peasant and worker militias to serve, at least for 
the time being, as the revolutionary armed forces.  Finally, the postrevolutionary 
government discarded the 1880 constitution, which had provided the mandate for liberal-
oligarchic rule, and reinstated the 1938 constitution as the legal foundation for a new 
corporatist state.   
While the liberal state generally ascribed to a classical liberal doctrine of 
individual rights, minimal intervention in society, and free-market economic policies, the 
MNR leadership greatly expanded the role of the state in society.  It placed the 
postrevolutionary government directly in charge of the management of the national 
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economy as well as the long-term financial planning of the state, as evident in the 
creation of COMIBOL, the expanded role of the CBF, and the marked growth of YPFB. 
The MNR leadership also entrusted the postrevolutionary government with ensuring the 
well-being of society.  During the first years of the revolution, the COB pushed through a 
series of laws that increased labor rights, raised minimum wage requirements, established 
society security, and secured health care for workers.  With the 1955 education reform, 
the government expanded the public education system, especially in the countryside.379  
The most salient feature of the postrevolutionary government was the dynamic 
relationship that emerged between state and society. The MNR came to power on the 
back of general mobilization of civil society that, in the case of rural mobilization dated 
to the nineteenth century, and in the case of labor activism dates to the immediate post-
Chaco period.  If the MNR leadership was going to successfully consolidate a 
postrevolutionary state, it had to incorporate diverse, and often competing sociopolitical 
agendas of local and national actors into the government, while sustaining its political 
legitimacy in a new democratic climate marked my mass political participation and 
wrought by turbulent structural change. Moreover, it had to mobilize society for 
revolutionary change.  In traditional democratic systems, local demands are channeled 
into the national government through political representation, usually in the form of 
locally-elected delegates to a national congress.  Although the Bolivian government has a 
bicameral legislature, after the Revolution, congress did not convene until after the first 
parliamentary elections in 1956.  And even then, it convened only sporadically during the 
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entire twelve year period of civilian rule.  Law was dictated not by consensus, but by 
supreme decrees emanating from the presidential palace.   
In lieu of more traditional forms of democratic representation, the link between 
state and society—between the national and the local—was thus predicated upon 
corporate groups and the patronage networks that connected them to the state.  The two 
largest, most powerful corporate groups that mediated state-society relations during the 
twelve year period of MNR leadership were the MNR party apparatus and the COB.  
Both were centralized and hierarchical structures organized according to a hierarchical 
structure that spread across the national territory. Both were represented in the central 
government.  And though there was much overlap between the two institutions, and 
though they were struggling to achieve relatively similar objectives (at least during the 
initial years of the Revolution), they competed for influence not only within the state, but 
within society as well.   
At the apex of the MNR organization was the Comité Político Nacional (National 
Political Committee, CPN), the primary decision-making apparatus of the party which 
directed political action, defined the party’s position, maintained discipline, and 
appointed party members to positions in the national government.  The nine members of 
the CPN were nominated by the party leadership and elected by the party base at the 
biannual national party conventions. Below the CPN, the rank and file of the party was 
organized into two separate coexisting hierarchal structures.  The first was founded on the 
political geography of the national territory.  Underneath the CPN existed Comandos 
Departamentales which represented each of Bolivia’s nine departments.  Below each 
Comando Departmental were the Comandos Provinciales, which were further subdivided 




consisted of individual cells organized around specific geographic location.  Small 
provincial capitals may have had only one MNR comando, usually run by the local MNR 
party boss, where larger cities such as La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba had 
organized according to neighborhood and street cells.  In the countryside, where the 
MNR was actively recruiting peasants, cells were founded upon communities, 
cooperatives, unions, or haciendas, and were under the direct authority of the Comando 
Provincial.  Leaders of the different commandos were voted in by the rank and file.380     
The party also organized thirteen Comandos Especiales, which in terms of the 
vertical structure of the organization, were equal to the Comandos Departamentales.  The 
precise nature of these Commando Especiales remains unclear.  According to James 
Dunkerley, there were the “thugs” of the MNR, the grupos de choque.381  It seems that 
the Comandos Especiales served as the paramilitary apparatus of the party.   They were 
located in frontier regions such as Riberalta and Villazon, but more importantly, in the 
mining camps—Llallagua, Huanani, and Uyuni.  Each Comando Especial was further 
partitioned into Sub commandos, depending on the particular make-up of the area.  The 
Comando of Llallagua, for example, was subdivided into a three different 
Subcomandos—Catavi, Siglo XX, and Chayanta—each corresponding to the different 
mining camps in the area.  In addition to boosting the coercive capacity of the 
postrevolutionary state in these areas, they may have also served a political function by 
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strengthening the power of the party (and the state) in key locations of policial, 
socioeconomic, or geopolitical importance.382   
The MNR also consisted of a parallel party hierarchy organized according to 
profession called the functional bureaucracy.  According to this structure, not only were 
party members were organized into different cells depending on where they lived, but 
they were also divided into cells according to their profession.  MNR militant José 
Quiroga Castro explains the dual organization of the party.  “Cada miembro del Partido 
tiene el deber de estar inscrito en su respectivo Comando Zonal, de acuerdo con el lugar 
de su habitación o vivienda,” he wrote, “pero al mismo tiempo está en la obligación de 
actuar en una organization funcional, de acuerdo a su lugar de trabajo (celula 
administrativa o fábrica).” 383  Miners, merchants, peasants, artisans, industrial workers, 
professional employees, state employees—they were each organized into cells at the local 
level, which made up a broader national cell.  Cement workers in Viacha, for example, 
were organized into a functional cell that consisted of other industrial workers and tied to 
the Comando Provincial of the Province of Ingavi.  In this way, the party bureaucracy 
mirrored and often overlapped with organized labor, giving the MNR an advantage of the 
COB. Just as the COB conspired to take control of the revolutionary state through the 
entreguista strategy, the MNR attempted to outmaneuver the labor movement through the 
dual structure of the party hierarchy.384  
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The second most powerful corporate groups within the postrevolutionary state 
was the CON.  Existed alongside and often overlapping with the MNR party 
organization, the powerful national labor confederation played a major role in 
incorporating the voice of the radical left into the revolutionary state.  This new national 
labor confederation—the first of its kind—sought to ensure the depth of revolutionary 
change and to provide an institutional counterweight to balance the more conservative 
element on the MNR right.385 Although the COB was not directly part of the MNR, it 
remained closely affiliated with the party leadership. Incorporating social existing social 
movements, particularly those orientated around labor, into the hierarchical and 
centralized structure would provide linkages between the postrevolutionary state and 
grassroots labor organizations.  The COB integrated existing unions from all sectors of 
the economy and all regions of the country into its rank and file—industrial workers, 
railroad workers, urban blue-collar professionals, teachers, and peasants. But it was the 
tin miners, and their labor confederation, the FSTMB, that remained the most powerful 
element within the organization.  
Like the MNR, the COB was organized according to a centralized, hierarchical 
bureaucratic structure led by an elected governing body, the executive committee.  Led 
by Juan Lechín from its foundation in 1952 until 1987, the executive committee 
integrated leaders from different sectors of labor—miners, industrial workers, artisans, 
etc. To be sure, different labor unions enjoyed more degrees of representation and power 
than others, and the COB was historically dominated by the powerful mining central, the 
FSTMB.  Moreover, the COB was more diverse and flexible in terms of political 
philosophy than the MNR.   
                                                 





In addition to institutionalizing postrevolutionary society according to a corporate 
structure, the popular statecraft model also depended on propaganda. In propaganda, I 
refer to the myriad ways in which the government communicated a specifically crafted 
messaged to broad sectors of society—from print media to radio, from theater to film. 
The postrevolutionary state utilized mass media, publicity, and popular culture as never 
before to project an aura of state power, national unity, and social benevolence. In the 
period spanning the foundation of the MNR in 1941 and the April 1952 Revolution, the 
MNR leadership developed a sophisticated approach to propaganda that it incorporated as 
a critical component of postrevolutionary statecraft.  The party’s participation in the 
Villarroel government and their experience in exile during the creole revolutionary 
struggle not only played a large role in shaping the populist style of the MNR, but they 
also determined the strategies underlying postrevolutionary nation building.386  After 
1952 the MNR utilized propaganda to project a more able and omnipresent state—an 
effort that would ultimately provide the institutional framework both to create and 
manage a specific national culture for postrevolutionary Bolivia.   
The MNR’s experience as an oppositional party in the 1940s shaped it governing 
style once the party leadership assumed control of the state following the April 
Revolution. The founders of the MNR recognized that if they were going to succeed in 
transforming the economic and political foundations of Bolivian society, they would need 
to shape public opinion as well.  The party leadership proved especially adept at using 
available means of mass communication to garner support and manage public opinion.  
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After all, half the party founders were professional journalists—the rest were politicians.  
Historian Jerry Knudson, author of an encyclopedic history of the revolutionary press, 
even argues that the MNR “started out being propagandists and ended up in the political 
arena themselves.”  Augusto Céspedes, José Cuadros Quiroga, and Carlos Montenegro all 
worked at La Calle, an opposition newspaper founded by Céspedes and Armando Arze in 
1936.387  For a short time after the Chaco War, Hernán Siles also worked on the editorial 
staff of a different newspaper in La Paz.  These journalists were joined by 
parliamentarians Victor Paz Estenssoro and Walter Gueverra Arze, who won support in 
their home districts of Ayapoya and Tarija, respectively, through their populist politics 
and impassioned rhetoric. 
Between the overthrow of the Villarroel-MNR coalition in 1946 and the 1952 
Revolution, propaganda served as the primary means through which the party broadened 
its popular support inside Bolivia.  With much of the MNR leadership exiled during the 
late 1940s, their ability to organize and communicate with their base was severely 
curtailed.388  Scattered across the southern cone, the MNR leadership initiated a 
propaganda campaign to ensure the party’s very survival.  Although the MNR leadership 
directed the propaganda effort from exile, the actual day-to-day management of the effort 
fell to lower ranking party militants remaining in country.  In 1946, the MNR leadership 
nominated the youth militant, Raul Murillo y Aliaga to oversee the propaganda effort in 
Bolivia.389  Working with Murillo was another young party militant named José Fellman 
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Velarde.390 Paz, Siles, Lechín, and other party leaders would write messages to the 
Bolivian people, which Murillo, Fellman, or other junior party militants would distribute 
urban centers.  Paz, for example, issued several pronouncements from exile in Buenos 
Aires including “Revolución y contrarrevolución en Bolivia” (1947) “Proceso y sentencia 
contra la oligarquía” (1948) and “La Última Carta de la Oligarquía” (1949). Most of 
these were edited by Céspedes, printed in Buenos Aires or Montevideo, and then 
smuggled across the Argentina-Bolivia border, where they were distributed among the 
party rank and file. 391 The party also used pasquines, large broadsides that were posted in 
public spaces, to make party announcements.392   
In designing the slogans, songs, and broadsides of their propaganda campaigns, 
the MNR selectively drew from existing expressions of Bolivian popular culture.  Party 
leaders realized that in order for their efforts to be successful—for them to have an 
impact in the general population—they would have to be projected onto existing cultural 
forms.  MNR propagandists drew upon vernacular forms of popular music in composing 
party odes.  Many party songs adapted nationalist lyrics to popular Chaco War marches.  
One march, written for the occasion of the fourth party convention in January 1948 went: 
“Nada arredre la noble pujanza/de esta marcha triunfal de la Fé./Movimiento, canción de 
esperanza, bajo un signo de luz: VILLARROEL.”393  Another vernacular musical style to 
which MNR propagandists adapted their lyrics was the cueca, a popular creole folk form 
in three-four meter.  The MNR anthem, “Siempre” by Gaston Velasco was a cueca for 
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example.  Another cueca was “Valientes Nacionalitas,” a song composed for the 1951 
elections that lamented the shared suffering of nationalist militants and guaranteed a 
victorious struggle.394   
After 1952, the MNR leadership assigned propaganda a central role in 
postrevolutionary statecraft.  Within days of assuming power, they established the 
Ministerio de Prensa, Propaganda e Información (MPPI). There was immediate need for 
such an office. The new regime had to provide an anxious public with constant stream of 
information of its intentions, goals, and accomplishments.  But government officials soon 
discovered that having a separate ministry to control propaganda created too much 
bureaucracy between decision making and the execution of tasks.  It seems that Paz and 
other officials were unable to direct the actions of the ministry on anything beyond a 
superficial level.  Hugo Roberts Barragán, the individual initially chosen to lead the 
ministry, proved to be especially problematic. Sympathetic to the right, Roberts had 
publicly broken with Paz on several key issues, most notably the nationalization of the tin 
mines.395  Before long, Radio Illimani employees accused Roberts of mismanagement.  In 
a petition to President Paz, they lamented that the ministry leadership purposely excluded 
state propaganda from its programming schedule.396  Paz promptly requested Roberts’ 
resignation, abolished the MPPI, and placed its functions under the auspices to the 
Presidencia de la Republica (PR) until a more permanent solution could be identified.    
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The following month, Paz created the Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y 
Cultura (SPIC) within the PR, thus granting himself, and the party, centralized control 
over postrevolutionary propaganda.397  The SPIC consisted of four departments (Culture, 
Arts, Publications, and Outreach), Radio Illimani, and a modest publishing arm that 
printed official government statements.  With this central propaganda office the 
postrevolutionary government sought to create ideological cohesion among party and 
government officials, manage the flow of information from state to society, and mold 
public opinion. Between its foundation in 1952 and its demise in 1957, the SPIC 
expanded significantly, growing from a presidential office intended to manage public 
opinion to a multifaceted institution overseeing the cultural politics of nation building.  
To direct the new government propaganda apparatus, Paz appointed José Fellman 
Velarde.  Fellman played a key role in party during the insurgent nationalist struggle, 
managing the MNR’s propaganda efforts in Bolivia and from exile. He had also worked 
closely with Paz in Buenos Aires, where both witnessed the populist political style of 
Perón.  During the first months of the Revolution, he served as Paz’s personal secretary. 
As the brain behind the SPIC’s unprecedented propaganda campaign, Fellman soon 
emerged as the chief party ideologue.  His revolutionary consciousness was deeply 
steeped in the revolutionary nationalist struggle.  He studied the previous failures of the 
MNR, seeking to identify more successful means at not only reaching society at large, but 
controlling public opinion.  The failure of the MNR-Villarroel regime to retain popular 
support during the period had a significant impact on this thinking.398  He attributed the  
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Illustration 9: José Fellman Velarde, Director of the SPIC.399   
success of the opposition to its increased control over press and radio.  With limited 
access to mass media, the MNR-Villarroel government never succeeded in creating a 
                                                 





“definitive revolutionary consciousness” among the people.400  “Existen bolivianos,” he 
wrote, “pero no existe el boliviano.”  This lack of national unity had undermined the 
MNR’s revolutionary project in 1946, and Fellman saw it as his historic duty to ensure 
that it did not happen again.401 By taking advantage of mass media and limiting the public 
sphere, he set out to instill “lo boliviano” in the population. At stake was the Revolution 
itself.   
The continued production and widespread diffusion of pro-Revolution, pro-MNR 
propaganda was the original objective of the SPIC.  Fellman sought to ensure that 
information was indiscriminately conveyed to each and every Bolivian regardless of race, 
class, or ethnicity.  For too long, he lamented, propaganda had catered exclusively to the 
needs of the creole oligarchy.  By using propaganda to project a unifying national culture, 
Fellman sought to instill a strong sense of nationalism in all Bolivian.  The SPIC, he 
asserted, “tiene como meta fundamental, dar a conocer las realizaciones de la Revolución 
y dotar si es posible a cada boliviano, de una formación teórica adecuada a fin de que 
comprenda el contenido del proceso revolucionario que vive el país y lo respalde 
conscientemente.”402 The postrevolutionary leadership subsequently deployed the SPIC 
to forge a national culture that would ensure both national unity and the longevity of the 
Revolution  
Its experience first in the post-Chaco press, then in the Villarroel government, and 
finally as an opposition party in exile had demonstrated to the MNR leadership that 
centralization, planning, and consistency were the keys to waging a successful 
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propaganda campaign.  It had to be national in scope, but popular in nature. The most 
effective propaganda efforts, one internal MNR document noted, are those that “les da un 
contenido de extracción popular, es decir, que provienen del propio pueblo.”403 This was 
especially true for songs, slogans, and graffiti.  Posters and handbills displaying graphic 
images in radiant colors were deemed most effective for reaching Bolivia’s illiterate 
majority—that is, those indigenous peasants and miners, “masas cuya cultrura es 
deficiente.”404  The content of propaganda depended on the audience, just as the 
institutional structure linking local to state interested varied throughout the country 
depending on existing forms of social and political organization.  Such distinctions 
become especially salient when comparing contrasting the rural and urban manifestations 
of popular statecraft.   
 
POPULAR STATECRAFT IN URBAN SPACES 
In urban spaces such as cities, provincial capitals, and mining camps, the 
postrevolutionary government emphasized the symbolic component of popular statecraft. 
Almost thirty percent of the population lived in urban areas. Population density was 
greater, markets were integrated, literacy rates were higher, and the state maintained a 
constant presence. The urban realm was, moreover, already organized into hierarchal and 
centralized groups that were easily incorporated into the corporatist structure of the 
postrevolutionary state.  Propaganda was thus the key component of urban popular 
statecraft.  If the corporate structure of the government served as the physical channels 
between state and society, propaganda defined the Revolution, providing its underlying 
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meaning to the general public. It was also intended to promote national unity through the 
establishment of an inclusive national culture. Fellman and others believed that 
establishing a strong, pervasive sense of nationalism was essential to ensuring the success 
of the Revolution.  Between 1952 and 1957, as the MNR leadership consolidated its 
dominant position within the state and set the Revolution on a course for national 
development, it expanded state propaganda in general and the SPIC in particular.  By the 
middle of 1953, the government had set out to monopolize mass media, establishing 
major outlets in newsprint, radio, and film. 
Mediating the national news was one of the first objectives of the MNR 
government. The MNR leadership recognized the important role that filtering national 
and international media in the shaping of social consciousness. Since the government 
shut down La Calle in 1946, the party worked to create another media outlet. The most 
successful of such efforts was the weekly party newspapers, En Marcha, which was first 
published in March 1951.  In October 1952, the government replaced En Marcha with La 
Nación.  Under the leadership of Saturnino Rodrigo and later, Augusto Céspedes, the 
paceño daily became a popular source of daily news and entertainment. The SPIC also 
oversaw the publication of a wide variety of informative pamphlets, magazines, and 
books intended to inform the general public of the transformations that the Revolution 
was introducing in Bolivian society. One such publication, Boletín de la SPIC was 
published twice daily and seems to have been intended for government and party officials 
for the purpose of establishing a clear and consistent party line.  It included the texts of 
new laws, key speeches of government leaders, and other news for party officials.  
Another publication, Pututu, was intended for public consumption.  Under the banner of 




publication provided a carefully constructed interpretation of national and international 
events for its readers.   
In addition to print media, popular statecraft also took to the airwaves.  By the 
1940s, radio had become the most widespread form of both entertainment and mass 
communication in Bolivia.405  The government established Radio Illimani in 1935 as the 
official state radio station and private stations were also established in La Paz, 
Cochabamba, Oruro, Santa Cruz, and other urban and mining centers. Indicating the 
important that the MNR leadership accorded mass media, the occupation of Radio 
Illimani had been one of the primary targets of the April insurrection.406 After the 
Revolution, the government charged the SPIC with the management of the station in an 
effort to maintain an influential voice over national airwaves.  Radio was important not 
only because of the large audience it could reach, but especially because it the only form 
of mass communication that could reach the large illiterate majority.  During 1953 and 
1954, Fellman worked with Carlos Montano Daza, the director or Radio Illimani, to 
modernize the station, improve its programming, and boost its ratings. To extend the 
range of the station, the SPIC established radio chains so that those residing in rural 
communities, mining camps, and more remote parts of the country could tune-in to 
official programming.407 One major problem the governments faced in this effort was a 
lack of radios.  In his study of Radio Illimani, Cristobal Coronel Quisbert found that the 
government distributed transistors to schools, unions, and party comandos to ensure that 
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the public could tune in.  The SPIC also set up loud speakers in public places such as 
plazas, rural villages, and at the weekly ferias francas.408  
Regular programming consisted of entertainment, sports, news, and pro-
government, pro-Revolution propaganda.  In fact all stations were required to reserve a 
portion of their commercial programming for official state programming.  Aside from 
entertainment, radio’s vast potential for civic education and moral uplift was not lost on 
government officials.  Patriotic messages, official information, and public service 
announcements constituted integral parts of Radio Illimani’s daily programming 
schedule.  For example, on August 2, 1952, a date that President Busch declared the “Día 
del Indio” back in 1937, Radio Illimani dedicated its entire programming schedule to pro-
Indian propaganda. 409  The Revolution, it broadcast, “marca para nuestro hermano indio 
su incorporación definitiva a la vida nacional que le corresponde con el mayor de los 
derechos.” 410 Underlying this broadcast was a message of national unity, one that linked 
Indians, mestizos, and creole in a common nationalist struggle.  “Radio Illimani, ‘La Voz 
de Bolivia’, se adhiere al júbilo de nuestros hermanos indios y en el día que el gobierno 
de la Revolución Nacional, le brinda su homenaje sincero, saluda con emoción patriótica 
a esta raza que simboliza la fortaleza inexpugnable del vigor que caracterizan al gobierno 
de la Revolución Nacional.” 411  
Cinema represented another key component of postrevolutionary propaganda, and 
the MNR sought to harness this popular form of entertainment as an important tool in 
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fomenting a national culture.  By mid-century, a nascent national cinema industry had 
emerged in Bolivia—though it paled in comparison to contemporary Mexico or the 
United States.412  It was during the 1940s, that Jorge Ruiz, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 
and others who would take a leading role in post-revolutionary film, launched their 
careers in writing, directing, and producing.  Recognizing the popularity of cinema and 
the important role that film could play in mass society, the MNR leadership established 
the Departamento Cinematográfico Nacional within the MIPP in April 1952.  Yet when 
the government folded the MIIP in November 1952 to have more control over the 
direction and management of propaganda, the DCN went along with it. In March 1952, 
Paz replaced it with the Instituto Cinematográfico Bolivia (Bolivian Cinematographic 
Institute, ICB) and appointed his brother-in-law, Waldo Cerruto, as Director.413 Over the 
course of the subsequent decade, the ICB emerged at the center of the national film 
industry and would produce such notable directors as Jorge Ruíz and Javier Sanginés.     
Cinema could both entertain and educate, and under the direction of Cerruto, the 
postrevolutionary state sought to tap the pedagogical potential of film to foment a 
revolutionary consciousness and to shore up support for the regime.  In his study of 
postrevolutionary film, historian Carlos Mesa demonstrates that the IBC was motivated 
as much by politics as by culture.414  Rather than long-playing films intended for pure 
entertainment, Cerruto orientated the ICB’s resources to the production of noticieros, 
informative ten-minute shorts that showcased the latest achievements of the Revolution 
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and aimed to both build and maintain support for the government.  Cerruto himself 
directed several films during his tenure as director of the ICB between 1952 and 1956, 
including “Bolivia se libera” and “Estaño, tragedia y gloria,”—both of which showcased 
the reforms of the revolution, explored pressing social problems, and detailed how the 
revolutionary government was confronting them. 415 “Por las rutas del progreso,” another 
noticiero produced by Cerruto, emphasized the developmental goals of the revolution and 
the socioeconomic improvement that it would soon bring all Bolivians. During this time, 
the government also sponsored an “indigenista cinema” with such ethnographic films as 
“Vuelve Sebastiana,” “Amanecer Indio,” and “Juanita sabe leer.” The most influenceial 
figure in postrevolutionary indigenista film was Jorge Ruiz, who succeeded Cerruto as 
director of the ICB.416  By the end of 1954, the ICB had produced 86 noticeros and 21 
documentaries.417   
Although the ICB and the SPIC were separate entities within the Presidency, the 
two offices often cooperated to ensure the widespread diffusion of government film 
productions.  In 1954, there were a total of 146 movie theaters across the country—50 in 
departmental capitals, 75 in the provinces, and 21 in mining centers.418 Movie theaters 
were required to integrate ICB productions into their regular programming schedules, and 
the SPIC was there to ensure that they followed the letter of the law.  As part of the 
MNR’s continuing effort to centralize propaganda, in May of 1954, the government 
charged the SPIC with “la supervisión y control de películas para todo el país, en lo que a 
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su calidad cultural y artística se refiere.”419  Another law required all film distributors to 
submit lists of the foreign movies they sought to import for SPIC approval.  Of those 
submitted, the SPIC would select appropriate movies and authorize their importation.  
Fellman justified the action with a need “proporcionar al pueblo una diversión sana, de 
alto nivel cultural y de categoría.”420 
The government’s tightening control of national cinema was indicative of a 
broader trend of restricting freedom of expression in order to maintain a state monopoly 
on the content of mass media.  Fearful that opposition press and radio would undermine 
government support, the SPIC adopted drastic measures to control the flow of 
information.  The MNR closed two major newspapers, La Razón and Los Tiempos, after 
the revolution. Owned by tin magnet, Carlos Víctor Aramayo, La Razón had long been 
the most popular newspaper in Bolivia, and its coverage reflected the interests of the 
oligarchic elite. The MNR silenced the paper almost immediately after the revolution.  
Los Tiempos, a Cochabamba daily that served as the mouthpiece of the landed oligarchy, 
remained open until November 1953, when it closed after pro-government mobs 
destroyed its offices.  Less notable newspapers suffered similar fates.  In May 1955, for 
example, MNR militants destroyed the office of La Patria, an independent daily 
published in Oruro.421 The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) responded to the 
government censorship with opprobrium, denouncing the newspapers closures and 
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declaring that Bolivia’s lacked freedom of press.  The government dismissed such 
accusations, justifying the closure as a necessary evil to establish national unity.422   
The SPIC’s efforts to manage information also raised the concern of the 
Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión (Inter-American Radio Broadcasting 
Association, AIR).  In terms of maintaining political legitimacy and the image of a 
functioning state on the local level, radio was absolutely crucial and, in 1954, the 
government began closing radio stations controlled by the opposition. The MNR boss of 
Oruro reported that recently-closed Radio Mercurio had been broadcasting 
antigovernment propaganda, “en abierta y descarada oposición al régimen popular del 
MNR.” 423 Though party militants had already sacked the station and put it out of 
commission, the official suggested that expropriating it instead would be “en benificio de 
la cultura del pueblo.”424 In a similar case, a Sucre union boss justified the closure of 
Radio La Plata on grounds that it had not only refused to play required government 
programing, but had been broadcasting anti-MNR and pro-FSB propaganda.425  The 
government received heavy pressure to allow the stations to continue broadcasting not 
only from AIR, but from the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters 
in the United States.426 Yet it appears that despite these, and other efforts, the stations 
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remained closed. Allowing these stations to continue broadcasting seemed a potent threat 
to the government—especially where its institutional presence was generally lacking.   
Officials defended the closures by citing new laws that affected both the 
management and content of radio, theater, and live musical performances.  In February 
1954, the government passed the first, and indeed, most sweeping of such laws, declaring 
that “La protección e intensificación del arte nacional, vigorizada con la Victoria 
Nacional de Abril, constituye uno de los postulados fundamentales del Gobierno de la 
Revolución Nacional.” The decree declared that all radio stations must contract enough 
artists so that at least 25 percent of radio broadcasts were live.  Of those artists 
contracted, no less than sixty percent had to be Bolivian nationals. The law further 
stipulated that any business authorized to host public entertainment must contract sixty 
percent of national actors in any live performance.427 The following month, the 
government issued another law that established a pay scale for “artists,” who the state 
defined as “aquellas personas cuyo media de vida principal es el arte.” To qualify, 
painters, musicians, actors and the like had to register with the SPIC and the Oficina de 
Coordinación Sindical of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Provisión Social.428   Indeed, not 
only were these laws intended to provide artists steady work, but they were also designed 
to foment a national culture model founded on vernacular forms, rather than the imitation 
of foreign culture.  By 1956, restaurants, hotel, coffee shops, and bars had to obtain prior 
authorization from the SPIC in order to host foreign artists.  If they failed to gain prior 
approval, they faced legal sanctions.429   
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While such regulations were intended to control the content of mass media and 
popular entertainment, they also had the effect of ensuring employment for national 
musicians, artists, and actors.  Recent research by ethnomusicologist, Fernando Rios 
shows that the postrevolutionary government sought to popularize particular forms of 
vernacular music styles that emphasized the mixed cultural heritage of the Bolivian 
nation.430 In nightclubs, in the studios of Radio Illimani, in state-sponsored cultural 
events, the government eschewed the more popular genre of brass-band marches for what 
officials identified as “mestizo” music.  In their view, mestizo panpipe ensembles from 
urban, working-class origins—groups such as Los Choclos and Los Cebollitas—were 
most emblematic of postrevolutionary national culture.  
Through these diverse efforts at monopolizing mass media and managing the 
content of popular entertainment, the MNR sought not only to inform society, but to build 
its legitimacy. Part of this effort was the creation of a “cult of personality” surrounding 
MNR leaders.  Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and Juan Lechín were cast as larger 
than life figures whose very beings embodied the revolutionary nationalist struggle.  
Exaggerated accounts of their heroism, sacrifice, and nationalism filled the pages of SPIC 
publications, giving the impression that these creole politicians of middle-class origin 
were “un gobierno del pueblo y para el pueblo.”431  To be sure, MNR leaders remained 
acutely aware of the perception of their actions and maintained that all state officials must 
uphold high standards of moral conduct. In May 1952, President Paz sent a circular to all 
ministries insisting that postrevolutionary officials needed to distinguish themselves from 
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the oligarchic governments of the past through their personal conduct.  Ministers of 
State—as well as high party officials—were to serve as a model for postrevolutionary 
society.  “Contrastando con la inmoralidad reinante durante los desgobiernos de la 
Rosca,” the document reads, “los hombres de la Revolución debieran demostrar un 
intachable comportamiento.”432 He further stressed that “La ética personal de los hombres 
de la Revolución debe constituirse en ejemplo, como fue ejemplo su coraje, su 
desprendimiento y su patriotismo.”433  
The little scholarship that exists on postrevolutionary propaganda faults the MNR 
for having a vague, or even incoherent cultural program and argues that the party placed 
politics over aesthetics.434  It seems that these were pragmatic decisions made by the 
party leadership.  Above all it seems recognition of their precarious position as leading a 
Revolution, replete with diverse goals, needs, and objectives.  It had to integrate Indians 
into postrevolutionary society, carry out land reform, and attend the rights and ever-
increasing demands of miners and urban workers—all the while carrying out the most 
ambitious national development strategy in Bolivian history. Thus in terms of national 
culture, the party had to delineate a model vague enough to accommodate these groups, 
while not as vague as to exclude them.  But when are cultural revolutions not vague?  The 
Mexican example—indeed the guiding light for the Bolivians as well as the point of 
reference for contemporary studies on cultural nationalism in twentieth century Latin 
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America—was not that cohesive and directed.435 To be sure, the Mexican state was 
stronger and more potent than the Bolivian state, and as such, it had more resources to 
finance efforts of artists and musicians.  But ultimately it is artists that make a cultural 
revolution.  The state, operating through a series of bureacratic institutions, channels 
those efforts towards the end goal of a national cultural form.  It is the individual vision 
of revolutionary modernization of indigenous peoples, of the past, or the present, of what 
constitutes a “revolutionary esthetic” that the state selectively appropriates and 
propagates.  Its ability to foment such inspiration is limited.  The real power of a state in 
fomenting a national cultural is limited to its institutional capacity. 
 
POPULAR STATECRAFT IN RURAL SPACES 
Extending state power into rural society presented a novel challenge to the 
postrevolutionary leadership.  In 1952, the countryside was home to over 70 percent of 
the population, the vast majority being impoverished, illiterate indigenous peasants tied 
to Bolivia’s seigniorial economy.  Commonly called colonos or pongos (depending on 
the region), they lived on the haciendas, where they exchanged their labor for usufruct 
rights to their lands.  The haciendas existed alongside the remaining free indigenous 
communities, peasant small-holders, as well as small- and medium-sized estates owned 
predominantly by rural mestizos.  The corporate groups so prevalent in urban society 
were largely absent the countryside, save landowner associations, indigenous 
communities, and a handful of rural sindicatos. The MNR leadership adapted popular 
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statecraft accordingly. The most urgent priority was to organize rural society into 
corporate groups affiliated within the postrevolutionary government.  Not only would 
such a measure give them a modicum of control over rural affairs, officials believed, but 
it would simultaneously incorporate indigenous Bolivians into national society.  Once 
organized, Fellman and the SPIC developed propaganda specifically tailored to a rural 
audience and devised new and imaginative ways to reach Aymara- and Quechua-
speaking peasants.   
Before the Revolution, state authority in the countryside rested on appointed local 
officials—prefectos, subprefectos, and corregidores—as well as alcaldes and other 
elected municipal authorities.  These official government posts existed alongside 
informal structures of power, which varied widely from region to region depending on 
such factors as climate, population density, land tenure practices, modes of production, 
and transportation infrastructure.  In regions such as Cochabamba, which had a long 
tradition of landed estates dating to the colonial era, and the Lake Titicaca region, which 
experienced the highest rate of republican hacienda expansion, social order depended on 
rural landowners and hacienda administrators (the notorious cholo majordomo), as well 
as collaborating ethnic authorities who played the key role of mediator between 
indigenous workers and the estate administration.  Coercion and spectacular acts of 
violence were not uncommon occurrences on haciendas, and served as the primary 
mechanisms of social control on the semi-closed estates.  In numbers there is strength, 
and most hacendados built on existing commercial or personal ties to establish strategic 
relationships with the mestizo and cholo vecinos of neighboring pueblos.  Landlords 
themselves also banded together in provincial, departmental, and national Sociedades 




free communities and, if necessary, meet rural unrest with concerted action.  If rural 
revolt surpassed the coercive capacity of the haciendas, vecinos, and Sociadades Rurales, 
history showed that they could count on the armed forces to help quell upstart Indians. 
With the Revolution, this matrix of formal and informal power fragmented across 
the countryside and a new social order emerged.  It is nevertheless important to note that 
the decline of the old order was by no means uniform, and that what emerged depended a 
great deal on local and historical circumstances. On the altiplano, for instance, Silvia 
Rivera found that relationships between landowners and vecinos were deteriorating 
already before 1952, and with the Revolution, they fractured completely.436  Many rural 
mestizo officials—subprefects, alcaldes, etc—ended-up joining the MNR, and those who 
did not, were ousted and replaced with a regime loyalist.437  The estates were left to fend 
for themselves.  In short, the Revolution generated a power vacuum across the 
countryside.  As officials scrambled to reconstitute state authority, the most severe 
challenge they faced came from grassroots rural mobilization that was challenging not 
necessarily the formal structures of power as manifest in local government offices, but 
the informal system of social control represented by the haciendas and, more commonly, 
their overseers.  True, rural government officials could become the target of peasant 
violence when they were perceived illegitimate. But most often the focus of rural 
violence was the hacienda administration.   
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The immediate response to the Revolution varied widely.  Most historical 
research on rural society in postrevolutionary Bolivia focus on regions such as 
Cochabamba and Achacachi, where there existed a history of labor organization dating to 
the previous decades.  In these regions, peasants organized themselves into autonomous 
unions on the local level.  A less developed component of the historiography examines 
the Lake Titicaca basin—the highland region just west of La Paz that experienced the 
highest rate of republican hacienda expansion and the most coordinated grassroots 
organization among Aymara communities.  While in Cochabamba the action was quick 
and centrally organized according to peasant unions, across the altiplano, violence was 
slower to arrive, more localized, and seemingly less coordinated.  Only once the agrarian 
reform was declared law on August 2, 1953, did many local communities rise up to oust 
landlords and overseers.  Others preferred to use legal channels, which perhaps indicated 
the significant faith that communities continued to place in the law.  
The government’s approach to organizing the countryside was shaped, to no small 
extent, by events that transpired in the Cochabamba countryside.  As Jorge Dandler and 
more recently José Gordillo demonstrate, Cochabamba—with its entrenched landed class 
and history of popular organization—became a hotbed for grassroots peasant syndicates.  
Immediately after the revolution, colonos working on various estates around Ucureña 
organized themselves into unions, and under the leadership of POR firebrand, José Rojas 
established an autonomous peasant syndicate. They unleashed a reign of terror on rural 
estates in the months immediately following the Revolution, seizing lands, slaughtering 
livestock, and, in some cases, murdering landlords and overseers—an intense historical 




Revolution.438  As the government set out to organize rural society in centralized, 
hierarchical organizations, its efforts to organize and impose a union structure butted up 
against local, grassroots forms of organization.  While the events that transpired in 
Ucureña proved exceptional, they underscore the challenges state authorities faced as 
national and local powers clashed. This effort not only underscored the urgency of 
organization before things got completely out of the control of the government, but also a 
need to contain the peasant sindicatos by tying them to a broader national union structure.  
The postrevolutionary government scrambled to organize the countryside to 
preempt the creation of further autonomous labor groups that threatened state authority.  
The objective was first and foremost, to organize local peasant unions and then, to create 
a national structure to integrate them into the state.  In 1952, MAC officials sent teams of 
labor organizers into the countryside to establish peasant sindicatos.  To lead the effort, 
Ñuflo Chávez chose Severo Oblitas, a labor activist who had cut his teeth in the mining 
camps in the 1940s.  The teams traveled first to the regions where large estates prevailed, 
to the Department of La Paz, then on to Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, and Tarija.439  As they 
began their labor, Paz signed a supreme decree declaring “immediate detention” for those 
extra-legal and unofficial efforts to organize and agitate in the countryside.  Only 
authorized state official were permitted to organize the countryside. They offered local 
authorities special incentives to form sindicatos. The most popular incentive was 
“cupos,” discount coupons for basic necessity good at a fraction of their market cost.440  
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They also distributed arms and ammunition to pro-MNR rural militias, and bartered local 
appointments as corrigedores and sub-prefectos to local caciques. By distributing goods 
and access to power as incentives to establish unions, personal patronage formed the 
bedrock of the client networks linking local authorities and national officials.   
In July 1953, as government efforts to establish unions continued apace with the 
final deliberations of the Agrarian Reform Committee, MAC convened the first national 
peasant conference in La Paz.  The meeting brought together the dirigentes of the new 
agricultural unions in order to found national umbrella organization that linked rural 
sindicatos to the state. The by-laws of the resultant Confederación Nacional de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB) laid out the centralized and vertical 
nature of the novel association.441  Local sindicatos, which corresponded with haciendas, 
ex-haciendas, or free communities, were to organize into subcentrales according to 
cantons, the lowest politico-administrative unit of state (similar to a county in the United 
States). The subcentrales were organized into centrales representing each rural province, 
which were further organized into Centrales Departamentales corresponding with each 
of Bolivia’s nine departments. At the apex of the CNTCB structure sat the Dirección de 
la Confederación de Campesinos, which was initially led by Ñuflo Chávez and included 
among its leadership prominent members from both the COB and the MNR.442   Not only 
were the unions intended to extend state authority into the countryside, but they would 
also provide the institutional framework for the agrarian reform.  The law privledged the 
structure of the rural sindicato over local forms of sociopolitical orginization, stating “Se 
reconoce la organización sindical campesina, como un medio de defensa de los derechos 
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de sus miembros y de la conservación de las conquistas sociales.” It stated, moreover, 
that “los sindicatos campesinos intervendrán en la ejecución de la Reforma Agraria.”443    
While the sindicato may have been an organic form of social organization in the 
Cochabamba valley and isolated parts of the Lake Titicaca region, it was alien to many 
free Altiplano communities attempting to reconstitute their ayllus.  Although the agrarian 
reform decree recognized the legal rights of communal landholding, postrevolutionary 
officials generally saw the ayllu as a traditional socioeconomic institution incompatible 
with the modern agricultural society that they sought to implement in the countryside. 444 
In May of 1954, the government amended the law with a decree reaffirmed communal 
land rights—an act that alarmed many.  In a letter to Paz dating to June 1954, Arturo 
Urquidi warned that the reestablishment of ayllus would be detrimental to the 
developmentalist objectives of the Revolution. “Esos resabios de colectivismo primitivo, 
que se manifiestan en ciertas costumbres indígenas,” he warned, “deben ser vistos con 
cautela y aprovechados solamente en cuanto pueden servir para ayudar al progreso de la 
agricultura nacional, pero nunca como antecedentes destinados a consagra y perpetuar 
una de las formas más atrasada de la propiedad agraria, como la comunidad indígena.”445  
It was was necesary to ensure “el desarrollo progresivo de la agricultura, y no incurrir en 
una ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata.”446  Traditional forms of socioeconomic 
organization on the altiplano were inconsistent with the modernized rural society 
imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.   
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The government set out to modernize ayllus by transforming them in agricultural 
cooperatives orientated towards commercial agricultural production and incorporated into 
the state through MAC’s Dirección General de Comunidades y Cooperativas.  In this 
way, officials sought to orientate communities away from traditional modes of 
subsistence farming and towards extensive agriculture production coordinated by state 
planners.  Only in this way would they incorporate the communities into both the 
monetary economy and the domestic market and ultimately succeed in modernizing the 
highland agriculture.  Government offered comunarios several incentives to establish 
Cooperatives.  To accelerate rural integration into the monetary economy in general, the 
government ordered all municipalities to establish “ferias francas”—weekly farmers 
markets—where peasants could sell their wares.447 Not only were Cooperatives 
exonerated from the small fee required to participate in the weekly markets, but they 
were also offered freed from departmental and municipal tax burdens.448 Despite such 
incentives, many communities apparently remained disinterested in establishing 
cooperatives.   
With most highland communities reluctant to establish cooperatives, the 
government adopted alternative strategies intended to incorporate communities into the 
corporate structure of the postrevolutionary state.  Beginning in 1956, it began to 
subdivide highland provinces into an increasing number of cantons.  Cantons are the 
smallest political-administrative units in Bolivia, resembling counties in the United 
States.  Government authority in the canton rested in the corregidor or intendente 
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(depending on the region), individuals who were appointed by the sub-prefect.  In areas 
where sindicatos prevailed, local union bosses typically occupied the post of 
corregidores, intendentes, or even sub-prefects, thus serving to integrate the rest of the 
union into the state apparatus.  In free communities, however, power typically rested with 
traditional ayllu authorities such as the Mallku, Jilakata and/or the Alcalde del Campo.  
Between 1956 and 1964, the government created 79 new cantons.  A review of the laws 
indicated that they affected most prominently highland districts such as La Paz, Oruro, 
and Potosí, where the majority of traditional communities existed. This measure reduced 
the size of cantons while increasing the number of state authorities in a region.  Within 
the new canton, the government appointed traditional ethnic authorities to occupy the 
office of the corrigedor or intendente.  By creating smaller political jurisdictions, the 
government tied rural communities more intimately into the national governing 
apparatus, giving officials a modicum of control over rural politics and agricultural 
production.449    
Although rural organization was undoubtedly motivated by broader 
preoccupations with establishing state authority and promoting economic development, 
the MNR leadership also sought to recruit increasing numbers of peasants into the party.  
MNR organizers set out to organize células del campo on each property, community, 
cooperative or sindicato and tie them to the Comando Pronvincial of the party.  This 
effort was motivated, first and foremost, by the changes in political culture effectuated by 
the 1952 universal suffrage law.  It created an entirely new base of rural voters who the 
MNR would need to win over in order to ensure continued electoral success and political 
longevity.  It was also intended to ensure peasant support of the MNR above the COB or, 
                                                 




even worse, the FSB. According to the MNR’s official bylaws, the primary duties of 
these groups was to “divulger la línea política doctrina y programas del partido, estimular 
la organización del campesinado en las filas del MNR, y realizar activo labor proselitista, 
procurando el ingreso de nuevos campesinos.” 450 But more importantly, they were to 
wrest control of the peasants from the COB and ensure their loyalty to the MNR, by 
“obtener control de las organizaciones sindicales campesinos, procurando que los 
dirigentes de esas sean los mismos que los del Comando.”451          
In addition to organizing rural society into the corporatist hierarchy of the 
postrevolutionary state, government officials developed propaganda specifically targeted 
for indigenous Bolivians.  Indeed, propaganda was an integral component of popular 
statecraft in the countryside.  Laura Gotkowitz’s recent work on rural legal culture had 
important implications on postrevolutionary state formation.  From the local apoderado 
networks of the late nineteenth century to the cacique apoderado movement of the 
twentieth, rural activists studied republican laws and saw the state as guarantor of their 
legal rights.  Such a heavy reliance on the law suggests that the countryside was not as 
stateless as scholarship commonly asserts.  While the state may not have existed on an 
institutional level, it existed as a virtual entity—as an arena for contestation at the very 
least, and as brutally repressive leviathan at the most.  If peasants we so reliant upon the 
law, then the state implicitly retained a presence in the countryside—perhaps it was an 
imagined presence, manifest in a multiplicity of ways according to specific historical 
circumstance—but it was a presence nonetheless.  Postrevolutionary rural propaganda 
operated on this imaginary plane.  Unlike urban areas, where the denser and largely-
                                                 





literate population could be reached through various modes of mass communication, the 
rural population was illiterate and dispersed over a varied geography that was often to 
reach even with radio. The content of rural propaganda, moreover, had to be distinct.  It 
had to fashion an image of state benevolence, and more importantly, promote production, 
efficiency, and development.    
Recognizing the particular challenges posed by rural society, Fellman developed 
distinct methods of mass communication to reach the rural population and a message 
specifically tailored for indigenous Bolivians. In a 1953 pamphlet intended for MNR 
militants called “Lecciones de propaganda, organización, y agitación” he pointed out that 
“el medio de propaganda que tendremos que emplear frecuentemente con nuestras masas 
indígnales debe ser estudiado cuidadosamente.”452 He instructed his readers to observe 
cultural distinctions, and that care must be taken to differentiate between Altiplano, 
valley, and lowlands ethnic groups.  The SPIC made efforts to create Aymara- and 
Quechua-language propaganda—especially for radio broadcasts—and when making 
posters, Fellman instructed party militants to ensure that they were, sobre todo con 
colores que impresionaren a nuestro indígena.”453 As for content, he recommended 
themes like “la representación de lo que va a ser la reforma agraria y el papel que tendrá 
el campesino en ella, la intensificación de la producción, la evitación de sabotaje y del 
levantamiento por medios agitadores, el combate de las ramas.” 454 At base, the 
government sought to inform campesinos of the latest developments in the Revolution 
that directly affected the countryside.   
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Propaganda could bolster state legitimacy on the local level by providing rural 
communities with the latest laws and decrees affecting them.  One of the primary roles of 
the SPIC, for example was “que el campesino introducido a la vida social del país, está en 
condiciones de conocer y saber que leyes lo defienden y lo protegen, al mismo tiempo 
que saber cómo defenderse de los demagogos y oportunistas.”455  Archival records 
indicate that colonos and comunarios constantly requested information from the central 
government, seeking the latest laws, decrees, or news form the urban centers. One group 
of rural dirigentes representing communities in Potosí, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba, for 
instance, wrote President Paz in August 1952 requesting state propaganda. They claimed 
that local officials “se ignoran… los últimos decretos supremos” and that propaganda 
would “hacer conocer a los nucleaos indígenas de las conquistas que ha venido logrando 
para ellos el actual gobierno de la Nación.456  Another case involving the Cochabamba 
community of Yayani underscores how rural folk could benefit from state propaganda. In 
August 1952, three peasants from Yayani wrote President Paz from the San Sebastián 
jail, where they had been detained since participating in the widespread peasant 
insurgency of 1947.  The party newspaper, En Marcha had informed them of the July 
1952 general amnesty law which pardoned all participants in the campesino and worker 
uprising of the late 1940s.  Pointing out that Yayani was one of the uprising specifically 
mentioned in the decree, they requested that Paz intercede to ensure their release. 457 
The SPIC’s rural propaganda efforts were also intended to remind campesinos of 
the important role they were accorded in the postrevolutionary national development 
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initiative.  Aside from the broadsides and posters already mentioned, the government also 
used comic books to reach out to campesinos. Published in 1957, Educación, producción 
y trabajo: las mejores armas para defender tu revolución y tu tierra is exemplary of the 
type of propaganda the MNR was distributing to rural communities. It seems to have 
been intended for male heads of households.458 The story follows a peasant who, thanks 
to the agrarian reform, obtained title to his land where he can now raise a family, educate 
his children, and even build a modern house. “Cuando la casa este construida, las tierras 
trabajadas y rindiendo sus frutos, los hijos sanos y educándose en las escuelas,” it reads, 
“tendrás la seguridad de una vida mejor para ti y tu familia.”  Only then, it concluded, 
would campesinos feel “el orgullo de ser un ciudadano útil a la patria y al MNR.”  
The extent to which this publication was distributed is unknown, and its reception 
is questionable given the high illiteracy rates in the countryside.  But what is certain from 
the content is informed by subtle undertones of a quid pro quo relationship: now that 
MNR has carried through with the agrarian reform, campesinos had to live up to their end 
of the agreement and augment production and contribute to national economic 
development.  Indeed, this is a message that government officials stressed again and 
again. Upon signing the agrarian reform law, Paz proclaimed, “El gobierno de la 
Revolución Nacional ha cumplido con vosotros ahora, sois vosotros los que también 
debéis cumplir con la Revolución Nacional, produciendo más y mejor.”459 Despite the 
universal suffrage law, postrevolutionary indigenous citizenship was not necessarily a 
given fact.  It was instead dependent not only on the embrace of “modern” cultural values 
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(Spanish literacy, hygene and sanitation, etc), but also on participation in the national 
economy as producers and consumers.  Echoing Walter Guevara Arze’s commentary on 
the “peso muerto” of indigenous Bolivians (quoted in chapter two), in order to be 
simultaneously Indian and Bolivian, one had to be a productive and useful member of 
postrevolutionary society.   
Radio proved the most effect means to reach rural society. One of the original 
objetives of the Radio Illimani charter was “contactarse con la raza indígena, ya sea en 
aymara o quechua en su propio idioma, organizando conferencia y enseñanzas apropiadas 
que serán amenizadas con variados programas musicales.”460 The importance of radio 
was not lost on the MNR. Fellman had pushed to create the radio chains in order to 
ensure broadcasts reached larger portions of the rural society.  In a policy paper 
addressed to Vice President Siles, MAC technocrat Carlos Dujovne commented 
“prácticamente el gran grueso del campesinado se halla desconectado de los centros 
urbanos, es decir, de la civilización.” 461 As such “los discursos del Presidente de la 
República o de los Ministros de Asuntos Campesinos y de Agricultura, como los 
excelentes programas de la Subsecretaría de Información y Prensa, no llegan al 
campesinado.” 462 Revealing the low opinion that many government officials held of the 
countryside, he noted, “Tampoco llegan los programas musicales, que tanto ayudarían a 
dispersar ‘la idiotez aldeana’, trayendo alegría.” 463  The official suggested distributing 
radios to the countryside, commenting, “Si hablamos de educación y revolución cultural 
en el campo, no existe mejor invento que el de la radio.”  This “‘radioficación’ del país,” 
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he asserted, would  “transmitir los discursos oficiales y de los dirigentes del MNR, sirve, 
sobre todo, para organizar diariamente una buena audición campesina, a base de consejos 
técnicos-agrícolas, para evitar confusiones en el proceso de la aplicación de reforma 
agraria, para darles lecciones de higiene, de sanidad, acerca de cómo debe atenderse un 
parto y alimentar a los lactantes, buena música y todo ello, que es lo más importante, 
dárselo en sus propios idiomas.” 464 Not only did radio provided a critical means of mass 
communication between urban centers of government and rural centers of production, but 
it also provided the state with an invaluable tool to promote social uplift and civilization. 
The government also brought film and theater to rural communities.  While movie 
theaters were prominent in major cities by the 1950s, they were rare in the countryside.  
As of 1954, there were a total of 75 theaters in all of the provincial cities in the entire 
country.465  In order to extend the reach of film (and the message it contained) to more 
isolated areas, Pablo Quisbert and Iris Villegas found that the ICB established six mobile 
teams that traveled to rural communities “para educar a los campesinos en el arte de 
labrar la tierra.”466 After the “ferias francas” were established in 1953, the SPIC began to 
use the popular weekly markets to serve state propaganda to the rural masses.467  ICB 
documents demonstrate that these mobile teams also traveled to mining centers and that 
the leadership hoped not only to translate movies into Aymara and Quechua, but to 
produce them in indigenous languages as well.468  Campesinos were perhaps the intended 
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audience for ICB productions like “Amanecer indio” (1953), “Juanito sabe leer” (1954), 
and “Un poquito de diversificacion económico” (1955) and other shorts that emphasized 
rural progress and economic development. 469  The SPIC also sent traveling puppet 
troupes to rural communities.  Mariano Baptista Gumucio, Secretary General of the 
SPIC, commented that “el Teatro de Títeres ha preparado varias obras de carácter 
bilingüe con objeto de ofrecer las a los campesinos en sus propio lugares de 
concentración.” He proudly announced that “la primera función en aymara” would soon 
debut at a popular feria franca in Batallas. Corresponding with Paz, Fellman perhaps 
revealed the underlying motivation of popular theater. He described the objective of one 
traveling puppet show as “realizar una gira artística por el interior del país desarrollando 
al mismo tiempo, labor de propaganda en beneficio del Partido.”470  
While institutional structures and the personal patronage networks served as the 
structures linking the state and rural society, propaganda provided the meaning behind 
those structures and the revolution itself.  Propaganda played an important role in rural 
state formation.  The MNR established a specific form of propaganda for rural 
audiences—one that projected an image of the state where its institutional vestiges were 
often absent.  Projected through print, radio, film, and theater, this virtual state was both 
benevolent and paternalistic. It ensured that rural folk understood their expanding rights 
and their new, and indeed important place in the nation—not only as social equals, but as 
an important new productive force that would guarantee the success of the Revolution .  
Officials also employed propaganda to provide the knowledge necessary for socially 
uplift—broadcasting Spanish lessons or sanitation lessons, for example. But most 
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importantly, it provided common peoples with a master narrative that made sense of the 
broader social changes transpiring across rural Bolivia—from the arid altiplano, to the 
lush Yungas, to the fertile valleys of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca.    
 
FROM POPULAR STATECRAFT TO CULTURAL POLITICS 
In addition to politically-motivated propaganda, Fellman increasingly orientated 
the SPIC towards fomenting an authentic national culture for the postrevolutionary 
republic.  Fellman, like other MNR officials, believed that national unity was necessary 
not only to ensure the success of the Revolution, but to sustain the MNR’s popular 
mandate.  “Ya pasó el tiempo de fraude cultural,” declared Fellman.  The Revoluion 
marked a moment of “transcendencia estética” in which the government would 
“recuperar por medio de la conciencia filosófica, estética, ética y política de una nueva 
generación, su gran unidad.”471  Already in 1953, Fellman was coordinating with other 
cultural institutions founded in the wake of the Revolution, especially the General 
Directorate of Culture of the Municipality of La Paz and the IBC, to selectively 
appropriate popular culture as representative of the Bolivian pueblo, as well as the 
postrevolutionary republic.  He dismissed those who argued “que el arte es puro, que 
debe hacerse ‘arte por arte mismo,’” asserting that the Revolution marked an exceptional 
moment in the historical development of republican Bolivia, one in which culture must be 
put to the service of the people.472  With the Revolution, he declared, “el arte pasa a jugar 
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su auténtico rol histórico,” and a unified national culture would  “surgen del espíritu de 
reivindicación social y económica que sacude los cuatro puntos de la tierra boliviana.”473   
The primary means through which the SPIC initially sought to foment this 
unifying national culture model was by sponsoring competitions in literature, poetry, and 
the visual arts.  The first of such efforts occured in November of 1953, when the SPIC 
sponsored “los primeros juegos florales revolucionarios,” a poetry competition for 
university students. The theme of the completition was “liberación nacional,” and 
participants were asked to “descubrir nuevos valores identificados con las aspiraciones de 
las grandes mayorías y estimular a los ya consagrados en otros torneos.” 474  Submissions 
had to refer to a revolutionary event such as nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, 
or universal suffrage.475  The SPIC published the three wining poems in 1954 with 
Trilogía Poética de la Revolución Nacional.476  That same year it published another 
volume of revolutionary poetry, Antología de poemas de la Revolución.477  One example,  
“Salutación campesina” by Oscar Arze Quintanilla, venerated the new horizons that the 
agrarian reform opened for Indians: “Hoy dos de agosto,/millones de gritos 
desmayados,/odios que florecen en la tierra, emanación de brazos seculares/brindan la 
comunión de tu destino.”478 The verse also contained familiar tropes of Indian’s natural 
relationship to the land: “La tierra al fin, es refugio de tu igualdad secreta,/la tierra al fin, 
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es multitud de puños, la tierra al fin entrega se vendimia/a su eterno guardián: El 
Campesino.”479 
The SPIC also set out to promote a revolutionary literature.  Fellman himself 
published Un bala en el viento in 1952, and it stands as one of the only examples of 
postrevolutionary literature.480  What could be deemed “revolutionary literature” had 
nevertheless actually preceded the revolution with the vibrant social realism of the 1930s 
and 1940s.481  Authors such as Tristan Maroff, Carlos Medinaceli, and Augusto Céspedes 
had taken on rural inequality, agrarian reform, and nationalization of the mines, and in so 
doing, had helped shaped the political and social consciousness of the revolutionary 
generation.  Under Fellman’s direction, the SPIC sought to reinvigorate national 
literature—imbibing it was a heavy nationalist spirit and putting it at the service of the 
Revolution.  To this end, the SPIC published an anthology of short stories about 
Revolutionary struggle in 1954, Antología de Cuentos de la Revolución.482 Short stories 
also appeared in the pages of publication such as Boletin de Cultura and Khana, the 
cultural journal published by the La Paz municipal government.  The Municipality of La 
Paz also sponsored periodic literary competitions.  In 1956, for example, it awarded 
Mario Guzmán Aspiazu literary honors for Hombres sis tierra, another rare example of 
postrevolutionary literature.483  
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Working in conjunction with the Municipality of La Paz, the SPIC also promoted 
the visual and plastic arts.  The SPIC aided in this process through its Salón de Pintura 
Revolucionaria, an art gallery in downtown La Paz.  The gallery hosted exhibits 
sponsored by the COB, the municipality of La Paz, and other social organizations seeking  
 
Illustration 10: “Invierno,” by María Luisa Pacheco (1953) stands as an example of the 
type of artwork showcased by the postrevolutionary government.  
to showcase a generation of new artists who found inspiration in the Revolution.  In one 




Reyes Pardo, Zolio Linares, and Raúl Rivas Reyes.  With their exhibit they provided a 
manifesto, “El arte por el pueblo y para el pueblo,” wherein they underscored the 
transformations in artistic expression engendered by the sociopolitical transformations 
wrought by the Revolution.484 Another notable exhibit hosted by the Salón was the work 
of German photographer, Gustavo Thorlichen called “El Indio.” The photographs, which 
the SPIC subsequently published in a book of the same title in 1955, captures stoic 
highland Indians, portrayed as masters of their natural environment.485  The exhibit 
impressed a young Ernesto Guevara as he passed through La Paz in 1953 on his famed 
motorcycle trip.486  
Fellman and the SPIC received the full support of the Paz administration as they 
set out to foment an authentic national culture for the postrevolutionary republic.   In an 
effort to promote this new “revolutionary esthetic, Paz even signed a supreme decree in 
March of 1954 that raised the salaries of artists employed by the SPIC and other cultural 
institutions.487 Paz also commissioned several muralists to visually interpret the 
Revolution in government buildings and public spaces.  The two most notable artists that 
defined their career as revolutionary muralists were Miguel Alandia Pantoja and Walter 
Solon Romero.488  During this time, they put up murals in the Palacio Quemado, the 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, as well as the headquarters of YPFB and COMIBOL (the 
content of their murals are explored in more detail in the following chapter). 
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The muralist movement had been the hallmark of the Mexican revolution, and 
postrevolutionary officials sought not necessarily to imitate the Mexican experience, but 
definitely to recreate it within Bolivia’s own Revolutionary context. In May of 1953, 
Diego Rivera visited Bolivia, upon the invitation of Victor Paz Estensoro to see with his 
own eyes the Bolivian national revolution.  During his brief stay in La Paz, he visited the 
Tiwanaku ruins and gave a lecture at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés where he 
received the diploma of Honorary Member of the Bolivian Society of Sociology, “por su 
eminentes servicios desde el campo de la pintura y la literatura, a la interpretación 
sociológica del Alma Indoamericana.”489 As can be expected, Rivera was particularly 
interested in exploring the new artistic expressions produced by the Revolution. The La 
Paz daily, El Diario reported that Rivera had “palabras especiales” for mural that the 
“pintor revolucionario” Miguel Alandia Pantoja had recently completed in the Palacio del 
Gobierno.490 Responding to journalists questions on his opinion of the Revolution, he 
responded that “si me hubiese sido posible escoger un lugar de mi nacimiento, hubiese 
sido Bolivia. Lo más indio del continente.” He also shared his thoughts on 
postrevolutionary aesthetics, telling one audience that “Sólo se puede hacer nacionalidad 
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Illustration 11:  Self portrait drawn by Diego Rivera during his visit to La Paz, May 
1953.492 
                                                 





Despite the advances made by the SPIC, declining economic conditions 
ultimately undermined the cultural revolution envisioned by Fellman, Paz and other 
postrevolutionary officials.  The postrevolutionary development strategy got off to a 
rocky start.  Faced with rising demands from labor, a need to finance COMIBOL, the 
government began printing more money.  Between 1952 and 1956, Bolivia’s currency, 
the boliviano, underwent what Herbert Klein has called “one of the world’s most 
spectacular records of inflation.” During these four years, he continued, “the cost of 
living increased twentyfold, with annual inflation rates over 900 percent.”  Moreover, 
decreasing agricultural production, a growing backlog of land reform claims, and a slow 
start to the lowland colonization initiative stalled import substitution efforts. By 1956, 
with inflation skyrocketing and the balance of payments slipping ever further into the red, 
postrevolutionary officials turned the United States and the International Monetary Fund 
for economic assistance.  Following the election of Hernán Siles in 1956, the government 
implemented an economic stabilization package designed by the economist George 
Jackson Eder. The plan consisted of curtailing government expenditures by 40 percent 
and eliminating state subsidies for basic commodities, such as the cupos.493 To the 
chagrin of the left, the United States would increasingly underwrite Bolivia’s 
development effort.  
In accordance with the Eder plan, the government cut spending on all but the most 
necessary components of the national budget. Already by 1955, the SPIC was struggling 
financially. President Paz had attempted to save the office by exempting it from 
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taxation.494  While this law allowed the SPIC to operate at a lesser cost, it further 
undermined much-needed state revenue.  After 1956, moreover, the Eder plan dictated 
the abolishment of special tax exemptions that the government had previously granted 
state ministries.495 By year’s end, the SPIC could no longer afford to publish cultural 
publications such as Pututu and Boletín de Cultura.  It could not even publish is 
commemorative Album de la Revolución Nacional, and in order to ensure the release of 
the book, they had to take money from the central bank.   
The implementation of the Eder plan also undermined the precarious unity of the 
postrevolutionary government coalition and fragmented both the MNR and the COB.  
Ñuflo Chávez, who was elected as Siles’ Vice-president, resigned in June in protest of the 
stabilization reforms, as did several other progressive cabinet ministers.496  Government 
workers and miners were hit especially hard by the stabilization plan.  Siles laid off 
miners and streamlined the state bureaucracy, shedding unnecessary personal that had 
been granted government posts in exchange for their loyalty. The increasing prevalence 
of strikes underscores the unrest that resulted from the stabilization plan.497  Richard 
Thorn found that while there were 220 and 310 labor strikes in 1956 and 1957, 
respectively, the figure jumped to 1,570 in 1958, and 1,272 in 1959.498  Confronting with 
rising worker unrest and the fragmentation of the popular coalition that marked Paz’ four 
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years in government, Siles bolstered the coercive capacity of the postrevolutionary state. 
Not only did he expand Control Politico, the dreaded MNR security apparatus led by 
Claudio San Ramón, but he also set out the rebuild the military, which had been 
eviscerated after the revolution. The Siles administration thus marked a turn away from 
popular statecraft model and toward the centralization of power under an increasingly 
authoritarian state.  In short, Siles put an end to the popular statecraft model that defined 
the first years of the Revolution, instead opting for a bureaucratic authoritarian model.  It 
was still a national-popular state, but Siles sought to co-opt rather than to cooperate.   
The FSB uprising in September 1956 served as the death-knell of the SPIC.  The 
day after the uprising, Fellman purchased add space in the La Paz daily, El Diaro to 
announce his defiance.  In accounting for the motivations underlying both the causes and 
the specific targets of the uprising, he stated “los barbaros necesitan destruir los órganos 
de expression de la cultura y del pensamiento.”499  He vowed that the SPIC will continue 
working, “porque la cultura y la voz del pueblo son indestructibles.” 500  The SPIC was 
finished, however.  Bowing to the financial pressures, Siles folded the SPIC in 1957. In 
its places, he created a more modest Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, which was 
responsible for informing the public of the latest advances of the Revolution.  Like the 
SPIC, it operated directly out of the office of the President. As for the cultural 
components of nation building, they were partitioned to the Ministry of Education and 
Fine Arts, where the new minister, Fernando Diez de Medina was working to centralize 
all state cultural efforts.501 Cultural politics would no longer operate out of the office of 
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the presidency.  And Diez de Medina eschewed politics for aesthetics in his efforts to 
foment a unifying national culture for the postrevolutionary republic.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The 1952 Revolution marked a novel moment in the historical formation of the 
Bolivian state.  Dating to the late nineteenth century, the liberal model of statehood was 
characterized by restricted suffrage and limited state intervention in the social and 
economic affairs of the Republic.  After 1952, the MNR leadership extended political 
rights to workers, women, and indigenous peasants—large swaths of society that had 
long been excluded from the formal political sphere—and incorporated them into a new 
corporatist state founded upon the 1938 constitution.  The MNR leadership greatly 
expanded the role of the state.  It placed the government in change of the management of 
the nation’s finite natural resources and national economic planning to promote economic 
diversification and national development.  The MNR also expanded the state into the 
social realm. With the introduction of social security, a labor code, and universal 
education, the postrevolutionary state would to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens.  The 
creation of this “Estado de 1952” marked the beginning of a new political era 
characterized by national-popular politics. 
The consolidation of the postrevolutionary state was predicated upon popular 
statecraft.  It was a strategy devised by the MNR leadership according to their own 
political struggle and specifically tailored to the prevailing structures of Bolivia society.  
Popular statecraft was predicated upon two interconnected strategies.  The first consisted 
the organization of society into centralized and hierarchical groups affiliated with the 




utilization of mass media to deploy propaganda that not only imparted the meaning of the 
revolution to everyday citizens, but projected a national culture model that would serve to 
unify the fragmented society and ensure the success of the Revolution.  As it confronted 
the particular challenges of constituting state authority in rural and urban areas, it adapted 
the model accordingly.  In urban areas—where only 30 percent of the population 
resided—where but which was already organized into corporate groups easily 
accommodated into the corporatist state, the propaganda component of popular statecraft 
was especially strong.  In rural areas, were the majority of the population lived, the state 
had to organize society in order to incorporate it into the structures of the 
postrevolutioary government.  The content of rural propaganda also differed from the 
urban realm, not only projecting an aura of state benevolence, but it stressed production, 
efficiency and development—goals that were in line with the developmentalist 
orientation of the postrevolutionary leadership.   
The propaganda component of the popular statecraft strategy provided the 
foundation for the cultural politics of the Revolution.  Fearing that a lack of national unity 
could undermine their political hegemony, Fellman and other officials set out to foment a 
national cultural model that would unify the nation.  The SPIC ultimately folded because 
of the economic priorities of the postrevolutionary state.  But its efforts to establish a 
national culture were transferred to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, where 
Fernando Diez de Medina was laying the groundwork for a new state cultural 
bureaucracy detached from the purely political motivation of the Office of the President.  
As the following chapter demonstrates, nation unity and national cultural formation 
became more pressing that ever toward the late 1950s.  And as the government sought to 











History as National Liberation? Creating a Usable Past for 
Postrevolutionary Bolivia 
¡Gloria al protomártir indo-mestizo Pedro Domingo Murillo! 
-MNR pamphlet, 1950  
 
Sabemos que somos víctimas del pasado; pero también que en el presente debemos 
asumir la responsabilidad del porvenir. 
-MNR, Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata, 1942 
 
In the absence of history, men create myths which explain the origin of their most sacred 
beliefs. 
-George W. Stocking, Jr. Race, Culture and Evolution 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make 
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, 
given, and transmitted from the past.  The tradition of all the dead generations weighs 
like a nightmare on the brain of the living. 
-Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
 
“La revisión de la historia es una de las formas de liberación nacional” asserted 
the popular author and MNR co-founder, Augusto Céspedes.502 It was December 1956 
and Céspedes was discussing his latest book, El dictador suicida: 40 años de historia de 
Bolivia, the most recent installment of a revisionist historiography being produced by 
MNR intellectuals and sustained by the postrevolutionary state.  The work had been 
savagely reviewed by several prominent intellectuals—perhaps the most notable being 
Minister of Education, Fernando Diez de Medina.  It was far too subjective and lacked 
adequate documentation to be considered “History” he argued.503  Critics agreed.  
Writing from his cozy diplomatic post in Rome, Céspedes was on the defensive. “Como 
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escritor de esa revolución, he publicado El dictador suicida con intención polémica,” he 
declared, “como aporte de un arma a la batalla nacionalista que libra Bolivia.  
Actualmente escribir la historia no es un deporte intelectual, es como fundir y templar un 
arma con la seguridad de que tiene que ser empleada en el combate.”504  
Céspedes’ candid commentary on the need for the past to serve the present 
exemplifies the utilitarian purpose that the MNR leadership assigned national history.  
After co-founding the party in 1941, Céspedes, along with José Cuadros Quiroga and 
Carlos Montenegro, set out to rewrite national history.  All three were journalists who 
worked at La Calle, the La Paz daily that served as the voice of the nationalist 
opposition.505  During the 1940s and 1950s, they applied their quick wit, biting prose, and 
political agenda to history, publishing in books, pamphlets, and essays a novel 
interpretation of Bolivia’s contested past.  They eschewed the racial essentialism and 
telluric determinants that framed the prevailing strands of Liberal historiography.  They 
instead cast Bolivia’s historical development in terms of a dialectical struggle between 
nationalism and colonialism. This revisionist historiography not only provided the MNR 
with the narrative necessary to contextualize the nationalist struggle and situate itself as 
the legitimate revolutionary vanguard.  It also naturalized the raceless society envisioned 
by the MNR leadership by linking middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban 
workers, and miners through a common history of resistance to neocolonial domination.   
This chapter examines three distinct albeit interrelated cases of the MNR’s use 
(and/or abuse) of History.  It first analyses the production of history.  The revision of 
national history was a deliberate process of reinterpreting and rewriting the past that 
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entailed the selection of specific individuals, groups, and events, and their inscription 
them with new meaning (and historical significance). By focusing on key texts written by 
Céspedes, Cuadros, and Montenegro, it explores the political and social content of their 
historiography and how it was related to the revolutionary imagination of the MNR 
leadership.  Second, the chapter chronicles the commemoration of historical memory.  
After April 1952, the MNR leadership harnessed the expanding cultural bureaucracy of 
the postrevolutionary state to commemorate this history, transforming civic time and 
space with monuments, murals, and national holidays.  Finally, it examines the 
professionalization of history.  Nationalist intellectuals maintained that history had long 
been falsified by the anti-national elite.  By institutionalizing epistemic standards of 
historical proof and objectively, the MNR set out to ensure that history would, in the 
future, be scientific, nationalist, and accurate.   
History is an integral component of the modern nation-state, providing 
populations living in a specific demarcated territory a common past that is necessary to 
collectively imagine a nation.506 In recent decades, scholars have labored to detail the 
relationship between history and the modern nation state.  Most studies have focused on 
this relationship in terms of the philosophy of history, highlighting the problematic nature 
of the nation in the production of historical narratives.  Correspondingly, these scholars 
have also criticized the nation as the universal subject/object of history, calling for 
historical inquiry to reach beyond national boundaries.  Yet, only recently have scholars 
begun to detail the practical application of history in the political, social, and cultural 
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construction of nations, nationalisms, and national identities.507  This chapter attempts 
engages these discussing by addressing the following questions:  How does history 
function in a politically divided and ethnically fragmented society?  And what 
consequences can it have on the formation, or in the case of Bolivia, the deformation of 
that society? 
 
HISTORY AND THE POLITICS OF THE PAST 
From caudillos to Conservatives, Liberals to Republicans, opposing political 
parties continually revised national history as they competed for, rose to, and fell from 
power in Bolivia’s tumultuous political landscape.  But none utilized the past as 
successfully, or monopolized it as fully, as the MNR.  With the establishment of the 
MNR in 1941, nationalist intellectuals began a concerted campaign to revise national 
history.  Coming of age in era of war, political realignment, and social reform, the 
middle-class attorneys, politicians, and journalists who constituted the MNR vanguard 
were acutely aware of the power of history.  They recognized that at stake in the past was 
not only the present, but the future as well.  For if the MNR was going to succeed in 
fundamentally realigning the relationship between state, society, and economy, it needed 
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first to provide a specific interpretation of the past that grounded the party, contextualized 
its reforms, and naturalized its particular vision of postrevolutionary society.   
Upon founding the MNR in 1941, nationalist intellectuals confronted a 
pessimistic and outward-looking national historiography that was largely shaped by the 
racial anxieties of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century creole elite.508  After a 
half century of frustrated nation building, caudillo rule, internecine conflict, and, in 1880, 
the loss of Bolivia’s costal territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific, a generation of 
intellectuals affiliated with the oligarchic state set out to explain Bolivia’s uneven 
historical evolution.  Never mind the lack of strong institutions, the limited public sphere, 
and the ambition of military officers; the cause of Bolivia’s seemingly perpetual 
instability was located in the Indians and mestizos that comprised the majority of 
Bolivia’s population.  
Creole intellectuals perceived ethnic difference and racial mixture as a threat to 
political stability and social order and, as such, an impediment to democracy.  Drawing 
from the latest trends in European race science to frame their own telluric understanding 
of Andean civilization, the governing and intellectual elite saw Indians as unequal, 
uncivilized, and generally ill-prepared for the responsibilities of republican citizenship.  
Cholos fared even worse in the creole racial imagination. They were perceived as morally 
degenerate ethnic hybrids that exhibited the most unflattering characteristics of Hispanic 
and Andean peoples.  The early twentieth century liberal historian Sabino Pinilla 
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asserted, for instance, “Enológicamente el producto mestizo concurrirá la economía 
social, por la inoculación bastarda que llevaba en su sangre y porque su regulación no fue 
atendida por la colonización española, ni siquiera posteriormente por los gobiernos de 
independencia.”509  For Pinilla and other positivist statesment and intellectuals, cholos 
represented a threat to the order and progress essential to the success of the Republic. 
Bolivia’s towering nineteenth-century historian, Gabriel René Moreno, was 
perhaps the most outspoken promoter of the need for racial purity in Bolivia’s fledgling 
democracy, and his prejudices shaped the burgeoning national historiography.  Born in 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Moreno attended secondary school in Sucre before moving to 
Santiago to study law at the University of Chile.  In Santiago, he distinguished himself as 
an antiquarian, bibliographer, and historian, and in 1868 he was named director of Chile’s 
prestigious Instituto Nacional.  Though residing in Santiago until his death in 1908, 
Moreno never renounced his Bolivian citizenship and dedicated himself solely to the 
study of Bolivia’s past, publishing fifteen books and a wide variety of articles and 
reviews, which remain fundamental texts on Bolivian history to this day.   
Throughout this vast body of work, Moreno identified both Indians and mestizos 
as the principle obstacles to national progress. In a biography of the nineteenth century 
Santa Cruz intelectual, Nicomedes Antelo, for example, he asserted, “El indio y el 
mestizo no sirven estrictamente para nada en la evolución de las sociedades modernas 
hacia el progreso.”510  Not only did Indians and mestizos represent an impediment to 
progress, but they also threatened to undermine Bolivian democracy.  “Es notoria la 
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tendencia de los mestizos a la pereza, a los litigios, al servilismo, a la intriga, que son 
gérmenes de escándalo y de ‘caudillaje’” he wrote, “a eso se añade la estupidez y la 
cobardía del indio incaico, pero perpetuar el despotismo en nuestra sociedad.”511  As 
such, neither Indians nor mestizo were fit for republican citizenship according to Moreno.  
Only those belonging to the “pure white race” were capable of participating as moral and 
responsible citizens.   
The racial determination that informed Moreno’s social thought shaped a 
subsequent generation of Bolivian historiography, which was already influenced to a 
large degree by positivism and social Darwinism.  Alberto Gutiérrez, for example, 
privileged race as a factor to account for political despotism in El Melgarejismo: Antes y 
después de Melgarejo (1917).  For Gutiérrez, Melgarejo was synonymous with the 
entirety of caudillo rule in Bolivia.  He argues for the elevation of Melgarismo as a term 
to describe the particular brand of tyranny specific to Bolivian caudillos in general and 
cholos in particular.  To understand the nature of Melagarejo, a mestizo from Tarata, 
Gutiérrez argued that the “clasificación biológica” needed to be examined.512  Bautista 
Saavedra also privledged race as a determinant in his La democracia en nuestra historia 
(1921), faulting the temperament of the Hispanic “race” for the shortcoming of Bolivian 
democracy.513  
Of the early-twentieth-century creole intelligentsia, the nationalist historians 
singled out Alcides Arguedas as epitomizing the pessimism and “furiosa 
autodenigración” that, they maintained, characterized liberal historiography.514  Arguedas 
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graduated in law from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz in 1903, on the 
heels of the Liberal Party’s violent rise to power.  For the paceño elite, the Liberal 
ascendance represented the triumph of modern over tradition—a new era of progress 
whereupon science, rationality, and order would enable economic growth, political 
stability, and social improvement.  The era was characterized by the consolidation of the 
tin mining economy, a marked increase in foreign investment, hacienda expansion, 
unprecedented indigenous land divestiture, urbanization, and railroad construction.515 
Still, to Arguedas and other creole intellectuals who looked to Europe and the United 
States to define their own standards of progress, Bolivia seemed a failed Republic.   
Arguedas, like much of his generation, looked to Europe to model his own 
expectations for republican society.  Arguedas lived in Europe between 1905 and 1915, 
where he read Gustavo Le Bon and Auguste Comte, and was influenced by the ideas of 
degeneration of Max Nordau and the pessimism of Spain’s generation of 1898.516   But it 
was the metaphor of social illness as introduced by the Argentine positivist Carlos 
Octavio Bunge that seemed to have had the strongest impact on his social thought.517  
While in Paris, Arguedas wrote Pueblo enfermo, his most famous, and indeed 
controversial work. The book relied in the metaphor of social illness to account for the 
chronic backwardness of Bolivian society.   Though he reserved his most severe 
judgment for Indians and especially cholos, creoles did not escape his bleak assessment 
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of the ills of Bolivian society.  In one example of the pessimism that characterized his 
work, Arguedas, who saw geography as playing a major factor in the formation—or the 
deformation—of national character, commented “Todo es inmenso en Bolivia, todo, 
menos el hombre.”518   
Arguedas perceived ethnic diversity and racial hybridity as impediments to social 
order and political stability. But where he differed from Moreno what that he linked these 
factors to a narrative of national degradation and social pathology to forge a negative 
national image.  True, he redeemed the Indian in the image of the “noble savage,” a 
virtuous, albeit inferior, being whose degradation was due to centuries of exploitation at 
the hands of, first, Spanish colonizers and then, rural mestizos and urban cholos. But 
assimilation via the harmonious blending of Andean and Hispanic peoples—or 
mestizaje—was not the answer.  It was, in fact, the cholos who Arguedas asserted were a 
threat to society and the primary source of Bolivia’s economic backwardness, social 
decline, and political chaos.  Echoing widely-held fears of racial hybridity and social 
degeneration, he argued for the maintenance of ethnic difference.519  Before his death in 
1946, Arguedas published many more historical studies, including La fundación de la 
República (1920), Historia general de Bolivia (1922), La dictadura y la anarquía (1926), 
Los caudillos bárbaros (1929), and Política y la Guerra del Chaco (1936). Guillermo 
Francovich argues that these works “no son sino una ampliación de los cuadros que sobre 
la historia boliviana había trazado en su Pueblo enfermo.” 520  The emerging generation of 
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nationalist intellectuals argreed. To them, this corpus of work served as the intellectual 
underpinning and provided the moral justification for the liberal-oligarchic state.  
 
NATIONALIST REVISIONISM 
It was against this pervasive narrative of racial degeneration and social illness that 
nationalist intellectuals were writing during the 1930s and 1940s.  Indeed, the MNR’s 
particular interpretation of national history had its roots in a critique of early twentieth-
century positivism.  But that critique was influenced by the milieu of ideological currents, 
reformist thought, and political opposition that emerged in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.  Revolution in Mexico, the rise of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA) in Peru, Peronismo, economic nationalism—each of these factors, 
and the ideologies that either influenced them or were projected by them shaped the 
burgeoning nationalist historical imagination.  The emerging generation of nationalist 
intellectuals, many of whom had served as officers in the Chaco, no longer negated 
Bolivia’s national experience by measuring it against European or North American 
standards of progress and national development.  Seeking a unique, yet universal national 
identity, some looked to a glorified pre-Hispanic past to locate the origins of the Bolivian 
nation. In one example of the emerging currents of historical thought, Federico Avila 
argued in Revisión de nuestro pasado (1936) that by conceiving of national history as 
beginning with the arrival of Columbus, it remained inaccurate and deformed.521 But with 
the oligarchy entrenched in power, such ideas remained on the margins of the creole 
historical imagination.   
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During the 1940s, MNR intellectuals began to compose their own interpretation 
of the past, elaborating what, in the late 1930s, was a disparate critique of Bolivian 
government and society into a distinct corpus of history.  Even before the foundation of 
the MNR, hints of the structural interpretation of the past that characterized the party’s 
revisionist history were already evident in La Calle, the opposition newspaper founded 
by Céspedes and Armando Arce in 1936 that included among its regular contributors 
Carlos Montenegro, José Cuadros Quiroga, and other nationalist intellectuals that would 
become affiliated with the MNR in subsequent years.  Glimpses of the economic 
nationalism and protectionist policies that would define both the party and the Revolution 
are apparent in Montenegro’s early writing, such as Frente al Derecho del Estado: El oro 
de la Standard Oil (1938).522  Similarly, Céspedes offered his view of national history 
and vision of the MNR’s social order with Sangre de Mestizos (1936).523    
The first cohesive and identifiable example of the MNR’s revisionist history was 
contained in the party’s founding manifesto, “Bases y principios de acción inmediata del 
Moviemiento Nacionalista Revolucionario.”  Written by Cochabamba-native, José 
Cuadros Quiroga, and published in June 1942, “Bases y principios” introduced the 
MNR’s nationalist ideology and outlined its reformist agenda.524  It is significant that 
Cuadros dedicated most of the forty-five page pamphlet not to critiquing the present, nor 
to shaping the future, but to providing a particular interpretation of the past. He opened 
by reminding readers that MNR’s political and ideological positions “son confirmadas 
por la historia de nuestra propia Patria,” a statement that makes especially salient the 
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importance that the MNR assigned history in defining its own revolutionary agenda.525 
He then went on to survey the entirety of Bolivian history—from the pre-Incan 
civilization of Tiwanaku to the immediate post-Chaco period.   
At the center of the nationalist position was that Bolivia’s backwardness was not a 
result of biology and geography, as Moreno, Saavedra, Arguedas, and others had long 
maintained.  Rather, he blamed it on the mining and landed elite that ascended to power 
with the Liberal Revolution of 1899, who had since enriched themselves at the expense 
of the Bolivian nation.  Cuadros employed a dialtectic, casting Bolivian history as a 
struggle between the authentic forces of the nation on the one hand, and the oligarchy on 
the other.  He asserted that the “anti-national” elite had enabled the marked acceleration 
of foreign ownership of Bolivia’s extractive resources and essential infrastructure while 
maintaining a feudal land tenure system that kept the nation’s indigenous majority in a 
state of poverty and backwardness.  Instead of progress, the consequence of forty years of 
liberal-oligarchic rule was the continued impoverishment and political exclusion of the 
popular classes—that is, workers, miners, and indigenous peasants—who represented the 
authentic Bolivian nation.  
In 1943, Carlos Montenegro subsequently expanded this narrative with 
Nacionalismo y coloniaje.  Montenegro was born in Cochabamba in 1903 to upper class 
parentage.  After a mix of public and private schoosl, he attended the University of San 
Simón where he studied law.526  Writing and politics was nevertheless where 
Montenegro’s passion lay, and during the 1920s, he contributed opinion pieces to local 
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publications under several different pseudonyms.527  In the late 1920s, during the 
Presidency of Hernando Siles, he had joined the Partido Nacionalista along with 
Cépedes, Paz, Guevara, and others who would redefine national politics during the 1930s 
and 1940s.528  During the Chaco War, he served as the Inspector de Propaganda del 
Estado Mayor.  After the war, he settled in La Paz, where  he co-founded the short-lived 
Partido Socialista and worked as a staff-writer for the La Calle.  He originally wrote 
Nacionalismo y coloniaje, undoubtedly his most popular publication, for an essay 
competition sponsored by the La Paz Association of Journalism in 1943.529  The 
submission won the competition and the following year, Universo press in La Paz 
published the essay.   
A history of republican Bolivia from the perspective of the national press, 
Nacionalismo y coloniaje is widely recognized as a turning point in Bolivian 
historiography.530  Montenegro elaborated the oppositional binary of nation versus anti-
nation introduced by Cuadros, establishing the dialectic upon which the nationalist 
interpretation of the past rested.  He recast Bolivian history as a tension between the 
forces of nationalism and colonialism.  The “national” forces of middle-class 
professionals, workers, miners, and indigenous peasants that represented the authentic 
Bolivian nation were repressed by the “anti-national” landed and mining elite of the 
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liberal oligarchy—dubbed “La Rosca”—who had enriched themselves at the expense of 
national development.  As the oligarchy monopolized the press and printing houses, they 
perpetuated a historical metanarrative characterized by the “difundida obra” of Alcides 
Arguedas.531  In the antinacional interpretation of the past, it was the “extranjero,” who 
“concluye por ser sujeto y objeto exclusive de la historia de Bolivia, y es él, no el 
boliviano, que se enaltece, ennoblece y fortalece con ella.”532  This was not history; rather 
it represented “antihistoria” as it negated Bolivia’s true past and represented not the 
forward movement of time, but a “marcha hacia atrás.” As a result of this historiograpy, 
Montenegro contended “el panorama histórico de Bolivia se [ofrece] sólo como una 
visión horrible” that negated Bolivia’s national reality.533 This “historiografía 
antibolivianista” had grossly distorted the development of a truly national sentiment: 
“Destruyendo ella las creencias colectivas—particularmente las creencias que en algún 
modo fortifican el sentimiento de la nacionalidad—descuida en absoluto sustituir lo que 
ha destruido.  Su finalidad—tácitamente cuando menos—parece por lo mismo la de 
eliminar toda noción histórica en el pueblo.”534  
With Nacionalismo y coloniaje, Montenegro sought nothing less than to 
“restablecer la verdad del devenir boliviano.”535  Bolivia’s sixteen-year struggle for 
Independence proved an especially important historical moment for Montenegro, who 
was eager to demonstrate precedent for the fledgling MNR’s political position.  He cast 
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independence as a popular and intensely nationalist movement that was frustrated by 
creole elites. The leaders of Bolivia’s Independence movement—the first nationalists, 
Pedro Domingo Murillo, José Miguel Lanza, and Esteban Arze—were either hanged in 
1810 or politically marginalized by the ascendant commercial class once independence 
was won in 1825.  The nascent Bolivian republic was thus hijacked by “anti-national” 
creole elites—“una aristocracia de descendientes de los conquistadores, de nobles y 
grandes hacendados”—who maintained the social and economic structure of colonial 
period for their own financial benefit.536  Montenegro asserts that “la adopción de la 
estructura social, económica y aun política de coloniaje después de haberse conquistador 
la independencia produce algo como un ataque de parálisis en el cuerpo de la 
Republica.”537 In this way, history actually stopped with Independence, only to be 
reinitiated by the MNR after 1952.    
The utility of this narrative was that it established a teleology that provided the 
MNR with a direct historical link to what was now cast as a frustrated national 
independence movement.  Historian Luis Antezana argues that the MNR fashioned the 
1952 Revolution as a “nueva independencia.” 538 Yet, there is a subtle, though important 
distinction to be made.  The MNR historicized its struggle not as a new independence, 
but rather as a continuation of the original independence movement—that is, a second 
independence.  For example, President Paz Estenssoro proclaimed that “La lucha por la 
Independencia Política, iniciada el 25 de mayo de 1809, es un proceso que tiene otra de 
sus jornadas decisivas el 9 de Abril 1952 y está todavía en pleno desarrollo hasta que  
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logremos la emancipación económica sin la cual no existe independencia política.” 539   
By detailing the extent to which national movements had been frustrated by the anti-
national interests of the elite throughout Republican history, Montenegro established a 
revolutionary teleology that legitimized the MNR’s nationalist platform as the realization 
of national independence.  
At the same time, Montenegro also created an anti-national teleology that began 
with the shortcomings of national independence and culminated in Bolivia’s defeat to 
Paraguay in the Chaco War.  This narrative linked the criollos who had “hijacked” the 
independence movement with Hilarión Daza’s loss of Bolivia’s coast in the 1880 War of 
the Pacific, the land-grabbing policies of the infamous caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo with 
the marked hacienda expansion that occurred under Ismael Montes, the decidedly anti-
national economic policies of Liberal President, José Manuel Pando with the 
authoritarianism of Bautista Saavedra—all culminating in the Chaco War, the nadir of 
Bolivian history and the most recent memory for many young Bolivians seeking social 
change.540  
Another historical moment crucial to the MNR’s self-definition was the period 
spanning 1899 to 1935, years that marked the ascendance of the liberal party to national 
government, the consolidation of the landed and mining oligarchy, and the Chaco War.  
Though the MNR’s historically-constituted legitimacy rested on a specific interpretation 
of the entirety of the national past, it was precisely the history of this period upon which 
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it could most clearly define its place in history by distinguishing itself from its immediate 
predecessors.  In Nacionalismo y coloniaje, Montenegro provides only a peripheral 
treatment of the twentieth century, devoting the grand majority of his analysis to the press 
and politics of the nineteenth. Similarly, Cuadros had provided only a rather shallow 
analysis of the Liberal era to contextualize the MNR’s political position.  It was Augusto 
Céspedes who added substance to Cuadros’s analysis while bringing Montenegro’s 
dialectic to the present with El dicator suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia.  Published 
in 1956, it was the first history written exclusively about the Liberal era.    
Bookending his study with the Liberal Revolution of 1899 and the formation of 
the MNR in 1941, Céspedes chronicles the consolidation of oligarchic rule and its 
consequences on national society and politics.  Providing the momentum behind his 
narrative are the failures and the injustices of the government—the loss of the Acre 
territory to Brazil in 1904, the formation of the Banco de la Nación Boliviana in 1913 
and its role in perpetuating the power of the landed and mining elite, the hypocrisy and 
violence of the Saavedra and Siles regimes, and, of course, the Chaco War.  It is telling 
that he based his thesis on the same logic and historical argumentation that Montenegro 
employed for Nacionalismo y coloniaje over a decade earlier.  Not only did he assert that 
Bolivian history was a dialectic between the nation and anti-nation, “la oposición entre 
Bolivia y la Anti-Bolivia, la soberanía económica y el capital financiero, el nacionalismo 
y el coloniaje.”541  But he also promoted a teleological narrative of nation-ness, casting 
the MNR as the nationalist vanguard, who “asumen la función de agentes de la dialéctica 
histórica de Bolivia, rebelándose contra su propio ambiente social e intelectual para 
                                                 




encabezar la rebelión del pueblo.”542 In this way, the MNR stands as the inevitable 
outcome of semicolonial domination at the hands of the antinational oligarchy.   
History served a utilitarian purpose in the eyes of the MNR leadership.  The 
revisionist narrative that Cuadros, Montenegro, and Céspedes composed during the 1940s 
and 50s provided the MNR with a usable past.  It supplied the general public with a 
revolutionary master narrative, a linear historical teleology beginning with the 
independence struggle and culminating in a modern nation state that the MNR itself 
would bring to fruition. Most importantly, this usable past provided the MNR with a 
historically-constituted legitimacy that cast the party and its goals as the realization of 
national independence.  It also provided context for the emergence of the party, enabling 
it to define itself in contrast to the liberal-oligarchic governments of the first half of the 
twentieth century.    
 
HISTORICIZING MESTIZAJE  
In addition to providing the party with a historically-constituted legitimacy, this 
revisionist history also naturalized the mestizaje-based social order that the MNR sought 
to bring to fruition after the Revolution.  Liberal historiography cited ethnic hybridity as 
one of the primary causes of Bolivia’s continued underdevelopment.  Venerating ideas of 
purity of blood during the apogee of scientific racism, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century intellectuals maintained that mixed races were not only a moral and political 
threat to the republic, but an impediment to democracy.  Intellectuals such as Franz 
Tamayo disagreed, finding virtue in the cultural and ethnic blending of Europe and the 
Andes.  Athough mestizaje as a source of national unity was largely dismissed by ruling 
                                                 




elites, during the 1920s and 1930s artists, intellectuals, and writers drew on both 
indigenous and western traditions to define a new national aesthetic that venerated 
Bolivia’s Andean and Hispanic origins.  Literary critic Javier Sanjinés argues that 
following the Chaco War, a new generation of reform-minded intellectuals and 
politicians began to “democratize” the idea of mestizaje.543   
The MNR was part this generation, and their primary contribution to the 
democratization of mestizaje was through the reinterpretation of the national past.  
Nationalists rejected the biological and geographic determinism of Moreno, Saavedra, 
and Arguedas, locating Bolivia’s national problems instead in the social and economic 
structures established by the oligarchic elite.  After all, the challenges that the MNR 
confronted were structural—the result of international capitalism and an entrenched 
oligarchic elite—not biological.  In Nacionalismo y coloniaje, for example, Montenegro 
asserts that “ya que tal hegemonía clasista fundada, no tanto en la tradición de sangre ni 
en el cimiento de los prejuicios, cuanto en la capacidad económica… lo cual da a dicho 
dominio de clase una consistencia cada vez más creciente y consciente que concluye por 
adquirir la organicidad característica de una fuerza regulada a sistema.”544  In recasting 
the national past, the MNR sought to rehabilitate the place of Indians and cholos in both 
national history and the revolutionary imagination.   
In addition to discrediting the biological determinants that had defined the 
positivist historiography, MNR intellectuals gave mestizaje social and political form by 
reconstituting the idea of a Bolivian pueblo in national history.545  The national/anti-
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national dialectic within which MNR intellectuals framed Bolivian history recast the 
nation as a multi-class, pan-ethnic coalition of middle-class professionals, intellectuals, 
urban workers, miners, and indigenous peasants united in a common struggle against the 
oligarchy.  In so doing, they historically validated a more inclusive conception of 
citizenship that placed the popular classes squarely within the national community. In 
Bases y principios, for instance, Cuadros characterized the nation as inherently mestizo, 
and proudly acknowledged a long history of ethnic and cultural blending.  “Llevamos en 
nuestra sangre la herencia de los hijos del Sol,” he proclaimed.546  “Nuestro es la 
privilegio de la tierra nativa y de la riqueza.  Nuestra es la tradición gloriosa de la 
revolución de la independencia que puso a prueba el talento y el valor del mestizo y del 
indio.”547 He also celebrated Indians as inherent members of the nation with statements 
like “Levantemos con orgullo los blasones de nuestra estirpe indiana.” 548  He 
nevertheless promoted an idealized vision of indigenous Bolivians consistent with their 
imagined role in national society as producers and consumers.  “Exaltemos las virtudes 
autóctonas del trabajo, la veracidad, la honradez y el culto del deber social” he wrote.549   
Although MNR intellectuals historically reconstituted the Bolivian people to 
include Indians, an examination of revisionist texts indicates that the indigenous past 
occupied an ambivalent space within nationalist historiography. Nationalist 
interpretations of specific moments of indigenous history demonstrate that the role of 
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Indians in national history remained shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty.  To be sure, 
indigenous history figured into the formative texts of the nationalist historiography.  Yet 
it is only particular flashpoints of this history that registered—the Tupak and Tomás 
Katari rebellions of the 1780s, Zarate Willka’s critical support of the liberal army during 
the 1898-99 Federal War, uprisings during the 1920s in Chayanta and Jesús de Machaca.  
Each of these historical episodes represents an exceptional moment in which indigenous 
mobilization threatened creole hegemony.  Nationalist intellectuals struggled to reconcile 
these diverse, and often autonomous local projects within a historical narrative that 
privileged the mestizo as the protagonist in the formation of the Bolivian nation state. 
MNR intellectuals deployed various strategies to fit indigenous history into a 
nationalist narrative of the past that privileged mestizos and creoles as the historical 
agents.  One was to place indigenous people alongside mestizos and creoles as integral 
components of a national pueblo. But as historian Laura Gotkowitz notes upon her 
reading of Nacionalismo y coloniaje, “Indians join mestizos and creoles as faceless 
components of a unified Bolivian pueblo, but indigenous political agency is erased.”550  
A fine example of this strategy is evident in Montenegro’s treatment of the “hermanos 
Katari” (the only such mention of the major anticolonial rebellions in the book).  As 
Sinclair Thomson illustrates in a recent essay on revolutionary memory in Bolivia, 
Montenegro conflates the rebellions with the contemporaneous Tupac Amaru rebellion in 
Cusco—which, in contrast to the Aymara-led rebellions of Tupak and Tomás Katari, 
enjoyed cross-class and pan-ethnic mobilization among creoles, mestizos, and Indians.  In 
so doing, Montenegro cleanses the Aymara uprising of “the disturbing aspect of ethnic 
and class polarization”—components of historical memory that did not fit within the 
                                                 




emerging nationalist historical imagination because they could not be easily 
accommodated within the MNR’s pan-ethnic and cross-class ideology.551  As Thomson 
points out, “The late-colonial experience of Indian peasant community mobilization thus 
posed a challenge to the thesis of a populist multi-class and multiethnic alliance that 
mestizo and creole movimentistas would lead.”552  
It was into more clearly defined “national” moments that creole intellectuals 
accommodated these flashpoints of indigenous history within the nationalist 
interpretation of the past.  In the unfolding nationalist teleology, moments such as 
Independence, the War of the Pacific, and the Federal War became temporal markers that 
indigenous history culminated in or emanated from.  While Montenegro glossed over the 
Katari rebellions in his narrative, MNR militant and University of San Andrés law 
professor, Alipicio Valenia Vega folded the rebellions into the independence struggle 
with El Indio en la Independencia.553   The work chronicles the role of indigenous people 
in Bolivia’s sixteen-year independence struggle.  The root of indigenous participation in 
the struggle, he argues was the Katari rebellions.   
It this way, the Katari rebellions become precursors to 1809 and are subtly 
subsumed to the nationalist teleology.  This particular interpretation of the Katari 
rebellion was central to the MNR efforts to valorize the indigenous past in national 
history.  If the fact the El Indio de la Independencia was published by the Ministry of 
Education is not enough to demonstrate the official nature of this narrative, Boilivia: 10 
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años de la Revolución, a volume published by the government in April 1962 to 
commemorate the Revolution confirms the particular interpretation of Katari in 
nationalist historiography.  In surveying the revolutionary struggle, the volume identifies 
the Katari rebellion as the “preludio de la Independencia” and providing an 
accompanying narrative that casts the rebellion as a legitimate response to colonial 
domination.554  By casting Tupac Katari as a proto-martyr for the nationalist struggle, the 
revisionist history subsumes the rebellion into the nationalist teleology.  In this way, the 
MNR, as Thompson argues cleansed the Katari rebellion of its problematic ethnic 
dimensions.  This rehabilitated image of Katari was meant for creole consumption in 
order to valorize the indigenous past.  It would not be until decades later that indigenous 
activists would rehabilitate Katari as a unifying symbol of an alternative Aymara 
nationalism. 
Another strategy that MNR intellectuals employed to integrate indigenous history 
into the nationalist teleology was the reinterpretation of problematic moments of 
indigenous history. Nacionalist intellectuals stripped flashpoints of indigenous rebellion 
of their problematic components of ethnic rejuvenation and self-determination, and 
presented them instead as examples of oligarchic exploitation.  The Aymara leader, 
Zarate Willka makes a brief appearance in Nacionalismo y coloniaje, as the “cuadillo de 
las muchedumbres indígenas adictas” who, after helping the Liberal army triumph over 
the Constitutionalists in the Federal War, was executed by the Liberals.555 Similar to his 
treatment of the Katari rebellions, Montengro overlooks the autonomous local project 
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underlying Willka’s support for General Pando and the Liberal army.556  Instead, the 
moment serves as an example of liberal treachery and indigenous victimization, an 
interpretation that more appropriately fit within the nationalist historiography. Willka 
also makes a brief appearance in El dicator suicida.  Céspedes writes, “El Partido Liberal 
había alzado la bandera federal y utilizado a los indios para desorganizar al Partido 
Conservador.  Consiguiendo el gobierno, aprobó la Constitución unitaria y el caique india 
Willca, que recordó sus promesas a los liberales fue fusilado.”557  Again, the reasons 
underlying Willka’s decision to support the Liberal army in the Federal War, made public 
in the widely publicized Mohoza trials the 1900s, go unmentioned.  Rather he uses the 
execution of the Aymara leader to provide an example in the litany of crimes perpetrated 
by the oligarchic elite.   
The revision of national history, linked to MNR preoccupations with establishing 
a historically-constituted political legitimacy and social order had the effect of 
marginalizing indigenous peoples within the emerging national narrative by 
subordinating them to a history in which creoles and mestizos were the primary agents.  
Sinclair Thompson states that “the significance of Montenegro’s text is that his 
aggressive project to decolonize Bolivian historical memory in fact operated to 
recolonize it on new terms.”558 Indeed it did.  Yet the colonization of historical memory 
goes far beyond Montenegro.  He was but one component of a much broader and 
intentional project of historical self-fashioning intended to establish not only the 
legitimacy of the party, but the social order it would bring to fruition. Indigenous people 
register in this revisionist narrative only as examples of either anti-national injustice, or 
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of the national pueblo to which mestizo—acting in the best interests of the nation 
(against, of course the anti-nation)—served as the vanguard. There is no autonomous 
indigenous history.  Rather it was subsumed into a narrative of the raceless social order 
imagined by the MNR leadership. 
 
SUSTAINING THE USABLE PAST 
Following the 1952 Revolution, the MNR leadership set out to commemorate the 
revisionist history that nationalist intellectuals had authored during the preceding decade.  
With increasingly powerful state institutions, the party assumed an unprecedented 
command of civic time and space.  Between 1952 and 1964, the government christened 
streets and plazas with the names of nationalist heroes, created national holidays to honor 
a new pantheon of revolutionary martyrs, revised school textbooks, commissioned 
murals, and constructed monuments to the Revolution.  The commemorative efforts of 
the postrevolutionary government were so extensive that the Archbishop in La Paz wrote 
President Paz in 1955, lamenting “los feriados civiles proliferaron exageradamente” and 
requested that he “reducir los dias feriados.”559  The purpose of commemorating national 
history was to ensure that civic space was infused with particular interpretation of the 
past that justified the MNR’s position while providing ordinary citizens with a sense of 
their place in national history.   
Commemoration is the primary means by which nation-states perpetuate 
historical memory.  In a much-cited study on the relationship between history, memory, 
and the nation-state, French historian Pierre Nora argues that modernization—what he 
                                                 





loosely defines as the process of change brought about by technological innovation and 
capitalism—is sweeping away historical memory.  In order to retain memories quickly 
slipping into the oblivion of the past because of the “acceleration of history” that 
accompanies modern life, societies create “lieux de mémoire,” that is, sites of memory.  
Nora’s lieux de mémoire are as subtle as they are all-encompassing, including 
monuments, archives, textbooks, museums, performances, or any other object, event, or 
institution that publicly crystallizes a specific historical moment for present and future 
generations. “Without commemorative vigilance,” Nora contends, “history would soon 
be swept away.”560  Sites of memory are especially important in the construction of 
modern nation states because they provide the population with a historically-constituted 
national identity that is at once universal and unique.  They cultivate a sense of belonging 
to the “imagined community” of the nation by imbuing public space with a sense of 
belonging to a common entity.561   
Ever conscious of the need for “commemorative vigilance,” the MNR began 
commemorating its revisionist historiography soon after taking power.  Carlos 
Montenegro’s Nacionalismo y coloniaje occupied a central position in the MNR’s 
historical self-definition and after the Revolution, the party went to great lengths to 
ensure the reprinting and widespread dissemination of the text.  It was, in fact, the first 
work published by the Biblioteca Paceña, a series of books republished by the 
municipality of La Paz in order “hacer resaltar y dar a conocer la transcendental labor de 
los escritores locales de mentalidad revolucionaria, para que sus libros no queden inéditos 
en esta hora de profundos transformaciones y para que el pueblo, en especial las clases 
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mayoritarias, se nutran de sus verdad cívicas, artísticas y culturales.”562  Lauding the new 
edition of the work, La Paz mayor and ranking MNR official, Juan Luis Gutiérrez 
Granier proclaimed the importance of Nacionalismo y coloniaje in terms of national 
historiography.  Montenegro, he proclaimed, “ha iniciado la revisión de nuestra historia, 
elevándola sobre la base de la verdad, desde una posición eminentemente dialéctica y 
polémica para explicar el pasado patrio como lucha del pueblo boliviano en procura de su 
auténtico y promisor destino.”563 The importance of the work, Gutiérrez continued was 
that it “enjuicia con claro sentido, en capítulos dramáticos, el rumbo netamente 
nacionalista que hoy guía y orienta a Bolivia en su conquista de la Independencia 
económica.”564   
The commemoration of Nacionalismo y coloniaje went hand in hand with the 
commemoration of Montenegro the individual.  Montenegro witnessed the initial triumph 
of the Revolution, but died of cancer at the age of forty-nine in a New York City hospital 
in March 1953.  La Nación eulogized Montenegro as “uno de los creadores de la nueva 
partria.”565  The party newspaper La Marcha celebrated him as a patriot and a pioneer of 
indigenous history: “el primer escritor boliviano que exigió que al hacer la historia de su 
patria se diera el rol que corresponde al pueblo, y de manera particular al pueblo indio, de 
cuyas condiciones morfológicas de desprende el valor de los pueblos del Nuevo 
Mundo.”566  His death was a solemn, though very public occasion for the state.  Upon 
receiving his body at the airport in El Alto, his casket was paraded through the streets of 
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central La Paz, with President Paz Estenssoro, Augusto Céspedes and other high ranking 
government and party officials acting as pallbearers.  Before being buried, Montenegro’s 
body was placed in the Salón de Honor of the municipality for public viewing.  Mayor 
Gutiérrez issued a municipal ordinance naming a street for the deceased writer and 
founding member of the MNR.    
Yet the postrevolutionary government’s commemoration efforts extended far 
beyond Montenegro.  During the first years of the Revolution, the SPIC published several 
works that reflected the MNR revisionist history more broadly.  Among them was Album 
de la Revolución Nacional, a commemorative volume that contextualized the National 
Revolution in the long history of Bolivia.  Written by Fellman, the offers a succinct 
retelling of Bolivian history. The book retains all of the characteristics of the nationalist 
historical narrative, establishing the dichotomy of the historical struggle of the nation 
against the anti-nation.  Like Céspedes, Fellman argued that the MNR was the inevitable 
outcome of this struggle, and would guide the country into economic independence and 
social modernization.  Echoing Montenegro, he argued that national independence was 
compromised by creole elites seeking to secure their own economic advantage.  The 
revolutionary struggle was nothing less than “La guerra de la segunda independencia de 
Bolivia.” The book also presents the view of the Bolivian pueblo that characterized the 
MNR expanded vision of national citizenship, and provides another example of how 
nationalist intellectuals subsumed indigenous struggles within the nationalist struggle.567   
State officials also sought to ensure that the nationalist interpretation of the past 
was part of primary and secondary school curriculum. In 1954, the Ministry of Education 
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adopted Sinopsis de historia de Bolivia as the official text for teacher training colleges.568  
Written by IIB director, Félix Eguino Zaballa, the book provides a series of lesson plans 
to guide the teaching of national history.  He opened by acknowledging the influence that 
Nacionalismo y coloniaje had on his own historical imagination, and reminded teachers 
of their enormous responsibility in instructing subsequent generations on Bolivia’s true 
past.569  Eguino celebrated mestizaje, writing that the “psicología de nuestros pueblos” 
was rooted in the cultural and ethnic blending of the Hispanic and Andean worlds 
following the conquest.570  In fact, it was mestizos who served as the “motor” of 
independence, the “alma de la insurrección y el levantamiento.”571 Like others, he 
struggled to fit the anticolonial rebellions of the 1780s in his narrative; but he did 
highlight the ethnic tensions underlying it.  “Si bien esta fue una verdadera guerra de 
razas,” he asserted of the Tupak Katari rebellions, “contribuyó con la sangre de los 
caudillos sacrificados a abonar la tierra donde fructificaría la libertad.”572  In this way, he 
makes a tenuous link between the anticolonial rebellions and independence.  Finally, his 
interpretation of the liberal epoch could have been taken straight out of Bases y 
principios.  The “special charater” of the liberal regimes, he instructed the nation’s future 
teachers, was “de entregar la explotación de nuestras fuentes económicas, a empresas 
privadas, comprometiendo la soberanía del Estado.”573 State financial records indicate 
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that in 1954, MAC purchased 3000 copies of the book, which were presumably destined 
for rural teacher training programs.574 
In addition to ensuring the widespread diffusion of nationalist historiography by 
making its foundational texts both known and readily-available and revising school 
curriculum, the MNR government also filled public space with a new pantheon of 
national heroes and martyrs through monuments, murals, and national holidays. Upon 
taking power in the wake of the April insurrection, the MNR government introduced a 
revolutionary calendar that honored the selfless struggles of ordinary citizens with the 
Día de la Fe Nacionalista (May 5). The MNR also renamed streets and plazas after 
nationalist heroes, Carlos Montenegro, Victor Paz Estenssoro, Germán Busch, Gualberto 
Villarroel.  The La Paz neighborhood of Villa Victoria itself became a commemorative 
symbol of the crucial role played by working class in the revolutionary struggle. But it 
was Gualberto Villarroel, the “Presidente Martir” who was at the core of 
postrevolutionary commemoration efforts, and his person became the very embodiment 
of the revolutionary nationalist struggle.     
In the years following Villarroel’s overthrow and the subsequent persecution or 
exile of the MNR leadership, party leaders upheld the fallen President as the ultimate 
symbol of the nation, and the democratic aspirations for workers, peasants, and the poor.  
His overthrow represented the treachery of the oligarchy, the very embodiment of the 
antinational antithesis. Writing from exile in Buenos Aires during the late 1940s, Paz 
Estenssoro had continually defended the actions of the Villarroel regime and bestowed 
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the virtues of the deposed martyr.575  Emerging victorious in April 1952, the MNR 
continued to venerate the fallen leaders, referring to the year spanning the fall of 
Villarroel and the April revolution as “the sexenio.”  This was an important rhetorical 
device that created an unbroken linkage between the reform of the Villarroel-MNR 
government and the National Revolution.  This way, 1946 stands as a counter revolution 
and the military oligarchic regimes become an interregnum in the inevitable triumph of 
the nationalist forces on April 9, 1952.   
Drawing this direct historical link between Villarroel and the April 1952 
insurrection was crucial for the MNR to define itself and demonstrate its political 
legitimacy.  It was a careful device that allowed the MNR to project backwards and 
subsume all popular struggles within the umbrella of its particular brand of revolutionary 
nationalism.  For example, within weeks of the revolution the MNR enacted a law 
declaring May 18 “Día del trabajador fabril” that honored worker participation in the 
revolutionary struggle by commemorating the massacre in Villa Victoria in 1950.576 The 
MNR also issued a general amnesty to all of the peasants and workers who revolted 
against the oligarchy during the sexenio.577  In this way the MNR symbolically 
incorporated these uprisings into the middle-class led struggles of the party, erasing them 
of their subversion, and rehabilitating them as national and popular. The law declared that 
“durante los seis últimos años del régimen oligárquico fueron iniciados varios procesos 
criminales contra trabajadores del campo y de las minas por actos originados en un estado 
de malestar social y que por tanto son de carácter político.”   It concluded that “es deber 
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del Supremo Gobierno reparar las injusticias de que han sido víctimas los indicados 
trabajadores para restablecer el imperio de la ley y de la justicia social.”578  By 
retrospectively decriminalizing the popular mobilization, the MNR discursively 
appropriated the peasant and worker mobilization into its own national popular struggle, 
while placing themselves on the right side of history as harbingers of social justice.579   
But it would be a difficult process for the new government.  Though Villarroel 
enjoyed an exalted position in the historical memory of the MNR, his presidency 
nevertheless continued to occupy a contested position in the national historical 
imagination. PIR leader, sociologist José Antonio Arze, who was exiled by Villorroel, 
published several tracts denouncing the regime as the Nazis in the U.S. press.580  Upon 
the fall of Villarroel and the subsequent imprisonment or exile of all of the MNR leaders, 
FDA supporters cast the MNR-Villarroel regime as Jacobin, and the bloody overthrow of 
Villarroel as a popular revolution in which freedom and democracy had triumphed over 
totalitarianism and fascism.581 Writers such as Alfredo Sanjinés G. equated Villarroel’s 
overthrow with the Murrillo’s declaration of independence of July 16, 1809.582   Carlos 
Núñez de Arco A. potrayed the event as “la revolución más democrática en la historia de 
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Bolivia.”583 Others such as Priegue Romero defended the violence of the mob, justifying 
Villarroel’s lynching as the “consecuencia de la culminación de un movimiento 
revolucionario,” rather than “un asesinato perpetrado con premeditación.”584 The 
historical memory of Villarroel’s overthrow had been transformed by intellectuals and 
journalists who supported the restoration of the oligarchy into an intensely popular and 
democratic uprising.  What was worse was that during the six-year period spanning the 
overthrown of Villarroel in 1946 and the 1952 Revolution the MNR’s ability to counter 
that narrative remained limited given the mass exile of the party leaders, increased 
repression, and government censorship.   
Commemorating the martyr to the Revolution thus required a concomitant effort 
to rehabilitate Villarroel in Bolivian popular memory.  Soon after the Revolution, during 
the days leading up to the date of Villarroel’s murder, July 21, President Paz Estenssoro 
enacted a series of supreme decrees to commemorate the President.  With supreme degree 
3123, the government created a new national holiday “El Día de los Mártires de la 
Revolución Nacional.”  With supreme decree 3125, the government posthumously raised 
the rank of Villarroel and other officers who died that day, and raised the pension for 
their surviving family members.  Finally, supreme decree 3127 officially declared as 
“heros and mártires de la Revolución Nacional” not only Villarroel, but all who lost their 
lives on that tragic day in 1946.  It is telling that the MNR used the date to announce the 
universal suffrage law, once again connecting revolutionary past and present.   
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As part of the effort to rehabilitate Villarroel in popular memory, the government 
deployed the SPIC to redefine his regime as a popular government that governed in the 
name of the people, only to be overthrown by the oligarchy.  In 1954, the propaganda 
ministry published the pamphlet, Coronel Gualberto Villarroel: Su vida, su martirio, to 
accompany a recent supreme decree creating the Coronel Gualberto Villarroel Military 
Academy.  In a bibliographic essay, Gualberto Olmos portrays Villarroel as a heroic 
martyr that stood firm until his death, a fine example to “Bolivia y la América toda, lo 
que es un militar boliviano cuando trata de cumplir con su deber.”585  Villarroel had the 
opportunity the leave the presidential palace on the morning of July 21, Olmos noted, but 
“con dignidad y hondurez” he instead chose to “permaneció en su puesto para convertirse 
desde ese momento en símbolo eterno del sacrificio y de la redención de su pueblo.”  He 
dismissed the government’s fascist sympathies as mere propaganda, and emphasized 
instead its reformist mission.  The government, he asserted, “acometió medidas de orden 
institucional, preocupado únicamente del proceso material y moral del país y de la 
liberación económica de la nación: creó derechos sociales para los trabajadores y dio 
impulso a la organización cultural.”586 
In 1955, the SPIC published two more titles intended to rehabilitate the historical 
memory of the Villarroel-MNR government. Carlos Montenegro’s Culpables, a succinct 
manuscript left unfinished with the author’s death in March 1953, did even more to 
rehabilitate the regime as national and popular.  Confronting charges of the regimes 
violent tendencies, he dedicated most of the text to showing the restraint demonstrated by 
the government in the face of increasingly violent protest. Like Olmos, he showed 
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Villarroel’s bravery in choosing not to abandon the palace.  The death of Villarroel, he 
proclaimed, “es el holocausto ofrecido en salvación y densa del pueblo como lo había 
sido su vida que empleó en dignificar, elevar, y ennoblecer a las clases populares.”587   
The Album de la Revolución Nacional, also published in 1955, capitalize on the 
visual spectacle of the violent 1946 coup by publishing gory photos of Villarroel’s 
lifeless body hanging from a lamppost in the Plaza Murillo.  “Su sangre es el precio para 
la libertad” reads the accompanying caption.588  The Album established Villarroel’s 
legacy by situating him as part of a long succession of national leaders that had struggled 
first for political independence (Murillo and the leaders of the Independence movement) 
and then economic independence (Villarroel, Paz, Siles).  Cast as such, the Villarroel-
MNR government represented a moment of authentic nationalist yearning frustrated by 
antinational violence and the sexenio is affirmed as a moment of revolutionary struggle 
that began with the participation of the MNR in the Villarroel government and 
culminated in the 1952 Revolution. 
The Monument to the National Revolution represented the MNR’s most 
ambitious effort to venerate Villarroel. The MNR decreed the construction of the 
monument on July 21, 1952 that would celebrate the triumph of Revolution and serve as 
a mausoleum for the remains of Villarroel.  It was “necesario perpetuar” the memory of 
the revoluionary struggle, Paz Estenssoro declared “como expresión de reconocimiento 
popular y para ejemplo de las generaciones futuras.”589 As a site for the monument, the 
Ministry of Education and the Alcaldia of La Paz decided on the recently-christened 
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Plaza de 9 de Abril at the northwestern edge of the central neighborhood of Miraflores.  
A design competition was opened in January 1953 and Hugo Almaraz Alaiga won with a 
truncated pyramid structure with Tiwanaku iconography etched into the exterior facade. 
The interior consisted of a large open hall with 30 foot ceilings. The large walls were 
designed to be adorned with murals.  Villarroel’s remains were to rest solemnly in a 
basement made of marble. Overseen by the Ministry of Education, construction began in 
1954 and a decade later, with massive murals by Miguel Alandia Pantoja and Walter 
Solon Romero completed, the Monument was open to the public on August 23, 1964 (a 
date that commemorated the twenty-five year anniversary of the death of President 
Germán Busch) and the plaza was renamed the Plaza Villarroel.   
Illustration 13: Monumento a la Revolución Nacional. The frontspiece reads: “LA 
VICTORIA NACIONAL DEL 9 DE ABRIL DE 1952 DIO LIBERTAD 





Standing as a tribute to both Villarroel and the Revolution, the monument, in all 
aspects of its design, reflects the nationalist interpretation of the past.  The frontispiece is 
a concrete relief mural designed by Almaraz, barring an Andean condor and an urban 
mestizo revolutionary in the center.  He is flanked to the left and the right, first by 
industrial and mine workers, and then, on the outer edges, by armed indigenous peasants.  
Under the relief mural, and across the front of the monument, it reads “La victoria 
nacional del 9 de abril de 1952 dio libertad al pueblo boliviano.”  Once visitors pass 
through the large metal and stained-glass doors which are adorned with icons depicting 
Tiwanaku-style pumas, they are surrounded by four giant murals.  The north and west 
walls each have a mural painted by Miguel Alandia Pantoja; the south and east walls, one 
mural by Walter Solon Romero.   
Alandia’s mural’s “Reforma educacional” and “Lucha del pueblo por su 
liberación” offer a visual interpretation of nationalist historiography.  A cross-class, pan-
ethnic mass guided by education, justice and science are the protagonists, followed by the 
literally faceless masses.  Where Alandia’s focused on the past, Solon Romero provided a 
utopic vision of the revolutionary future with his mural, “Historia de la Revolución 
Nacional.”  His mural seems a portrayal of the modernized, mestizo-based social order 
imagined by MNR intellectuals. Workers, soldiers and the modern family seem the idea 
representation of the revolution.  Indigenous peasants are almost completely absent from 
the mural.  They are literally marginalized on the far left side of the mural, driving 





Illustration 14: The mural “Reforma Educativa” by Miguel Alandia Pantoja (1964).  
Located inside the Monument to the National Revolution (photo by 
author). 
PROFESSIONALIZING HISTORY 
In addition to structuring civic time and space to commemorate this emerging 
nationalist narrative, the MNR leadership sought to professionalize the historical 
discipline.  President Paz asserted that Bolivian history had been “falsificado” according 
to “los intereses de las clases que dominaron a Bolivia hasta el 9 de abril de 1952.”   




he created the Comisión Nacional de Historia (CNH, National Commission on History) 
in April 1954.  By “confrontar la historia escrita con las fuentes documentales autenticas 
conservadas en los archivos oficiales y particulares,” the CNH would  “reconstruir la 
verdadera Historia de Bolivia para que la ciudadanía conozca su autentico pasado.”590 
The CNH’s primary mission was not related to publication. It was instead tasked with 
facilitating primary source research through the compilation of information on public and 
private archives, as well as the acquisition and organization of documentation in national 
repositories. If a lack of available sources had resulted in the distortion of national 
history, a commitment to a scientific epistemology based on primary source materials and 
objective detachment would in the very near future vindicate the MNR’s Bolivia.  
The generation of intellectuals that rose to power with the MNR and the 
Revolution invested tremendous stock in the ability of textual documents to reveal a 
succession of objective facts upon which national history could be reconstructed.  The 
Revolution represented a breaking point in historical epistemology, what Michel Foucault 
identifies as an “epistemological threshold,” which he describes as “moments that 
suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and 
force it to enter a new time, cut off from its empirical origin and its original motivations, 
[and] cleanse it of its imaginary complicities.”591  With the creation of the CNH, 
nationalist intellectuals began working in conjunction with the government to promote 
and institutionalize what they called “scientific history.” The reconstruction of the past, 
they asserted, must be based on the scientific method—factual, empirical, and objective.  
To be sure, it was a repackaging of the same historical positivism Gabriel Rene Moreno 
                                                 
590 D.S. 03708 cited in Anales de Legislación Boliviana, Vol. 21, (Abril-Junio, 1954).   




and Alcides Arguedas had strove to achieve a half century before.  Yet what Arguedas 
and other historians lacked in raw data—that is, objective proofs upon which to verify 
their arguments—the CNH would provide by making the national archival and library 
systems comprehensible and open to the public.   
With the CHN, the postrevolutionary government set out to ensure that national 
history was created according to scientific methodology and that class and racial 
prejudice would never again taint historical analysis.  To lead the effort, Paz appointed 
Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, a Sucre-born attorney and diplomat notable for his 1948 
historical monograph, Linares, el presidente civil.592  Aiming to establish a documentary 
base upon which the new scientific history of Bolivia could be written, the CNH first 
carried out a national census of archives and libraries.  It was an unprecedented process 
intended to make legible the documentary past by identifying all library holdings and 
archival repositories in the nation.  In order to augment the institutional capacity and to 
extend the geographical reach of the CNH, in 1955 the Ministry of Education created 
Subcomisiones Distritales de Historia (District Sub-commissions on History, SDH), to be 
led by a senior history teacher (Profesor Decano de Historia) from every school district 
in the nation.593 Teachers from each subcomisión were required to submit to the Central 
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Committee in Sucre not only copies of catalogues from the libraries in their district, but 
also detailed reports on all private and public archival collections.594 With these efforts, 
the CNH sought to create a national inventory of existing documentation in Bolivia, 
ultimately to facilitate the revision of the national past. 
Beyond national repositories, the CNH also set out to identify foreign archival 
repositories that held documents pertaining to Bolivian history.595 In 1955, the CNH 
signed onto a joint project carried out by the Instituto Panamericano de Geografía y 
Historia (Pan-American Institute of Geography and History, IPGH) and UNESCO 
intended to identify documents pertaining to Latin American history in Europe.  Though 
the CNH worked through various Bolivian embassies to take stock of archival 
repositories in Spain, England, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, it was documents from 
university libraries and archives in the United States that were of particular interest.  
Working with the U.S. embassy in La Paz, the CNH purchased microfilmed copies of all 
of the correspondence between the U.S. Department of State and its legation in Bolivia 
between 1848 and 1906 from the U.S. National Archives.596  The CNH was also awarded 
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a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to send Gunnar Mendoza, director of the 
Bolivian National Archives, to the United States to identify documents pertaining to 
Bolivia in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and in the Nettie Lee Benson 
Collection at the University of Texas at Austin in 1958 and 1959.597 With these efforts, 
the CNH made accessible a wide array of primary source documentation for future 
researchers.   
As part of this unprecedented effort to establish a documentary base for the study 
and revision of national history, the CNH also promoted the accumulation and systematic 
organization of primary source materials.  Since being appointed director of the National 
Archives in 1944, Gunnar Mendoza had demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to 
applying the latest methods of library science to organize the National Library and 
Archives.598  After the Revolution, state support for this effort became manifest in the 
CNH.  Using Ministry of Education funds specifically reserved for the acquisition of 
historical documentation, the CNH purchased several private libraries and archival 
collections in 1954 and 1955, and deposited them in the Bolivian National Archives.  The 
indefatigable Mendoza worked tirelessly to catalogue not only the new collections, but 
existing ones as well.  In a 1956, he submitted to Frontaura the first fruit of these efforts, 
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Documentos inéditos para el estudio de la minería colonial en Potosí, 1549-1825, 
assuring the President of the CNH that “se ha organizado este material en forma 
sistemática, de suerte que el investigador pueda de inmediato entrar de lleno a su labor de 
estudio.”599  He also reported that “Se he hecho una recopilación de materiales publicados 
relativos a los diversos aspectos de la evolución nacional cuyos resúmenes catolográficos 
se están ordenando cronológicamente, a fin de orientar la consulta de acuerdo con la 
sucesión de épocas históricas.”600   
Another component of the new epistemological practices promoted by the 
postrevolutionary state was a dedication to scientific objectivity.  Objective facts were to 
be the basis of postrevolutionary history, historical proofs culled from archival 
repositories and untainted by the social bias or political opinions of the author.  The 
primary source materials uncovered, purchased, and organized by the CNH would 
provide the foundation for this revisionist historiography.  With these documents the past 
would speak for itself, and Bolivian history would finally be free from the moral 
judgments and presentist concerns that had distorted it for so long.  Frontaura clearly 
reflected this sentiment in writing Minister of Education, Federico Alvarez Plata in 
December 1955. “La revisión de la Historia no se hará por el procedimiento polémico, o 
sea refutando los errores que pudiesen contener las obra sobre historia de Bolivia ya 
publicadas,” he indicated.  Instead, “La Comisión ha preferido adoptar el sistema 
científico, revisando cuidadosamente las fuentes históricas para registrar los 
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acontecimientos, con la mayor probidad, en sus publicaciones.”601 In this way, Frontaura 
demonstrates the Rankean philosophy underlying the mission of the CNH, to furnish 
documentary evidence in order to present the past “as it really was.” 
This emerging commitment to historical objectivity was reflected in the critical 
response to Céspedes’ El dicator suicida.  The book was emotional and personal, and 
Cespedes had done little to mask the political motivations underlying the work.  He even 
included a special preface, a “Guía autocrítica para el lector,” wherein he advises his 
readers of the “tendenciosa y complicada” nature of the book.  He assured his readers, 
however, that his was “una obra leal con la verdad objetiva.” The “subjetivismo 
hipercrítico” of the book “no la ha complicado en la falsificación de hechos.  Los hechos 
referidos son verídicos,” he assured his readers.602  Yet Céspedes’ revisionism diverged 
markedly from the scientific epistemology being promoted by the CNH and the Ministry 
of Education more broadly.   
Soon after its publication, Fernando Diez de Medina reviewed El dictador suicida 
in Corillera, the bimonthly cultural publication of the Ministry of Education.  The new 
Minister of Education oversaw the CNH and, stood alongside Frontaura in his effort to 
ensure that the revision of history proceeded in an objective manner based on verifiable 
historical proof.  Reflecting this broader shift occurring in Bolivian historical 
epistemology, Diez de Medina reminded his readers that history “es una ciencia y un arte 
a la vez.”603  El dictador suicida, he proclaimed to the lettered public, “no es obra de 
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historia.”604  In making such a strong claim against a work of history written by one of 
the nation’s most celebrated authors, he argued that the book failed to meet basic 
standards of historical objectivity.  Politics had obscured Céspedes’ ability to accurately 
interpret the past.  The result was that “épocas, hombres, hechos aparecen 
deformados.”605  He asserted that “Ni hechos, ni hombres fueron como el los ve.” 606He 
concluded by reminding his readers of the need to remain committed to a historical 
objectivity grounded in scientific method. “En esta época de confusión de los valores, en 
que la pasión política nubla el entendimiento y el incienso de los acólitos oscurece el 
juicio, era necesario restituir a la historia su dignidad de ciencia, de arte de espejo 
normativo de la sociedad.”607   
Guillermo Ovando Sanz, the Chilean-trained historian who founded the Institutito 
de Investigaciones Históricas (Historical Research Institute, IIH) at the Universidad 
Tomás Frías in Potosi in 1956, was also critical of the work.  He not only faulted 
Céspedes for his biases as Diez de Medina had, but he took him to task for not proving a 
bibliography for the work, making a broader point about the production of national 
history.  “El que escribe sobre historia en Bolivia tiene como obligación, citar las fuentes 
de información para que éstas sirvan también a otros estudiosos que puedan interpretar 
los hechos en forma semejante o en forma diferente y aportar a su vez nuevos 
documentos.”608 He even went as far as to list all of the books to which Céspedes made 
passing reference, and noted others that that he suspected he had used.  The critical 
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reception of El dictador suicida reflected the broader recognition occurring in academic, 
political, and intellectual circles of the need to develop a professionalized history with 
rigorous standards of sources and scientific detachment. 
By 1957, with the state financial crunch instituted by the 1956 stabilization plan, 
the government’s efforts to professionalize standards of historical sources and method 
lost momentum. Already in 1956, for instance, Gunnar Mendoza, who had since replaced 
Frontaura as director of the CNH, had to petition the Ministry of Education for back pay 
for the his staff.609  By 1962, the CNH disappears from the documentary record. But other 
institutions stepped in to continue the work that the CNH had begun.  The Academia 
Boliviana de Historia which maintained affiliation with the Real Academia de Historia in 
Madrid since its establishment in the 1920s, emerged during this time to play an 
expanded role in the professionalization of the historical discipline.  The Instituto de 
Investigaciones Históricas at the Universidad Tomás Frias, also sought to promote the 
development of and objective national history founded on the documentary past.610  Still, 
it was not until 1966, that the Universidad Mayor de San Andres in La Paz offered the 
first degree in history.  And in 1971, it founded the first history department in the nation.  
Its first chair was Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, the original director of the CNH.611  
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This chapter has explored the MNR’s efforts to revise, commemorate and 
professionalize national history during the period spanning the foundation of the party in 
1941 and onset of the military phase of the Revolution in 1964.  In books, pamphlets, and 
speeches, they recast national history as a dialectical struggle between the anti-national 
forces of the oligarchic elite on the one side, and the popular forces of the authentic 
nation on the other.  After April 1952, the MNR leadership harnessed the expanding 
cultural bureaucracy of the postrevolutionary state to commemorate this history and 
affirm its status as the nationalist vanguard.  With monuments, murals, and national 
holidays, the party transformed civic time and space to reflect a historical memory shaped 
largely by the MNR.  By providing a specific interpretation of past that contextualized 
the revolutionary present, history did indeed serve a liberating purpose.  
In addition to providing necessary context for the Revolution, this revisionist 
narrative naturalized the raceless society envisioned by the MNR leadership by linking 
middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a 
common history of resistance to neocolonial domination.  Indeed, this new national 
history inserted Indians into the national community.  At the same time, however it 
privileged creole and mestizos as agents of national history while denying Indigenous 
people an active role in the historical formation of the Bolivian nation.  Key moments and 
figures of indigenous history—the Túpak Katari Rebellion or Zárate Wilka, for 
example—were either subordinated to creole-mestizo struggles or enveloped in silence.  
Once subordinated, grassroots indigenous resistance movements against the colonial and 
republican states were generally cast as proto-nationalist or nationalist events and tied to 




the Revolution emerged a new commitment to epistemic standards of historical proof and 
objectively.  If the MNR looked to the colonial and republican past to explain the past 






Revolutionary Ruins: Excavating the Politics of Race, Nation, and 
Knowledge at Tiwanaku 
 
Tengo el agrado de manifestarle que el Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en 
Tiwanaku está realizando importante labor científica en torno a la cultura prehispánica 
de nuestro país, contribuyendo bastante a la revalorización de los valores indígenas y 
nacionales de Bolivia. 
-Carlos Ponce Sanginés, 1959  
 
Diachronies, interruptions, and imbalances between ancient ruins and the products of 
modern technology generate tensions that animate space but make it difficult to decipher. 
-Henri Lefebvre, De l’État 
 
Tiwanaku assumed a prominent position in the postrevolutionary imagination.612  
Located twenty kilometers southeast of Lake Titicaca, on the high plateau straddling Peru 
and Bolivia, Tiwanaku was once the administrative and ceremonial center of an 
expansive Andean empire.  Since its enigmatic downfall sometime after 1000 A.D., all 
that remained of the great city-state were giant sandstone monoliths, giant terraced 
mounds, and intricately-carved iconography.  The ruins subsequently attracted Inca 
settlers, Spanish chroniclers, Argentine generals, North American naturalists, and 
European explorers.  Yet the Bolivian government remained largely indifferent to the 
ruins.  Struggling to reconcile North Atlantic standards of modern nationhood with an 
indigenous majority it perceived as racially inferior, culturally backward, and the primary 
obstacle to the nation’s progress, successive governments left Tiwanaku—and the 
contested indigenous history it embodied—to a handful of antiquarians and amateur 
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social scientists.613 After the 1952 National Revolution, however, the government 
demonstrated unprecedented interest in Tiwanaku.  Just months after the Revolution, 
officials coordinated an ambitious plan to excavate the site and reconstruct the ruins. 
Over the course of the next decade, a new generation of nationalist archeologists 
appealed to modern science to restore Tiwanaku to its imagined splendor.   
This chapter examines the Tiwanaku restoration project as a lens onto the 
processes by which archeological knowledge was shaped by and contributed to novel 
constructions of race and national identity in postrevolutionary Bolivia. As the 
postrevolutionary government set out to integrate indigenous Bolivians into the social 
and economic structures of the nation, it launched a concurrent effort to construct a 
unifying national culture that proudly embraced the mixed Andean and Hispanic origins 
of the republic. Commenting on this process, IIB director Félix Eugino Zaballa affirmed 
that “Bolivia, asimila actualmente al elemento autóctono por imperio de los Postulados 
de la Revolución Nacional de 9 de abril de 1952.”614  He cautioned, however, “No quiere 
permitir en su cultura resabios para razas atrasadas, sino la unidad nacional, en su más 
amplio sentido.”615  In their search for a unifying national symbol for the 
postrevolutionary republic—one that celebrated the mixed cultural heritage of the nation 
while emphasizing the positive attributes of Bolivia’s indigenous population—officials 
set their sights on Tiwanaku. 
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The ancient ruins provided an ideal symbol for the postrevolutionary republic.  
For one, they provided a rare glimpse of Andean civilization before colonial domination 
and agrarian exploitation degenerated indigenous Bolivians.  But perhaps more 
importantly, the political power, social organization, and technological sophistication 
required to construct the magnificent ruins lay testament to the modernizing potential of 
indigenous Bolivians.  "En Bolivia, los estudios arqueológicos llevan implícito un 
mensaje de esperanza,” Carlos Ponce Sanginés, director of the state archeological 
mission, wrote in 1957.  “Si en el pasado los pueblos aborígenes fueron capaces de 
notable hazañas, si pudieron erigir edificios y ciudades señeros, es lógico que sus 
descendientes, los indígenas de hoy, podrán dominar en el futuro la tecnología moderna y 
ayudaran a transformar el país ahora retrasado.”616 
Notwithstanding the restoration of the ruins as a tangible symbol of 
postrevolutionary national unity, another, more subtle, objective underlay the MNR’s 
desire to excavate and reconstruct Tiwanaku: the valorization of the Aymara past.  
Constituting approximately twenty-five percent of the population on the eve of the 
Revolution, the Aymara were the second largest ethnic group in Bolivia, superseded only 
by the Quechua, who represented thirty-five percent of the population.617  As Laura 
Gotkowitz illustrates, the Quechua were more easily incorporated into postrevolutionary 
constructions of mestizaje—thanks, in part, to a long history of biological and cultural 
intermingling dating back to the conquest.618  Yet accommodating the Aymara into this 
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new national ideal proved to be more difficult.  The Aymara lacked such a tradition of 
mestizaje, given their more peripheral position in the colonial socioeconomic order. But 
perhaps the greatest obstacle confronting postrevolutionary intellectuals was a contested 
history of ethnic resistance to both colonial and republican rule that included such 
flashpoints as the 1781 Tupak Katari Rebellion and the 1899 Federal War.  Such events 
had not only molded creole perceptions of the ethnic group as violent and savage, but 
also shaped a canon of social scientific knowledge that cast the Aymara as backward, 
insular, and unfit for republican citizenship. After the Revolution, as the MNR 
transformed Tiwanaku from a contested symbol of the indigenous past into a unifying 
symbol of the postrevolutionary present, a new generation of nationalist intellectuals 
sought to rescue the Aymara from history.   
Under the leadership of archeologist Carlos Ponce Sanginés, Bolivia’s burgeoning 
state archeological mission turned to modern science to supplant a more recent, contested 
Aymara past with a glorious, pre-Hispanic history focused on Tiwanaku.  With the 
introduction of stratigraphic analysis and radiocarbon dating, state archeologists 
confirmed a more recent chronology for Tiwanaku.  In so doing, they decreased the 
temporal distance between the pre-Hispanic past and the national present and 
substantiated long-marginalized claims of Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.  Tiwanaku 
archeology thus not only provided the postrevolutionary government with proof of the 
grandiose Aymara past, but also evidenced the future potential of nation’s indigenous 
population as a modernizing force.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 





REPUBLICAN ANTECEDENTS  
Though the Bolivian government remained largely uninterested in Tiwanaku, the 
site attracted a host of travelers and naturalists who made the arduous journey across the 
Andes to visit the ancient ruins. During the nineteenth century, these visitors generated an 
influential body of knowledge on Tiwanaku and the Aymara-speaking peoples who 
populated the region.  At the center of this body of knowledge was an enduring debate 
over the origins of the ruins.  Who had built and populated this once grand city?  Was it 
the descendants of the Aymara?  Was it the Inca?  Or was it a lost civilization that had 
since vanished without leaving clues to its existence?  As a new generation of La Paz 
intellectuals rose to prominence in the first decades of the twentieth century, debate over 
Tiwanaku’s origins became deeply enmeshed in broader struggles to define Bolivian 
national identity and to accommodate the Aymara past within that disputed narrative.   
In one of the most influential studies on Tiwanaku published in recent decades, 
archeologist Alan Kolata shows that nineteenth-century travel literature negated the 
possibility that the Aymara were the descendants of Tiwanaku’s original occupants.619   
Nineteenth-century travelers perceived the Aymara as inferior, backward Indians who 
lacked the technological sophistication and social organization required to construct 
Tiwanaku’s magnificent ceremonial architecture.  As such, they concluded that the 
ancient city must have been built by a foreign, or even lost, civilization.  Francis de 
Castelnau, a French Count and explorer who visited the ruins in the 1840s, determined 
that Tiwanaku was a cult of Osiris, transplanted from Egypt by a lost civilization “whose 
                                                 





memory has not been retained by the imbecilic race that inhabits this country today.”620  
Peruvian engineer Pablo F. Chalón agreed that Tiwanaku’s origins were foreign, but he 
reached a more general conclusion than Castelnau.  He argued that the architects of the 
ruins came from somewhere that was “already civilized by the influence of the Old 
World,” who then disappeared without a trace. He concluded, “We know little of this 
tradition, except that they were white and bearded men.”621 The Marquise of Nadaillac 
also denied the possibility of Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.  Refuting Castelnaus’ Egypt 
hypothesis and Chalón’s Old World theory, he contended that it was the “Nahua race” of 
central Mexico that built the ruins.  “What is certain,” Nadaillac asserted, “is that such 
monuments could not be the vestiges of an autochthonous civilization” that developed on 
the altiplano.622   
Doubts surrounding the Aymara origins of Tiwanaku did not go uncontested, 
however; and during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, several more 
scientifically-qualified observers attributed the ruins to the contemporary inhabitants of 
the region.623  Bartolomé Mitré—Argentine general, writer, and later president of the 
republic—became fascinated by Tiwanaku while exiled to Bolivia in 1847-48.624  In a 
description of the site published in 1879, Arqueología americana: Las ruinas de 
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Tiahuanacu (recuerdos de un viaje), he attributed the origins of Tiwanaku to the 
ancestors of the region’s Aymara inhabitants.625  The famed German archeologist Max 
Uhle also asserted that the Aymara were the  descendants of Tiwanaku. Collaborating 
with Alphons Stübel in 1892, he cited the geographic distribution of the Aymara 
language as consistent with Tiwanaku’s political and cultural expansion.626 Similarly, 
U.S. anthropologist Adolph Francis Alphonse Bandelier argued in 1911 that the original 
inhabitants of the ruins could have very well been the Aymara.  In making such an 
assertion, he cited the Pima of Southern Arizona, who had left a similar settlement and 
abandonment pattern to the Aymara.627  
Such varied conclusions surrounding Tiwanaku’s origins resulted not only from 
the racial biases of their authors, but also from the enigmatic nature of the Aymara past in 
the limited historical and ethnographic literature of the time.  In comparison to the Incan 
and Spanish colonial past, the history of the Aymara remained largely unknown. The 
history of the Spanish was obvious enough.  Pedro Cieza de León, Graciela de la Vega, 
Bernabé Cobo, and other Spanish chroniclers traversed the arid plains and fertile valleys 
of the central Andean highlands, compiling detailed information on the diverse peoples 
that population them.  In doing so, they also inscribed the history of the Inca, but aside 
from local myths and the contemporary socio-political structure of the twelve Aymara 
kingdoms of Kollasuyo (the fourth realm of the Incan empire) the provenance of the 
Aymara remained a mystery.  Writing in 1918, for example, the French anthropologist 
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Henri Beuchat noted that “de la historia de los aimaras o collas no sabemos nada.”628  
Contemporary Bolivian observers remained stumped as well.  In 1916, Manual Rigoberto 
Paredes, a leading member of the La Paz intelligentsia wondered “where does the 
mysterious inhabitant of the Andean altiplano come from?”629 It was ultimately upon this 
shaky foundation of speculative and fragmented knowledge that Bolivian intellectuals 
began to integrate Tiwanaku—and the disputed indigenous past associated with it—into 
the emerging pantheon of national symbols. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a new generation of politicians and 
intellectuals fixed their gaze on Tiwanaku as part of a broader search for a symbol of 
Bolivian nationhood.  Leading this effort was the La Paz-based Liberal party, which 
came to power in 1899, after defeating the Sucre-based Conservatives in the internecine 
Federal War of 1898-1899.  Upon taking power, they moved the national capital from 
Sucre to La Paz—closer to the center of the emerging tin-based economy—and set out on 
an unprecedented project of social and economic reform.  José Manuel Pando, the first 
liberal President, hailed the era as the “geographic period” of Bolivian history.630  Not 
only did intellectuals set out to explore, map, and interconnect Bolivia’s vast interior 
landscape, but they also sought to construct enduring national symbols.  It was, after all, 
the fin de siècle, the era of the great nation-state, and Bolivian intellectuals, like their 
counterparts across Europe and the Americas, sought to both create and project a national 
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identity that was at once universal and unique.631  At the vanguard of the new liberal 
order was a group of mestizo and creole intellectuals, statesmen, and entrepreneurs who 
saw themselves as the harbingers of Bolivian modernerization.  As they debated the 
content and meaning of Bolivian national identity, Tiwanaku emerged as a prominent 
albeit highly contested national symbol.  
In her study of liberal nation-building in early twentieth-century Bolivia, Seemin 
Qayum demonstrates the important place that Tiwanaku occupied in the creole 
imagination.  She argues that the ruins offered liberal intellectuals a distinctive national 
symbol by providing an alternative vision of Andean history, “one that was Tiwanaku 
centered rather than Cuzco-centered.”632 Tiwanaku provided “a glorious, primordial 
Aymara past” that provided Bolivian statesmen a means to distinguish themselves from 
the Inca-dominated history that Peruvian nation builders were integrating into their own 
national artifice.633  Within the vanguard of paceño intellectuals that rose to national 
prominence with the liberal revolution, Manuel Rigoberto Paredes—a prominent 
politician and essayist who wrote widely on regional folklore—stands out as the most 
vocal proponent of Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.634  He contended that the Aymara not 
only built Tiwanaku, but were the ancestors of the Quechua-speaking peoples populating 
                                                 
631 Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, Artilugio de la nación moderna (Mexico City: El Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1998). 
632 Seemin Qayum, Creole Imaginings: Race, Space, and Gender in the Making of Republican Bolivia, 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2002, p. 219.   
633 Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous Mestizos; Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca. 
634 Manuel Rigoberto Paredes produced a series of studies on the provinces of his home department of La 
Paz during the first decades of the twentieth century. See, for example: Provincia de Inquisivi: estudios 
geográficos, estadisticos y sociales (La Paz: J. M. Gamarra, 1906); La altiplanicie; descripción de la 
Provincia Omasuyos (La Paz, 1914); Tiahuanacu y la Provincia de Ingavi (La Paz: Ediciones Isla, 
1956).  For his work on folklore, see: Mitos, supersticiones y supervivencias populares de Bolivia (La Paz: 
Arno hermanos, 1920).  For a general treatment of his work, see Sinclair Thomson "La cuestión india en 
Bolivia a principios de siglo," Autodeterminación, 2:4 (1987-88): 83-116; see also Thomson's M.A. thesis 




Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia as well.  Yet, despite his stature among early twentieth 
century intellectual and statesmen, Paredes’ conclusions had little influence on the liberal 
national imagination.    
One of the principal reasons why an Aymara-centered interpretation of Tiwanaku 
failed to take hold within the liberal imagination was contemporary perceptions of the 
“Aymara race.” During the Federal War, an Aymara militia commanded by Zárate Willka 
proved to be a critical ally for the liberals in their triumph over the Sucre-based 
conservatives. 635  General José Manuel Pando—the leader of the liberal army—had 
assured Willka and his followers that in exchange for their support, he would abrogate 
the land privatization laws of the 1870s and 1880s.  Hoping to recover lands lost to the La 
Paz commercial elite, Aymara communities across the altiplano joined Willka’s militia 
and fought alongside the liberal army. After defeating the conservatives in 1899, 
however, liberal leaders reneged on their promise.  The ascendant liberal elite had a 
major financial stake in the redistribution of communal lands. The shift in the national 
economy from the Potosí-based silver mines, to the Oruro-based tin created a new 
demand for agrarian goods and shifted the axis of agricultural production away from 
Sucre and towards La Paz. The privatization and subsequent acquisition of communal 
lands thus offered liberal elites both wealth and status. In an effort to discredit the 
Aymara militia, President Pando accused them of fomenting race war, citing events in 
Mohoza, where a detachment of Willka’s army massacred liberal soldiers in February 
1899.  Although the massacre did indeed occur, historian Marta Irurozqui argues that 
allegations of race war were largely unfounded, invented to justify the state’s decision not 
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to restitute indigenous communal lands.636  Despite their fallaciousness, the allegations 
resonated in a society living under the specter of indigenous uprising, and after the war, 
the government prosecuted Willka and other Aymara leaders at the Mohoza and Peñas 
trails.637  
The highly-publicized trials played a critical role in shaping creole perception of 
the Aymara. As the proceedings dragged on during the 1900s, politicians and the national 
press vilified the Aymara, drawing on familiar tropes of racial degeneration to explain the 
intrinsically barbaric, savage, and violent nature of the Aymara population.638  The most 
authoritative voice to emerge was that of Bautista Saavedra, the La Paz attorney 
appointed to provide legal counsel for the Aymara defendants in the Mohoza trail.639  In 
1903, he published his defense as “La criminalidad Aymara en el proceso Mohoza,” an 
essay included in his most widely-recognized social scientific tract, El Ayllu.  As Brooke 
Larson points out in a recent article, instead of exculpating his defendants, Saavedra’s 
defense served as a condemnation of the so-called Aymara race.640  In constructing his 
defense, Saavedra drew on contemporary French theories of crowd psychology and 
positivist criminology to explain the extreme violence and moral degeneration underlying 
the massacre.  But ultimately, Saavedra’s defense rested on pseudoscientific explanations 
                                                 
636 Marta Irurozqui, La armonía de las desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920 
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994).p. 134. 
637 For more on the trials, see: Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making. 
638 For more on how the Aymara uprising was treated by the national press, see: E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, 
“Acting Inca: The Parameters of National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia,” Hispanic 
American Historical Review, vol. 90, no. 2 (May 2010): 247-281 
639 For an overview of Saavedra and how his ideas fit into broader currents of racial and national thought in 
early twentieth-century Bolivia, see: Brooke Larson, “Reedeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting 
Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910,” in Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950, eds. 
Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (Duke University Press Books, 2005). 




of the “condiciones étnicas y psicológicas del indio aymara.”641  According to Saavedra, 
his defendants were victims of biology, and the massacre at Mohoza was a “la 
manifestation de un estallido feroz y salvaje de una raza atrofiada moralmente.”642  
Throughout the text, he goes to great lengths to explain “la profunda perversión de la 
sensibilidad moral en los Aymaras” and “la índole cruel e indómita de los aymaras.”643  
Despite Saavedra’s efforts to explain the massacre as a result of biology and crowd 
psychology, Willka and his lieutenants were executed and the net effect of the entire 
affair was to marginalize the so-called “Aymara race,” recasting them as national 
enemies.  
For this generation of paceño intellectuals and statesmen, who articulated 
progress as the triumph of civilization over barbarity, an Aymara-centered interpretation 
of Tiwanaku thus presented a conundrum. How could the government embrace Tiwanaku 
as a national symbol, while distancing themselves from the “morally atrophied” Aymara?  
As historian Gabrielle Kuenzeli illustrates, one solution to this problem of national 
identity was to emphasize the Inca history of Bolivia while silencing the Aymara past.644  
She argues that in the wake of the Federal War, statesmen and intellectuals alike 
promoted a glorious Inca past as a means to distance themselves from the Aymara and to 
demonstrate national progress.  That the creole elite privileged an Inca interpretation of 
Bolivia’s pre-Hispanic past might seem to negate Qayum’s assertion that Tiwanaku 
provided liberal nation builders with a glorious Aymara past.  Rather, it speaks to the 
multivocal and heterogeneous nature of nationhood in the imagination of early-twentieth 
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century Bolivia nation builders.  Yet given the prevalence of Tiwanaku iconography and 
increased interest in the ruins during the first decades of the twentieth century, it seems 
implausible that the Inca past retained a lasting place in the creole national imagination—
especially given the fact that nation builders sought to distance themselves from Peru.  
Instead of an Inca past, instead of an Aymara past, early twentieth-century creoles 
fashioned a new narrative of Tiwanaku that allowed them to aggrandize the pre-Hispanic 
past while distancing themselves from the Aymara.     
Ultimately, the speculative nature of Tiwanaku archeology and the lack of 
specific, scientifically-grounded information on the Aymara, granted La Paz intellectuals 
a great deal of interpretive freedom. Arturo Posnansky had the vivid imagination to 
provide the Bolivian state with the narrative necessary to champion Tiwanaku as a 
national symbol.  An Austrian immigrant turned self-styled anthropologist, Posnansky 
emerged as the most influential Tiwanaku myth-maker within the political and social 
circles of the La Paz liberal elite. Especially prolific in both output and imagination, 
Posnansky published over 130 tracts on Tiwanaku between his first foray in 
“Tiahuanacologia” in 1904 and his death in 1946.   His work enjoyed great popularity—
not just in Bolivia, but across the Americas and Europe as well. Advancing spectacular 
theories regarding the origins of the ruins, and the civilization that once populated them, 
Posnanaky’s analysis, similar to those of the European travelers that preceded him, was 
rife with unfounded racial assumptions that dismissed Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.   
As the title of his 1945 masterwork, Tiwanaku: El cuño del hombre Americano, 
suggests, Posnansky contended that Tiwanaku was the cultural and spiritual birthplace of 
all pre-Colombian civilizations in the Americas.  The book was the culmination of almost 




published in various scientific journals and books in the Americas and Europe. His 
interpretation of Tiwanaku was founded upon telluric notions of geography and climate, 
and shaped by positivist theories of racial degeneration.  Dating Tiwanaku’s ceremonial 
architecture to 12,500 B.C.E., he argued that the site was originally constructed by the 
Kollas, an “Andean Arian” race that had conquered the Arawak, a racially inferior people 
that had previously inhabited the region.645  He postulated that the altiplano once enjoyed 
a climate that provided lush vegetation and abundant wildlife, but “climatic aggression” 
displaced the occupants, forcing them to abandon Tiwanaku for more favorable 
environments.  The Kollas then went on to populate the Americas; they “migrated in part 
to Brazil, in part to Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and from there to 
Central America, Mexico, and even Northern Arizona.”646  The Aymara, he concluded, 
were either a degenerated Kolla or the descendants of the racially-inferior Arawak who 
did not flee the changing climate.  The altiplano, he assured his readers, was not always 
“inhabited by such inferior races, possessing scant civilization, like those of the Aymara, 
Quechua, Puquina, Uru, etc.”647   
Posnansky’s interpretation of Tiwanaku reflected the dominant paradigms of 
scientific racism in vogue at the time, and resonated with Bolivia’s ruling elite, who were 
struggling to maintain a racially segregated society.  It proved especially convenient to 
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early twentieth-century liberals who sought to transform Tiwanaku into a national symbol 
by allowing them to project the aggrandized pre-Hispanic past as a symbol of national 
greatness while simultaneously distancing themselves from the Aymara population that, 
in their perception, served as a hindrance to prevailing precepts of order and progress.  
Mergeing indigenista mysticism, Victorian romanticism, German physical anthropology, 
social evolutionism, and contemporary Bolivian social thought, Posnansky provided a 
distinct interpretation of Andean civilization destined for elite consumption.  Kolata 
observes that such a rationale regarding Tiwanaku’s origins—one that at once 
exaggerated its importance and underscored the racial inferiority of the indigenous people 
who inhabited the area—“shored up the intellectual underpinnings supporting the 
repressive system of patron-client relationships and economic domination that 
characterized the social relationships between European and Indian” in early-twentieth 
century Bolivia.648 
Yet, this interpretation of Tiwanaku did not go uncontested.  In 1932, the Bolivian 
government granted Wendell Bennett from the American Museum of Natural History 
permission to excavate at Tiwanaku.  What was most significant about the expedition was 
the application, for the first time, of stratigraphic analysis. Developed in the mid-
nineteenth century by Austrian and Italian archeologists working in the eastern 
Mediterranean, stratigraphic analysis provided archeologists with a method to date 
artifacts and establish relative chronologies of ancient civilizations.649 By exploring 
human refuse in different sediment levels, one could determine a basic cultural-historical 
sequence.   Digging at Tiwanaku and a nearby mound called Chiripa, Bennett identified a 
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basic chronology of Tiwanaku civilization from pottery shards and other refuse, 
establishing the first cultural historical sequence of the site.  He posited that Tiwanaku 
civilization existed between 200 C.E. and 1200 C.E. and passed through three distinct 
stages, which he labeled as Early, Classic, and Decadent. He also notes the existence of a 
fourth stage, post-Decadent, that coincided with the Inca conquest.650 The Bennett 
excavation was also notable for unearthing a giant monolith measuring seven meters tall 
and almost two meters wide, which was subsequently named the Bennett Monolith to 
honor its discoverer.  Bennett’s excavation represented a scientific revolution in the study 
of Tiwanaku, and posed a challenge to Posnansky’s fantastic reading of the ruins and 
their origins.  Regardless of the scientific foundation of Bennett’s conclusions, 
Posnansky’s interpretation nevertheless continued to enjoy widespread popularity in 
social scientific circles in Bolivia and Europe. 
Despite increasing interest in the ruins among prominent paceño intellectuals, 
efforts to promote Tiwanaku as an official national cultural symbol during the first half of 
the twentieth century ultimately failed. Qayum argues that the project was “compromised 
by ambivalence over national identity in a racially and ethnically divided society.”651  As 
both she and Isabel Scarborough point out, the ambivalence surrounding Tiwanaku’s 
place in the national imagination became especially salient during the 1930s, when 
Posnansky transferred the massive Bennett monolith from Tiwanaku to La Paz in order to 
place it in the center of the Plaza Isabella Católica, on Avenida Arce, a major urban 
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thoroughfare. 652  Protest flared among the city’s creole elite and working class mestizos, 
who saw the monolith as a constant reminder of “Indianness” and a harbinger of bad 
luck.653  In 1940, mounting public discontent obliged Posnansky to remove the monolith 
from the city center and place it to the neighborhood of Miraflores.  Only after 1952 
would this ambivalence subside—at least in terms of government policy. The fact that 
indigenous people were then, for the first time, granted the full rights of citizenship made 
very real the possibility that Tiwanaku could become a unifying national symbol.  
 
TIWANAKU AND THE POSTREVOLUTIONARY NATION 
“Somos el pueblo que hizo Tiwanaku,” proclaimed Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 
President of Bolivia’s fledgling postrevolutionary government, before thousands of 
cheering miners and campesinos at Haununi, a sprawling mining camp in the department 
of Oruro. “Somos el pueblo que supo resistir tres cientos años de dominación española y 
supo sobrevivir con sus instituciones y un día supo triunfar y derrotar a los españoles y 
establecer la independencia política,” he continued.  “Somos un pueblo que ha sabido 
resistir, mucho más de un siglo de la vida republicana, con todas las injusticias que a 
pesar de la independencia política subsistieron, somos un pueblo que ha sido capaz a 
través de estos seis largos y duros años, de derrotar a la Rosca en las magníficas jornadas 
de Abril.” 654 This speech, which President Paz Estenssoro delivered just weeks after the 
Revolutionary triumph of April 1952, provides a vivid example of the unifying national 
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discourse of mestizaje that lay at the heart of the Bolivian National Revolution. Seeking 
to eliminate deep-seated divisions of race and class, the postrevolutionary government set 
out to create a new, more inclusive national culture that embraced Bolivia’s Hispanic and 
Andean origins.  As Paz Estenssoro’s speech lucidly illustrated, the notion of pueblo—
originally elaborated by founding MNR intellectuals José Cuadros Quiroga and Carlos 
Montenegro—provided the conceptual foundation for the mestizo nation by linking 
middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a 
common history of resistance to colonial domination.  In Tiwanaku, the postrevolutionary 
government recognized a powerful icon of national unity for this new national artifice.   
To the intellectuals, politicians, and party stalwarts that assumed positions in the 
postrevolutionary government, Tiwanaku represented an ideal symbol of national unity.  
Creating a new national culture that celebrated Bolivia’s mixed cultural and ethnic 
heritage was particularly challenging in a society dominated by a creole minority that 
generally considered Indians as racially inferior, uncivilized, an unfit for citizenship.  For 
the MNR to succeed in instilling pride in the nation’s Andean origins, it needed first to 
supplant entrenched notions of racial and cultural inferiority with alternative narratives 
extolling the virtues of indigenous culture.  Immediately after the Revolution, officials 
turned to Tiwanaku in order to fashion that narrative.  The ruins served as a testament to a 
glorious pre-Hispanic past in which an indigenous Andean civilization demonstrated a 
high-degree of civilization, technological sophistication, and social organization. 
Tiwanaku thus offered a perfect example of how the indigenous past would ensure the 
modern, mestizo future.   
Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, the head of the newly-created Ministerio de Asuntos 




Tiwanaku as a symbol of the postrevolutionary nation. Just two weeks after the 
Revolution, he set out to improve the Museo Nacional Tiwanaku (Tiwanaku National 
Museum, MNT) 655  The MNT was the most popular museum in Bolivia, exhibiting relics 
from Tiwanaku and other Andean civilizations, and Chávez presumably sought to 
increase public interest in Bolivia’s pre-Hispanic past. 656  During the previous decades, 
the government had increased the role of the MNT beyond the exhibition of the pre-
Hispanic past, placing its staff in charge of the protection and preservation of the ruins.  
After the Revolution, Chávez sought to increase their role even further, urging MNT 
officials to expand their budget in order to take on a role archeological research at 
Tiwanaku.  Manuel Lazarte Liendo, who had served as the director of the MNT since 
1950, welcomed the unprecedented government enthusiasm and set out to increase state 
funding for both the Museum and the archaeological site.   
Tiwanaku was the primary focus of a broader state initiative to valorize the 
indigenous past in general and the Aymara past in particular.  Chávez and other MNR 
officials sought to transform the MNT into the national headquarters for social scientific 
research on Bolivia’s indigenous population. With the creation of MAC in April 1952, 
the government expanded the IIB, creating within the state indigenista bureau the 
Departamento de Investigaciones Antropológicos (Department of Anthropological 
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Research, DIA)657  To staff the new office, Chávez drew from the MNT staff, and chose 
Maks Portugal Zamora to direct it.  Like his colleagues in the mid-century Bolivian social 
sciences, Portugal did not have a professional degree in archeology.  He had actually 
studied art, graduating from the prestigious Escuela de Artes Aplicadas of La Paz in 
1930.658 For most of the following two decades, he worked as Posnansky’s assistant, 
assisting with research, excavations, and field work. Posnansky also served as his mentor 
as he independently studied archeology and anthropology.659   He was soon among the 
paceño cultural vanguard, occupying the coveted directorship of the MNT from 1936 to 
1939.  By 1952, he was recognized as one of the nation’s leading indigenista 
intellectuals, and remained closely affiliated with the Museum and its activities.660 Given 
the MNT’s similar preoccupation with scientific study of the indigenous past, officials 
from the Ministries of Education and Peasant Affairs pushed for a high level of 
coordination between the MNT and the IIB.661  By July, the IIB staff was split between 
the offices of MAC and the MNT in downtown La Paz.     
The director of the IIB, Félix Eguino Zaballa, began to work in conjunction with 
Manuel Lazarte and Gregorio Cordero of the MNT to broaden government interest in 
Tiwanaku.  To this end, Eguino organized an official state ceremony at Tiwanaku for 
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September 21, 1952, which marked Lapaca Pacha, an Aymara celebration of the spring 
equinox (also called Citua Raymi after the Inca conquest).   This cultural tourism was by 
no means new.  During the 1930s, Posnansky and other La Paz elites traveled to 
Tiwanaku during solstice and equinox celebrations to carry out secretive ceremonies. 
With the Revolution, however, the celebration was transformed from a cultish gathering 
among paceño intellectuals into an official celebration of the nation. Eguino contacted the 
Guaqui-La Paz railroad—which was built in the mid-nineteenth century and stopped at 
the village of Tiwanaku on its way to and from the Lake Titicaca port town of Guaqui—
to arrange for a special transport for the exclusive guests—which President Paz 
Estenssoro, several state ministers, as well as foreign dignitaries—to Tiwanaku on 
September 20, and to return after sunrise on the twenty-first.  Guests were treated to song 
and dance from local indigenous communities, speeches by MNR officials, and just as 
the sun was rising, a Bolivian flag was raised atop the ruins in an unprecedented symbolic 
gesture.662  There was even a popular effort to establish the day as the “primera fecha 
nacional,” an effort that resulted in historians and antiquarians to review Aymara folk 
calendars, the early chronicles Bernabe and Lobo, and colonial archives.663 It seemed that 
was the kind of ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata” that Urquidi described to Paz.664   
In the aftermath of the official celebration of Lapaca Pacha, Eguino convinced 
MAC officials of the importance of the ruins in the postrevolutionary imagination.  In 
October 1952, Ñuflo Chávez wrote the Minister of Education, Mario Diez de Medina, 
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proposing a state project to excavate, reconstruct, and restore the Tiwanaku ruins.   “In 
keeping with the revolutionary ideals of Reconstruction and Restoration of the values that 
inform our culture,” he urged, “my office believes that it is now time to approach 
together with the Museum of your honorable ministry the study of a serious official plan 
for the Reconstruction and Restoration of Tiwanaku.”665 If Chávez was unable to appeal 
to Medina’s nationalist sentiment with patriotic statements regarding the valorization of 
the indigenous past, he was quick to assure the Minister of Education that the project 
would also coincide with the MNR’s broader goal of economic diversification by 
providing a “inexhaustible source of tourism.”666 Seeing that the National Tiwanaku 
Museum operated under the purview of the Ministry of Education, Chávez urged Medina 
to include in the Ministry’s 1953 budget, five million bolivianos to create a “real 
excavation plan.”667  Over the course of the next five years, the Bolivian state would 
invest 25 million bolivianos into the project.  By 1957, Chávez imagined the construction 
of an “American archeological park,” where the Bolivian government would “show the 
American continent one of its grandest accomplishments.”668  
The Tiwanaku restoration project represented an unprecedented state intervention 
in national archeology.  Marking a distinct break from the cultural politics of the past, it 
was the first time that the Bolivian government provided material and institutional 
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support for archeological research.  This shift indicated the cultural colonization of the 
ruins, their transformation from a contested and indeed ambivalent symbol of the 
indigenous past into a potent and readily-identifiable symbol of the newly-integrated 
postrevolutionary republic.  The project to excavate and restore Tiwanaku necessitated 
(and justified) not only the creation of state institutions to manage the effort, but a 
research agenda that challenged decades of inaccurate, unscientific research and 
imaginative speculation into the ruins and the indigenous civilization that once populated 
them.   
The establishment of a research agenda for national archeology was the primary 
objective of the First Round Table on Bolivian Archeology, which convened in La Paz 
between December 15 and 21, 1953.669  Organized by the Municipality of La Paz, it was 
the first conference to bring together specialists from across the country.  Indeed, the 
meeting in itself attests to the postrevolutionary government´s broad interest in Bolivia’s 
pre-Hispanic past.  The list of attendees included the new generation of nationalist 
archeologists, who in subsequent years, would lead a burgeoning state archeological 
mission and become the architects of the postrevolutionary mestizo nation.  The attendees 
were Gregorio Cordero Miranda, sub-director of the MNT; Maks Portugal, Director of 
the Casa de Murillo; Jacobo Liberman, president of the Municipal Council of Culture; 
Dick Iberra Grasso, Director of the Museum of Archeology at the University of San 
Simón in Cochabamba.  Presiding over the event was Juan Luis Gutiérrez Granier, mayor 
of La Paz and a committed MNR militant.670   
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The sub-director of the conference was an aspiring archeologist, nationalist, and 
MNR militant named Carlos Ponce Sanginés.  It was Ponce who, in his capacity as vice 
president of the La Paz Municipal Council on Culture, was the primary motivating force 
behind the organization of the conference.  And it was Ponce, more than any other figure 
during this period, who envisioned in Tiwanaku archeology a fundamentally nationalist  
Illustration 15: Archeologist Carlos Ponce Sanginés, head of the postrevolutionary 
archeological mission (Credit: South American Pictures). 
mission.  Born into a wealthy La Paz family in 1925, Ponce’s passion for archeology 
started when he was a child, exploring on his parent’s estate, Hacienda Mollo, in 
Muñecas, a central province in the department of La Paz.  He attended college in the 
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba in Argentina, where he studied archeology under 
Antonio Serrano.671  In 1948, at the age of 28, he published his first monograph on 
national archeology, a study of Tiwanaku ceramics.672  Upon his return to La Paz, he 
joined the MNR, and following the Revolution, he was appointed to his position in the 
municipal government.  With the First Round Table on Bolivian Archeology, Ponce 
sought to convene the nation’s archeologists to discuss the current state of the discipline 
in Bolivia and to develop a set of questions to frame future research.   
What resulted from the conference was a research agenda that attended to the 
broader nationalist mission of postrevolutionary archeology.  The primary objectives of 
this agenda were to dispel the speculation and mystery surrounding the ruins and to 
establish a new chronology for Tiwanaku civilization employing the latest scientific 
methods.673 Fundamentally, it sought to disprove an existing canon of archeological 
knowledge shaped, above all, by Posnansky.  Posnansky’s legacy was deeply entrenched 
in the La Paz intelligentsia, and even resonated in foreign archeological circles as well.674 
His enduring legacy was even visible on the stationary of the Sociedad Arqueológica de 
Bolivia (Archeological Society of Bolivia, SAB), an independent organization of La Paz 
scholars, politicians, and antiquarians founded in 1930 by those interested in the study of 
Bolivian archeology.675  Members of the organization included several notable figures in 
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pre- and post-revolutionary Bolivian archeology, including Alberto Laguna Meave and 
Federico Diez de Medina. Inscribed on the 1954 letterhead of was an explanation of the 
history of Tiwanaku, stating that the 12,500 year-old ruins were the birthplace of 
American peoples.  The text was taken verbatim from Tiwanaku: Cradle of American 
Man.676   
At the Round Table, Ponce and other nationalist archeologists asserted that 
Posnansky’s work was problematic on several accounts.  First of all, it was racist because 
it argued for the biological inferiority of Andean peoples in general, and the Aymara in 
particular.  Revealing both the reach of Posnansky’s ideas and the race-based theories 
that underlie them, in 1945 Juan Comas, the Spanish-born Mexican anthropologist, 
repudiated Posnansky in América Indígena, the quarterly publication of the Instituto 
Indigenista Interamericano, to make a broader statement on race and racism in the 
Americas.677  Indeed, nationalist archeologists associated Posnansky’s work with a 
broader canon of national self-denigrating knowledge produced during the liberal era, 
whose infamous progenitor was none other than Alcides Arguedas.  Another problematic 
aspect that nationalist archeologists identified in Posnansky’s research was its 
chronology.  By dating Tiwanaku civilization back 12,500 years, his interpretation of the 
ruins provided a past too remote to link to the postrevolutionary nation.  Nationalist 
archeologists asserted, moreover, that his methods for arriving at this date were 
unscientific, the result of a speculative assumptions about Tiwanaku iconography and 
ancient astronomy rather than modern scientific inquiry.   
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While the First Round Table defined a research agenda for postrevolutionary 
archeology, and while the MNT and IIB began planning the excavation and restoration 
plans for Tiwanaku, other nationalist intellectuals drew on Posnanky’s conclusions to 
assist in the postrevolutionary objective of valorizing the Aymara past.  One particularly 
salient example is a 1954 essay written by Luis Soria Lens, “Origen, lugar de origen de 
los Aymaras y su probable expansión de las tres Américas, Dinastías Aymaras.” 678  A 
linguist by trade and a MNR militant, Soria applied his knowledge of the Aymara 
language to North American toponymy to challenge Posnansky’s infamous assertion that 
the Aymara were the descendants of the racially inferior Arawak.  He asserted that it was 
the Aymara, not the Kolla, who populated the Americas 12,500 years ago, settling as far 
north as Alaska.  He argued that the Algonquin names of Midwestern states have their 
roots in the Aymara language.  Michigan, for instance, comes from the Aymara phrase 
“Mitchi hani” which means “without arrow.”  The word Mexico originated “misikku,” 
the Aymara word for a yellow daisy with six pedals that grows on the Bolivian altiplano, 
that, he points out, “are also plentiful on the Mexican altiplano.”  The word Maya, he 
asserted, came from the Aymara word for the number one, “maya.”679   
With such linguistic and toponymic evidence, Soria Lens presented a provocative 
case for a hemispheric Aymara diaspora. But his argument was also tied to broader 
contemporary concerns with indigenous social uplift.  He argued that, “If some authors 
considered the Maya and Aztec as the Greeks of America, and the Inca the Latin people 
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of this part of the world, the Aymara, who, by the proof that we have provided, are 
perhaps the predecessors of both civilizations, since they were lucky to possess a superior 
culture whose relics remain in Tiwanaku.”680 But despite similar attempts to advance 
nationalist archeology upon Posnansky’s claims, Ponce believed that only though the 
tools offered by modern science could Tiwanaku’s true history be revealed and the 
contested Aymara past could, one and for all, be valorized. 
  
SCIENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ARCHEOLOGY 
If refuting Posnansky was the pillar upon which postrevolutionary archeology was 
both founded and institutionalized, an uncompromising commitment to modern science 
enabled nationalist archeologists to achieve their objective.  With the First Round Table 
on Archeology, nationalist intellectuals had distanced themselves from their predecessors 
by proclaiming a rigid adherence to modern scientific techniques.  The Round Table, 
Ponce asserted, served as the reference point for a new nationalist archeology, and he 
welcomed the “modifications that the incessant development of science will be able to 
forge in the future.”681  To be sure, the standardization of scientific methodology within 
archeological practice upon was the primary factor motivating the institutionalization of 
postrevolutionary archeology.  And despite the purported universality of science, 
Tiwanaku archeology and the scientific practices upon which it was founded developed 
within an increasingly restricted nationalist agenda.682   
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Having established a research agenda for nationalist archeology at the First Round 
Table, Ponce set out to ensure that the excavation of Tiwanaku was carried out using 
stratigraphic analysis and to introduce novel techniques of radiocarbon dating.  Although 
stratigraphic analysis had existed since the nineteenth century, the technique was not 
introduced in Bolivia until 1932 by Wendell Bennett, who demonstrated its utility by 
establishing the first cultural historical sequence of Tiwanaku civilization.  Yet Bennett’s 
excavation was limited: his analysis was based on only ten pits.  By applying 
stratigraphic analysis to the excavation of the entire site, Ponce hoped not only to test 
Bennett’s conclusions, but also to confirm his dates with new advances in radiocarbon 
techniques.  While stratigraphic analysis provided a relative chronology of ancient 
civilizations, radiocarbon offered a method to date archeological sites with much more 
precision.  The technique—developed by the University of Chicago chemist, Willard 
Libby in 1949—was based on the carbon-14 isotope, which is present in all organic 
materials.  Calculating that the carbon-14 isotope had a half-life of 5568 ± 30 years and 
decayed at a fixed exponential rate, Libby demonstrated that the age of carbon-bearing 
materials—such as bone or charcoal—could be established by measuring the level of 
decay of the carbon-14 isotope against its half-life.  With such practices, Ponce would 
establish a definitive history of Tiwanaku, one confirmed by the authority of science.   
Ponce and other government officials sought to consolidate the efforts of the IIB, 
the MNT, and the SAB under a centralized state institution that could properly manage 
the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku and ensure that project was being carried 
out in accordance with the latest scientific developments in archeological practice.  In 
order to do so, the Minister of Education, Federico Álvarez Plata, created the Comisión 




Working with the U.S. embassy, Álvarez Plata invited Wendell Bennett (who had since 
left the American Museum of Natural History to take a position at Yale) to return to 
Bolivia, head the CAB, and oversee the excavation and restoration project.  Bennett was 
unable to accept the offer; but before his untimely death in September 1953, he 
recommended the University of Texas anthropologist Richard P. Schaedel to head the 
program instead.683 While awaiting confirmation from Schaedel in February and March 
of 1954, Álvarez Plata began recruiting members of the committee.  He started by 
bringing on most of the members of the SAB leadership, including Federico Diez de 
Medina (Honorary President), Alberto Laguna Meave (President), and Manuel Lazarte 
(Jefe de Arqueología).  He also brought in personnel from both the IIB and the MNT, 
including Félix Eguino Zaballa, Zacharias Monje Ortiz, Miguel Alandia Pantoja, and 
Gregorio Cordero.   At this time, Ponce, and his wife, the anthropologist Julia Elena 
Fortún, traveled to Mexico City where they served as the cultural attaché to the Bolivian 
legation.   
As efforts to recruit Bennett and Schaedel illustrate, the CAB sought to bring 
established foreign specialists to Bolivia in order to ensure that the burgeoning state 
archeological mission operated in accordance with the most recent developments in 
archeological research and practice.  In 1956, the CAB invited University of 
Pennsylvania archeologist, Alfred Kidder II to dig at Tiwanaku and at Chiripa, where 
Wendell Bennett had carried out his excavations in 1932.  With the excavation at Chiripa 
and Tiwanaku, CAB officials hoped to build upon Bennett’s research and to reveal more 
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about early Tiwanaku with evidence from pottery and carbon dating.684  Working from 
Mexico City, Ponce arranged for samples of organic materials unearthed during the dig—
charcoal and bone—to be sent to laboratories at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor 
for radiocarbon dating.685  In applying for the necessary permission from the Ministry of 
Education to carry out the project, Jacobo Liberman, General Director of Cultural for the 
La Paz municipal government, emphasized the way in which archeological research 
attended to the patriotic duty of valorizing the indigenous past.  “We are guided by the 
intention of helping to clarify the chronology of our proto-history,” he stated, “to rectify 
mistakes of the past which have slandered the ancient culture of our peasantry.” He 
reminded Ministry officials that “it falls on us to us to take advantage of technical and 
more scientific means to extol the merits of our culture.”686  
In February 1956, after almost two year of coordination, study, and planning, the 
CAB presented its official plan for the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku.  Of 
the four major monumental structures at Tiwanaku—the Pumapunku temple, the 
Akapana pyramid, the subterranean temple, and the Kalasasaya acropolis—the CAB 
decided to begin the excavation and restoration project with Kalasasaya.   A sprawling 
courtyard enclosed by giant granite monoliths protruding from the dry earth, Kalasasaya 
attracted the attention and captured the imagination of the CAB staff.  It was the largest 
and most mysterious complex in the ruins.  Upon visiting the ruins in 1868, E.G. Squire 
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had dubbed it the “Stonehenge of South America.”687  The courtyard also contained the 
most emblematic, and indeed, famous symbol of the ruins: the Puerta del Sol, a giant 
stone gateway adorned with elaborately carved iconography.  Over the course of five 
years, and with a government commitment of ten million bolivianos, the CAB sought to 
survey the site, carry out a scientific excavation, vertically align the granite monoliths, 
expose the rectangular stone platform at the northeast corner of the platform, expose and 
reconstruct the walls between the vertical monoliths, and construct a parking lot to 
accommodate the automobile traffic of visitors. 688   It was an ambitious project intended 
not only to reveal Bolivia’s glorious Andean past, but to illustrate the modernizing 
potential of the Aymara people.  
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Illustration 16: Overview of Tiwanaku Complex (Javier Escalante, INAR 1988).  
Yet with the government beset with a rising economic crisis, the Tiwanaku 
project sputtered by 1956. With the strict budget cuts outlined in the monetary 
stabilization plan the Siles administration implemented in December that year, state 
resources for the effort seemed to dry up.  Faced with severe state budget cuts, Fernando 
Diez de Medina—who had just recently been appointed as Minister of Education—set 
out in search of alternative sources of capital to fund the first phase of the project, the 
excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya.  He turned to the private sector, soliciting 
both money and materials from Bolivian industry.  In a blanket introduction letter, he 




only contribute to economic diversification with the influx of tourism that would resulted 
from the effort, but that it would also highlight Bolivia’s primordial Andean origins. 689  
Wheelbarrows, buckets, shovels, concrete, and wood were all donated from private 
Bolivian industry.  Even Klaus Barbie, the infamous Nazi known as the “Butcher of 
Lyon” who was hiding in Bolivia under the name Klaus Altmann, donated wooden 
boards to the project, from Madera Santa Rosa, his timber company in the Yungas.690   
As capital and materials rolled in from the private sector, Ministry of Education 
officials sought to centralize control of the excavation and to standardize science within 
national archeological practice.  To oversee the project and make sure it was being 
carried out within the boundaries of modern science, Diez de Medina dissolved the CAB, 
and created the Comité de Excavaciones (Excavations Committee, EC) an interim 
institution that would oversee the project while officials worked to hammer out the 
details of a permanent state institution within the Ministry of Education.691  He named 
Ponce (who had recently returned from his sojourn in Mexico) director, and in July 1957, 
tasked him with the creation of a legal code that would guarantee the scientific 
excavation of ruins.692  During the following year, Ponce, Julia Elena Fortún and others 
from the MNT, reached out to research institutions, universities and museums across the 
globe in order to develop a comprehensive set of regulations for the excavation, 
reconstruction, and preservation of archeological ruins and artifacts  They obtained laws, 
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regulations, and guides from Mexico, Italy, Spain Great Britain, France, India, Japan, 
Germany, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).693   
What resulted was the Reglamento de excavaciones arqueológicas.694  Signed into 
law on June 1, 1958, the Reglamento institutionalized scientific methods within the 
practice of national archeology, stipulating that all researchers—foreign and national—
must submit a scientific plan, citing all of the relevant literature; the plan would then be 
vetted by national archeologists and government officials.  Applicants were also required 
to survey the site, and propose a coordinate system for the excavations pits.  The 
excavations themselves had to be carried out according to specific methodological 
standards, including stratigraphic analysis.  Samples of pottery shards and/or organic 
matter had to be deposited with the Ministry of Education for carbon dating and further 
analysis. The Reglamento de excavaciones arqueológicas ensured that future excavations 
would be carried out according to established scientific practices, established strict 
government oversight over archeological research, and guaranteed that archeological 
patrimony would not be removed from the country.  Ponce boasted that the Reglamento 
represented “el más moderno” government code to guide archeological research “de toda 
América.”695  
At the same time, the Ministry of Education transformed the EC into the Centro 
de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (Center of Archeological Excavations in 
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Tiwanaku, CIAT), a permanent state institution that, in subsequent decades, would carry 
out the excavation and restoration project, and protect the site from looters and vandals. 
Of course, the organization’s charter also stipulated that all aspects of the Tiwanaku 
restoration project must be scientific—which meant the utilization of stratigraphic 
analysis in all excavations, the registration of artifacts in a central database, and 
orientating all subsequent research within the existing scientific and archeological 
literature on Tiwanaku.696  With these efforts, the government sought to ensure that 
modern science would serve as the foundation of postrevolutionary archeology and such 
practices would glorify Bolivia’s pre-Hispanic past.   
 
AYMARA PAST/MESTIZO PRESENT 
On September 21, 1957, after almost five years of planning, the government 
inaugurated the much-anticipated Tiwanaku restoration project with the excavation of the 
Kalasasaya acropolis. That the inauguration corresponded with Lapaca Pacha, the 
Aymara celebration of the spring equinox, was no coincidence.  Similar to the trip 
sponsored by the IIB back in 1952, state officials sought to capitalize on the symbolic 
currency of the date to launch the project.  To mark the occasion, the Ministry of 
Education organized a widely-publicized official ceremony that was covered by the 
national and international press and filmed by the Bolivian film institute.697   Presiding 
over the ceremony, in addition to Ponce and the state archeological team, was President 
Siles; the Minister of Education and Fine Arts, Fernando Diez de Medina; the Minister of 
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Peasant Affairs, Federico Álvarez Plata; the President of the National Agrarian Reform 
Council, Adalid Balderrama; foreign dignitaries; and a host of local officials from the 
municipal government and rural peasant unions.698  In addition to celebrating the 
inauguration of the project, the ceremony represented the transformation of Tiwanaku 
from an indigenous remnant into a national-cultural symbol.  As such, it provided an 
opportunity for the MNR to celebrated Bolivia’s Aymara past and to showcase the 
postrevolutionary mestizo nation before foreign dignitaries and the national press.   
After breaking ground, President Siles gave a brief speech at the most 
recognizable emblem of the ruins, the Puerta del Sol.  He officially recognized Tiwanaku 
as a national symbol that represented the unity of the mestizo nation through its common 
ancestry, announcing that Tiwanaku “signifies the past of the greatness of our race.”699  
Not only did he evoke the idea that Aymaras, creoles, and mestizos were linked through a 
shared primordial national past, but he also discursively appropriated indigenous 
struggles as part of the MNR’s national popular project.  “Like you, compañeros, 
children of this immense altiplano homestead, we, the current government leaders, have 
suffered the consequences of injustice," he proclaimed to the crowd.  “Fortunately, the 
clamor of our glorious forbears and our unified fight against the oppressors enabled us to 
break the chains that were subduing us and return our rights.”700 Tiwanaku provided a 
symbol that united the population under the nationalist banner of a multiethnic, cross-
class struggle in which the Aymara were partnered with the creole-mestizo revolutionary 
vanguard. 
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Illustration 17: President Hernán Siles at the Puerta del Sol, inaugurating the Kalasasaya 
excavation, September 21, 1957.701  
As the Tiwanaku restoration project proceeded into the 1960s, the restoration of 
Kalasasaya and the neighboring Templete Semisubterráneo gave tangible form to what 
were previously inchoate ruins, while the attendant excavations provided new clues to the 
social structure, political organization, and economic base of the ancient civilization. 702  
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Under the leadership of Ponce, a CIAT team consisting of Julia Elena Fortún, Gregorio 
Cordero, and Gregorio Loza unearthed a host of artifacts including mummified human 
remains, ceramics, metal jewelry, precious stones, instruments made from bone, stone 
points, finely worked metals, and massive stone monoliths adorned with finely carved 
iconography.  As the excavation team worked tirelessly under the scorching altiplano sun, 
they were motivated by a strong sense of patriotic duty and the thrill of discovery.  
Reflecting on the excitement that the CIAT team felt as they excavated Kalasasaya, for 
example, Fortún recalled that, “Todos participamos en común de la sana alegría del 
científico, que hace sobrellevar los disgustos, estructurando con patriotismo las líneas 
fundamentales de la verídica historia de la más grande cultura américa, Tiwanaku, y 
haciendo conocer a Bolivia sus raíces más hondas.”703  
The discovery of such a rich array of material-cultural artifacts evidenced the 
advanced level of cultural production, technological sophistication, and sociopolitical 
organization achieved at Tiwanaku and enabled Ponce to put forth new interpretations as 
to the rise and decline of the civilization. With scientifically verifiable dates provided by 
radiocarbon techniques and a basic chronology resulting from the application of 
stratigraphic analysis, Ponce drew on Wendell Bennett’s research to elaborate a new 
cultural-historical sequence for Tiwanaku.  Influenced by such thinkers as Arnold 
Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, he attempted to fit Tiwanaku into universal paradigms of 
the rise and decline of human civilizations.704  Excavations at Kalasasaya revealed 
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material-culture artifacts that pre-dated the first phase of Bennett’s cultural-historical 
sequence, thus establishing even deeper roots for Tiwanaku and, in the eyes of Ponce and 
the nationalist archeological mission, the Bolivian nation.  His most notable assertion, 
however, concerned the historical development of the site. Bennett and others had long 
contended that Tiwanaku served as the ceremonial center of a broader civilization, but 
never developed into a densely-populated city. Based on the new data from the CIAT 
excavations, Ponce identified a new phase in the cultural-historical sequence, “Tiwanaku 
V,” which was marked by an “urban revolution” characterized by increased population 
density at the site.  This, he asserted, was the final epoch of Tiwanaku civilization and he 
speculated that its downfall ultimately resulted from a shortage of food to supply the 
rapidly expanding population.    
The novel interpretation of Tiwanaku that resulted from the restoration project 
provided the postrevolutionary government with a glorious Aymara past to supersede a 
more recent history marked by ethnic resistance and racial inferiority. Elaborate 
ceramics, metal jewelry, precious stones, finely worked metals, and other material 
cultural artifacts excavated by the CIAT team revealed the technological sophistication of 
the ancient Aymara, while the massive stone structures evidenced a high degree of social 
organization which would have been necessary for their construction.  Ponce’s “urban 
revolution” thesis, moreover, demonstrated that Tiwanaku was a highly-developed city-
state that retained all of the characteristics of a socially-stratified and politically-
organized civilization that equaled, if not surpassed, the great cities of contemporaneous 
Europe.  The Tiwanaku restoration project thus challenged entrenched notions of an 
uncivilized, savage, backward, and inferior Aymara by revealing a pre-Hispanic past in 




constructed a massive city, organized labor, and lorded over an expansive empire 
surpassed in size and influence only by the Inca.  
Eager to reveal this glorious Aymara past and the scientific advancement of 
Bolivian archeology to the general public, José Felleman Velarde, the recently-appointed 
Minister of Education and a longtime MNR stalwart, called for the renovation of the 
Museo Nacional Tiwanaku. In 1960, the Ministry closed the MNT to update the 
collection with the artifacts unearthed by CIAT and to reorganize it exhibits according to 
the historical development of pre-Hispanic Andean civilization.  The goal was to provide 
Bolivian citizens and international tourists with a progressive interpretation of Bolivia’s 
past. The new MNAR was organized into six different rooms, organized chronologically 
to present a linear progression of national development that began with Tiwanaku and 
culminated in the Bolivian nation-state. “Esta forma de exhibición,” the Museum’s new 
director, Gregorio Cordero, remarked, “es fácilmente accesible al conocimiento del 
público en general y especialmente la niñez.”705  The Ministry of Education renamed the 
institution the Museo Nacional de Arqueología (MNA) and opened it to the public on 
January 31, 1961 with an official inauguration ceremony.  
Presiding over the inauguration, Fellman Velarde celebrated the mixed cultural 
and ethnic heritage of the nation and emphasized the Aymara roots of Bolivian 
nationhood.  He proclaimed that Tiwanaku represented “La Época de Oro de la Cultura 
Aymara,” and the halls of the MNA—displaying the artifacts uncovered by Ponce and the 
CIAT team—stood as a testament to two thousand years of Aymara culture, “la celula 
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madre de la Bolivianidad.”706  Valorizing the Aymara past while emphasizing the 
population’s potential as a modernizing force, he declared that the MNA “constituye el 
orgulloso testimonio de lo que fuimos en el pasado y la base de la esperanza, sobre lo que 
podemos ser en el futuro.”707 In a particularly salient example of the redemptive narrative 
underlying postrevolutionary archeology, he concluded by stating that “las generaciones 
bolivianos que transiten por estas salas, hallen en la obra de nuestros antepasados un 
legítimo motivo de sentirse orgullosos de su sangre india.”708  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Tiwanaku restoration project was the centerpiece of a broader government 
initiative to create a more inclusive national identity for postrevolutionary Bolivia.  
During the 1940s, MNR intellectuals had revised national history, representing the 
Bolivian nation as a diverse people of middle class professionals, dissident intellectuals, 
urban workers, miners, and indigenous peasants united in a common struggle against an 
entrenched oligarchy that governed the country solely in the interests of foreign capital.  
After the Revolution, the MNR sought to enact this unified vision of Bolivian society by 
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Illustration 18: Tourism poster featering the Puerta del Sol at Tiwanaku, c. 1961.709 
                                                 




promoting a new discourse of nationhood and citizenship founded upon the concept of 
mestizaje. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Ñuflo Chávez, Félix Eguino Zaballa, and other ranking 
government officials recognized in Tiwanaku a tangible symbol of postrevolutionary 
national unity.  With the Tiwanaku restoration project, the MNR sought to restore the 
monumental architecture at the site in order to illuminate Bolivia’s glorious pre-Hispanic 
past and the potential of the postrevolutionary mestizo nation. And through film, radio, 
speeches, publications, and of course, museum exhibits, the postrevolutionary 
government popularized Tiwanaku. 
 While the restored ruins furnished the government with a unifying national 
symbol, the archeological research that complemented the Tiwanaku restoration project 
provided a new, scientifically-grounded history of Tiwanaku civilization that served to 
valorize the Aymara past.  If Aymara were going to be part of the new mestizo nation—
one that proudly embraced both its Andean and Hispanic origins—then the MNR had to 
displace an entrenched canon of knowledge that cast the population as savage, racially 
inferior, and unfit for republican life with a new narrative extolling the virtues of Aymara 
civilization.  As historian, Pierre Nora reminds us, nations aggrandize themselves by way 
of the past.  “The greater our origins, the more they magnified our greatness,” he wrote in 
a much-cited study of the French past.710 “Through the past, we venerated above all 
ourselves.”711 Led by the indefatigable Carlos Ponce Sanginés, Bolivia’s state 
archeological mission provided a new chronology of Tiwanaku civilization based on 
modern scientific practices such as stratigraphic analysis and carbon dating. Narrowing 
the temporal distance between the Tiwanaku city-state and the Bolivian nation-state, this 
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interpretation not only affirmed Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins, but evinced a socially 
organized, technologically advanced, politically sophisticated civilization. At the same 
time, however, this narrative supported a homogenizing discourse of mestizaje that 






Patrimony for Whom?  The National and Local Politics of 
Postrevolutionary Cultural Patrimony Formation 
De Tiwanaku poco es lo que queda en pie, visible al ojo curioso de viajero.  Sus tesoros 
habrá que buscarlos en el seno de la tierra, en sus cementerios escondidos, en sus 
inmediaciones vírgenes o en los faldeos de los apartados cerros, inexplorados aun.   
-Salvador Debenedetti, 1910 
 
In December of 1958, Carlos Ponce Sanginés reached his wits’ end.  The director 
of Bolivia’s burgeoning state archeological mission arrived at Tiwanaku one day to find a 
herd of cattle grazing on the ruins.  There were cows on the lands between the Kalasasaya 
acropolis and the Templete Semisubterráneo, and, perhaps most appalling, on top of the 
Akanpana pyramid.  Infuriated, Ponce hit three cows with his Jeep before rounding up the 
rest of the herd and taking it to the police station, just down the road, in the town of 
Tiwanaku.  There, he ordered the arrest of the owner of the cattle, a local vecino, or 
townsperson, named Pedro Pizarroso, for trespassing on government property and for 
violating national cultural patrimony laws.712 In responding to the complaint that 
Pizarroso subsequently filed with Ponce’s superiors at the Ministry of Education, Ponce 
dismissed the vecino with a racial epithet, as a “típico cholo ‘tinterillo,’” before quipping 
that “para él más importante es que sus vacas revienten de gordas, aunque destruyen 
todos los monumentos de la cultura prehispánica de Tiwanaku.713”     
Yet it was not just vecinos like Pizarosso who valued archeological sites more for 
their socioeconomic utility than for their importance as national cultural patrimony.  
Neighboring Aymara communities posed an even more daunting threat to 
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postrevolutionary patrimony.  Following the passage of the agrarian reform law in 1953, 
Aymara communities occupied the land immediately surrounding the Tiwanaku ruins.  
According to law, the communities had a legitimate claim to the land—land, that in most 
cases, had been illegally possessed during the great wave of highland hacienda 
expansion.  As the postrevolutionary government increased its commitment to cultural 
patrimony, however, that claim was threatened by the archeological artifacts that lay 
under the surface of the contested territory. Government officials wanted to conserve the 
land in order to preserve the material-cultural evidence of Bolivia’s glorious pre-Hispanic 
past. Certain that farming and grazing would damage the artifacts, they repeatedly 
ordered the communities not to use the territory.  The peasants refused to cooperate, 
however, insisting on their rights to their ancestral lands. To Ponce, one never short on 
hyperbole, the use of the land not only violated cultural patrimony laws, but also 
represented “un atentado contra la cultura del país.”714  
In the wake of the 1952 Revolution, conflict between state archeologists and 
Aymara peasants became commonplace in the Tiwanaku valley as the MNR expanded 
the state’s role in both the management and the protection of national cultural patrimony.  
At the root of the conflict was differing perspectives on the meaning of land, history, and 
patrimony.  Local actors and government officials assigned land divergent, and often 
contradictory, meanings.  For Ponce and other officials seeking to preserve the 
indigenous past as an intrinsic component of the national present, the land surrounding 
the ruins represented history, containing within it testament to the primordial roots of the 
Bolivian nation.  As such, the government sought to conserve it as national cultural 
patrimony. For locals, however, land meant much more.  For one, it had practical value.  
                                                 




For centuries, vecinos and peasants alike had quarried the ruins for stones to build roads, 
houses, and churches.  Indigenous communities farmed and grazed on archeological 
lands.  And, as the national and international markets for antiquities grew, Tiwanaku 
became a source of income for locals who plundered the site in search of valuable 
artifacts.  But perhaps more importantly for local Aymara communities, land had sacred 
value, and was infused with historical memory and communal identity.715    
This chapter explores the politics of national cultural patrimony formation in 
postrevolutionary Bolivia by examining local struggles over archeological lands 
surrounding Tiwanaku. In keeping with its nationalist objective of valorizing vernacular 
culture as an authentic representation of the postrevolutionary republic, the MNR 
instituted a rigorous cultural patrimony regime.  Indeed, during the first half of the 
twentieth century, the government had introduced laws intended to define and protect 
patrimony, but as anthropologist Beatriz Rossells points out, they were “insuficientes y 
aisladas.”716 The state rarely enforced these laws, trusting instead that individuals and 
private institutions would act within the established legal framework.717 As such, the pre-
revolutionary patrimony regime remained weak and largely ineffectual. After the 
Revolution, the MNR placed the management of cultural patrimony firmly in the hands 
of the state. Doing so required not only the introduction of laws that would expand the 
content of patrimony and the government’s ability to protect it, but also the creation of 
state institutions that would enforce the new regulations. Tiwanaku was at the center of 
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this effort. The ruins had been neglected, looted, and damaged for centuries.  And as the 
MNR began to restore Tiwanaku as a unifying national symbol, the need to increase 
protection of archeological site played a key role in postrevolutionary cultural patrimony 
formation.  
While the government had to protect Tiwanaku from thieves and vandals, it was 
ultimately neighboring Aymara communities that emerged as the principal threat to the 
site after 1952. With the Tiwanaku restoration project, the government was laying claim 
to the pre-Hispanic past as the primordial foundation of the Bolivian nation.  Yet laying 
claim to the past necessitated laying claim to land as well, for it was not just the 
monumental architecture at the site that required protection under cultural patrimony 
laws, but the material-cultural artifacts that lay in the subsoil of the territory surrounding 
the ruins.718  In order to protect the artifacts, government officials sought to expand the 
perimeter of the archeological site by expropriating Aymara communal lands. Patrimony 
thus became a fierce site of contestation at the local level as state archeologists and 
indigenous communities fought over rights to land. And though the state ultimately 
remained unsuccessful in its attempt to obtain rights to the lands in question, the enduring 
conflict proved to be instrumental in the promulgation of the 1961 cultural patrimony law 
and lay at the core of subsequent efforts to commercialize indigenous popular arts. 
Against the backdrop of the legal and institutional measures that the 
postrevolutionary government introduced to create a stronger cultural patrimony regime, 
the following pages trace the historical struggles of Achaca, an Aymara ayllu neighboring 
the Tiwanaku ruins.  Given that not ruins, not objects, rather land was at the heart of the 
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controversies that arose as the state sought to protect the site, the chapter explores the 
long history of Achaca, and how its protracted struggle for land and justice undermined 
government efforts to obtain archeological lands and contributed to cultural patrimony 
laws. Achaca was the most litigious and fractured ayllu in the entire Department of La 
Paz—not necessarily because of the ruins, but because the government’s continued 
inability to protect archeological lands originated in a parallel struggle within the ayllu 
over rights to specific plots of land after the 1953 agrarian reform.  
In addition to revealing the dynamic interplay between state and society in the 
formulation of cultural patrimony policy after 1952, this chapter also demonstrates how 
the institutional objectives of different government ministries shaped postrevolutionary 
cultural politics. The divergent meanings that Achaca peasants and state archeologists 
assigned the territory surrounding the Tiwanaku ruins became manifest at the institutional 
level as the government began to redistribute hacienda lands in accordance with the 
agrarian reform law. While the Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes (Ministry of 
Education and Fine Arts, MEBA) had to protect archeological lands in accordance with 
postrevolutionary state’s commitment to cultural patrimony, the Servicio Nacional de 
Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Service, SNRA) was obligated to grant 
peasants legal right to the territory they occupied.  Land reform was a necessary 
component of the postrevolutionary initiative to uplift and to integrate Bolivia’s rural 
indigenous majority, and as such, it conflicted with the state’s desire to protect 





ACHACA: SPACE AND AYLLU 
In order to understand the postrevolutionary politics of cultural patrimony in 
Tiwanaku, the space must be situated within a much longer local history of community 
struggle and hacienda expansion.  The disputed space was the Pumapunku temple and the 
land immediately surrounding it.  Located on the eastern side of the Tiwanaku complex, 
Pumapunku is a massive stone platform 900 meters to the southeast of the Akanpana 
pyramid.  It was constructed during the seventh and eighth centuries C.E., the zenith of 
Tiwanaku civilization, and remains one of the most impressive—and indeed, 
mystifying—examples of monumental architecture at site. 719  According to the urban 
layout of Tiwanaku, which archeologists believe was planned according to the spiritual 
and cosmological beliefs of the civilization, Pumapunku served as the principal gateway 
to the city. 720  Arriving from Lake Titicaca just to the west, visitors were greeted by the 
magnificent, snow-capped peaks of Illimani, which aligned perfectly with the eastern-
facing doorway of the structure, providing a powerful backdrop for the monumental 
architecture of the city.   
In the centuries since the civilization’s enigmatic downfall, however, human 
settlement greatly transformed Tiwanaku’s original urban plan.  By the twentieth century, 
railroad tracks, roads, trails, irrigation ditches, and property lines separated Pumapunku 
from the other monumental structures at the site.  Set apart from the primary Tiwanaku 
complex, only the actual ruins were protected by the patrimony laws introduced by the 
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liberal state in the first decades of the twentieth century. The rest of Pumapunku—
massive earthen works such as the ramp of the western entrance—and the  
Illustration 19: Pumapunku in relation to the rest of the Tiwanaku ruins.721 
archeologically-significant lands surrounding it were private property.722 As landlord 
power broke down throughout the region in the wake of the 1952 revolution and the 1953 
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agrarian reform, state archeologists sought to expropriate the territory surrounding the 
temple.   At stake in protecting the land was the MNR’s claim to the nation’s primordial 
past, for as Ponce asserted, the “ruinas milenarias [de Tiwanaku] comprueban las hondas 
raíces de la nacionalidad misma.”723 
At the time of Independence in 1825, the Pumapunku ruins were located on the 
communal lands of an Aymara ayllu called Achaca—one of the seven ayllus that 
constituted the indigenous community of Tiwanaku.724   The community had gained title 
to its lands from the Spanish Crown in 1746, and as the postcolonial tributary regime 
took form after independence, Achaca, along with the other ayllus of the region, paid 
tribute in exchange for land rights.725 Records suggest that during the first decades of 
Republican rule, Achaca and the other ayllus of Tiwanaku lived in relative harmony with 
the few haciendas that existed in the region. Yet towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, wealthy creoles, motivated by the tin boom, began eyeing the lands of Achaca 
and neighboring ayllus.  The Tiwanaku valley proved especially appealing to the land-
hungry paceño elite. It bordered Lake Titicaca, it was close to La Paz and its market, and 
it was accessible to the expanding railroad network.726  Situated in a valley, moreover, the 
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area was not exposed to the harsh climate that characterized other parts of the altiplano.  
Potatoes, barley, and quinoa grew in abundance, as did pasta brava, a rich grass well 
suited for livestock.   
Hacienda expansion and the attendant divestiture of ayllu lands varied from 
department to department, but it was in La Paz where the greatest majority of indigenous 
communities were disrupted. To give a sense of the scale of land turnover during this 
period, Herbert Klein estimates that in the Department of La Paz alone, 11,900 sayañas 
were sold.727  Of those, 71 percent were bought by non-Indians.728  The legal basis for 
this unprecedented attack on indigenous communal lands was, of course the 1874 
Disentailment Law.  Most buyers hailed from the burgeoning La Paz elite—who were 
gaining power and status vis-à-vis the traditional Sucre-based oligarchy.  Documentary 
evidence reveals a striking pattern of land divestiture in the canton of Tiwanaku.  After 
independence, just under half of the farmland in the canton belonged to indigenous 
communities.  In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this number began to 
markedly decline.  By the 1950 agrarian census, not one free community existed in the 
entire canton.729  
It was during the first great wave of highland hacienda expansion when Achaca 
and the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku began the long, contested 
transformation from ayllu to hacienda.  The force behind this transformation was 
Benedicto Goytia, who began acquiring land within Achaca and the neighboring ayllu of 
Huancollo in 1882. Part of the emerging La Paz elite, Goytia was an established liberal 
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politician and entrepreneur, serving as a diputado for the province of Lareja in 1885 and 
1889 in the national parliament, and owned stake in several tin mining enterprises.730  
Like other members of the ascendant liberal elite, Goytia sought to invest in land to turn a 
profit while diversifying his financial portfolio. 731 Bolivia’s emerging tin-based 
monoexport economy placed investors at greater risk of world price fluctuations and 
investing in land would help absorb financial ruin if world tin prices plummeted.  The 
acquisition of land, moreover, provided status and recognition for this emerging class of 
national elites  
Similar to the rest of the region, the acquisition of ayllu lands in Achaca was a 
piecemeal process that lasted decades and entailed a mix of legal measures, forced sales, 
and violence. Government agents surveyed, partitioned, and redistributed the ayllu lands 
as private property in 1882 and 1883.  After purchasing title to their sayañas, several 
comunarios voluntarily sold their deeds to Goytia when he began buying tracts of land in 
Achaca and the neighboring ayllus during the 1880s.732  Those that sold retained the 
rights to their sayañas house plots and enjoyed usufruct rights to the land.  In exchange, 
they were obligated to provide labor, a portion of their harvest, seed, and other necessary 
implements to tend to the fields and/or livestock.  Though some comunarios sold their 
lands voluntarily, legal disputes filed during the period 1900-1921 allege that Goytia 
relied heavily upon fraud and coercion to acquire ayllu lands, taking advantage of his 
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political position and economic influence to avoid legal sanctions.733  According to a 
petition that illegially divested peasants filed with the prefect of La Paz, Goytia “habia 
adquirido algunas sayañas en nuestra ex-comunidad y prevalido de su situación oficial ha 
ejercitado una serie de procedimientos atentatorios e ilegales por medio de sus 
mayordomos o administradores con el exclusivo objetivo de adueñarse del resto de las 
tierra que nos pertenece.”734 Another lawsuit underscores Goytia’s reliance on violence to 
aquire ayllu lands, alleging that he “ha pretendido expoliarnos nuestras tierras de 
comunidad sin más derecho que la fuerza, valiéndose para ello de agentes desalmados, 
quieres mediante la astucia, la tortura, el terror y otros medio de extorsión, se ha 
apropiado de dichas nuestras tierras, sometiendo nuestras personas a una verdadera y 
vergonzosa esclavitud, con mengua de las leyes de la Republica.” 735  
As Goytia obtained vast tracts of communal lands in Achaca, peasants adapted 
existing hierarchies of authority to the new structure of the hacienda.  On free 
communities across the Aymara-speaking altiplano, local political authority rested in the 
jilakata.  After fulfilling a series of community debts and services, jilakatas were chosen 
by the community to lead the ayllu for one year.736  Herbert Klein found that as the 
hacienda frontier expanded across the La Paz altiplano, landowners retained the existing 
hierarchical structure of the communities as they acquired ayllu lands and colono 
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labor.737 As such, the jilakata became the primary authority on the estate, serving as the 
mediator between the hacienda administration and the community.  Under the hacienda 
regime, jilakatas cooperated with the majordomo (estate manager) to ensure that colonos 
met labor obligations and provided the necessary portion of their harvest to the 
landowner. In some cases, the jilakata even served as the hacienda administrator in lieu of 
a majordomo.  With the new circumstances of the hacienda, the role of the jilakata thus 
changed significantly. Instead of being a rotating position occupied by different 
individuals according to their fulfillment of community obligations, as was customary, 
jilacatas could remain in power for years, or even decades. Moreover, rather than being 
appointed by the community, as was also customary, the jilacata was often chosen by the 
landlord.738 Given that the jilakata served as the key interlocutor between the hacienda 
and its labor, landlords often sought to play a key role in the selection of the jilakata and 
his tenure in power.  On Achaca, the landlord appointed Domingo Pati Morales as 
jilakata sometime during the early 1920s, and it appears that he served until 1952.  
Hacienda consolidation on Achaca was a conflict-ridden process that caused 
lasting divisions within the communities that carried on well into the twentieth century.739 
During the first decades of the century, social cohesion within Achaca fractured.  As 
some comunarios voluntarily sold their lands while others refused, ayllu solidarity eroded 
and internal power hierarchies were rearticulated.  Collaboration with the hacienda 
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administration undermined the legitimacy of the jilakata and other traditional ayllu 
authorities in the eyes of those comunarios who refused to sell their sayañas. 740 They 
rejected the authority of the jilakata, separated themselves from the colonos, and 
appointed two apoderados to represent them, Ildelfonzo Cruz and Mariano Marin.  
Between 1916 and 1928, Cruz and Marin petitioned local, regional, and national officials 
to protect their sayañas.  Apoderados “did not discount the power of the law,” Laura 
Gotkowtz argues, but rather “they insisted on its enforcement.”741  Indeed, Cruz and 
Marin maintained unfaltering faith that the government would uphold their rights as they 
repeatedly drew on established laws to defend the comunarios’ lands.  They sought 
assistance from local courts to guarantee their rights to lands to which they held legal 
deed. They also petitioned the government to have local state officials intercede on their 
behalf to cease maltreatment by the hacienda administrators, the jilakata Domigo Pati, 
and other colonos on the estate. The state complied and ordered hacienda officials to 
refrain from levying labor demands and hassling the comunarios. But beyond sending 
orders, the government could do little else; given the weakness of the Bolivian state and 
the semi-closed nature of the haciendas, landlords—and more, commonly their 
administrators—remained the ultimate power brokers on the altiplano.    
Tensions peaked in 1921 when Goytia sold the estate—colonos included—to 
Jorge Zalles, another member of the La Paz elite.  Not only did the title that Goytia 
transfer include the lands that he had legally gained title to—the sayañas that colonos had 
sold and the aynokas—but the sale also included all of the lands to which the comunarios 
retained legal title. What made matters worse for the comunarios was that the prefect, the 
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government official that would typically intercede on their behalf, was Elias Zalles, the 
cousin of the new property owner.  Thus, despite the illegal nature of the sale, the 
apoderados were largely powerless.  Only once all legal efforts were exhausted—after 
they petitioned the prefect, the minister of government, and finally President Saavedra 
himself—did the comunarios revolt, declaring themselves “sublevación.” However the 
uprising was manifest, it must have arrived at a level that was threatening to Zalles and 
other land owners, for the military ultimately intervened.  On June 22, 1922, the First 
Regiment de Abaroa occupied the ayllu.  Allegations of rape, arson, and murder soon 
followed. Cruz, Marin and other local leaders were imprisoned or evicted from the 
hacienda.742   
With the apoderados imprisoned and many comunarios expelled from the 
hacienda, hostility on Achaca seems to have subsided—at least the document trail runs 
cold.  The last legal petition from Achaca in the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria 
(National Institute of Agrarian Reform, INRA)  archives dates to 1929.  Nevertheless, 
other records provide a glimpse onto the changes that transpired on Achaca during the 
1930s and 1940s.  At some point—when exactly remains unclear—Zalles sold the 
hacienda to Juan Perou, another paceño who, like both Goytia and Zalles before him, 
remained an absentee land owner who charged local administrators with the day to day 
operations of the estate. In the ensuing years, bits and piece of archival documents 
indicate that some of the expelled comunarios resettled in the burgeoning outskirts of La 
Paz to try their hand in the free labor market, while others vanished from the historical 
record.   
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As for the territory surrounding Pumapunku, it now belonged to Juan Perou.  It 
was not long, however, before the government challenged Perou’s rights to this 
archeologically-rich territory.  As public interest in Tiwanaku increased during the 1930s 
with Wendall Bennette’s excavations and the widely-read works of Arturo Posnansky, 
the government introduced new laws to protect the ruins.  On June 29, 1933, President 
Daniel Salamanca enacted a law that called for the “expropiación forzosa” of four zones 
bordering the Tiwanaku ruins, including nine hectares of land surrounding the 
Pumapunku ruins.743  Officials affiliated with the Museo Nacional Tiwanaku (MNT) 
believed that the land contained valuable artifacts and perhaps other structures that would 
be damaged by planting crops and grazing livestock.  Yet, the law remained ineffectual 
on the lands surrounding Pumapunku.  Reflecting the weak cultural patrimony regime of 
the pre-revolutionary era, the law included a provision that allowed affected landowners 
to negotiate the terms of the expropriation.  Under this provision, Perou retained legal 
deed to the nine hectares surrounding Pumapunku, but only under the condition that the 
he preserve the land.744  This agreement allowed the state to maintain its respect for 
private property regime while ostensibly protecting the archeological lands.   
 
POSTREVOLUTIONARY CULTURAL PATRIMONY AND TIWANAKU 
When the MNR took charge of the national government in April 1952, it inherited 
a weak and largely ineffective cultural patrimony regime.  Previous governments had 
introduced laws to both define and protect national cultural patrimony, but they rarely 
enforced them, relying instead on private institutions such as the Sociedad Geográfica de 
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La Paz. 745  Lacking oversight, pre-Hispanic artifacts, colonial art, rare texts, and other 
valuable material-cultural objects often ended up in the hands of local collectors and 
foreign museums.  This changed significantly after 1952. Seeking to expand the content 
of patrimony, to centralize its management, and to ensure its protection, the MNR created 
the Departamento de Museos y del Monumento Nacional (Department of National 
Monuments, DMMN) as a dependency of the Ministry of Education in 1952, and charged 
it with the enforcement of existing cultural patrimony laws.  At the same time, the MNR 
also set out to establish new laws that would provide a more expansive legal framework 
for the management and protection of national cultural patrimony.   
Tiwanaku’s location at the center of postrevolutionary patrimony efforts belies the 
importance that government officials accorded to the pre-Hispanic ruins.  Already by 
September 1952, MAC officials had demonstrated their intent to transform Tiwanaku into 
a symbol of the postrevolutionary nation—an intention that was most saliently manifest 
in the state-sponsored Lapaca Pacha celebrations.  Similarly, President Paz and other 
government officials were already citing Tiwanaku in their speeches, exemplifying the 
ruins as testament to the high levels of culture achieved by the Andean civilization that 
served as the foundation of the postrevolutionary republic. “Somos el pueblo que hizo 
Tiwanaku,” President Paz had proclaimed to cheering peasants and miners at Huanuni in 
August 1952.746  The occupation of the lands immediately surrounding this important 
symbol of postrevolutionary Bolivia thus particularly alarmed government officials—as 
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did the longstanding practice of allowing archeological artifacts to leave the country.  The 
protection of the archeological site and the artifacts it guarded became an urgent national 
priority. As such, Tiwanaku emerged at the heart of postrevolutionary efforts to centralize 
the management and to expand the legal framework of national cultural patrimony. 
The centralization of cultural patrimony management began in 1954 in order to 
protect Tiwanaku artifacts.  As the director of the DMMN, it was Miguel Alandia Pantoja 
who oversaw this process.  Within a decade, Alandia would be the defining muralist of 
the Revolution, but in 1954, he was a young artist and idealist, committed to the 
principles of nationalism and social justice that characterized the post-Chaco generation.  
He had served on the front in the Chaco, becoming a prisoner of war.  Upon returning to 
Bolivia, he became a social activist, finding resonance in the working-class political 
mobilization and leftist militancy of the 1930s and 40s.747  As the newly-appointed 
director of the DMMN, he saw the Tiwanaku restoration project as “una de las 
afirmaciones de la responsabilidad histórica que corresponde a los hombres de la 
revolución nacional.”748 Exemplifying the newfound importance that the 
postrevolutionary state bestowed on cultural patrimony, he asserted that the Revolution 
had “creado condiciones para defender positivamente nuestros tesoros arqueológicos, no 
solo de la exportación, sino para preservaros también del deterioro y de su 
destrucción.”749  Infused with nationalism and emboldened by a sense of historical 
importance, Alandia set out to ensure that the postrevolutionary government enforced 
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cultural patrimony laws long in existence, but rarely implemented by the MNR’s 
predecessors.   
The government’s legal review was sparked by a request by Stig Rydén, a Swiss 
archeologist, to remove Tiwanaku artifacts to Switzerland for further study.  After 
excavating at Chiripa and Tiwanaku in 1952, Rydén had petitioned the National Museum 
to return to Europe with some of the artifacts he excavated to continue his analysis.750  
Following the First Round Table on Archeology in December 1953, the Consejo de 
Cultura of the Municipality of La Paz recommended that the Ministry of Education grant 
Rydén permission to remove the artifacts from Bolivia for a period of two years.751 As 
director of the Consejo, Carlos Ponce Sanginés justified the decision by asserting that the 
study would have “imponderable valor para el desarrollo de la ciencia arqueológica 
nacional.”752 It is perhaps no surprise that in arriving at this conclusion, Ponce struggled 
to reconcile his own dedication to cultural patrimony with the scientific advancement of 
national archeology.   
The decision initiated conflict between municipal and MEBA officials, and led 
Alandia to define the postrevolutionary government’s stance on cultural patrimony.  As 
such, the incident played an important role in the centralization of postrevolutionary 
cultural patrimony management. Speaking on behalf of the Ministry, Alandia denied 
Ryden’s petition on grounds of national cultural patrimony laws.  In what seemed at once 
a rejoinder to Ponce Sanginés and a declaration of the government’s renewed 
commitment to the protection of patrimony, he declared that “Lo lamentable es que no 
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obstante haberse producido un cambio radical en la conciencia política de nuestro pueblo 
de existir hoy condiciones sociales que permiten la defensa de nuestra cultura y nuestra 
tradición, todavía existen estudios simulando poses legales que pretenden oponerse a la 
Ley del Monumento Nacional, que este Ministerio está poniendo en vigencia.”753   
In justifying his decision, Alandia drew from a legal precedent that dated to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Although the liberal state neither organized nor 
funded any excavations or restorations projects, it did grant permission to foreign 
archeological missions.  In 1903, the French Scientific Mission lead by Georges de 
Créqui-Monfort excavated at the subterranean temple, a large submerged courtyard 
located at the base of the Akapana pyramid.754  The primary findings of the French 
Mission were little documented, but the excavation revealed what many observers had 
long suspected: that the majority of Tiwanaku’s monumental architecture remained 
buried, and what was visible was only a fraction of the original site.755  The excavation 
was nevertheless remembered less for what it revealed, than for what it destroyed.  In 
1904, the Sociedad Geografica de La Paz denounced the French mission for destroying a 
number of structures during the excavation.   
The damage done by the French team had merely added insult to injury. For 
centuries, the Tiwanaku ruins had been destroyed and looted.  Colonial officials, 
hacienda owners, and indigenous communities alike had carted off stone blocks from the 
ruins to be used in the construction of roads, walls, and buildings.  Upon visiting the town 
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of Tiwanaku in 1868, for example U.S. naturalist, E.G. Squier commented that “On all 
sides are vestiges of antiquity from the neighboring ruins, which have been a real quarry, 
whence have been taken the cut stones not only for Tiwanaku and all the villages and 
churches in the valley, but for erecting the cathedral of La Paz, the capital of Bolivia.”756 
This problem was further compounded towards the end of the nineteenth century, as the 
market for Tiwanaku artifacts blossomed with both local and foreign collectors.  While 
many artifacts were stored at the National Museum in La Paz after its foundation in 1846, 
many pieces ended up in the private collections of paceño elites. What was even more 
troubling is that foreign archeologists had long removed artifacts for study, but rarely 
returned them. Most of the artifacts unearthed during the French mission, for instance, 
became part of the permanent collection of the Muséum Américaine in Paris.757   
Recognizing the historical importance of the ruins and the attendant need to 
preserve them, President Ismael Montes introduced the first cultural patrimony laws of 
the republic.  In October 1906, Montes introduced a law that declared the Tiwanaku ruins 
were property of the nation and, as such, protected by the state.  It further charged both 
the state and various geographic societies, such as the SGLP, with care of the ruins.758  In 
1909, Monte’s successor, Eliodoro Villazón expanded the protections introduced in the 
1906 statute.  With the Supreme Decree of 11 November 1909, the government 
specifically addressed the question of excavations, stipulating that digs could only be 
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carried out by the government or interested parties that “present a complete and scientific 
plan of exploration.”759  
While Alandia cited both the 1906 and 1909 decrees, the primary law that he 
drew from in making his case was the Ley de Monumento Nacional (National Monument 
Law).760 Promulgated by President Hernando Siles in 1927, the law built on the 1906 and 
1909 decrees to define all archeological ruins existing in Bolivian territory as national 
monuments, and thus protected by the state.  The law also expanded the definition of 
national monuments beyond structures to include material-culture objects such as pottery 
shards.  Highlighting the fact that archeological artifacts were defined as national 
monuments, Alandia prohibited the export of such items, unless granted permission by 
the Ministry of Education.761  In presenting this legal argument, Alandia closed with a 
narrative of indigenous redemption that identified archeology as a means to valorize the 
indigenous past for the postrevolutionary present, concluding that “La ley de Monumento 
Nacional, debe ponerse en practica sin restricciones si queremos conserver nuestra 
heredad cultural y hacernos dignos de sus creadores y de las generaciones de 
porvenir.”762 The need to ensure the enforcement of existing laws was essential to the 
valorization of the indigenous past and provided further justification to the centralization 
of patrimony management. 
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In addition to inspiring the centralization of patrimony management, the 
protection of the archeological site also underlie the development of stronger cultural 
patrimony laws.  In 1954, the government placed the Comisión Nacional de 
Arqueología—the quasi-government institution that organized the Tiwanaku restoration 
project (see previous chapter)—in charge of revising existing national patrimony laws.763 
Although the Comisión seems to have never completed the task, the fact that the 
government placed it in charge of the effort illustrates the central place that Tiwanaku 
occupied in the postrevolutionary imagination as the government sought to expand 
cultural patrimony laws. The influence of state archeologists and the centrality of 
Tiwanaku in the formulation of cultural patrimony laws would only increase in 
succeeding years as the state archeological mission confronted new threats to the 
archeological site with the initiation of the Tiwanaku restoration project.  
The primary threat to patrimony that state archeologists confronted in Tiwanaku 
was not so much the ruins themselves, but the land that surrounded them. As tangible 
relics of the pre-Hispanic past, the monumental architecture and the material-cultural 
artifacts from the site were clearly defined by and protected under the 1906 and 1909 
decrees, as well as the 1927 National Monument Law. Land was different, however, for it 
did not reveal as clearly its value as patrimony. Artifacts lay in the subsoil and remained 
invisible to the untrained eye and the human-made earthworks surrounding the site were 
often interpreted as natural geologic formations. As such, existing cultural patrimony 
laws protected only the land directly occupied by the ruins, and the surrounding lands 
rich in potential archaeological materials remained private property. To be sure, the 
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Salamanca administration apparently recognized this legal gap and, in 1933, issued the 
decree that called for the expropriation of territory surrounding the ruins.  Yet, in the case 
of the land surrounding Pumapunku, the government seemed to privilege property rights 
over cultural patrimony.  The landowner, Juan Perou, retained title to the nine hectares of 
Achaca surrounding the ruins which the government sought to expropriate, under the 
condition that he would not use them.764 The government thus never obtained these lands, 
and all that protected them was an agreement between MNT officials and Perou—an 
agreement that would prove to be quite fragile.    
Following the Revolution, widespread indigenous mobilization to establish legal 
ownership of ayllu lands threatened archeological territory, and the national cultural 
patrimony associated with it.  On August 2, 1953, President Víctor Paz Estenssoro signed 
the agrarian reform into law.  The decree called for breaking-up large, unproductive 
estates and redistributing them to the indigenous peasants that worked them under the 
guiding principle that property must serve a “función útil.”765  Yet in many cases, 
indigenous communities had already taken the initiative, ousting landlords and hacienda 
administrators and seizing the land in the months immediately following the April 
insurrection.  In fact, recent scholarship by such authors as Roberto Choque, Silvia 
Rivera, Pilar Mendieta, and Laura Gotkowitz is beginning to demonstrate both the depth 
and the continuity of rural mobilization during the entirety of the republican period as 
indigenous communities sought to reclaim lands and exert their rights.766  By the late 
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1940s and early 1950s, the situation had blossomed into what Laura Gotkowitz has 
identified as a rural revolution, autonomous from the creole-mestizo revolution led by the 
MNR.767  While the most radical peasant mobilization occurred in the Cochabamba 
valleys, indigenous mobilization was also widespread on the southern and eastern shores 
of Lake Titicaca.768  In short, the process was already well underway—it had been since 
at least 1874—and had achieved such a level of dynamism that the MNR had limited 
control over the expropriation and redistribution of land.  And as Achaca colonos 
struggled to shed the hacienda past during the 1950s, patrimony became a fierce site of 
contention over land, history, and power. 
 
THE CONTESTED DYNAMICS OF LAND AND PATRIMONY 
Once the MNR signed the Agrarian Reform into law in August 1953, Achaca 
colonos mobilized to evict the hacienda administration, and to obtain legal title to the 
territory that corresponded with the original ayllu boundaries, including all of the lands 
immediately bordering the north, west, and south sides of the Pumapunku ruins.769  Under 
the leadership of Juan Mamani Quispe, the colonos established the Sindicato Agrario de 
Achaca, (SAA) and claimed the land under the auspices of the peasant union.  The SAA 
expelled all those who had closely collaborated with the hacienda administrators—
starting with the hated jilacata, Domingo Pati Morales—and established itself as the new 
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authority within the community. Although they did not yet hold legal title to the land, the 
colonos—who, with the collapse of the hacienda regime, now referred to themselves as 
ex-colonos—maintained effective control over it and soon began planting and grazing on 
their individual sayañas.  With these actions, the sindicato controlled the territory 
immediately surrounding Pumapunku, and the 1933 agreement between Perou and the 
MNT disappeared along with the hacienda administration.770 With the archeological 
territory now in possession of the ex-colonos, Achaca became deeply entangled in the 
politics of postrevolutionary national cultural patrimony formation.   
Given the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to the protecting cultural 
patrimony, MEBA officials grew increasingly concerned with the ex-colonos’ occupation 
and use of the territory surrounding Pumapunku. In February and March 1954, Manuel 
Liendo Lazarte, Director of the MNT, repeatedly cabled local officials—including the 
corregidor, the mayor of Tiwanaku, and the guard of the ruins—obliging them to 
intercede on behalf of the government by ordering the Achaca ex-colonos to desist from 
planting and grazing on lands bordering the archeological ruins.771 Yet despite such 
efforts, peasants insisted on their primordial  rights to the land.  “Como consecuencia de 
la Reforma Agraria,” Liendo reported to the Minister of Education, Federico Álvarez 
Plata, "los campesinos de la comunidad de Achaca, pretenden realizar sus faenas 
agrícolas en todos estos terrenos colindantes con las ruinas de Tiahuanacu, a pesar del 
hecho que el propietario de la finca mencionada desde hace muchos años no ha utilizado 
esos terrenos por la circunstancia de que con seguridad en su subsuelo existen enormes 
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piedras que son restos arqueológicos de la mayor importancia.”772  Liendo lamented that 
"la utilización de tales terrenos por los campesinos de Achaca que pretenden revindicar 
esos terrenos para la comunidad de Achaca, sería altamente prejudicial, inclusivo para el 
actual perímetro fiscal de las terrenos donde se exhiben las milenarias ruinas.” 773   
Fearing that planting and grazing on the land would damage material-cultural 
relics that lay in the subsoil, Lazarte declared that expanding the perimeter of state lands 
around Pumapunku was a “necesidad urgente.”774  IIB director, Félix Eguino Zabala, was  
also alarmed by the ex-colonos’ occupation of the territory.  After all, it was his 
institution that, according to its mission statement, was tasked with nothing less than 
“preservar y conservar los tesoros de la cultura vernacular, que posee al suelo 
boliviano.”775  Frustrated by the community’s intransigence, he sent Liendo a sketch of 
the ruins that indicated the perimeter around them that required protection.  Liendo urged 
Eguino to contact the Secretary of the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca, Juan Mamani, to 
communicate “la importancia de las ruinas y la obligación de respetar las leyes existentes 
del patrimonio nacional.”776  Meanwhile, Liendo wrote Álvarez Plata, urging the Minister 
to promote a supreme decree that would “se amplié el perímetro de la pertenencia fiscal 
de las ruinas de Tihuanacu, agregando todos los terrenos limítrofes que pertenecían a la 
Hacienda Achaca.”777  Such measures were necessary, he asserted, because “futuras  
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Illustration 20: Contour map showing surface features of Pumapunku.778 
 
Illustration 21: Surface features of Pumapunku. Acacha ex-colonos occupied the 
“Western Plaza” on the left of the drawing.779   
                                                 




excavaciones arqueológicas puedan poner en descubierto valiosas reliquias que con 
seguridad existen en tales terrenos.”780  
State cultural officials saw the expropriation and preservation of the lands 
bordering the ruins as the only way to “defend” the cultural patrimony in the face of 
rising indigenous mobilization to restitute ayllu lands. In December 1955, Lazarte wrote 
Hugo Almaráz, who had since replaced Miguel Alandia Pantoja as Director of the 
DMMN, pointing out the “necesidad de efectuar algunas expropiaciones de propiedades 
particulares alrededor de las ruins.”781 As peasants continued to insist on their rights to 
the lands, state efforts to obtain the contested territory became increasingly desperate.  In 
1956, Almaráz wrote the Minister of Education on behalf of the CAB, recommending 
that the Ministry contact the Instituto de Geográfica Militar “para el levantamiento de un 
plano topográfico de los terrenos ya adquiridos; es decir de los que corresponden a las 
ruinas de Puma Punku, la Casa del Inca, y Kalasasaya, siendo esta una de las primeras 
medidas, previa la completación [sic?] que tiene que efectuarse con la adquisición de los 
lotes de propiedad particular que se encuentran ubicados dentro del perímetro que 
encerrara a las indicadas ruinas, pues dentro del plan de trabajos que presento esta 
Comisión ante el Ministro Dr. Federico Álvarez Plata, se contempla la expropiación de 
los terrenos particulares.”782    
Yet despite the urgency that Liendo, Eguino, Almaraz, and other officials 
assigned the matter, the government did not issue a supreme decree expropriating the 
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lands surrounding Pumapunku.  In the face of widespread peasant mobilization and the 
rural politics of the MNR, it seems that they remained largely powerless. Evidence 
suggests widespread and growing hostility between state archeological officials and 
indigenous communities. Achaca was not the only community that was struggling to 
retain rights to archeological lands. Museum officials also confronted a similar threat to 
the patrimony on an Aymara ayllu called Acuta (to the southwest of Tiwanaku), as 
campesinos occupied the lands surrounding another pre-Hispanic archeological site 
called Khonko Huancane.783  Tensions escalated to such a point that state archeologists 
began arming themselves for expeditions into Aymara provinces. Beginning in 
November 1954, budgets for archeological expeditions on the altiplano included rifles, 
revolvers, and ammunition in addition to the usual shovels, wheelbarrows, and 
buckets.784    
Local struggles for land and rights ultimately undermined government efforts to 
expropriate the territory surrounding Pumapunku in order to preserve it as cultural 
patrimony.  Not only were the ex-colonos struggling with state officials to gain legal title 
to the contested ayllu lands.  But towards the middle of the 1950s, conflicts arose within 
the ayllu as ex-colonos sought to defend their sayañas against the encroachment of 
returning ex-comunarios, who despite having been expelled from the hacienda decades 
earlier retained legal title to parcels of ayllu lands.  The protracted local struggle that 
ensued posed a formidable challenge to state efforts to expropriate the archeological 
lands surrounding Pumapunku.       
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The conflict between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios originated in the land 
displacement and social changes that occurred on Achaca during the seventy years that 
had passed since it began the long, contested transformation from ayllu to hacienda.  
Although the external boundaries of Achaca remained unchanged, land claims within the 
community had changed significantly.  During the first decades of the twentieth century, 
Goytia and Zalles each expelled those unwilling to forfeit lands and/or submit to 
hacienda labor obligations. The military assault on Achaca in 1922, the imprisonment of 
apoderados such as Cruz and Marin, and the expulsion of other comunarios left vacant 
sayañas that other colonos soon occupied.  Further dislocation presumably occurred in 
the wake of the 1933 supreme decree that expropriated private lands for cultural 
patrimony, as Perou removed the colonos who occupied the nine hectares surrounding 
Pumapunku. 785  As a result, peasants were uprooted from their ancestral lands and either 
relocated within the hacienda or simply left the community.  By the time that the MNR 
signed the agrarian reform into law in 1953, actual land possession thus differed 
markedly from the legal titles that many ex-colonos and ex-comunarios held.  This 
became the subject of protracted legal battles, as ex-comunarios returned to Achaca only 
to find their sayañas occupied by ex-colonos.  
The legal conflicts that resulted from such discrepancies between the occupation 
and possession of ayllu lands were arbitrated within the framework of the 1953 agrarian 
reform law. Drafted by a state commission dominated by a group of Cochabamba leftist 
intellectuals that included Arturo Urquidi Morales, Ernesto Ayala Mercado, and Ricardo 
Anaya, the agrarian reform law privileged usufruct over private property rights.  Evoking 
the popular mantra, “la tierra es para quién la trabaja,” it declared ex-colonos the rightful 
                                                 




owners of the parcels of land they both occupied and worked on any estate classified as 
exploitive. What became the most contested aspect of the law were articles 77-92, which 
established who would be granted preferential treatment in the redistribution of hacienda 
lands.  The law granted ownership rights to those individuals who had occupied the land 
for a period that dated back two or more years from the passage of the agrarian reform 
law on August 2, 1953. As such, it legalized the land reallocations that had transpired on 
the estate under the hacienda regime, and favored ex-colonos at the expense of those ex-
comunarios who held legal title to the lands that they had been forcibly expelled from 
decades earlier.   
It was not long before the government recognized the necessity to clarify the 
decree in order to address rising hostilities on haciendas such as Achaca where ex-
comunarios were returning to reclaim sayañas to which they did not possess, but held 
legal deed.  In May 1954, President Paz Estenssoro signed the Ley de restitución de 
tierras de las comunidades a los campesinos, a measure intended to mitigate land 
disputes between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios.  The law reaffirmed the rights of ex-
colonos to the lands they occupied, declaring that “no podrán ser despojados bajo ningún 
concepto por parte de los ex-comunarios.”786  At the same time, it invalidated all land 
titles conferred during the period 1900-1953.  Ex-comunarios no longer had a claim to 
the sayañas to which they held deeds—that is, to a specific parcel of land in the ayllu—
but the law guaranteed them legal title to another plot of land of equal value on the estate.   
Clashes between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios intensified on Achaca after 1956, 
as each sought to acquire legal possession of contested ayllu lands. Having expelled the 
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hacienda administration and taken extralegal possession of the lands in the wake of the 
1953 Agrarian Reform, ex-colonos banded together under the SAA to initiate formal 
proceedings to acquire legal title to lands in October 1955.787 Under the law, the land was 
legally theirs. Still, ex-comunarios, whose sayañas were occupied by ex-colonos, filed 
competing claims and, in some cases, occupied the sayañas to which they held legal title. 
This group included Esteban Cabrera Cruz, grandson of apoderado Ildelfonzo Cruz, and 
several others who had been dispossessed of their sayañas during the 1910s and 1920s.788  
This generated significant conflict within the community, as ex-colonos refused to 
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recognize these land titles, pointing out that the returning ex-comunarios were “artesanos, 
fabriles ó comerciantes y que por tanto han dejado de ser campesinos estictu-sensu.”789  
Citing the 1953 agrarian reform decree and the 1954 addendum, they quoted the guiding 
principle of the law, “la ‘tierra es para quién la trabaja’” and argued that they, the ex-
colonos, deserved preference in the redistribution of ayllu lands because they had worked 
the land.790 Only after the state granted title to ex-colonos, they argued, should the ex-
comunarios be granted lands on the ayllu.   
With the passage of the 1954 law, SNRA had to arbitrate the disputes between ex-
colonos and ex-comunarios, and was obligated to accommodate ex-comunarios on 
equitable lands within the ayllu.  Doing so required surveying and redistributing the 
hacienda lands in order to accommodate both the ex-colonos who already possessed the 
land, and the ex-comunarios who were guaranteed parcels of land on the ayllu. Yet 
SNRA faced a difficult task.  Not only was there a fixed amount of land to accommodate 
the ex-comunarios, but the distribution of this land had become incredibly inequitable 
over the course of the century.  According to a 1956 study carried out by SNRA, the total 
number of ex-colonos on Achaca, including male heads of household, females, and 
children was 543.791  This population lived on 143 sayañas that ranged in size from two 
to fifty-five hectares.  SNRA surveys indicate that the 25 largest sayañas comprised 60 
percent of the land, while the smallest 20 only owned only six percent.792  Further 
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complicating the situation was the fact that there was a limited amount of arable land. 
The topographer in charge of Achaca’s land claim noted that “muchas de las sayañas que 
actualmente ocupan son de extensión bastante grande, en cambio, restos no son 
cultivables en toda su extensión.” 793   
Given the lack of arable land, the fertile territory surrounding Pumapunku became 
an incredibly valuable commodity that SNRA needed in order to accommodate the 
demands of ex-comunarios.  Confronted with this situation, SNRA and MEBA faced 
conflicting institutional obligations. While MEBA officials sought to expropriate the 
lands and preserve them as national cultural patrimony, SNRA was legally obliged to 
attend to peasant demands and accommodate the ex-comunarios on Achaca.  Thus, the 
redistribution of hacienda land and the government’s agrarian reform policies took 
precedence over the need to protect archeological lands as cultural patrimony.  In terms 
of the overall objectives of the postrevolutionary government, its commitment to agrarian 
reform and national development trumped its dedication to national cultural formation.   
In 1956, SNRA sent a team of topographers and lawyers to Achaca to redistribute 
ayllu lands in order to accommodate the ex-comunarios and resolve the local conflict. 
After surveying the ayllu, they expropriated portions of the largest sayañas and 
reallocated communal lands to supply the territory needed to accommodate the thirty-
three ex-comunarios demanding restitution. The team completed the task in February 
1957, granting each ex-comunario ten hectares of ayllu lands.794 With this effort, it seems 
that local hostilities largely subsided. The calm proved short-lived, however, for soon 
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after SNRA redistributed the lands, Domigo Pati Morales, the hated jilakata, initiated 
legal proceeding to recover not only his sayaña, but also those of other colonos who the 
SAA had expelled in 1953.795 According to the agrarian reform laws, Pati had legal rights 
to ayllu lands, but given his past, both ex-colonos and ex-comunarios contested his 
claims. Pati’s claim reignited hostilities on the ayllu and undermined SNRA’s 1957 
redistribution.  In the succeeding years, as SNRA set out once again to redistribute the 
limited amount of land to attend to the contested petition of Pati, local struggles 
continued to frustrate efforts to protect archeological lands.   
 
NATIONAL PATRIMONY, LOCAL STRUGGLE 
As the state archeological mission began excavating and reconstructing the 
Kalasasaya acropolis in early 1957, they confronted this volatile situation. The 
Kalasasaya dig marked not only the expansion of the Tiwanaku restoration project, but 
also the ascendance of Carlos Ponce Sanginés as the head of the state archeological 
mission.  Ponce had spent the previous two years in Mexico, where he and his wife, the 
anthropologist Julia Elena Fortún, served as cultural attachés in the Bolivian embassy.  
Upon returning, the Minister of Education, Fernando Diez de Medina, appointed Ponce, 
first as head of the Comité de Excavaciones—the interim institution charged with 
developing an excavation plan for Tiwanaku—and then as director of the Centro de 
Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (Center for  Archeological Research at 
Tiwanaku, CIAT), the permanent state office overseeing the Tiwanaku restoration 
project.  With Ponce leading the state archeological mission, the protection of the 
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Tiwanaku ruins would play an even more significant role in postrevolutionary patrimony 
formation.  
The excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya also marked the beginning of a 
permanent presence of state archeologists in the Tiwanaku valley.  Since the ruins were 
about two hours from La Paz by car, and lacked regular railroad service, CIAT personal 
stayed at the ruins during the week.  In 1957, Ministry of Education officials obtained the 
old Hotel Refugio Tiwanaku on loan from the fledgling National Directorate of 
Tourism—who had it on lease from the Prefect of La Paz—to house the archeological 
staff.  In June 1958, President Siles signed a supreme decree, transferring title from the 
Prefect of La Paz to CIAT to serve as permanent headquarters for archeological 
research.796 The Hotel Refugio became the headquarters of the state archeological staff at 
Tiwanaku (and the surrounding altiplano), housing the central offices of CIAT, 
laboratories, and living quarters.797   
It soon became clear, however, that neither the indigenous communities 
surrounding the archeological site, nor vecinos from the neighboring village of Tiwanaku 
welcomed the permanent and expanding presence of state archeologists in the area.  In a 
memoir that Julia Elena Fortún drafted in November 1959 about her participation in the 
excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya, she recounted the hostilities that she and 
others faced as the state archeological mission settled into the Hotel Refugio and 
prepared Kalasasaya for excavation.  During the initial days of the excavation, she 
recalled, someone detonated dynamite next to the new headquarters, shattering all the 
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windows, under the pretext of an accident during a party.  While detonating dynamite is 
not an uncommon occurrence during altiplano festivals—especially around the mining 
centers of Oruro and Potosí—Fortún interpreted the incident as nefarious.  Given the 
broader circumstances, she was probably correct.  She also described more severe 
incidents, one in which state archeologists came under gunfire on two occasions as they 
surveyed Kalasasaya for excavation in early 1957.798  
To Fortún and the rest of the excavation team, the hostilities revealed the 
government’s continued inability to adequately safeguard the archeological site and the 
attendant need to establish new means to protect cultural patrimony at Tiwanaku.  In 
order to do so, they sought to enlist the cooperation of locals to help mitigate local 
hostility and enforce cultural patrimony laws.  In May 1957, the Ministry of Education, 
sent an official envoy to Tiwanaku to discuss the state archeological project with local 
authorities.  After inspecting the ruins, officials sat down with local officials to discuss 
the importance of cultural patrimony and what the Tiwanaku restoration project was 
going to entail. The state envoy included Alberto Laguna Meave, Maks Portugal, and 
Gregorio Cordero from the Consejo Consultivo de Arqueologia, and Julia Elena Fortún 
as a representative of the Ministry of Education’s Departamento de Arqueología, 
Etnografía y Folklore (Department of Archeology, Ethnography, and Folklore, DAEF).  
They were received by village and peasant leaders, including the head of police, the 
president of the citizens group, delegates from the rural unions, and the local MNR boss, 
Walter Fernandez.  
                                                 
798 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce “Mi anecdotario de 




Seeking to ensure the protection of both ruins and artifacts, the envoy arrived with 
two objectives.799  First, they wanted to stop huaquerismo, clandestine digs carried out by 
locals seeking to uncover artifacts to sell to collectors and tourists.800 Since antiquities 
emerged as a valuable commodity in the nineteenth century, this practice had provided a 
lucrative source of income to locals. The postrevolutionary government sought to put an 
end to this threat to cultural patrimony.  Since the 1940s, the MNT had posted a guard at 
Tiwanaku to protect the site from vandals and prevent huaquerismo. The guards were 
local campesinos who were paid by the Ministry of Education.  In order to fortify the site, 
the postrevolutionary government posted additional guards at the ruins.  Yet, despite 
increased protection of the ruins, huaquerismo continued to be a problem.  According to 
officials, the guards were easily bribed with alcohol or money, and prone to look the 
other way.   
To stop huaquerismo once and for all, Fortún directed the resources of the DAEF 
to organize rural artisan cooperatives in the indigenous communities surrounding 
Tiwanaku .801  She came up with this idea during her recent sojourn in Mexico where, as 
historian Rick López shows, the government was promoting rural arts and crafts as 
authentic representations of a purely Mexican national culture after the Revolution.802 
Fortún recognized the utility of such an effort in Bolivia—not only would it contribute to 
the valorization of popular arts, but it could also be useful in terms of cultural patrimony.  
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The creation of rural artisan cooperatives in Tiwanaku, she argued, would protect 
patrimony by dissuading the practice of huaquerismo by offering peasants an alternative 
source of income. Instead of illegally digging up artifacts to sell on the black market, 
rural artisans would create replicas of pre-Hispanic artifacts to sell to tourists and 
collectors.803  The effort would stop huaquerismo and protect important artifacts by 
offering peasants an alternative source of income.  Rural artisan cooperatives would also 
contribute to the Revolution’s broader goal of economic diversification by promoting 
rural industry.804   
The second objective of the official envoy was to enlist the cooperation of local 
authorities to dissuade indigenous communities from using archeological lands for 
planting and grazing.  The primary concern continued to be the lands surrounding 
Pumapunku. Despite government protest, Achaca peasants had continued using the lands 
surrounding Pumapunku for planting and grazing.  Following the May 1957 meeting at 
Tiwanaku, Fortún reported to Diez de Medina that “el área de arqueológica había sido 
invadida en gran escala por los campesinos, encontrándose ya roturada la tierra en pleno 
anfiteatro del Puma Punku.”805 With expropriation out of the question because of 
SNRA’s need to resolve the conflict between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios on Achaca, 
Fortún suggested posting signs that clearly demarcated archeological land and creating 
“una aparienceia mas organizada” of the state archeological mission.806 Such efforts 
proved to have little effect, however.  
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As the excavations got underway, the Minister of Peasant Affairs sent a 
memorandum to all authorities in the canton of Tiwanaku—alcaldes, intendentes, 
corregidores, and secretarios agrarios—urging cooperation with state archeologists.807  
The Minister stressed the importance of the restoration project in terms of national 
cultural patrimony, and requested that locals leave state archeologists to their work.808 
Yet many refused to comply.  Fortún lamented that “Las autoridades se animaron a dar la 
orden y se enfermaron el momento de la ejecución.”809 Correspondence and field reports 
describe constant disputes between the CIAT team and local authorities. In addition to 
dynamite and gunshots, Fortún recalled that locals cursed the excavations pits with 
witchcraft.810 With these, and other actions, she concluded, locals sought to “run off” 
archeologists (“su afan de ‘correr’ a los investigadores”).811   
Fortún looked to the permanent presence of state archeologists to explain the 
hostility encountered by the archeological team.  Explaining the resistance, she stated 
that, “Indudablemente constituyen esos actos las reacciones de no pocos lugareños, no 
todos en verdad, derivadas de la incomodidad que les significa el establecimiento de un 
centro oficial dispuesto a velar por al cumplimiento de las disposiciones jurídicas 
                                                 
807 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1957-58 (02-146), Vincente Alvarez Plata to Alcalde, Intendente, 
Corregidor, y Secretarios Agrarios de Tiwanaku, Memorándum, 10/9/1957.  
808 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia 1957-58 (02-146), Vincente Alvarez Plata to Alcalde, Intendente, 
Corregidor, y Secretarios Agrarios de Tiwanaku, Memorándum, 10/9/1957.  
809 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce “Mi anecdotario de 
Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 7.  Of note, in this short memoire, Fortún reveal that it was her, and not her 
husband, Carlos Ponce that discovered the monolith that still bears his name today.    
810 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún, “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” 
November 1959, p. 8.  An intellectual who played crucial role in the foundation, institutionalization, and 
professionalization of the archeological discipline in Bolivia, Fortún saw in these “brujeríos” an 
opportunity to study indigenous folklore. She states, “…en este caso cabe agradecerles, por haberme 
brindado un interesante tema de estudio folklórico sobre mágica y superstición.”   
811 UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún, “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” 




concernientes al patrimonio arqueológico.”812 Speculating as to who was behind the 
hostilities, Fortún asserted that it was certainly not campesinos.  “Hay que puntualizar 
hidalgamente,” she wrote, “que los obstáculos anotados no proceden de los campesinos, 
quiénes no exteriorizan ningún tabú o animadversión hacia las excavaciones 
metódicas.”813  Quite to the contrary, she contended that local indigenous communities 
both supported and benefitted from the Tiwanaku restoration project.  Citing the creation 
of rural artisan cooperatives, she argued that “les proporcionan trabajo y con el 
incremento del turismo han aumentado sus ingresos en la venta de los ‘monolitos’ o 
estatuillas que imitan las estelas precolombinas, las cuales han originado el 
establecimiento de una próspera artesanía rural.”814  They also understood the project in 
terms of its potential for social uplift.   “Los grupos nativos de la región han empezado a 
revalorizar lo antiguo, los restos dejados por sus remotos antepasados tiwanakotas.”815  
While exonerating indigenous communities with a narrative that espoused notions of the 
noble savage, she asserted that it was the local vecinos who were the aggressors.816 
For Ponce, however, the stubborn occupation of archeological lands by local 
indigenous communities lay at the very heart of the continuing hostilities.  Towards the 
end of the decade, he grew increasingly frustrated by the fact that the ex-colonos and ex-
comunarios of Achaca continued to undermine efforts to protect cultural patrimony.  The 
breaking point occurred in December 1958, when Ponce arrived at Tiwanaku to find the 
vecino, Pedro Pizarroso, grazing his herd of cattle on the ruins. Following this incident, 
Ponce resolved to obtain title to all the contested lands and to strengthen the 
                                                 
812 Ibid., p. 7. 
813 Ibid. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Ibid., p. 7. 




government’s ability to enforce cultural patrimony law.  The lands bordering Pumapunku 
were his primary concern, and he was certain that the territory belonged to the state.  Yet, 
community leaders disagreed. Frustrated, he subsequently cabled the Minister of Peasant 
Affairs, Walter Flores complaining that “Los campesinos de la comunidad da Achaca 
expresan que los terrenos que se encuentran sobre el grupo arqueológico de Pumapunku 
les pertenece.”  He proclaimed that the occupation of the lands surrounding Pumapunku 
represented “un atentado contra la cultura del pais, deteriorando el mejor grupo de ruinas 
de Tiwanaku.”817  
In March of 1959, Ponce frantically set out to procure the title to the contested 
lands, cabling the Ministry of Education, the Contraloría General de Republica, and the 
Ministry of Government.  Given the passage of the 1933 supreme decree that called for 
the expropriation of nine hectares of land surrounding Pumapunku, Ponce was correct in 
assuming that the contested land was state property.  Yet under the weak patrimony 
regime of the pre-revolutionary state, the hacendado Juan Perou had retained ownership 
of the land. Following the agrarian reform, the lands fell into the hand of Achaca ex-
colonos.   On 8 March 1959, he wrote the Minister of Education, lamenting that CIAT 
"no puede exhibir por tal circunstancia ningún documento que acredite que Pumapunku 
es propiedad del Estado, ni indicar cuales son los linderos con los terrenos vecinos.” 818 
In order to “de defender esta parte de las ruinas” he wrote, “es necesario saber si el 
Estado posee algún título.” If the state could not produce a title, he asserted, “habria que 
dictar de inmediato la expropiación de la extensión que abarque Pumapunku, más o 
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menos 300 x 150 metros de superficie”819 In the meantime, he cabled the Minister of 
Government, requesting that the local police commander order the Secretario General de 
la Comidad de Achca not to plant in Pumapunku.   
Confronted with this renewed attempt to expropriate their lands, the Sindicato 
Agrario de Achaca turned to the Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina 
(General Directorate of Rural Legislation and Justice, DJC) for assistance.  The 
government created the DJC as a branch of the Ministry of Peasant Affairs in 1952 “to 
attend to the legal defense of campesinos.” 820  The peasants of Achaca sought to use the 
DJC to affirm their rights lands.  Ponce wrote the Director of DJC, protesting their 
willingness to hear the case. Not only did he remind the director that it was CIAT’s 
responsibility to protect the ruins as part of national cultural patrimony, and as such to 
keep the Achaca peasants from planting on the lands surrounding Pumapunku.  But also, 
he highlighted what he saw as the abusive nature of the Achaca peasants.  “Debese 
señalar,” he wrote, “que dichos campesinos han amenezado a los guarderuinas del 
Centro, funcionarios publicos que cumplen se deber, inclusive amenazado de muerte.”821 
Ponce Sangines protested that “El CIAT no puede permanecer en silencio ante tan 
vandálicos actos, que amenazan la cultural del país.” 822 
Ponce’s effort to expropriate the lands surrounding Pumapunku ultimately failed.  
As ex-colonos and ex-comunarios continued to fight over their sayañas, the government 
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prioritized agrarian reform over conservation of cultural patrimony.  In 1960, SNRA once 
again redistributed ayllu lands to accommodate the demands of Domingo Pati and other 
ex-colonos who the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca had expelled in the wake of the agrarian 
reform.823  To the dismay of Ponce and other state archeology officials, the Achaca ex-
colonos retained legal possession of the lands. The occupation of the Achaca and the 
permanent presence of state archeologists remained a continual source of tension in the 
region.  In 1961, U.S. anthropologist William Carter briefly stayed at the CIAT 
headquarters, on his way to the Aymara community Irpa Chico where, under the auspices 
of the DAEF, he carried out the first ethnographic study of a post-agrarian reform 
Aymara community.  Taking note of the high walls surrounding the state archeological 
headquarters and the armed guards who protected it, he noted that instead of an official 
scientific station, CIAT resembled more a military outpost.824 He recalled that, “The 
guard who was posted at the gate to the center’s compound had orders to shoot anyone 
who entered or left after 8:00 p.m.”825   
 
TIWANAKU’S LEGACY ON PATRIMONY FORMATION AND CULTURAL POLITICS  
Despite the government’s failure to expropriate the archeological lands 
surrounding Pumapunku, the conflict in the Tiwanaku valley left a lasting legacy on 
postrevolutionary cultural patrimony formation.  Under pressure from Ponce, Fortún, and 
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other state cultural officials, the Ministry of Education initiated a project to establish a 
new, more-expansive cultural patrimony law in 1961. Drafted under the direction of the 
Minister of Education, José Fellman Velarde, and the Oficial Mayor de Cultura, Carlos 
Serrate Reich, the new law attended to the need to expand both the management and the 
protection of the canon of objects, texts, structures, and places deemed intrinsic to 
postrevolutionary national culture.  Signed into law on November 6, 1961 by President 
Paz Estenssoro, Decreto Supremo 05918 represented the most extensive cultural 
patrimony law in Bolivian history. Superseding the Ley de Monumento Nacional of 
1927, which had long served as the primary legal instrument for the protection of 
patrimony, the 1961 law amplified the content of patrimony, created specific institutions 
to enforce it, and introduced legal sanctions for violations of the law.826  
The law also attended to the postrevolutionary government’s long-standing bid to 
centralize cultural patrimony management.  It stipulated that the Dirección National de 
Cultura, the recently-created cultural arm of the MEBA, had to both create and maintain a 
detailed inventory of all objects of cultural patrimony in public museums and private 
collections in the entire nation.  In order to ensure enforcement of the decree, Minister 
Fellman Velarde subsequently issued a resolution declaring that all public and private 
institutions “que posean obras de arte de las épocas Precolombina, Colonial y 
Republicana que tengan valor artístico, histórico y arqueológico en el pais” must register 
their possessions with the Direction of Culturas within thirty days or face legal penalty.827  
By creating a central catalog of patrimony, the law enabled the state to enforce the 
protection of patrimony more effectively.   
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Yet the most radical changes introduced by the 1961 law concerned archeological 
patrimony.  As director of CIAT, Ponce wielded considerable power within the state 
cultural bureaucracy, and as Ministry of Education officials drafted the new patrimony 
law, he exercised his authority to influence its content.  Supreme Decree 05918 
significantly expanded the definition of archeological patrimony to include a host of 
structures and artifacts that had escaped protection under previous laws.  In addition to 
monumental architecture and material-cultural artifacts, the law defined yacimientos 
arqueológicos, trash pits, cemeteries, huacas, textiles, as well as precious metals and 
stones as cultural patrimony.  The expanded definition of patrimony demonstrates the 
extent to which conflict over the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku influenced 
the new law and underscores the state’s recognition of the need to include land in the 
expanded definition of patrimony.  By including the specific language “yacimientos 
arqueológicos” in the expanded definition of national cultural patrimony, the law 
empowered the state to protect land with archeological remnants. In order to ensure that 
property rights would not undermine the protection of such lands in the future by locals, 
the law granted the state the right to expropriate patrimony under the condition of 
indemnification.828  
The protection of Tiwanaku played a central role not only in the development of 
stronger cultural patrimony laws, but also in the creation of rural artisan cooperatives.  In 
1957, Julia Elena Fortún organized the first cooperatives in Tiwanaku as a strategy to 
prevent huerquerismo by offering rural communities an alternative source of revenue in 
the form of “pre-Hispanic” artifacts destined for the burgeoning tourist market. Although 
                                                 




huerquerismo continued to be a problem, the project proved a success in other regards—
it fomented rural industry while providing communities with a source of income.   
From its origins in Tiwanaku, the program became the centerpiece of a broader 
state initiative intended to valorize the popular arts as an authentic expression of national 
identity.  Fortún and other intellectuals affiliated with the postrevolutionary state insisted 
that the racism and prejudice of pre-revolutionary society had distorted national 
patrimony by valorizing “lo occidental” while denigrating “authentic” aspects of national 
culture such as popular arts and indigenous folklore.  By directing state resource to 
promote rural artisanry the government could, in the words of the Oficial Mayor de 
Cultura, Carlos Serrate Reich, “revalorizar lo auténticamente nuestro.”829   To realize this 
effort, President Hernán Siles introduced the Ley General de Cooperativas on September 
25, 1958.  The law created the Dirección Nacional de Cooperativas (National Directorate 
of Cooperatives, DNC) to administer the project, established regulations for the 
cooperatives, and introduced mechanisms to provide them with critical access to credit.830  
Under the guidance of Fortún and the DAEF, the DNC organized rural artisan 
cooperatives “en los lugares caracterizados por una reconocida tradición” such as 
Copacabana, Jesus de Machaca, and Tarabuco.831  In addition to valorizing popular art, 
Fortún affirmed that that the cooperatives would provide rural communities with an 
“oportunidad de ocupar su tiempo en forma creadora,” while “elevando su nivel 
cultural”—not to mention establish their economic livelihood.832 
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As the number of cooperatives increased, Fortún began to lay plans for a Museo 
Nacional de Artes Populares in order to generate public interest in this authentic, though 
long disregarded, representation of national culture. She envisioned the Museum as a 
space that would serve to valorize popular arts by exhibiting examples from across the 
nation. Moreover, by offering artisan goods for sale, it would also help commercialize 
popular arts.  Further underscoring both the transnational nature of the Bolivian 
Revolution and the enduring influence of the Mexican Revolution on Bolivian 
intellectuals, Fortún modeled her plans on the Museo Nacional de Artes e Industrias 
Populares (MNAIP) in Mexico City.833  Resulting from the initiative of the famed 
anthropologist and Director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Alfonso Caso, the 
Mexican government founded the MNAIP in 1951 as a museum for popular arts that also 
served as a research center and a market rural artisanry.834  Fortún recognized in the 
MNAIP an “eficaz modelo para la solución del aún inabordado problema de nuestras 
artes populares.”835  She was especially influenced by the Director of the MNAIP, Daniel 
F. Rubín de la Borbolla, an anthropologist who had published widely on the subject of 
popular arts.836  Rubín de la Borbolla had made the MNAIP incredibly profitable by 
buying directly from rural artisans not only to place on exhibit, but also to sell to 
Museum visitors.837  Fortún’s effort came to fruition in 1962 with the creation of the 
Museo Nacional de Arte Popular, which subsequently became the Museo de Etnografía 
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and Folklore.838  Serving as a space that both exhibited and sold rural artisanry, the 
Museum attended to the objective of valorizing and commercializing popular arts.     
As part of its effort to integrate popular arts as an intrinsic component of 
postrevolutionary national culture, the government expanded cultural patrimony laws 
during the 1960s to include a multitude of expressions of everyday rural life that the 
dominant paradigms of western social science defined as indigenous folklore.  Julia Elena 
Fortún and the state anthropological mission stood at the forefront of this effort. In 1961, 
the government signaled its growing interest in the valorization of indigenous culture by 
transforming the Departamento de Arqueologia, Etnografica y Folklore, a small state 
institution overseeing disparate efforts in Archeology and Anthropology, into the 
Dirección Nacional de Antropología (DNA), an office dedicated exclusively to the study 
of Bolivia’s indigenous population.  During the 1960s, the DNA sent teams of 
anthropologists into the countryside to study the customs, rituals, and celebrations of 
indigenous communities. As a result of these studies, Fortún and the DNA expanded the 
content of patrimony beyond the popular arts to include indigenous folklore.  Yet, as the 
following chapter will demonstrate, this project left an enduring legacy on constructions 
of race and ethnicity in postrevolutionary Bolivia.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As the MNR elevated Tiwanaku as a unifying national symbol, the need to protect 
the archeological site and the artifacts that originated from it played a central role in 
postrevolutionary patrimony formation.  Given that nationalism was the principal 
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ideology motivating the MNR, it should come as no surprise that the party would 
implement a more rigorous cultural patrimony regime after coming to power in April 
1952.  By establishing the DMMN in 1952, the MNR promptly demonstrated its 
commitment to enforcing existing cultural patrimony legislation, and its intent to 
centralize patrimony management within a single government office.  Stig Rydén’s 
efforts to remove Tiwanaku artifacts to Switzerland for further study in 1954 provided 
the catalyst that transformed policy into practice. Miguel Alandia Pantoja’s decision to 
deny Rydén permission to remove the artifacts proved to be a defining moment in 
postrevolutionary patrimony formation. It represented the first instance in which the 
postrevolutionary government demonstrated its commitment to the enforcement of 
existing cultural patrimony laws. Moreover, by establishing the DMMN as the only state 
institution legally capable of making such decision, Alandia’s decision centralized 
patrimony management.   
Yet it was ultimately local conflicts over archeological lands that had the most 
decisive impact on postrevolutionary patrimony formation. While the controversy 
surrounding artifacts defined the role of state institutions in the management and 
protection of cultural patrimony, efforts to protect the archeological lands surrounding the 
Tiwanaku ruins influenced both the promulgation and content of the strongest cultural 
patrimony law in Bolivian history. State archeologists confronted a novel challenge to 
patrimony as Achaca ex-colonos and ex-comunarios occupied the lands surrounding the 
Pumapunku ruins in the wake of the 1953 agrarian reform. The MEBA’s continued 
efforts to expropriate the land were undermined by not only by the Achaca peasants 
themselves, but also by SNRA, which had to use the fertile lands neighboring the ruins to 




Ponce sought alternative ways to protect archeological territory.  Although the 
promulgation of the 1961 cultural patrimony law did not directly result from the local 
conflicts in Tiwanaku, the content of the resolution reflected Ponce desire to expand the 
definition of cultural patrimony to protect archeological lands.  In addition to defining 
archeological lands as patrimony, the 1961 law also granted the state the right to 
expropriate private property.    
Beyond influencing cultural patrimony formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia, 
the conflict over the archaeological lands surrounding Tiwanaku raises broader, more 
important questions regarding the concept of cultural patrimony—namely, patrimony for 
whom?  Why did the ex-colonos and ex-comunarios of Achaca refuse to recognize the 
importance of the land in terms of national cultural patrimony?  Lacking ethnographic 
studies of the community, it is difficult to arrive at a precise answer to this question. But 
the available documentation and the contours of the particular historical moment provide 
some insight. While MEBA officials prized the land for its potential archeological 
significance, the ex-colonos and ex-comunarios of Achaca valued the land for its 
socioeconomic function as well as its cultural, historical, and religious significance. They 
sought to use the territory to plant crops and graze animals.  As ex-colonos and ex-
comunarios recovered legal titles to their ancestral lands, the territory also acquired a 
different form of historical resonance.  It represented the end of the hacienda regime, 
triumph in a seventy-year struggle for land and justice, and a hitherto unimaginable 
future.   
But at the core of the issue, aside from land and its varied significance, lies the 
question of national belonging.  The concept of national cultural patrimony only has 




sense of citizenship, without a sense of belonging to the “imagined community,” that is 
the modern nation-state, patrimony becomes an abstract concept, a phrase void of 
signification—an elite construct and nationalist instrument.  Patrimony is thus intimately 
linked to citizenship. And in order to understand what patrimony meant to the community 
of Achaca, one must first ask, what did the nation mean to the community?  In spite of 
the postrevolutionary government’s efforts to integrate indigenous peoples and to 
valorize popular arts and indigenous folklore, the following chapters demonstrate that in 






“Por la cultura nacional”: Postrevolutionary Anthropology and the 
Paradox of Modernization 
 
Though the idea of the corrupting influence of civilization was not a new one—it is, in 
fact, a continuing theme in Western culture—the idea that such alterations were the 
necessary price of an indefinite progress was a particular product of nineteenth-century 
optimism.  In the face of the inevitable and necessary changes, in the face of an almost 
infinite variety of man whose details were essential to a definition of man, the obligation 
of both scientist and humanist was clear: he must collect and preserve the information 
and the products of human activity and genius so rapidly being destroyed.   
-Jacob W. Gruber, “Ethnographic Salvage and the Shaping of Anthropology” 
 
Approaching the tenth anniversary of the National Revolution, officials could 
reflect on the cultural achievements of past decade with a true sense of accomplishment.  
They had forged a unifying culture for the newly-integrated republic—one that reflected 
the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people while celebrating the mixed Andean and 
Hispanic heritage of the nation. They had revised national history, reconstructed 
Tiwanaku, refurbished the National Museum, and expanded cultural patrimony laws to 
protect archeological ruins and indigenous popular arts.  Reflecting on the decade, Oficial 
Mayor de Cultura Nacional, Reynaldo Urquiso Sossa, wrote “se ha considerado la 
urgencia de la definición de la cultura nacional en interpretación de nuestro pasado 
aymara, de dominación quechua, española y de la República hasta el 9 de abril de 1952, 
fecha esta que marca el camino de la rendición del pueblo boliviano y la liberación de sus 
clases explotadas.”839  He celebrated the effort as “una política de incorporación definitiva 
del indígena a la vida la nación que sin perder su esencialidad, se acomode a las ventajas 
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del desarrollo de la civilización occidental y la técnica moderna.”840 In just ten years, they 
had established a unifying national culture that celebrated Bolivia’s indigenous heritage 
while underscoring the modernizing aspirations of the postrevolutionary government.  
Social scientists affiliated with the centralized cultural bureau of the Ministry of 
Education, the Oficialía Mayor de Cultura Nacional, were more reserved, however.  They 
were growing increasingly concerned that the rural modernization initiatives of the 
postrevolutionary government were sweeping away the “authentic” expressions of 
Aymara and Quechua culture that they had worked so tirelessly to cultivate.  Writing in 
1961, for instance, Julia Elena Fortún—anthropologist, ranking state cultural official, and 
director of the recently-created Dirección Nacional de Antropología (DNA)—lamented 
that “es innegable la necesidad de una recolección sistematizada de nuestros temas 
folklóricos, ya que a partir de pocos años a esta parte se está notando el abandono de 
interesantísimas especias en el agro boliviano, debido precisamente a que las nuevas 
reformas político-sociales están creando en el campesino una nueva mentalidad que les 
hace abandonar sus añejas costumbres y tradiciones.”841 If preventative measures were 
not soon instituted, she—and others—warned that the essence of Bolivia’s indigenous 
heritage would soon be lost forever. 
National development posed an enduring paradox to the postrevolutionary 
leadership.  On the one hand, rural modernization was absolutely essential to national 
development. The success of the postrevolutionary development initiative was predicated 
upon transforming indigenous Bolivians into a modernized agrarian peasantry—the 
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campesinado—who, as independent producers and consumers, would drive economic 
diversification and expand the national economy. With universal suffrage, agrarian 
reform, indigenous education, rural market initiatives, and the national union structure, 
officials set out to integrate indigenous Bolivians into postrevolutionary society as 
modernized, market-orientated campesinos.  On the other hand, rural modernization 
threatened to undermine postrevolutionary national culture formation.  Transforming 
Indians into campesinos would extinguish the authentic expressions of indigenous dance, 
music, art, and tradition recently deemed vital to the national patrimony. As government 
officials redoubled the national development effort in the early 1960s, they harnessed 
anthropological knowledge to bridge the contradictory impulses of postrevolutionary 
modernity.  
This chapter examines the institutionalization of anthropology following 1952 as 
a window onto the new forms of ethnic exclusion created by the National Revolution. 
Widely recognized as a universal and holistic “science,” the discipline of anthropology 
was borne of the Enlightenment and consolidated in the crucible of European imperial 
expansion.842 It then evolved within distinct national settings over the course of the 
twentieth century. Claudio Lomnitz describes these “national anthropologies” as 
“traditions that have been fostered by educational and cultural institutions for the 
development of studies of their own nation."843  Bolivia’s national anthropological 
tradition developed upon two distinct branches of the discipline—each of which evolved 
alongside the consolidation of the modern nation-state.  The first was applied 
anthropology. The following pages trace the historical trajectory of applied anthropology 
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over the course of the twentieth century, and how it was consolidated as one of the pillars 
of Bolivia’s fledging national anthropological tradition. The second was folklore. This 
chapter explores the institutionalization of folklore in Bolivia, focusing on shifting 
definitions of the discipline and what (or who) constituted its legitimate object of study.  
As defined and bordered areas of intellectual inquiry, both applied anthropology 
and folklore carried embedded assumptions of human difference and, as they were 
institutionalized within the postrevolutionary state, they left their mark on constructions 
of race and ethnicity. Each branch of anthropology was orientated towards cultivating a 
distinct vision of indigenous Bolivians.  The objective of applied anthropology was to 
transform traditional, subsistence-based Indians into the idealized campesino imagined by 
the postrevolutionary leadership.  In this way, applied anthropology operated alongside 
rural education as one of the primary means through which the postrevolutionary 
government pursued the assimilation of indigenous Bolivians into modern, western 
society. Folklore created the necessary opposite, upon which the modern campesino was 
defined: the Indian. Where applied anthropology was orientated toward (re)creating 
modern individuals, folklore set out to create an image of the idealized, traditional Indian 
that was in accordance with the national cultural model promoted by the 
postrevolutionary state.  
Given the discipline’s privileged location at the intersection of racial formation, 
the construction of knowledge, and nation building in postrevolutionary Bolivia, a study 
of anthropology is crucial to understanding constructions of race and ethnicity.  As a 
disciple that produces knowledge about the indigenous “Other” under the authority of 
science, anthropology played a key role in the re-articulation of racial identities during 




dynamics of internal colonization in Bolivia: a nation overwhelming populated by 
indigenous peoples, but dominated by a governing creole minority.844  Examined against 
the the paradox of modernity, and placed in the context of the internal colonialism of the 
postrevolutionary state, anthropology thus serves as a fine example of what 
anthropologist Renato Rosaldo has termed “imperialist nostalgia.”845 Finally, the study of 
postrevolutionary anthropology reveals that the Revolution consolidated a new form of 
racism—one that was not founded on biology or environment, but on culture. Moreover, 
the practices, objectives, and epistemologies embraced by postrevolutionary 
anthropologists provide a window not only onto changing constructions of indigenous 
alterity, but prevailing understandings of indigenous Bolivians and their place in the 
republic 
 
APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Applied anthropology was a vital component of the postrevolutionary 
modernization enterprise.  It proved critical for development planning, providing state 
ministries overstuffed with eager technocrats with both the qualitative and quantitative 
data necessary to confront cultural adaption, applied social change, and other urgent 
problems of rural modernization.  Bolivia’s national anthropological tradition, steeped in 
the French and German polygenist traditions of physical anthropology, had produced 
little of the ethnographic knowledge on rural Andean society essential to the modern 
applied anthropologist.846  Still into the 1950s, foreign applied anthropologists and rural 
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sociologists working in Bolivia continued to rely upon Bautista Saavedra’s 1903 study of 
the ayllu, José Maria Camacho’s population estimates from the 1920s, or Louis Baudin’s 
utopian socialist of the 1930s.847  Thus as the postrevolutionary government set out to 
channel applied anthropological knowledge towards the practical problems of national 
development, it relied on foreign professionals to train national personal.  This first 
section traces the genealogy of applied anthropology as it developed in the first half of 
the nineteenth century in order to illustrate the underlying assumptions embedded within 
the technological knowledge provided to Bolivian anthropologists.   
Before arriving in postrevolutionary Bolivia, applied anthropology evolved in 
distinct historical-cultural circumstances in North America and Western Europe.  In the 
United States, applied anthropology is rooted in the diffusionist school established by 
Franz Boas and his students—A.L. Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, Robert Lowie, Manuel 
Gamio, Edward Sapir—in the early twentieth century.  Boas rejected the teleology 
implicit in prevailing theories of social evolution espoused by the likes of Henry Lewis 
Gates and E.B. Tylor.  Distinct human civilizations did not all evolve according to the 
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same fixed pattern, from primitive to civilization; rather, Boas and his students drew on a 
German ethnographic tradition established by Rudolf Virchow and Adolf Bastian to 
demonstrate that different “culture areas” had evolved according to distinct local-
historical circumstances.848  While those working in social evolutionary paradigms 
generally carried out their work from afar—in scientific societies, colonial offices, and 
university laboratories stocked with human skulls—the diffusionists privileged 
ethnographic study of “primitive” societies to examine processes of cultural change.  
In the crucible of early twentieth century European imperial expansion, applied 
anthropology—or “practical anthropology,” as many of its early practitioners called it—
portended to facilitate more effective extraction of resources and imperial administration 
of colonial subjects.849  In Great Britain, the tradition developed during the 1920s, as a 
younger generation of anthropologists began to recognize the practical applications of 
anthropology from their experience working overseas in the colonial administrative 
offices. Bronslow Malinowski and Alfred Radcliff-Brown began to apply Emilie 
Durkheim’s research on social institutions and “primitive” societies to questions of 
socioeconomic change of non-Western populations.850  They established the functionalist 
school.  Where Boas and his students were interested in culture, the functionalists were 
interested in society, and how it functioned in relation to other aspects of life. 
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Malinowski—who is widely recognized as the founder of the field—urged his colleagues 
to reach beyond the prevailing theoretical orientation of social evolutionary paradigms. 
Doing so, he explained “would throw an extremely important light upon the theoretical 
problem of the contact of cultures, transmission of ideas and customs, in short, on the 
whole problem of diffusion.”851  During a distinct historical epoch marked by colonial 
expansion and the consolidation of European powers, applied anthropology would 
address “the problem of the westernization of the world.”852    
Of course, neither of these developments were isolated events, but they occurred 
in an increasingly globalized network of scholars interested in applying social scientific 
knowledge to the betterment of modern society.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the social, 
economic, and political transformations initiated by the Mexican Revolution provided 
western social scientists a laboratory to test the efficacy of social scientific knowledge in 
bettering the human condition. Mexico’s indigenous population, moreover, served as a 
unique workshop for emerging theories of directed cultural change and social 
adaptation.853  Affiliated with U.S. universities (primarily Berkeley and Chicago) and 
philanthropic organizations (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller), a generation of Mexican, U.S. 
and European social scientists defined their career carrying out fieldwork in rural 
Mexico.854  As anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists carried out applied social 
research in Mexico during the 1920s, 30s and 40s, prevailing schools of diffusionism and 
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functionalism merged to produce new theories of cultural change.  It was in this 
particular time and place that Robert Redfield produced the theory of diffusionism, that 
Ralph Beals developed an ethnographic model to study the stages of acculturation, and 
that Nathan Whetten applied rural sociology to the Mexican countryside.855     
Applied theories tested in Mexico soon made their way back to the United States 
where, during the Great Depression, they found support under the state-sponsored social 
programs of the New Deal.  It was during this time when Bureau of Indian Affairs 
director, John Collier—who was influenced both by Manuel Gamio’s research in Mexico 
and by Malinowski’s in Africa—began to apply anthropological knowledge to address 
social problems on U.S. Indian reservations.856 Perhaps a more salient development in 
relation to Bolivia was the “rural extension services” promoted by U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) New Deal initiatives like the Resettlement Administration and the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics.857  With the depression hitting rural families 
especially hard, the government turned to rural sociologists to study the problems facing 
American farmers at the height of the dustbowl.  Charles J. Galpin and Charles Loomis, 
pioneering figures in the field of rural sociology, led a generation of researchers that 
included Nathan Whetten, T. Lynn Smith, and Olen Leonard to apply sociological 
research to geographic isolation, economic integration, social mobility, and other 
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problems of rural society.858 The effort resulted in the professionalization of the sub-
discipline and increased its overlap with applied anthropology.  Charles Loomis was, in 
fact, on the board of both the Society for Applied Anthropology and the Society for Rural 
Sociology, and was a regular contributor to both their journals. 
In Latin America, where social scientists immediately recognized the utility of 
applied anthropology for the resolution of the age-old “Indian problem,” the Instituto 
Indigenista Interamericano (III) provided the hemispheric headquarters for social 
scientists seeking to apply anthropological knowledge to fantasies of directed social 
change. Founded in 1940 upon the initiative of Manuel Gamio and Moisés Sáenz, the III 
called on Americans government to study national indigenous populations in order to 
better facilitate their incorporation into modern society. The first international congress, 
held in Pátzcuaro, Mexico in 1940, convened an wide array of scholars researching 
American indigenous populations.  Notable participants included Manuel Gamio and 
Juan Comas from Mexico, John Collier from the U.S., Paul Rivet from France, Alfred 
Métraux from Switzerland, and Enrique Finot, Eduardo Arze Loureiro, and Elizardo 
Pérez from Bolivia.859 Within the III, emerging applied disciplines were debated, 
consolidated, and deployed throughout the Americas as modernizing states set out to 
integrate national indigenous populations.   
The final resolutions of the congress underscore the emphasis that the 
organization and its members placed on applied anthropology to mitigate indigenous 
                                                 
858 Alvin L. Bertrand, “Rural Sociological Research in the South: An Historical Perspective,” Paper 
presented at the Southern Rural Sociological Association Meeting (Nashville, Tennessee, February 1-4, 
1987).  
859 Archivo Histórico del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, México D.F. (AHIII), Primer Congreso 
Indigenista Interamericano (PCII), Primer volumen: Generales, Documento 2, “Lista de los miembros del 




poverty, political exclusion, and underdevelopment, while shepherding them into the 
socioeconomic structures of modern republics.  Article ten recommended that “las 
naciones americanas que al plantear y administrar sus respectivos programas para el 
bienestar del Indio, exploren y utilicen lo que sobre la material pueda enseñarles la 
Antropología Aplicada.”860 Article eleven obliged governments to incorporate 
ethnographic methods “en estudios que analicen el proceso histórico de la formación 
cultural de los núcleos indígenas afectadas y que muestren, mediante este análisis 
histórico, las fuerzas vivas que en el seno de ellas puedan ayudar a la conclusión de sus 
problemas.”861 Finally, article twelve recommended that member countries take full 
advantage of their higher educational institutions to train anthropologists, and to establish 
a fund for those which did not, in order to send local specialists abroad for training.”862  
Throughout the decade, Comas, Gamio, Collier, and several others would promote the 
use of applied anthropology through III publications, América Indígena and Boletín 
Indigenista, as well as English-language journal such as Applied Anthropologist and 
Rural Sociology.863   
The USDA also proved an early supporter of applied anthropological research in 
Latin America.  After working for the Resettlement Administration during the 1930s, 
Loomis was appointed as chief of the Division of Extension and Training of the Office of 
Foreign Agricultural Relations of the USDA, where he oversaw the extension services 
program for Latin America.  Loomis looked to his former New Deal colleagues to staff 
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the project, sending Nathan Whetten to Mexico, T. Lynn Smith to Brazil, Carl C. Taylor 
to Argentina, and Olen Leonard to Bolivia.864  Their work combined the functionalist 
assumptions of the British school and the diffusionist principles embraced by the 
Boasnians to confront poverty and underdevelopment in the region.  They took a holistic 
approach to improving rural life, focusing not just on agrarian production, but on the 
social institutions, cultural values, and psychological wellbeing of their subject 
populations.  As such, they employed ethnography alongside more traditional statistical 
methods.  In terms of models, they looked to postrevolutionary Mexico, employing 
strategies developed by the Ministry of Education such as rural cultural brigades.865 They 
also drew from conclusions derived by Loomis, Leonard, and others who had worked on 
a USDA “village rehabilitation” experiment in El Pueblo, New Mexico from 1933-1941.  
Not only was the effort intended to test the hypothesis of applied social change to a 
predominantly indigenous rural society, but it was explicitly intended to provide a model 
of social change that would be applicable “in our sister American republics.”866  
Applied anthropology arrived in Bolivia in the 1940s as part of the burgeoning 
foreign assistance programs sponsored by the United States.  Under the banner of the 
Good Neighbor policy, the Roosevelt administration rejected dollar diplomacy and began 
channeling economic and technical assistance to Bolivia during the 1940s through the 
Office of Inter-American Affairs. Multilateral institutions such as the OAS and the ILO 
also began to promote applied anthropological research through extension programs 
intended to train Bolivian specialists in rural development at institutions in the United 
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States and in field work in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Peru.  The Rockefeller Foundation 
launched a public health initiative in Bolivia not only to study tropical disease, but to 
train local medical professionals.867 Even evangelical church groups integrated applied 
practices into their missionary efforts.  Between 1937 and 1942, Canadian Evangelical 
Baptists at the Lake Titicaca hacienda of Huatajata set out to instill a strong protestant 
work ethic while emphasizing education, hygiene, and Christian morality.868 With the 
exception of the Huatajata mission, most of these programs were led by rural sociologists 
and applied anthropologists who had been monitoring closely applied research in Mexico 
and worked in New Deal programs in the United States during the previous decades.  
After the Revolution, state interest in applied anthropology expanded greatly, and 
the government set out to establish institutions to channel anthropological knowledge 
toward the objectives of national development in general and rural modernization in 
particular.  Indicating the importance that postrevolutionary officials assigned to 
anthropology and the inadequacy of their own “national tradition,” archeologist Maks 
Portugal—who, as head of MAC’s Departamento de Investigaciones Antropológicas, 
assumed a leading position in the burgeoning state cultural bureaucracy—commented 
that “Como el tema de Antropología es completamente extenso y abarca investigaciones 
de las ciencias afines, tendremos que considerar los aspectos de importancia inmediata 
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para Bolivia y circunscribir su actividad.”869  Not only did he call for increased 
government support for ethnographic and archeological research, but he also cited the 
practical application of ethnographic knowledge to urgent problems of indigenous social 
uplift and national integration.870  
Applied anthropology provided one of the primary means through which the 
postrevolutionary government would transform indigenous Bolivia from backwards, 
traditional Indians into modern campesinos, the motor of the national revolution.   Initial 
efforts to institutionalize the discipline took place within the Ministry of Peasant 
Affairs—after all, it was MAC that was managing indigenous acculturation and rural 
modernization initiatives of the postrevolutionary state.  As previous chapters have 
shown, with the creation of the MAC in April and May of 1952, government officials 
expanded the IIB in order to “levanter el nivel cultural y spiritual de las masas 
campesinos.” 871 The postrevolutionary IIB was constituted not only of the DIA—which 
during the first years following the revolution was closely affiliated with the MNT and 
orientated primarily toward folklore and archeological research—but also a the 
Departamento de Estudios Socioeconómicos (DES). The government appointed the rural 
sociologist, Rodolfo Cornejo Álvarez to head the new office.  Working alongside him 
was the Colombia trained statistician, Anestesio Avernganza.  The objective of the novel 
state anthropological office would “encara el problema agrario vinculado a la sociedad y 
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economía en base a estudios exhaustivos de la feudalidad económica.”872  It was upon 
“las recomendaciones fundamentales sobre el régimen jurídico de las tierras y el hombre 
que la exploras” that would provide the foundation for “acción viva”—in order words, 
toward forumating state policy toward rural modernization.873   
The postrevolutionary government quickly mobilized the new office, tasking it in 
May 1953 with carrying out a cost-of-living study of Aymara communities in the Lake 
Titicaca basin. The motivating factor of the study was the agrarian reform.  If, as a result 
of the agrarian reform law, peasants were at last going to be paid for their labor, the 
government first needed to study patterns of consumption and production on rural estates 
to determine a realistic minimum wage for agricultural workers.  The study would 
provide the government with “un base más científico que cualquier otra apreciación” as 
officials planned the ambitious rural modernization initiative.874 As for methodology, 
Conejo and Averganza combined data from the agrarian and population censuses of 1950 
with ethnographic data culled from rural markets, personal interviews with campesinos, 
hacendados, and rural merchants.  During October and November 1953, the team carried 
out its research in the La Paz departments of Omasuyos, Camacho, and Ingavi.   
In addition to socioeconomic conditions of rural Aymara populations, the 1953 
study was intended to acquire more detailed knowledge on the normative aspects of 
quotidian rural life.  It is here—in the recognition of the scientific utility of applying 
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ethnographic knowledge to problems of social change—that postrevolutionary Bolivia’s 
engagement with applied anthropology becomes most salient.  By obtaining detailed 
information on rural life, state officials were confident that the government, “lograra 
mejorar su standard [sic] de vida, obteniendo como resultado la radicación del elemento 
indígena en el campo y por consiguiente su tecnificación agropecuaria.”875  Thus, the 
team acquired not only the socio-economic data required for the cost of living study, but 
also studied how such consumption patterns were related to local forms of socioeconomic 
organization; the land tenure practices employed by individual campesino families; rural 
housing; as well as the clothing, food, and transportation habits of Aymara families.  
While rural anthropological research had generally been orientated toward documenting 
the civic and religious festivals and indigenous folklore—that is the symbolic and/or 
folkloric aspects of indigenous popular culture—, the SBS would provide date on the 
normative aspects of rural life to facilitate the effective development of the rural 
development policies of the postrevolutionary state. 
In 1953 and 1954, as the postrevolutionary development moved lowland 
colonization to the center of the national agenda, anthropological knowledge became a 
critical component of the ambitious social engineering project.  Lowland colonization 
was by far the most ambitious—and perhaps utopian—component of the 
postrevolutionary development strategy.  By aligning people and available resources, 
Guevara had identified the lowlands as Bolivia’s economic salvation. Yet before the 
project could be carried out on a national scale, it first required careful scientific study.  
Citing the high mortality rate from tropical disease among indigenous soldiers in the 
Chaco, postrevolutionary planners worried how the tropical climate and geography would 





affect the health of highland colonists. The government assigned the CFB the important 
task to establishing experimental colonies in lowland regions where trained 
professionals—not only anthropologists, but also physicians, agronomists, and social 
workers—would monitor the adaption of highland Indians to the tropical lowlands.   
With generous assistance from the U.S. Point Four program, the CFB launched 
project 59, working in coordination with MAC officials to establish experimental 
colonies at Aroma in the department of Santa Cruz and Reyes in the department of 
Beni.876  Through participant observation and ethnographic study, as well as personal 
interviews and medical examinations, the staff carefully selected the first wave of 
colonizers from highland indigenous communities and mining camps, transported them to 
the lowlands, and then monitored their psychological, social, and biological conditions as 
they adapted to the new environment.877 The efforts at Aroma and Reyes were led by 
Eduardo Arze Lourreiro and Oscar Arze Quintanilla, respectively—both were rural 
sociologists from Cochabamba.  Before heading the Aroma project, Arze Lourreiro had 
earned a M.A. in Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State College of Agriculture 
and Applied Science (now Michigan State) under Charles Loomis, worked on the 
Agrarian Reform Commission, and then served as President for the National Agrarian 
Reform Council. Arze Quintanilla, who studied rural sociology at UMSS and headed the 
Reyes effort in Beni during the 1950s, would eventually go on to serve as director of the 
III in Mexico City.   
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Their academic training nevertheless proved the exception, rather than the rule.  
Postrevolutionary officials found themselves lacking the necessary human resources to 
carry out the anthropological studies necessary for rural modernization.   Bolivian 
universities had not yet created anthropology departments.  The closest thing resembling 
applied anthropology was rural sociology—which was centered at the Universidad de 
San Simón in the agricultural hub of Cochabamba.  Manuel Liendo Lazarte, the director 
of the National Museam, lamented in1958, for example that “Existe en nuestro país la 
urgente necesidad de iniciar la carrera profesional universitaria de los estudios 
antropológicos, que por su significativo valor social y por el conocimiento que 
proporcionan sus diversas especialidades son necesarias para solucionar diversidad de 
situaciones culturales conflictivas.”878 Students interested in obtaining degrees in 
anthropology (in the holistic sense of four fields) had to study abroad. The 
postrevolutionary government was thus dependent on foreign missions to meet the rising 
demand for technical specialists.   
For the time being, UNESCO provided the postrevolutionary government with the 
anthropological knowledge necessary for national development. In 1950, the UN 
partnered with the OAS, the ILO, and the III to coordinate developmental assistance 
programs for Bolivia and other Andean republics.  The Andean Mission, as the ambitious 
assistance program was called, was intended to channel social scientific expertise and 
development capital to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.  By providing social scientific 
expertise and critical funding, the Mission promoted initiatives in agriculture, public 
health, and rural education in an effort to overcome the poverty and underdevelopment 
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the characterized the Andean republics.879  To be sure, the effort drew on over a half 
century of applied research into rural society carried out by a network of scholars 
working in Mexico and the United States.  
The project that had the most significant impact in Bolivia was the Cornell-Peru 
Project (CPP), an ambitious experiment in applied anthropology and directed social 
change carried out jointly by Cornell University and the Peruvian government during the 
1950s and early 1960s. In 1952, Cornell leased the Vicos hacienda, a functioning 
agricultural estate outside the highland city of Huaraz. With it came 2,250 indigenous 
peasants who remained contractually tied to the estate. Until 1966, when the project 
ended, Vicos served as a laboratory for U.S. and Peruvian anthropologists seeking to 
apply the latest trends in American social science to Peru’s so-called “Indian problem.”880  
Richard Patch, who worked on Andean Mission projects, carried out fieldwork at Vicos 
while a doctoral student at Cornell working under Richard Holmberg, the brainchild 
behind the effort.881 Most literature on applied anthropology and rural modernization 
tends to focus on this important project, while overlooking the fact that there were four 
such projects initiated at the same time in Bolivia.  Moreover, many of the personel 
working on the CPP effort, would go on to assist the Bolivian effort as well, as the 
postrevolutionary government set out to transform indians into campesinos.  
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The director for the Bolivia program was Olen E. Leonard, the rural sociologist 
who had worked for the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics during the great 
depression and on early colonization efforts in Cochabamba during the 1940s.  Leonard 
described the Andean Mission as a “technical assistance” program, “designed to further 
integrate into the national social and economic life, the indigenous populations of the 
Andean countries of Latin America.” 882  Launched in 1953, the Andean Mission 
coordinated with MAC toward three primary objectives: the progressive development of 
altiplano communities; overseeing the lowland colonization efforts; and training locals in 
“modern techniques” of applied anthropology with the intent of eventually preparing the 
Bolivian government to manage the effort.  Not only would such a program benefit the 
Bolivian government in its modernization efforts, but Métraux (who was then affiliated 
with the III), also noted that “the transformation in its [Bolivia’s] economic and social 
structure make it an exceptional field for experiments.”883 Indeed, the lesson gleaned 
from rural modernization would be applicable in other countries in the Americas seeking 
to incorporate national indigenous populations into the socioeconomic structures of 
modernizing republics.   
Perhaps drawing on recent developments in Mexican applied anthropology, the 
Andean Mission established three “Centros de Rehabilitación Campesina,” in semi-
remote indigenous villages in the departments of La Paz (Pillapi), Oruro (Playa Verde) 
and Potosi (Otavi).884  Working in coordination with the IIB and MAC’s rural education 
office (Departamento de Educación Fundamental), the project stressed key areas of 
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agricultural technology, rural industry, Spanish literacy, hygiene, sanitation, dress, home 
maintenance, and alimentation.  The effort was primarily directed toward the accelerated 
implementation of the postrevolutionary rural education initiative. Just as earlier 
twentieth century reformers had drawn on anthropometric studies to devise rural 
pedagogy in the 1910s, postrevolutionary officials similarly applied ethnographic 
knowledge to rural society in order to develop a rural education program better attuned to 
the material and psychosocial wellbeing of indigenous peasants. Gozalo Rubio Orbe, the 
UN specialist who advised the rural education initiative, underscored the critical 
assistance that applied anthropologists could render to indigenous education and other 
rural modernization initiatives. He remarked that they, “estudiaron la realidad en todos 
sus aspectos; buscaron los problemas mas importantes emplearon métodos eficientes 
alcanzaron la confianza de la comunidad dieron ejemplo de trabajo, puntualidad, 
honradez, desprendimientos y se trasformaron en verdaderos promotores sociales, a pesar 
de ser elementos extraños al lugar y al país.”885  
The Pillapi project, the largest component of the Andean Mission operating in 
Bolivia, underscores the methodologies deployed by the Bolivian official and their UN 
counterparts, and the particular assumption regarding Andean civilization embedded 
within them. Similar to the CCP project at Vicos, the Bolivian government acquired title 
to the Pillapi hacienda, colonos and all, and promptly handed it over the Andean 
Mission.886  Upon arriving in 1953, the Mission set out to realize its primary objective of 
“creer las condiciones indispensables para la integración de los indígena a la vida 
nacional, con el fin de acelerar su desenvolvimiento económico, técnico, social y 
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cultural.”  The emphasis on basic education, vocation training, hygiene and sanitation, 
illustrate the important role played by anthropologists in remaking indigenous Bolivian in 
the image of the modern campesino envisioned by the revolutionary state. The Pillapi 
estate ultimately served as an experimental station to test prevailing hypothesis of applied 
cultural change and to measure the processes of acculturation, diffusion, and 
socioeconomic integration through ethnographic research and participant observation.887   
Moreover, such acculturation efforts underscore the cultural biases embedded 
within the national and international rural assistance missions as anthropologists, 
sociologists and other “technical experts” promoted modern, scientific, secular practices 
in the Altiplano community.  In 1954, Anthropologist Richard Patch, having recently 
completed his first stint of field research at Vicos, Peru under Richard Holmberg, arrived 
in Bolivia to begin doctoral research on the agrarian reform process in Cochabamba. 888 
His observations on the Pillapi project underscore not only the staff’s efforts to instill in 
the community modern forms of medicine, agricultural practices, and hygiene, but the 
disparagement of local forms of knowledge valued by rural society.  Doctors affiliated 
with the mission attempted to discredit yatiris (local healers) while “giving them a 
modern alternative to traditional curing practices.”889 In an effort to modernize the 
inhabitants of Pillapi, the Mission staff also discouraged coca chewing and alcohol abuse, 
despite recognition of the role these practices played not only in the quotidian practices of 
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rural life, but their civic-religious significance.  In short, the applied anthropologist was 
on the frontline of postrevolutionary efforts to transform traditional subsistence-based 
rural communities into the progressive, hardworking campesino. 
In the decades since its development in European colonial administration, New 
Deal social programs, and postrevolutionary national integration efforts in Mexico, 
applied anthropology had arrived in the central Andes to remake indigenous Bolivians 
into modern peasants.  The practice eschewed the social evolutionary paradigm embraced 
by physical anthropologists.  Instead of anthropometric measurements and 
dolichocephalic indices, the applied anthropologist turned to ethnography as a legitimate 
source of scientific data on subject populations.  As the discipline developed, so too did 
explanatory models of social and cultural change such as diffusion and acculturation.  In 
the 1950s, professionally-trained, foreign applied anthropologists and rural sociologists 
arrived in increasing numbers through multilateral foreign assistance missions, providing 
“technical expertise” and much-needed professional training to a Bolivia’s first 
generation of professional anthropologists.   As they did, these concepts found their way 
into the lexicon of postrevolutionary development and rural modernization in Bolivia.  
 
POSTREVOLUTIONARY FOLKLORE AND THE PARADOX OF MODERNIZATION 
As the postrevolutionary government set out to unify the integrated republic 
around a new national identity that celebrated Bolivia’s Andean and Hispanic heritage, it 
moved indigenous popular culture to the center of national folklore.  To be sure, Bolivia’s 
lettered elite had long demonstrated curiosity toward rural dance, music, and other facets 
of rural Aymara and Quechua culture.  During the nineteenth century, for instance, the 




Adan,” while in Cochabamba, Juan Wallparrimachi composed poetry in Quechua.890  
Though long an object of scholarly interest and intellectual curiosity for the creole elite, 
indigenous music, dance, and other manifestations of rural popular culture nevertheless 
occupied an ambivalent position within the national canon of traditions called folklore.  
The postrevolutionary government would move indigenous dance and music to the center 
of national folklore after 1952.891  In the process, it not only professionalized the 
discipline, but consolidated new forms of ethnic exclusion within the postrevolutionary 
republic.   
Originating as a branch of anthropology, folklore is a field of academic inquiry 
that claims the popular traditions and cultural practices distinct to particular regional, 
class, or ethnic populations as its object of intellectual inquiry.892 The discipline traces its 
roots to nineteenth century Europe—to the romantic Völkergedanken of pioneering 
German ethnologist Adolf Bastian or to the English antiquarian, William J. Thoms, who 
first coined the term “folklore.”893 It was a time and place marked by the rise of the 
modern nation-state, and its consolidation as the normative unit of geopolitical 
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organization.  Leaders of emerging republics identified the music, dance, language, 
tradition, myths, knowledge—the “folk” elements—rooted in their populations as 
vernacular, or even primordial, representations of the nation and its people. Folklore 
provided republican leaders with the “invented traditions” necessary to collectively 
imagine the nation and consolidate the state.894  It appealed to statesmen and intellectuals 
across Latin America, for not only did folklore provide the foundation for unified 
national cultures, but it also served as a site for the articulation of local, regional, or 
ethnic identities.895 
Establishing a “folklore” is a power-laden process that requires the selection of 
distinct customs, myths, and knowledge existing within a population, and their placement 
within a canon of traditions that stand as representative of the soul of a nation or a 
people—what Bastian called, Gesellschaftsseele. “Folklorization,” as the social scientific 
literature has termed the process, occurred alongside the consolidation of the nation-state 
in Latin America. Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer’s description of the term as “the 
relocation of native customs (typically music and dance, but other arts forms as well) 
from their original contexts to new urban contexts” belies the spatial orientation of 
folklore in national imaginations—it is typically seen as a bastion of traditional culture 
embraced by rural peoples.896  In addition to such spatial distinctions, there is also a 
temporal component underlying folklorization.  Folklore reconstitutes its subject—which 
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is, by definition, “traditional”—as temporally apart from the modern cultures that it 
claims to represent.  In nation states where populations are fragmented by ethnicity, class, 
race, and/or regionalism, folklore supposedly includes the popular cultures of 
traditionally marginalized groups. The selective representation can nevertheless result in 
the exclusion of minority (or majority) populations and/or temporally situating them apart 
from the nation.897  Who defines what distinguishes “folk” from “popular” culture? And 
what happens when a minority population redefines the popular cultures of a majority 
population as folklore?  The following pages explore these questions within the context 
of mid-twentieth century Bolivia, as postrevolutionary intellectuals moved indigenous 
music and dance—traditionally disparaged manifestations of indigenous popular 
culture—to the center of the canon of nation folklore after 1952.  
In Bolivia, academic folklore is rooted in the writings of the prominent early-
twentieth-century intellectual, essayist, and politician, Manuel Rigoberto Paredes. His 
Mitos, supersticiones y supervivencias populares en Bolivia, published in 1920, is widely 
recognized as the foundational study of Bolivian folklore. The work examines the 
traditions, customs, myths, and quotidian practices of the Aymara world that surrounded 
his rural estate. In addition to Mitos, He also penned several ethnographic studies of the 
provinces of his home department of La Paz, providing a detailed portrait of a rural 
society being transformed by hacienda expansion and global market integration.898  
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Throughout his life, he sought to move indigenous popular culture to the center of 
national identity. Yet, his son, Antonio Paredes Candía—one of the most prominent 
folklorists to emerged in the mid-twentieth century—commented that his scholarship was 
generally received “con desprecia por el mundo intellectual del país.”899 Just as 
prevailing anti-Indian sentiments undermined efforts to move Tiwanaku to the center of 
national culture, he argues that racial prejudice precluded embrace indigenous folklore as 
an authentic representation of Bolivian nationhood.   
Folklore nevertheless grew in popularity after the Chaco War, as an ascendant 
generation of progressive reformers looked to vernacular expressions of popular culture 
to unify the fragmented republic around a shared national heritage.  Ethnomusicologist 
Fernando Ríos shows that the military socialist governments of Toro and Busch 
considered indigenous music and dance as intrinsic to national culture. State-sponsored 
civic festivals of the late 1930s—such as the first national “Día del Indio (August 2, 
1937)—featured not only popular creole and mestizo styles of music—such as cuecas 
and morenadas, respectively—but also indigenous panpipe enables and choreographed 
dances.900 The Villarroel-MNR regime also promoted indigenous music and dance as part 
of national folklore celebrations.  The closing celebration of the May 1945 indigenous 
congress featured indigenous music, dance, and art, as did the Concurso Vernacular y 
Folklórico de 1945 held later that year.901 These and other efforts underscore what Laura 
Gotkowitz identifies as early efforts to promote mestizaje as idiom of national unity.902 
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The reformists governments of the 1930s and 40s sought to valorize indigenous popular 
culture as an intrinsic components of Bolivian national identity.    
As the post Chaco wave of rural migrants flooded the highland cities of La Paz, 
Oruro, Potosí and Cochabamba, municipal governments also began to incorporate 
indigenous dance and music into civic celebrations of national and religious holidays.903 
It was during this time, for example, that municipal authorities in Oruro sought to 
promote the regional Carnival celebration as national folklore.  In 1940, moreover, the 
Mayor of La Paz, Humberto Muñoz Cornejo decreed the integration of indigenous music-
dance troupes into municipal Carnival festivities in 1940s. While such efforts 
undoubtedly appealed to popular sentiment, they were nevertheless disparaged by the 
city’s conservative creole elite.  The conservative newspaper, Ultima Hora carried the 
headline, “Debería este año evitarse la indigenizacion del Carnaval” as late as 1945.904 
“Una cosa es el culto de lo típico y folklórico,” the autor noted, “y otra distinta el 
indigénizar hasta un exceso censurable las fiesta de Carnestolendas.”905 Still, on the eve 
of the Revolution, urban, middling paceños resented the integration of indigenous 
popular culture into their folklore.   
Prevailing prejudice aside, growing interest in transforming folklore from a 
popular curiosity into a legitimate field of academic inquiry was manifest in the 
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institutionalization of the discipline.  The year 1940 saw the establishment of the 
Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia in La Paz.906  The national society 
was founded by Ralph Steele Boggs, a renowned Spanish linguists and early pioneer in 
Latin America folklore who established the discipline as an independent field of study in 
the U.S. academy.907 He and Arthur Posnansky had apparently become friends—perhaps 
at one of the Americanista congresses they frequently attended—and the Sociedad was 
placed within the Instituto “Tihuanacu” de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria 
(established by Posnansky and Manuel Ballivian the previous decade).  The society’s 
members included the younger generation of “las místicas de la tierra,” the cabal of La 
Paz letrados characterized by intellectual historian Guillermo Francovich by their telluric 
approach to Andean civilization and their cosmological interpretations of Tiwanaku.908  
The Sociedad’s vision of folklore would prove just as fantastic and exclusionary as their 
interpretation of Tiwanaku (see chapter five).   
The Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia embraced a particular 
understanding of folklore that belied the racial prejudice that prevailed among the 
místicas.  Posnansky, who authored all of the articles in the new journal, defined folklore 
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as a “ciencia” dedicated to the study of “mitos, tradiciones orales, leyendas, fabulas, 
hisorietas, cuentos, supersticiones, y otras cosas por el estilo, de character netamente 
populares.”909 He made a careful distinction, however, between “espíritu popular e 
indígena” in relation to national folklore.  “No tiene (la palabra folklore) ninguna relación 
con el concepto de música o con el de bailes populares indígenas,” he wrote.  To employ 
the word to describe these activities, he pointed out, “es impropio.”910 As Posnansky 
understood it, folklore was an academic discipline related to ethnographic and 
anthropometric studies of indigenous Bolivians, not an inclusive practice that celebrated 
their popular culture as representative of a national essence.  Creole traditions were 
representative of the nation; indigenous culture was an object of scientific inquiry.   
 Towards the end of the decade, folklorists from the departments of Chuquisaca 
and Tarija set out to institutionalize a more inclusive and, from their perspective, 
scientific approach to the study of folklore that eschewed the ethnic 
compartmentalization embraced by the místicas.  In 1950, José Felipe Costas Arguedas, 
Julia Elena Fortún, and Victor Vargas Reyes established the Sociedad Folklorica de 
Bolivia in Sucre.911  Seeking an air of epistemological authority, Costas and Fortún 
affiliated the SFB with the Circulo Panamericano de Folklore—an inter-American 
organization that drew together folklore societies from Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and 
other states.912  The goal of the SFB was to establish folklore’s status as a legitimate 
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science and to professionalize the discipline according to international standards of 
epistemology and methodology. Doing so first necessitated defining the term folklore.  In 
the first issue of the Cuaderno de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia (SFB), Costas 
Arguedas, the notable Sucre folklorists and first president of the SFB, set out to do just 
that.   
The SBF evidenced a more inclusive understanding of the folklore concept that 
allowed for the inclusion of rural popular culture.  Citing French ethnographer Paul 
Rivet, Swiss anthropologists Alfred Métraux, and Argentine ethnomusicologist, Carlos 
Vega, Costas Arguedas identified folklore a “ciencia antropológica” concerned with the 
study of “lo popular, lo tradicional, lo anónimo, lo regional.”913 While Posnansky had 
explicitly dismissed indigenous dance and music as legitimate objects of folklore, Costas 
provided a more expansive formulation of the concept that allowed for the inclusion of 
rural popular culture. As legitimate objects of study, he identified cultural themes instead 
of racial and/or ethnic groups (or types).  Alimentation habits, fashion, work routines, 
recreation activities, myth, tradition—each of these contributed to the “psicología 
colectiva” of a people and therefore represented legitimate objects of study.914  He 
pointed out that while folklore may share many of the same methodological principals as 
modern ethnography—participant observation and objective description, among them—it 
differed markedly in the ends it pursued.  Ethnography was dedicated to the objective 
observation of traditional populations as part of a broader effort to obtain a “holistic” 
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understanding of a single cultural group. True, folklore necessarily took on traditional 
cultures. But the objective of this new national science as articulated by the SBF was the 
collection and classifications of ethnographic materials towards the goal of documenting 
the popular consciousness of an entire national population.  
After 1952, this more inclusive vision of folklore moved to the center of the 
national consciousness as the government looked to the SBF to assist in state efforts to 
promote a postrevolutionary national folklore.  The postrevolutionary government 
demonstrated its intent to move indigenous popular culture to the center of national 
folklore by sponsoring several folkloric festivals in La Paz in 1953 and 1954, all of which 
prominently featured indigenous music and dance.  Seeking the most “authentic” and 
“pure” articulation of native folklore, government officials often even sent 
announcements to rural communities inviting them to participate.915   Postrevolutionary 
officials did not necessarily disparage intrinsic components of creole folklore—such as 
the cueca or the waltz—but indigenous popular culture was certainly the primary focus of 
government-sponsored folklore celebrations after 1952.   
In 1954, the government created the Department of Folklore (DF) within the 
Ministry of Education to manage state folklore festivals and, ostensibly, to carry out the 
collection of folkloric materials.  The influence of the SBF on the DF is indicated by its 
charter, which stated the primary objective as the “inventory and study of national 
folkloric elements” and their collection in a “national music archive.” As Costas had 
originally argued, folklore referred to the practice of documenting and scientifically 
classifying the entirety of the divergent manifestations of popular culture existing with 
the national territory to serve as the essence of the republic and its people.  To lead the 
                                                 




new office, officials chose Julia Elena Fortún. Among her colleagues, she had the best 
professional pedigree. She had majored in pedagogy at San Xavier before enrolling at the 
Escuela Nacional de Maestros, also in Sucre, where she pursued a degree in music 
education while studying at the Conservatorio de Música in La Paz.916 She went on to 
study ethnomusicology and folklore under Carlos Vega in Buenos Aires, and upon 
assuming the directorship of the DF, she had just returned from Spain, where she had 
completed a doctorate in “historia primitiva” from the University of Madrid.917 Soon after 
being appointed director, however, she departed for Mexico City, where between 1954 
and 1956, she pursued postdoctoral study in anthropology at UNAM.918  Despite initial 
efforts to centralize folklore, state folklore remained inconsistent and decentralized 
during the early years of the Revolution, with the SPIC, IIC, IIB, and the Municipality of 
La Paz each sponsoring separate events.919   
Postrevolutionary efforts to move indigenous dance and music into the venerated 
canon of national folklore became most salient in 1955, with the Primera Mesa Rotunda 
de Folklore en Música y Danzas. Sponsored by the Municipality of La Paz’s Directorate 
of Culture, the event convened prominent folklorists to expound on the place of 
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indigenous music and dance in the national canon, and its intrinsic value to the 
revolutionary process.  Yolanda Bendregal, who had helped organize the event, 
announced its objective as “Buscar la fuente mas profunda e intima de nuestras 
manifestaciones cultural en el alma y el espíritu del pueblo milenario que sustenta nuestra 
raza indomestiza.”920 Gonzales Bravo emphasized the pedagogical utility of indigenous 
music in primary education.  He imagined the nation’s children playing traditional rural 
music on kenas, sicus, and other “indigenous” wind instruments.  Such an effort, would 
“restauraríamos y enriqueceríamos el acervo folklórico nuestro” while provided an 
authentic national esthetic.  Perhaps realizing the absurdity of such a claim, he 
rhetorically asked, “¿La parte aún más elevada del Arte Nacional, basada en elementos 
nativos?”921 He went on to assuage any fears by explaining that once the original music 
was properly documented, it would be reinterpreted “en las formas modernas más 
convenientes.”922  Max Portugal and Dick Ibarra Grasso noted that indigenous music and 
dance had been “los aspectos menos estudiados” of national folklore.923 Underscoring 
their ethnographic value for revealing Bolivia’s deeper cultural traditions—those from 
Africa or Asia—hey echoed Costas in calling for the systematic study and scientific 
classification of indigenous folklore.924    
Yet conference participants confronted a more urgent matter.  In opening the 
conference, La Paz mayor Julio Zuazo Cuenca noted that “Los especialistas en esta 
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importante rama del conocimiento humano han anotado, y con sobradas razones, que de 
un tiempo a esta parte la actividad folklórica de nuestros campesinos han venido 
surgiendo un visible relajamiento y una peligrosa mestización en sus valores 
tradicionales.”925   He warned that “si dejamos así las cosas sin tomar las necesarias 
medida para precautelar nuestra enorme riqueza folklórica, que es patrimonio cultural de 
nuestra Nación, esta deformación desembocara en perdida definitiva.”926  All participants 
agreed that the primary threat to the nation’s indigenous heritage was rural 
modernization—all except for Francisco Viscarra.  He blamed alcohol and agrarian 
exploitation, lamenting that authentic musical forms “ha sido y es remplazada por la 
profana borrachera de llocallas e imillas a causa de la cantidad de bebidas alcohólicas que 
proporciona el gamonal o de lo contrario el mayordomo.”927  
The dangers posed to “traditional” culture by the expansion of “modern” society 
had long been recognized by Bolivian letrados interested in rural popular culture.  Such a 
concern was clearly evident in the charter of the Socieded de Folklore, Folkvisa y 
Folkway. “Con los sistemas de militarización, alfabetización e industrialización 
impuestas por la vida moderna,” Posnansky had warned back in 1942, “corren peligro de 
perderse definitivamente dichas manifestaciones del espíritu popular e indígena.”928  
With the Revolution, this threat became more urgent than ever.  Not only did it mark the 
first effort to incorporate indigenous music and dance into national folklore.  But state 
cultural officials and folklorists alike worried that agrarian reform, rural education, 
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lowland colonization, and other rural modernization initiatives would cause the 
disappearance or deformation of traditional indigenous dance and music. The final 
recommendations proposed by the Mesa Rotunda implored the state to intervene in order 
to “restaurar, conserver y depurar” indigenous music and dance from the contaminating 
influences of western modernization.929  Only by observing, studying, and classifying 
folklore according to established scientific methods could its “calidad primitiva” be 
preserved, in order that this increasingly important national tradition would be 
safeguarded for future generations.930   
Rising concern with the contamination and/or loss of authentic representation of 
Bolivia’s indigenous heritage proved the primary factor behind both the 
institutionalization and professionalization of folklore after 1952.  Silvia Rivera correctly 
argues that the primary paradigm motivating postrevolutionary folklore was 
“antropología de rescate.”931 That is, the necessity to collect, document, and archive 
“traditional” cultures before they disappeared as a result of the homogenizing forces of 
western modernization.  Salvage anthropology cuts to the heart of the contradictions 
implicit within modernity itself: the pull towards modern life coupled with the 
melancholy of leaving that which is familiar and natural.932  Anthropologist Joseph 
Gruber (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) traces the history of early ethnographic 
research within the British empire, arguing that the contradictory impulses of modernity 
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have provided anthropology with its raison d'être for much of its history, as humans 
scramble to “collect and preserve the information and the products of human activity and 
genius so rapidly being destroyed” 933  As the rural modernization effort intensified in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, postrevolutionary officials increasingly grappled with the 
paradox of modernity: the exciting lure of modernism promoted by postrevolutionary 
development, together with the tragic loss of tradition resulting from rural modernization.    
To attend to the paradox of modernization, the government established the 
Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore (Department of Archeology, 
Ethnography, and Folklre, DAEF) within the Department of Education in July 1956.  
Whether this development occurred in response to the Mesa Rotunda remains uncertain.  
But the creation of the DEAF coincides with two important developments.  The first was 
the centralization of national cultural management that took place under Fernando Diez 
de Medina’s term as Minister of Education (1956-57).  Seeking to centralized national 
culture production, Diaz had proposed creating the Dirección General de Cultura while 
head of the Education Reform Committee.  Following the promulgation of the 1955 
Education Code, the Ministerio de Educación was transformed into the Ministerio de 
Educación y Bellas Artes (MEBA) to reflect the central role it would play in national 
cultural formation.934  The second development that may have contributed to the creation 
of the DEAF was Julia Elena Fortún’s return from Mexico in July 1956.935 Upon her 
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arrival, both she and her husband, Carlos Ponce Sangines assumed leadership positions 
within the fledgling Dirección General de Cultura. 
The creation of the DAEF marked an important step in the professionalization of 
folklore in postrevolutionary Bolivia, introducing both the institutional structures and 
legal measures necessary to ensure the conservation of the indigenous music, dance, and 
other manifestations of rural popular culture under assault by national development. The 
objective of the new office was “recoger todas las expresiones folklóricas y etnográficas 
de la Patria, para luego clasificar, comparar, establecer correlaciones y determinar, 
mediante la interpretación, conclusiones al respecto del origen, del desarrollo de la 
difusión de estas expresiones, para llegar así al fondo mismo de la alma colectiva y 
traducir su mensaje.”936 The DAET was subdivided into three offices—Sección de 
Etnografía Musical, Sección Correografico, Sección de Literatura Traditional—each 
orientated toward the study of distinct folkloric materials.  The staff of these offices were 
directed to travel the countryside in order to collect, observe, and record music, dance, 
literature, myth and other expressions of rural popular culture without altering their 
natural form. Once collected, the information would then be classified scientifically and 
systematically cataloged within an MEBA archive.   
The legal measures complementing the institutionalization of national folklore 
were designed both to safeguard and valorize Bolivia’s indigenous heritage.  The DAEF 
charter announced the expansion of existing cultural patrimony laws, declaring that all 
music collected by the DAEF would become the intellectual property of the  
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Illustration 22: Ministry of Education official recording indigenous music as part of the 
state folklore initiative.937 
government.938  It also declared that “la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional, los corales 
polifónicos, conservatorios, radios del estado y demás instituciones oficiales, serán las 
encargadas de la parte activa de discusión del material folklórico musical escogido por 
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este Departamento.”939  Another measure obligated the Escuela Nacional de Maestros, 
the Conservatorio Nacional de Música, as well as all secondary schools to integrate 
folkloric music into their curriculum, “por la necesidad imperiosa de estudio y 
valorización de nuestra música en todos los ambientes del territorio patrio.”940  Finally, it 
obliged the Academia Nacional de Danzas not only to require students to intensively 
study folkloric dance, but also to incorporate traditional indigenous dances into their 
dance repertoires.941  In short, it marked significant state intervention in the educational 
system to ensure the promotion and diffusion of vernacular culture as the base for a more 
inclusive national culture.   
The systematic collection of indigenous folklore would be a national effort.  The 
DAEF’s staff was limited, consisting only of Antonio Gonzales Bravo, Antonio Paredes 
Candia, and Maks Portugal.  They carried out the necessary studies of indigenous music, 
dance, and literature by traveling to rural communities during national holidays such as 
Todos Santos, Carnaval, and Christmas, as well as other more localized civic and 
religious festivals that take place across the countryside.  In addition to trained 
specialists, Fortún looked to the nation’s primary and secondary school teachers in her 
efforts to collect and catalog the complete national folklore canon.  Rural school teachers 
were especially valuable for the effort. Given their extensive knowledge of the customs 
and traditions of the communities in which they worked, they would provide essential 
inroads into the “traditional” cultures often shielded from strangers—especially state 
officials. Circulars sent to all teachers emphasized their participation as a nationalist duty.  
They would assist “restructurar la Cultura Nacional, a base del conocimiento de nuestro 
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propios valores” by observing “nuestras genuinas expresiones tradicionales.”942 School 
teachers, especially rural school teachers, would play a contradictory role in 
postrevolutionary nation building.  They would provide the Spanish literacy, basic 
arithmetic, and other skills necessary to transform rural communities into the modern, 
market-orientated campesino integral to the success of national development.  At the 
same time, they would also serve as the front line defense against the homogenizing 
forces of national modernization by collecting the traditional forms of rural culture that 
they set out to transform.     
To prepare the nation’s rural teaching for this task of paramount national 
importance, Fortún wrote a textbook, the Manual para la recolección de materiales 
folklóricos. The textbook, published by the MEBA in 1957, was intended to provide “un 
empeño patriotico y cientifico guia” to all teachers (and teachers in training) as they 
assumed their new albeit secondary role as nationalist ethnographers.943   Folklore was 
not a simple task of haphazardly recording aspects of popular culture. There were careful 
scientific practices of observation and classification involved.  She explained that folklore 
was, in fact, a branch of cultural anthropology, “una ciencia con material concretos, con 
un método propio, con una finalidad conocida.”944 With the Manual, Fortún hoped to 
provide teachers with the basic instruction necessary to “realizar el inventario sistemático 
de los materiales de nuestra tradición y estudiarlas metódicamente.”945 Perhaps more 
importantly, however, it would enable them to develop a discerning eye, in order to 
“escoger aquello que por útil y positivo merezca ser incorporado a nuestro moderno 
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caudal de vida.”946 Of course, that which was “útil” or “positivo” was relative, and could 
depend on several factors, not least of which being prevailing assumption of indigenous 
backwardness.  
Beyond its pedagogical utility, the Manual also serves as a window onto 
postrevolutionary folklorización, and his it affected prevailing constructions of 
indigenous alterity.  Efforts to move indigenous popular culture to the center of national 
folklore extended far beyond music and dance, reaching into normative aspects of 
everyday life for most Bolivians.  Collective labor practices such as ayni and mink’a 
were cast not as typical of rural Andeans, but as backwards, atavistic relics.947 Within the 
schema developed by Fortún, they constituted “Folklore Material.”  The history, myths, 
and traditions embraced by rural indigenous communities were characterized as of 
“Folklore Espiritual” within the burgeoning national canon.948  Other actions filled with 
cultural meaning and significance that served to register, recognize, and transmit the past 
were also defined as folklore, their content considered cultural vestiges of a pre-modern 
past rather that actual representations of living indigenous cultures. Ritual dance, drink, 
and music—actions that anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie has shown were filled with 
cultural meaning and historical significance—were to be observed, collected, and 
archived in the Ministry of Education or put on display in one of the increasing number 
of state museums in La Paz.949   
 After 1952, the postrevolutionary government moved indigenous music and 
dance to the center of national folklore as part of a broader effort to establish a more 
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inclusive national culture comprised of authentic representation of the national essence.  
Despite its inclusive veneer, the creation of a national folklore that privileged indigenous 
popular culture contributed to broader process of racial formation underway in 
postrevolutionary Bolivia. Cast alongside the vision of the idealized modern campesino 
projected by the postrevolutionary state, the traditional Indian stood as temporally apart 
from the modern nation.  The process of folklorization played on prevailing cultural 
constructions of race to create new forms of ethnic exclusion by reinforcing direct 
associations between cultural markers of “Indianness” (language, dress, rural) and a way 
of life that was traditional, backward, pre-modern, and ill-prepared for inclusion in the 
modernizing republic.  The process served not to reaffirm rural popular culture as vibrant 
and evolving expressions of Bolivia’s indigenous population, but to redefine these 
expressions as cultural relics of a time past.   
 
MEXICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 
During the 1950s, as government officials worked to institutionalize folklore and 
applied anthropology within the postrevolutionary state in order to assist in the rural 
modernization campaign, social scientists affiliated with Mexico’s Instituto Nacional 
Indigenista (INI) were pioneering new approaches to national integration and indigenous 
social uplift. Founded in 1942, as a national bureau of the III, the INI assumed national 
leadership in prevailing questions of indigenous integration and rural modernization. INI 
director, anthropologist Alfonso Caso described the objectives of the institute as “tratar 
los problemas de las comunidades indígenas en forma integral, conservando y 




los medios para elevar el nivel cultural en todos los aspectos de la vida colectiva."950 By 
the time the U.S. announced the Alliance for Progress in 1961, INI had developed a 
model for indigenous community development that would exported not only to Bolivia, 
but throughout the Americas.   
Since the 1920s, Mexico’s postrevolutionary government had actively pursued the 
integration of its indigenous population into the political, social, cultural, and economic 
structures of the republic.  Indeed, postrevolutionary Mexico served as the laboratory for 
applied social sciences during the 1930s and 1940s, hosting Boas, Malowinski, and other 
international luminaries.  With the consolidation of the Inter-American indigenista 
movement in 1940 and the establishment of the INI in 1942, the latter institution emerged 
at the forefront of applied indigenista research in Mexico.  The INI set out to apply social 
scientific knowledge in order to develop more effective rural modernization and 
indigenous acculturation efforts.  Miguel León-Portilla, who suceded Gamio as director 
of the III, noted that “Para poder hacer una autentica planificaci6n es indudable que 
primero hay que poseer un conocimiento lo mas completo posible de la realidad social y 
física sobre la que se piensa actuar.”951 Like other intellectuals across the Americas, 
León-Portilla believed that social scientific knowledge could provide the solution to the 
age-old Indian problem.    
During the 1940s and 1950s, Alfonso Caso, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, Julio de la 
Fuente, and other anthropologists affiliated with the INI began experimenting with new 
forms of indigenous integration.   Eschewing the national integration policies pursued 
since the 1920s by the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, they developed regional 
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integration efforts tailored to the specific historical experiences and cultural values of 
different indigenous populations.  The logic underlying this transformation was derived 
from Aguirre Beltrán and de la Fuente’s previous research on inter-ethnic relations 
between rural Indians and urban mestizos in the Tzeltal Tzotzil region of Chiapas.  They 
posited that indigenous modernization would be more effective by addressing the 
material and psychological needs of specific ethnic groups as they were integrated into 
the nation.952  By strengthening bonds between rural communities and urban villages, 
moreover, they not only hypothesized a strengthening of regional market structures, but 
hoped that the modern cultural values embraced by mestizos would be diffused into the 
indigenous pueblos.   
In 1950, the INI established the first Centro Coordinador Indigenista in the city 
of San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas to implement the regional integration model and 
test its efficacy.  The region was selected for its predominantly-rural indigenous-majority 
population, as well as the market linkages and social relationships that existed between 
the town’s mestizo population and the surrounding indigenous communities. Employing 
anthropologists, physicians, agronomists, and sociologists, the project integrated 
ethnography, statistics, and biometric studies to study the specific needs of the population 
and how to most effectively—and efficiently—“improve” the standard of living of the 
inhabitants.  Once such data was collected, specialists devised specific programs for the 
target community and implemented them, seeking to “improvement” in the three key 
areas of education, economy, and health.953   The effort was deemed a success, and by the 
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end of the decade the INI had established several more coordinating centers in 
predominantly indigenous regions of the country.954 
The INI’s regional integration initiative soon caught the attention of III director 
Miguel Leon-Portilla, who recognized its potential in assisting other republics in the 
Americas grappling with national integration, indigenous social uplift, and rural 
modernization.  “Hay en el Continente American más de treinta millones de indígenas,” 
he wrote, underscoring the scope of the issue.  “El Instituto Indigenista Interamericano 
considera indispensable iniciar proyectos pilotos,” he asserted, “fomentarse de manera 
directa el desarrollo de las comunidades indígenas, conjuntamente con la preparación de 
técnico que posteriormente pueda colaborar en otros trabajo en favor del desarrollo de 
comunidades indígenas.”955 The project could be especially helpful for Bolivia and 
Guatemala, he noted; which not only had the highest indigenous populations (per capita) 
in the Americas, but also generally lacked trained specialists and university programs 
specializing in the practices of applied anthropology.  “El problema que plantea esa 
carencia de técnicos e igualmente de proyectos plenamente adaptados a las características 
especificas de los grupos indignas, ha movido al Instituto Indigenista Interamericano a 
iniciar una programa conjunto de acción y adiestramiento en Bolivia y Guatemala.”956  
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 would provide the III with an unprecedented 
source of financial support to export the INI’s model of indigenous community 
development.   
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In 1961, Kennedy inaugurated a new era of Inter-American relations with the 
Alliance for Progress. The Alliance represented a novel effort to promote economic 
development and political stability throughout Latin America.  Invoking the United 
States’ own revolutionary legacy, Kennedy declared in March of 1961 that “our 
unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man’s unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a 
framework of democratic institutions.”957  Through the infusion of economic aid and the 
support of democratic institutions throughout the region Kennedy planned to frustrate the 
ability of communists to exploit underdevelopment and political instability, thus avoiding 
another “Cuba.” The Alliance, Kennedy argued, would “improve and strengthen 
democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the 
people” and “accelerate economic and social development, thus bringing about a 
substantial and steady increase in the average income in order to narrow the gap between 
the standard of living in Latin American countries and that enjoyed in the industrialized 
countries.”958 The OAS adopted the Alliance for Progress charter in August of 1961.  In 
the following months, Washington would pledge $20 billion to help Latin American 
nations help themselves and, through these efforts, Alliance planners predicted an annual 
economic growth rate of 2.5 percent throughout the region.  
With the Alliance channeling large sums capital to national development 
initiatives across Latin America, León-Portilla began coordinating with the OAS to 
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export the indigenous community development model to Bolivia and Guatemala.  “El 
desarrollo socio-económico integral de las comunidades indígenas debe concebirse como 
formando parte de los planes nacionales de desarrollo de los varios países del 
hemisferio,” he wrote,” contando con el apoyo de la Alianza para el Progreso, de la carias 
dependencias gubernamentales y de otros organismos internacionales.”959 Using funds 
procured via the Alliance, the III began planning Project 208, and ambitious indigenous 
community development program that, in the succeeding decades, would provide Bolivia 
with both the training and expertise necessary to realize its rural modernization 
campaign. 
 
RURAL MONDERIZATION AND ETHNOGRAPHIC SALVAGE 
Following the re-election of Víctor Paz Estenssoro as President in 1960, 
ethnographic salvage became a top priority of state cultural officials.  Paz moved back 
into the Palacio Quemado vowing to realize the development initiative introduced during 
his first term as President (1952-1956).  The national development strategy designed by 
Guevara Arze had borne little fruit. The postrevolutionary regime had counted on mining 
and petroleum to generated the revenue necessary to finance domestic development—
principally commercial agriculture.  Things did not work out as planners had intended, 
however.  The profitability of the state mining enterprise, COMIBOL, had been 
undermined by a combination of falling tin prices, decreasing quality of ore, corrupt and 
inefficient management, and a bloated and poorly-managed labor force.  The alternative 
sectors of economic development identified by Guevara—primarily petroleum and 
                                                 
959 AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Programa de desarrollo de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala, 
Miguel León Portilla, “Programa de Desarrollo Económico-Cultural de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia 




commercial agriculture—had actually performed quite well.  Still, COMIBOL continued 
to drain Bolivia’s foreign exchange, and as the government scrambled to fund the 
Revolution, it become increasingly reliant on Washington to finance its ambitious 
modernization plans.   
 As a precondition of providing economic assistance, Washington demanded that 
Bolivia get its house in order.  In order to receive the necessary financial assistance, 
President Siles implemented tough austerity measures designed by the United States and 
World Bank—decreasing the labor force, cutting social services, and stopping state 
spending on all but necessary budgetary items.960  For almost the entirety of his four-year 
term, Siles was wracked with mounting labor unrest, fragmenting party unity, and rising 
economic pressures as he implemented to the austerity measures.  By the time Paz was 
reelected in 1960, the Revolution itself seemed to be on the verge of collapse.   
In an effort to achieve a semblance of national unity and redouble the national 
development effort, Paz introduced the Plan Decenal de Desarrollo Económica y Social 
in March 1961.  The ambitious ten-year development plan was intended to accelerate the 
development efforts initiated during his first administration and to bring some results to 
the struggling Bolivian economy.  Its primary objectives were to increase production, 
create jobs, increase standard of living and social mobility, eliminate illiteracy, and better 
the health of the population.961 Rural modernization remained a key objective of the 
postrevolutionary government.  Agricultural production had actually begun to slowly 
increase after initially falling off during the period 1952-56 because of widespread 
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agrarian unrest and one of the worst droughts on record.962 The lowland colonization 
effort was also much slower to move forward than officials had originally planned.  Thus, 
as part of the ten year plan, Paz assigned Roberto Jordan Pando, his newly-appointed 
Minister of Peasant Affairs and former Vice President of the National Planning Board, 
the task of devising a rural modernization strategy to accompany the broader Plan 
Decenal.963 
Illustration 23: Artwork for the Plan Decenal de Desarrollo Económica y Social.964 
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Designed over the course of 1961 by an army of technocrats from the Ministries 
of Peasant Affairs, Agriculture, and Health, and implemented in January 1962, the Plan 
Nacional del Desarrollo Rural (PNDR) was designed to accelerate to process of rural 
modernization on the altiplano and valleys of the western highlands.  Jordán justified the 
geographic focus of the plan in terms of acculturation, noting that “los campesinos no 
están en el mismo nivel social, económico y cultural del resto del país, de ahí que la 
Revolución persigue fundamentalmente nivelar a esa mayoría rezagada.”965 The PNDR 
reaffirmed the pivotal role originally assigned to indigenous Bolivians by the 
postrevolutionary planners.  They would be the motor of the Revolution, contributing to 
economic diversification and the expansion of the domestic market through their 
participation in the postrevolutionary economy as independent consumers and producers.  
By increasing the flow of capital, technology, and expertise to the rural sector, Jordán 
hoped, once and for all, to uplift the peasantry and realize the revolutionary promises of 
establishing a sovereign, self-sufficient national economy. 
Paz’s commitment to national development soon caught the attention of the 
Kennedy administration. Washington saw Bolivia’s modernizing revolution as a perfect 
test case for the Alliance for Progress.  In January 1962, Kennedy wrote Paz, stating “I 
wish to assure you of my continuing personal interest in actions by the United States 
within the framework of the Alliance for Progress which will help Bolivia in its long-
term efforts to bring about significant, self-sustaining development.”966 With financial 
and political support provided by the Alliance, Bolivian officials began working with the 
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OAS, the Pan-American Union, and other multilateral institutions to implement the rural 
community development model developed by the INI. From the perspective of 
postrevolutionary policymakers, it would not only accelerate the process of integrating 
rural society into the economic and social structure of the nation, but it would also attend 
to the objectives of the ten-year plan by transforming indigenous communities into 
progressive units of rural socioeconomic development.  
The Bolivian government signed on to the indigenous community development 
initiative in November 1962.  The “Programa de desarrollo económico-cultural de 
comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala”—or simply Proyecto 208—was an 
aggressive rural modernization strategy founded on four key principles, gleaned from a 
decade of research carried out by the INI at various regional coordinating centers in 
Mexico. The ground rules for Proyecto 208 stipulated that regional programs must be 
consistent with the national development goals of the participating states; that the specific 
methods employed by the project must be consistent with “contexto cultural propio” of 
the indigenous community where the project was being implemented; that the “técnicos” 
administering the local program “se encuentran capacitados en los métodos y principios 
básicos de la antropología social”; and, finally, that the project staff do their best to 
empower local leaders to participate in the effort.967  The INI had developed a model of 
rural modernization, rooted in applied social scientific practices developed over the 
course of decades.  If postrevolutionary Mexico had served as the laboratory for the 
development of applied social sciences that would attend to indigenous integration and 
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rural modernization, postrevolutionary Bolivia would provide a laboratory to test the 
universal efficacy of such practices.  
Proyecto 208 was an international program intended not only to promote 
indigenous integration and rural modernization in Bolivia, but to train social scientists 
from other American republics which lacked adequate higher education institutions.  The 
III and OAS would manage the effort for the first three years, during which it would 
prepare Bolivian specialists in the tools of applied anthropology and rural community 
development.  It would then hand over management of the effort to the Instituto 
Indigenista Boliviano (IIB).  Oscar Arze Quintanilla, who had recently been appointed to 
head the IIB, would lead the effort. He had spent much of the previous decade working 
on the lowland colonization effort alongside Richard Patch and other anthropologists.968 
To prepare him to lead this novel approach to rural community development, the III sent 
him to a nine-month intensive training seminar at the INI Regional Coordinating center in 
Chiapas, where he and other specialists worked alongside INI director Alfonso Caso on 
rural community development programs already underway. 969  In addition to applied 
anthropology, statistics, and administration, the students also studied earlier “estudios de 
antropología social” carried out “en Mexico entre diverso organismos oficiales.”970  
Upon returning to Bolivia, Arze Quintanilla set to work. Project 208 pursued two 
primary objectives.  The first was the planning and implementation of rural community 
development programs tailored to the particular cultural practices and socioeconomic 
structures of the target communities.  Arze Quintanilla selected the highland Aymara 
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community of Charagas in the Department of Oruro to serve as the pilot program.971  
Isolated, impoverished, mono-lingual in Aymara, and lacking essential infrastructure, the 
region was ideal to test the efficacy of the foreign program on Bolivian soil.  To staff the 
site, he assembled a team of anthropologists, agronomists, linguists, and medical 
professionals. After carrying out preliminary ethnographic studies and demographic 
surveys of the community, the team focused their effort on the four most important area 
of improvement: the economy, health and sanitation, primary education, and 
communication.   
Illustration 24: Diagram detailing the objectives and methods of Proyeto 208.972 
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The second object of Proyecto 208 was training.  Not only would the III staff train 
Bolivian personal, but the field site would also be utilized by the program staff to train 
specialists from other American republics, so that they could bring the practices of rural 
community development back to their host countries. The intensive training course lasted 
one year.  The first phase, lasting two month, consisted of coursework at UMSA in La 
Paz. Students from Bolivia, Peru, and Guatemala studied applied anthropology with the 
Peruvian anthropologist Alberto Cheng Hurtado and INI director Alfonso Caso; rural 
sociology with Oscar Arze Quintanilla and Arturo Urquidi; and Bolivian folklore and 
ethnography with Julia Elena Fortún.973 Students spent the second and third phases at the 
project site. For nine months, they gained hands-on experience while simultaneously 
promoting rural community development.  The team introduced new techniques for 
growing potatoes, built bathrooms and clinics to improve healthcare, carried out literacy 
courses, adult education and vocation training courses to demonstrate modern practices in 
agriculture and livestock. The final month of the course consisted of round tables to 
discuss the efficacy of the program and how it could be improved, based on the personal 
experiences of each participant. 974  
In 1965, the III handed over the effort the Ministry of Agriculture, which 
managed the project well into the next decade.  The effort was staffed by the first 
generation of Bolivian applied anthropologists, trained at different project centers in 
Mexico, Guatemala, and Bolivia. By the 1970s, the Servicio de Desarrollo de las  
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Illustration 25: Rural community receives instructions on how to improve agricultural 
practices.975 
Illustration 26: North American technician teaching Andean farmer about potatos.976 
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Comunidades Indigenas had expanded to include some twenty sites across the country, 
employing not only Bolivian personal, but U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, doctoral students 
from other countries, and a burgeoning array of development-orientate NGOs.  
The acceleration of the rural modernization initiative introduced with the Plan 
Decenal and Proyecto 208 nevertheless sparked increasing concern among state cultural 
officials. Although the recognized the need for rural modernization, they saw the process 
as threatening the pure forms of indigenous popular cultural that the government was 
valorizing as authentic expressions of Bolivian nationhood.  It was during the 1960s, 
when the salvage component of national folklore became especially urgent.  Writing in 
1961, Julia Elena Fortún underscored broader fears shared among her colleagues in the 
DAEF.  “Es innegable la necesidad de una recolección sistematizada de nuestros temas 
folklóricos,” she wrote, “ya que a partir de pocos años a esta parte se está notando el 
abandono de interesantísimas especias en el agro boliviano, debido precisamente a que 
las nuevas reformas político-sociales están creando en el campesino una nueva 
mentalidad que les hace abandonar sus añejas costumbres y tradiciones.”977  
Seeking to salvage Bolivia’s authentic indigenous heritage before it was swept 
away by the renewed rural modernization initiative, Fortún set out to strengthen both the 
legal and institutional capacity of the state to protect rural popular culture.  In addition to 
expanding the protection of archeological ruins, the 1961 Cultural Patrimony Law (see 
previous chapter) established the Dirección Nacional de Antropología (DNA), an 
autonomous office within the Dirección Nacional de Cultura that was exclusively 
dedicated to the collection, classification, and cataloging of national folklore.  It also  
                                                 




Illustration 27: Transription of rural music carried out by DNA staff during Todos 
Santos in Tiwanaku, November 1964.978   
Illustration 28: DNA official recording rural music in the field. Todos Santos in 
Tiwanaku, November 1964.979 
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stipulated the creation of an archive within the Ministry of Education to “centralizer los 
fichero antropológicos de todas las investigaciones realizada y por realizarse.”980 
Previously Fortún only received a small portion of the budget earmarked for the DAEF—
most of the funds went to CIAT and the Tiwanaku restoration project. With the creation 
of the DNA, Fortún obtained increased funding and government authority to conserve the 
national canon of indigenous traditions, myths, and popular cultural deemed integral to 
the national essence yet in danger of being destroyed by the homogenizing forces of rural 
modernization.  
Throughout the decade, Fortún continued in her effort to extend cultural 
patrimony laws to protect indigenous music and dance.  It was not until 1968 that she 
succeeded, however.  Supreme Decree Number 8396 of July 1968 declared that “la 
música folklórica o sea aquella que tiene las características de tradicionalidad, anonimato 
y popularidad, así como la music producida en grupos campesinos y ‘folk’ en general” 
that collected by the DNA became intelectual property of the government.981  In 
subsequent years, the DNA ethnographic staff made numerous trips to the highlands and 
valleys to study rural indigenous communities. They observed the festivals and 
ceremonies, carefully noting every step of the choreographed dances, and drawing the 
fine details of the elaborate costumes worn by the dancers. Technicians recorded the 
music of each and every community they visited, transcribing the songs, note for note.  
All of this data was then scientifically classified, cataloged, and filed away in an archive 
in the Ministry of Education, so that when rural modernizing wiped out the last vestiges  
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Illustration 29: DNA ficha illustrating the choreography of a rural dance called the 
“Chunchus” from the Aymara community of Compi (Province of Manco 
Capac, Department of La Paz).982    
                                                 




Illustration 30: DNA ficha depicting the costumes worn by dancers in the community of 
Toloma (Province of Aroma, Department of La Paz).983 
 





of tradition Andean culture, the cultural vestiges of the once great Aymara and Quechua 
civilization, would preserved as Bolivia’s national heritage.   
 
CONCLUSION 
As the Revolution entered its tenth year, Bolivia’s divergent anthropological 
traditions seemed to be working in perfect symbiosis.  Rural sociologists affiliated with 
MAC and CBF had been working for the past decade alongside foreign applied 
anthropologists to transform indigenous Bolivians into the archetype campesino imagined 
by the postrevolutionary leadership.  With the introduction of the Plan Decenal in 1962, 
the Paz administration expanded the applied anthropology initiative with Proyecto 208.  
Working alongside professional anthropologists from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and the 
United States, Bolivia’s first generation of applied anthropologists incorporated 
ethnographic fieldwork with more traditional statistical methods to study the obstacles to 
rural modernization and develop specifically tailed social programs orientated toward to 
social, cultural, and political structure of the rural communities in which they were 
working.  Drawing from knowledge derived from Mexico and the United States, they 
developed regional integration programs designed to assimilate indigenous Bolivians into 
the social and economic fabric of modern society.   
At the same time, Julia Elena Fortún expanded the institutional capacity and legal 
framework of the state folklore initiative to ensure the conservation of the “pure” and 
“authentic” forms of indigenous music, dance, and art that were rapidly being swept 
away by the rural modernization initiative.  With the establishment of the Direccion 
Nacional de Antropologia (DNA) in 1961, the government expanded the state folklore 




Fortún obtained increased funding and authority to conserve the indigenous popular 
cultures deemed integral to the national essence yet in danger of being destroyed by the 
homogenizing forces of rural modernization. Fortún also succeeded in expanding the 
definition of the national cultural patrimony to protect music and dance alongside ruins, 
archeological lands, and indigenous popular arts.  The fruits of these efforts, though long 
forgotten, continue occupy the storeroom of the Museo de Etnografía y Folklore 
(MUSEF) in La Paz, where thousands of fiches, audio recordings, and documents reveal 
the extent of the postrevolutionary folklore initiative.   
While bridging the contradictory impulses of modernity, postrevolutionary 
anthropology efforts also contributed to broader processes of racial formation already 
underway in Bolivia.  Orientated toward forging the modern campesino imagined by the 
postrevolutionary leadership, applied anthropology disparaged rural socioeconomic 
organization, political structure, agricultural practices, and cultural traditions as backward 
and traditional—as inconsistent with the modernizing orientation of the Revolution.  
Articulated within the language of science, applied anthropology reaffirmed prevailing 
notions of indigenous backwardness.  At the same time, folklorization contributed to 
racial formation by creating temporal and spatial distinctions between the modern nation 
and traditional Indians.  It established direct associations with indigenous music and 
dance and “markers” of pre-modern rural culture.   
On the morning of 3 November 1964, rebellious military forces under the 
command of Vice President René Barrientos Ortuño seized control of Cochabamba.  
Barrientos, the politically ambitious former head of the Bolivian Air Force, perceived the 
almost rising discontent with President Paz as his opportunity to seize power, and with 




spread to Santa Cruz and Postosí, Barrientos cabled the besieged President urging his 
resignation if he desired to avoid “rivers of blood” flowing through Bolivia.984  The 
following afternoon, as rebellious military forces battled Paz loyalists in central La Paz, 
Paz boarded an airplane bound for Lima where he would apply for political asylum.  
Violently ushering out over twelve years of civilian rule under the aegis of the MNR, 
Barrientos’ “Revolución dentro de la Revolución” marked the onset of the military phase 
of the national revolution.985  
 Despite the changes in the national political leadership, the social scientists 
leading the cultural offices of the postrevolutionary state nevertheless retained their 
leadership positions.  They would continue in their efforts to centralize the state cultural 
bureaucracy, eventually establishing the Instituto de Cultura Boliviana in 1975.  As they 
deepened their connections in rural society and increasingly turned to University 
education Aymara and Quechua comunarios for access, they would eventually come to 
embrace a new vision of national culture that recognized ethnic identity, establishing the 
multicultural concept that would not prevail until the following decades, before 
crystalizing into state policy in 1994, as the government revised the constitution to 
recognize ethnic difference and to extend legal protections to ensure the protection of the 
many ethnicities that constitute the national population.   
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Nos sentimos económicamente explotados y cultural y políticamente oprimidos.  En 
Bolivia no ha habido una integración de culturas sino una superposición y dominación 
habiendo permanecido nosotros, en el estrato mas bajo y explotado de esa pirámide. 
-Manifiesto de Tiwanaku (1973) 
 
Lucho para que mi hija no sea nunca tu empleada.  
-Felipe Quispe, radical Aymara leader of the CSUTCB 
 
As dawn broke over Tiwanaku on September 21, 1973, founding members of the 
fledging Katarista movement snuck past the guardaruinas posted at CIAT headquarters. 
They were Aymara and Quechua university students, rural school teachers, and 
intellectuals affiliated with an array of grassroots cultural organizations including the 
Centro de Coordinación y Promoción Campesina Mink’a, the Centro Campesino Túpac 
Katari, the Asociación de Estudiantes Campesinos de Bolivia, and the Asociación 
Nacional de Profesores Campesinos.  Two decades earlier, in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1952 Revolution, the Ministry of Peasant Affairs had capitalized on the symbolic 
currency of the spring equinox—a ceremonial day in the Aymara agricultural calendar—
to promote the Tiwanaku ruins as a unifying symbol of the postrevolutionary republic.986 
Now, this ascendant generation of rural activists hurried toward the Kalasasaya acropolis 
to reclaim the reconstructed ruins for themselves—as an icon of an alternative 
nationalism, one which valorized Bolivia’s indigenous present. Tiwanaku would stand 
alongside the Aymara rebels Túpak Katari and Bartalina Sisa as representative of the 
traditions, cultures, and histories that, the activists asserted, had been disparaged by the 
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cultural politics, rural education practices, and developmental strategies of the 
postrevolutionary state.  
Forming a circle around the iconic Puerta del Sol, the activists took turns reading 
aloud from the Manifiesto de Tiwanaku, a radical document they had drafted earlier that 
winter which would come to symbolize a renewed struggle for territorial rights, cultural 
recognition, and ethnic plurality.  Historian Roberto Choque, who participated in the 
event as an Aymara university student, reflected on the origins of the movement. “El 
impacto del proceso política y social de la revolución de 1952 impactó en la 
intelectualidad indígena,” he recalls, “de la generación de la década 70 del siglo pasado, a 
preguntarse sobre el porqué de las cosas.”987 Despite the sweeping changes introduced by 
the postrevolutionary government—universal citizenship, legal equality, rural education, 
and agrarian reform—the Manifiesto demonstrates that many indigenous Bolivians 
continued to feel excluded from the nation. They expressed “terribles frustraciones” in 
“la falta de participación real de los campesinos quechuas y aymaras en la vida 
económica, política y social del país.” They warned “sin un cambio radical en este 
aspecto será totalmente imposible crear la unidad nacional y un desarrollo económico 
dinámico, armónico, propio y adecuado a nuestra realidad y necesidades.”  With this 
humble ceremony, they announced their “política liberadora campesina” to the public.988 
“Somos extranjeros en nuestro propio país,” they announced, denouncing the 
national culture model promoted by the postrevolutionary state. “No se han respectado 
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nuestra virtudes ni nuestra visión propio del mundo y de la vida,” they explained.989  
They similarily condemned the rural education initiative, stating that “La escuela rural 
por sus métodos, por sus programas y por su lengua es ajena a nuestra realidad cultural y 
no solo busca convertir al indio en un especie de mestizo sin definición ni personalidad, 
sino que consigue igualmente su asimilación a la cultura occidental y capitalista.”990 
Finally, they singled out the rural development strategies of the postrevolutionary state as 
imposing foreign development models that were out of touch with the communitarian 
values of rural Andean civilization.  Although they too recognized the need to “tecnificar 
y modernizar” agrarian production, they insisted that such efforts be designed in 
accordance with existing cultural values. “No queremos perder nuestras nobles virtudes 
ancestrales en aras de un pseudo-desarrollo,” read the document.991     
 The Manifiesto de Tiwanaku marked a new era in the political history of modern 
Bolivia in which ethnicity assumed a position alongside class as legitimate arena for 
sociopolitical struggle.  If the opening anecdote of the “DDT Revolution” illustrates the 
contradictory logic underlying the integration policies of the postrevolutionary state, then 
the Manifiesto provides the most salient example of how that logic framed the legacy of 
the Revolution.  The authors of the Manifiesto were predominantly Aymara and Quechua 
university students—“los hijos de la revolución,” per Javier Hurtado—who experienced 
first-hand the assimilationist practices of the postrevolutionary rural modernization 
initiative.992  At the same time, however, that very project that continued to exclude them 
had provided them with the very tools needed to contest the postrevolutionary state.  
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Illustration 31: Túpak Katari poster from INDICEP publication that is illistrative of the 
ethnic-based political mobilization promoted by the Katarista 
movement.  The text accompanying the portrait reads:  “Túpac Katari, el 
Aymara rebelde, que tenía sed de dignidad, luchó hasta la muerte para 
liberar su alma, su territorio invadido y devolver a su pueblo el orgullo 






The Bolivian National Revolution represented the culmination of two distinct 
historical struggles.  The first was rooted in the grassroots struggles for land, equality, 
and justice among rural Aymara and Quechua communities.  During the second half of 
the nineteenth century, comunarios confronted increasingly aggressive liberal land 
privatization laws by appointing local apoderados. Merging colonial and republican 
discourses of legal rights, apoderados contested liberal land divestiture and hacienda 
encroachment within the judicial institutions of the republican state.  Following the 
Liberal Revolution of the 1898 and the repression of the apoderados, rural activists 
forged new national networks of caciques apoderados to stop the wave of highland 
hacienda expansion that accelerated during the first decades of the twentieth century.  
Though the Chaco War marked a setback for rural mobilization, the veterans who 
returned to their communities redoubled their efforts, deepening existing connections 
with urban labor activists, forging new networks of activists (such as the Alcaldes 
Mayores Particulares), and introducing grassroots education efforts.  The 1945 
Indigenous congress, which resulted, in part, from the renewed rural mobilization, 
provided indigenous Bolivians with new legal rights from which they increasingly drew 
upon to contest the seigniorial order. By 1952, as Laura Gotkowitz argues, there was 
already a revolution underway in the countryside that, to small extent, contoured the 
politics of the Revolution.993    
The second historical struggle to culminate in the Revolution was more recent, 
originating in the crisis of state legitimacy that resulted from the Chaco War and was 
primarily articulated in terms of class.  Following Bolivia’s crushing defeat to Paraguay, 
                                                 




military officers, urban professionals, industrial workers, and tin miners increasingly saw 
the social and economic policies of the government as inconsistent not only with the 
national interest, but also with the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people.  Those who 
had served in the Chaco—many appalled at the racialized hierarchy of the military and 
the disproportionate number of Indian casualties—returned with a more inclusive sense 
of nationhood, in addition to bitter resentment of the national political leadership. 
Widening frustration with the government was manifest in a push for progressive reform 
among an ascendant generation of middle-class professionals, journalists, university 
students, labor leaders, and lower-ranking military officers.  National politics during the 
period 1936-1952 was subsequently characterized by progressive reform on the one hand, 
with the governments of Toro, Busch, and Villarroel, and conservative retrenchment on 
the other, as Peñaranda, Hertzog, and Urriolagoitía confronted the growing power of 
organized labor (manifest in the CTSB and the FSTMB).  It was also during this period 
when factions of the radical and moderate left established the Partido Obrero 
Revolucionario (POR), the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR), and the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR).   
Their generation—the “Generación del Chaco”—located the national problem 
neither in biology nor in geography, but in the socioeconomic structures established by 
the tin and landed oligarchy.  They argued that since ascending to power with the Liberal 
Revolution of 1898, the “superestado mineral” had not only monopolized the 
mechanisms of the state, but had also gained control of seventy percent of Bolivia’s 
foreign exchange and over ninety percent of its arable lands.  The POR, PIR, and MNR 
all agreed on the necessity of revolution; believed that Bolivia’s natural resources should 




indigenous Bolivians (in varying degrees) into their political organizations.  Though they 
were aligned in their opposition to the oligarchy, they nevertheless expressed conflicting 
views of what “revolution” would mean.  Both the Trotskyite POR and the Leninist PIR 
advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat, workers control of the mines and urban 
industry, and the nationalization of Bolivia’s natural resources and essential 
infrastructure.  The MNR, the most moderate of the three, eschewed Marxist dogma as a 
foreign ideology inadequate to address the complexity of Bolivia’s national problems.  
Drawing from prevailing currents of nationalism, socialism, fascism, and liberalism, they 
sought to wrest control of the state from the oligarchy to establish a social democracy.994 
They imagined the state serving as an instrument of capital accumulation that would 
finance domestic development, ensure the well-being of the population, and establish a 
national culture to unify the fragmented postcolonial nation.  
In the immediate aftermath of the April insurrection, these various political forces 
vied for control of the state.  Citing its victory in the annulled 1951 elections as its claim 
to constitutional legitimacy, the MNR emerged as the dominant faction within the 
government.  With the establishment of the Central Obrero Boliviano (COB), however, 
the radical left established itself as a powerful bloc within the postrevolutionary 
leadership.  During the initial phase of postrevolutionary unity that marked Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro’s first term as President, the government employed the popular statecraft 
strategy to consolidate its rule in urban spaces and to extend state authority into the 
countryside, where hacienda colonos in rural La Paz and Cochabamba had began to rise 
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up extralegally against the seigniorial order.  By tying civil society into the centralized 
and hierarchal structures of corporate organizations affiliated with the state—primarily 
the MNR and the COB, but also including veterans organization, mutual aid societies, 
and agrarian cooperatives—the postrevolutionary leadership attempted to gain a 
modicum of control over “lo abigarramiento.”995 The government also monopolized mass 
media—radio, film, print media—to mobilize both state and society behind a unified 
revolutionary project.    
Within the new “national-popular” coalition that characterized the “Estado de 
1952,” the moderate MNR leadership embraced a more radical position on several key 
issues. The most salient of these was the nationalization of the tin mines.  Though 
scholarship (and the MNR propaganda machine) tends to cast the nationalization as one 
of the original—and indeed defining—reforms embraced by the party leadership, the 
MNR did not official embrace the measure until March 1951.996  On October 31, 1952, it 
nationalized the big three tin mines, entrusting the management of the nation’s mineral 
wealth in the new state mining corporation, the Corporación Mineral de Bolivia 
(COMBOL).997 In July of that year, the postrevolutionary government extended political 
citizenship to indigenous Bolivians (and women) with universal adult suffrage, and 
issued a general amnesty to all participants in the 1947 cycle of rebellion. On August 2, 
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1953, the government proclaimed land reform, freeing land and labor from the 
unproductive seigniorial order, and providing indigenous peasants titles to the lands they 
worked.   
It was also during these initial years of postrevolutionary unity that Walter 
Guevara Arze established the basic framework for the most ambitious state-directed 
national development initiative in Bolivian history.998 The overarching goal of 
postrevolutionary development was to establish a sovereign national economy.  Reliant 
upon tin for 97 percent of its foreign exchange, Bolivia’s economy was grievously prone 
to vicissitudes of the global market.  Economic sovereignty thus meant shielding the 
domestic economy from external shocks by promoting alternative export commodities 
such as petroleum and commercial agriculture. Economic sovereignty also implied self-
sufficiency. Imports—thirty five percent of which were domestically produced food 
commodities such as rice, sugar, and flour—represented a constant drain on the balance 
of payments.999  By aligning population and resources under rational state planning 
strategy, Guevara envisioned transforming Bolivia from a semicolonial, segregated 
republic into a modern, integrated nation-state. With both land and labor now freed from 
the unproductive estates, postrevolutionary officials fixated on commercial agriculture as 
Bolivia’s economic salvation. As such, indigenous Bolivians were thrust to the center of 
the postrevolutionary imagination—it was their labor that would boost domestic 
production, while their integration into the monetary economy would create new 
economic opportunities for the aspiring bourgeoisie. 
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The postrevolutionary government turned to the nation’s social scientists to 
transform their development imagination into tangible policy, and in so doing, helped not 
only establish, but institutionalize the modern social scientific disciplines in Bolivia.  
Sociology, economics, anthropology, and other academic disciplines related to the study 
of society offered a rational, ordered, and indeed scientific approach to applied 
socioeconomic change.  They provided the information necessary to identify national 
problems, the data needed to measure their severity, and the knowledge required to 
effectively mitigate them. Sociologists José Antonio Arze, Arturo Urquidi, and Ernesto 
Ayala Mercado played a major role in the formulation of both the agrarian reform and 
rural education initiatives.  Rodolfo Cornejo, Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, Eduardo 
Arze Loureiro, and Oscar Arze Quintanilla worked with foreign applied anthropologists 
to carry out the social scientific studies necessary for lowland colonization and agrarian 
reform.  Increasing government interest in applying social scientific knowledge to the 
problems of rural modernization, indigenous social uplift, and development planning 
resulted in the professionalization of sociology and applied anthropology within state 
institutions.   
Social scientific knowledge also proved essential to another objective of the 
postrevolutionary leadership: forging an “authentic” national culture to unify the 
fragmented nation.  The revision of national history served as a key instrument to 
refashion the Bolivian “pueblo” and for the MNR to establish its political legitimacy.  
José Cuadros Quiroga, Carlos Montenegro, and Augusto Céspedes wrote Indians into the 
nation by recasting national history as a multiethnic struggle against foreign economic 
exploitation.  Following the Revolution, the state not only commemorated this narrative 




Historia Nacional to ensure that the revision of national history proceeded in a scientific 
and objective manner.  Carlos Ponce Sanginés led a generation of nationalist 
archeologists in the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku, identifying in the ruins 
the primordial origins of Bolivian nationhood. The government subsequently established 
the Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (CIAT) to ensure not only the 
protection of the ruins, but that the excavation and reconstruction efforts were carried out 
in accordance with modern scientific practices. Julia Elena Fortún, Max Portugal, and 
other officials affiliated with the Departamento de Folklore—and later, the Dirección 
Nacional de Antropología—carried out countless ethnographic studies of rural 
communities, while expanding the definition of cultural patrimony to include indigenous 
art, music, and dance.  If social science provided postrevolutionary officials with 
objective truths upon which national culture was constructed, the professionalization of 
these disciplines under the aegis of the state would ensure that they were carried out in 
accordance with international standards of objectivity and value-free knowledge.  
By the time that the civilian leadership of the postrevolutionary state was ousted 
by the military in November 1964, they had succeeded in constructing a unifying national 
culture that reflected the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people while celebrating the 
Andean and Hispanic heritage of the newly-integrated republic.  The postrevolutionary 
leadership had revised national history, reconstructed the Tiwanaku ruins, revealed the 
glorious primordial roots of the nation, refurbished the National Museum, and expanded 
cultural patrimony laws to protect archeological ruins and indigenous popular arts. If the 
first half of the twentieth century was characterized by the secularization of knowledge—
as science replaced religion as the only source of legitimate authority—then the 




expanded the state bureaucracy to channel social scientific knowledge to the challenges 
posed by national development.   
 
FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The primary objective of this study had been to examine the contradictory logic 
underlying postrevolutionary integration in light of the contested legacy that the 
Revolution has cast for indigenous Bolivians.  In an effort to investigate the rearticulation 
of social hierarchies after 1952, I set out to explore the cultural initiatives, development 
strategies, and politics of knowledge of the politicians, intellectuals, artists, activists, 
social scientists, and technocrats affiliated with the state during the period spanning the 
April 1952 insurrection that triggered the Revolution and the November 1964 coup that 
ousted the civilian leadership of the postrevolutionary government.   
The Revolution proved a double-edged sword for indigenous Bolivians.  On one 
hand, the postrevolutionary leadership extended political citizenship to Indians, uprooted 
the seigniorial order, and provided education, public health, agricultural credit, and other 
state services that were previously denied to them. It also valorized long-disparaged 
expressions of indigenous history and popular culture, placing archeological ruins, rural 
music and dance, and other symbolic components of “Indianness” at the center of 
national culture.  On the other hand, the Revolution created new forms of ethnic 
exclusion that nevertheless undermined indigenous equality. In their pursuit of national 
modernization, the postrevolutionary government disparaged the “traditional” customs 
embraced by indigenous Bolivians, while actively encouraging their assimilation into 
“modern” society.  This study reveals this contradictory process through three principal 




The first argument is that indigenous integration was a modernization imperative.  
The postrevolutionary leadership set out to “modernize” Bolivia according to a normative 
model of socioeconomic development predicated on the exceptional model of the North 
Atlantic West. For the MNR leadership, modernization meant, first and foremost, 
establishing a sovereign and self-sufficient national economy under the responsible 
management of the state.  It meant a society in which all individuals—regardless of race 
or gender—were guaranteed political participation.  It also signified the creation of a 
welfare state, in which the government ensured the wellbeing of the population through 
public health and sanitation programs, expanded education, and social security initiatives.  
The primary focus of the state’s social welfare initiatives was rural society. Through rural 
education, adult literacy programs, agricultural extension services, public health 
initiatives and sanitation campaigns, the postrevolutionary government set out to 
“improve” indigenous Bolivians and enable them to participate in the economic and 
social fabric of the modern republic.  Integration was not instantaneous.  Rather it was 
managed by the state, and predicated upon the embrace of such “modern” ideals as 
Spanish literacy, contemporary agricultural practices, and urban standards of hygiene and 
sanitation, as well as their participation in officially sanctioned socioeconomic 
organizations such as rural unions and rural agricultural cooperatives.    
To be sure, indigenous integration was a gradual process, resulting from a series 
of measures that included universal suffrage, political amnesty, agrarian reform, and rural 
education. Universal suffrage—which, by extending political citizenship to indigenous 
Bolivians for the first time, seems the most drastic measure towards indigenous 
integration—was rooted in the MNR leadership’s commitment to social justice and 




democratic triumphalism, the party embraced the cause of social justice, identifying the 
popular struggles of indigenous peasants as one with their own (a discourse that is 
perhaps most saliently exemplified in the July 22, 1953 amnesty decree). Whereas 
universal suffrage was motivated by social justice and democracy, agrarian reform and 
rural education—the two most significant measures attending to the social and economic 
integration of indigenous Bolivians—were motivated by the exigencies of national 
development and orientated toward rural modernization.   
The primary factor motivating postrevolutionary indigenous integration in general 
and agrarian reform in particular was domestic economic growth.  If the mining super 
state had impaired Bolivia’s integration into the global capitalist economy, the haciendas 
constrained the potential for domestic economic growth by locking both land and labor in 
an unproductive seigniorial order that not only kept Indians apart from the cash economy, 
but stunted their cultural evolution.  Only when Indians were unconstrained producers 
and consumers in a modern market-based society, the MNR leadership argued, would the 
republic be able to develop its full economic potential.  As the postrevolutionary 
government fixated on commercial agriculture as Bolivia’s economic salvation, it 
identified indigenous Bolivians as the motor of national development.  It was upon their 
active participation in national society as independent producers and consumers that the 
success of the modernization initiative rested.  And until they embraced the prerequisites 
for modern citizenship, they would remain apart from the nation.   
The second argument advanced by this study is that the Revolution marked a 
paradigm shift in prevailing constructions of race in Bolivia.  Postrevolutionary 
development was predicated on new conceptions of race which emphasized the 




Chaco generation of reformers lifted the burden of biology from the Indian problem by 
locating the source of indigenous backwardness not in biology, nor in geography, but in 
the socioeconomic structures of the capitalist economy in general, and the feudal modes 
of production that characterized the seigniorial order in particular.  In the 1940s, 
structuralism merged with cultural relativism—which was arriving by way of Mexico, 
Peru, and the United States—in the thinking of reformist intellectuals.  Instead of racial 
type rooted in biology, Indians were understood as belonging to distinct cultural 
formations, each the result of specific local-historical circumstances.  Nevertheless, the 
cultural practices embraced by Andean civilization—from language to work habits—
were largely understood as pre-modern, backwards, and inconsistent with the modernized 
republic imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. Such ideas provided the 
foundation for the notion of indigenous improvability deemed central to the successful 
implementation of the national development strategy.   
In the historiography of modern Latin America, our understanding of the role and 
reception of racial thought has been largely limited to eugenics and public health. Only 
recently has scholarship begun to examine the “cultural turn” in racial thought that 
occurred across the region during the middle of the twentieth century.1000  This 
dissertation contributes to this literature by demonstrating how “progressive” and 
seemingly-benign (and even beneficial) modernization initiatives such as rural education 
and national cultural formation operated to sustain social hierarchies rooted in perceived 
racial difference.  True, cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on 
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biology and organized according to “type.”  At the same time, however, it reaffirmed 
indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural 
evolution.  Even while dismissing as “backwards” and “atavistic” biological 
understandings of racial difference, postrevolutionary officials located indigenous 
Bolivians on a lower rung of cultural evolution.   
Finally, this study posits that that it was the cultural politics of Revolution that 
ultimately determined the limits of ethnic inclusion.  Seeking to unify Bolivia’s diverse 
population around a shared national identity, the government declared Bolivia a race-less 
society and, through a burgeoning array of state cultural institutions, promoted a 
“revolutionary esthetic” that celebrated the mixed Andean and European heritage of the 
republic.  Despite the inclusive veneer of this populist esthetic, the cultural politics of 
postrevolutionary Bolivia emphasized homogeneity while simultaneously reaffirming 
social hierarchies founded on race.  
The Revolution is commonly cast as setting into motion a homogenizing national 
project, wherein the government valorized mestizaje as an idiom of national unity while 
expunging the traditions, customs, and culture embraced by most Bolivians.  Discarding 
the pejorative “indio” in official state discourse, the postrevolutionary leadership instead 
assigned indigenous Bolivians the identity “campesino,” which privileged their class 
identity and signaled the central role accorded to them in national development.  Early 
critiques of the Revolution leveled by Fausto Reinaga and Herbert Klein criticized the 
revolution for embracing mestizaje—or “cholaje” as they explicitly refer to the process 
according to local language of racial hybridity.1001  Others have since focused on the 
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discourse of “campesino,” arguing that the term subsumed ethnic diversity to a solitary 
class identity.1002  “El paso del ‘indio’ a ‘campesino’ en el vocabulario oficial se estuvo 
haciendo después del Chaco y quedó también consolidado por el MNR dentro de su 
terminología,” writes Xavier Albó and Josep Barnadas. “Insistían en convertir al 
campesino en pleno miembro del país a través de insertarlo plenamente como productor y 
como consumidor.”  More recently, Waskar Ari has labeled the postrevolutionary 
policies “de-indianization” upon studying the rural union structure that the 
postrevolutionary government attempted to impose on rural society as part of the popular 
statecraft strategy.1003 
Indeed, valorizing the mestizo and/or cholo—racialized identities which had long 
been disparaged in the political, social, and scientific literature of Bolivia—was a central 
aim of the postrevolutionary leadership’s effort to forge a common history and shared 
national heritage to unite the fragmented nation.  But was the Revolution a mestizo-based 
project as is commonly asserted?  Is the term mestizaje appropriate for Bolivia?  Were 
Bolivians using the term?  Scholarship often draws from an erroneous source as evidence 
for this point, the widely-cited (though fabricated) pronouncement made by President Paz 
Estenssoro on the occasion of the agrarian reform: “From now on you will no longer be 
Indians, but rather peasants!” 1004  While this was certainly the implicit message 
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embraced by the postrevolutionary leadership, it was never so explicitly articulated.  The 
postrevolutionary politics of culture reveal, moreover, that official discourses of 
mestizaje were more complex, more contradictory, and more subtle that this quote 
implies.   
This study has examined how the postrevolutionary leadership—as well as the 
intellectuals, artists, and activists affiliated with state institutions—not only articulated 
the mestizaje concept publicly, but understood it themselves.  Commenting on the 
process of postrevolutionary indigenous integration, IIB director Félix Eguino Zaballa 
wrote “no se pretende un indigenismo absorvente [sic], sino el acrecentamiento gradual 
del mestizaje, que como en todas las latitudes de Américas constituye el equilibro social 
y político mas conveniente.”1005 It seems that Eguino shared with other officials a general 
understanding of mestizaje as a necessary component of national integration—it provided 
the cultural “middle ground” for a national population long fragmented by race, class, 
and ethnicity. At the same time, however, mestizaje seems too imprecise given the 
government’s recognition of the unchanging nature of its demographic reality.  It would 
seem that the biological component implicit within the mestizaje ideal may have 
precluded its application as an accurate term to describe postrevolutionary integration 
programs.   
To be sure, postrevolutionary officials rarely employed the term mestizaje. They 
instead employed the bifurcated “indo-mestizo” (or simply “indomestizo”—depending on 
the author) to describe the national population. The MNR’s founding manifesto from 
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1942 celebrated the “indomestizo” essence of the nation.1006  A 1950 MNR pamphlet 
cried “¡Gloria al protomártir indo-mestizo Pedro Domingo Murillo!”  After 1952, the 
term provided the biological and cultural glue that would hold together the nation.  Yet, 
as Laura Gotkowitz points out, the hyphenation of the term undermines the very unity 
that it portends to signify.  Through a burgeoning array of state cultural offices, the 
postrevolutionary state cultivated two distinct, mutually-reinforcing images of indigenous 
Bolivians in the national imagination—the campesino and the indio—that transformed 
this populist discourse into a contradictory reality. 
The first, and ideal, image promoted by the postrevolutionary government was the 
campesino—the idealized modern peasant—fashioned as the agent of Bolivian 
modernization, who through their production and consumption, would ensure the success 
of national development.  Though this “national type” was rooted in the early economic 
policy prescriptions of the MNR leadership, it ties back to a longer trope of Bolivian 
cultural and intellectual history that cast Indians as biological predisposed to agricultural 
labor and situated them in their natural Andean environment as agrarian producers.1007  
The postrevolutionary government cultivated this image through several interrelated 
processes.  The development strategy designed by Walter Guevara Arze mapped the role 
of Indians in the postrevolutionary republic as agrarian producers and consumers.  The 
Agrarian Reform Committee reaffirmed this ideal as they drafted a legal framework for 
land redistribution consistent with the modernizing objective of the national development 
strategy.  As historian Wasker Ari points out, the campesino ideal was also promoted by 
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organizing peasants into rural unions and agrarian cooperatives.1008  Indeed, the 1953 
agrarian reform decreed specifically identified the “sindicato campesino” as the principal 
instrument through which ex-colonos should enact land claims and defend the rights 
guaranteed to them by the new law.1009  The campesino was also central to the imaginary 
underlying the pedagogy of rural education—one of the most striking examples of how 
progressive conceptions of social difference rooted in culture (rather than biology) 
contributed to novel constructions of race and new forms of ethnic exclusion.1010 The 
objective of rural education was to “improve” Indians in five key areas of Spanish 
literacy and arithmetic, health, sanitation, home improvement, and agrarian technical 
training.  For indigenous Bolivians, becoming campesino necessarily entailed abandoning 
their cultural heritage for the “modern” values promoted by the governing urban creole-
mestizo minority.   
The idealized image of the campesino was not only cultivated by the development 
strategies of the state, but it was reinforced by postrevolutionary cultural initiatives.  The 
Tiwanaku reconstruction project provides perhaps the most vivid example.  In addition to 
illustrating the glorious primordial origins of the republic, the ambitious project also 
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endeavored to emphasize the improvability of indigenous Bolivian in general and the 
Aymara in particular. “In Bolivia, archeological research implicitly carries a message of 
hope,” CIAT director, Carlos Ponce Sanginés wrote in 1961.  “If in the past, indigenous 
people were capable of notable feats, if they could erect buildings and outstanding cities, 
it is logical that their descendants, the Indians of today, will be able to master modern 
technology in the future and assist in the transformation of this backward country.”1011 By 
revealing the political power, social organization, and technological sophistication of 
Tiwanaku civilization, archeological research demonstrated the modernizing potential of 
indigenous Bolivians. Yet it was applied anthropology that provided indigenous 
Bolivians with the training necessary to assume their modernizing role in the 
postrevolutionary republic. With the introduction of the Plan Decenal in 1962, applied 
anthropologists joined rural school teachers on the frontlines of rural modernization.  It is 
in the assimilationist objectives underlying the creation of the idealized, modern 
campesino that the “de-indianization” posited by Ari becomes most salient.1012   
The second image of indigenous Bolivians promoted by the postrevolutionary 
government was that of the indio.  This image provided the foil against which the modern 
campesino was defined.  The campesino embraced Spanish literacy, while the indio was 
monolingual in Aymara or Quechua. The campesino joined the rural union, while the 
indio remained wedded to the ayllu. The campesino represented progress, national 
development, the future of the republic. The indio was cast as a pre-modern being, 
resistant to progress, and an impediment to national development. Consider Arturo 
Urquidi’s comments on the ayllu: “Esos resabios de colectivismo primitivo, que se 
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manifiestan en ciertas costumbres indígenas deben ser vistos con cautela y aprovechados 
solamente en cuanto pueden servir para ayudar al progreso de la agricultura nacional, 
pero nunca como antecedentes destinados a consagra y perpetuar una de las formas más 
atrasada de la propiedad agraria, como la comunidad indígena.”  In closing, he warned 
that “una ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata” threatened to hinder “el desarrollo progresivo 
de la agricultura.”1013 In short, the Indian—and the customs they embraced—were 
inconsistent with the modernizing goals of the Revolution, representing a pre-modern, 
traditional past to be romanticized.   
While disbelieving the capacity of Indians to serve as “útil” members of the 
modern republic, officials simultaneously romanticized indigenous culture as an integral 
component of postrevolutionary national identity.  State cultural offices constructed an 
idealized image of the pre-modern Indian as a symbol of Bolivia’s Andean heritage and 
an icon of the postrevolutionary republic.  Noble, virtuous, hard-working, intrinsically 
tied to the land—the idealized Indian cultivated by state cultural officials provided the 
moral foundation of the postrevolutionary republic. Their determination to retain their 
ancient customs and traditions in the face of centuries of colonial and neocolonial 
domination could serve as an example of resilience and resistance to be embraced by all 
Bolivians as they constructed a new, modern republic.  To be sure, however, it was this 
idealized image of the Indian—and not the Indian him/herself—that the state worked to 
cultivate. 
Efforts to construct an idealized Indian corresponded with the postrevolutionary 
folklore initiative.  After 1952, the government moved indigenous music, dance, and art 
to the center of national folklore as part of a broader effort to establish a more inclusive 
                                                 




national culture.  Rural popular culture provided a unique source of national identity for 
the postrevolutionary republic, one that evidenced the rich cultural heritage of the nation.  
Working through the an increasingly centralized state folklore official, Julia Elena Fortún 
and other official traversed the countryside to document, categorize, and archive 
indigenous music, dance, and art, as well as the myths, traditions, and customs of rural 
communities. At the same time, officials worked to broaden the definition of the national 
cultural patrimony to include indigenous popular culture as authentic representations of 
postrevolutionary nationhood.   
Despite its inclusive veneer, the creation of a national folklore that privileged 
indigenous popular culture contributed to broader process of racial formation underway 
in postrevolutionary Bolivia. Cast alongside the vision of the modern campesino 
projected by the postrevolutionary state, the traditional Indian stood as temporally apart 
from—yet critical for—the modern nation.  Folklorization worked with prevailing 
cultural constructions of race to create new forms of ethnic exclusion.  It reinforced direct 
associations between cultural markers of “Indianness” (language, dress, rural) and a way 
of life that was traditional, backward, pre-modern, and ill-prepared for inclusion in the 
modernizing republic.  The process served not to reaffirm indigenous popular culture as 
vibrant expression of Bolivia’s indigenous population, but to redefine these expressions 
as cultural relics of the present.   
Promoting the mutually reinforcing images of the campesino and the Indian was a 
contradictory process that entailed the simultaneous disparagement and valorization of 
the traditions, customs, language, and values embraced by indigenous Bolivians.  The 
postrevolutionary government disparaged those components of rural Andean society 




agricultural practices, and traditional medicine, for example.  Through rural education, 
applied anthropology, and other initiatives in directed social change, the state set out to 
correct such perceived deficiencies and transform indigenous Bolivians into a modern 
agrarian workforce, integrated into the socioeconomic structures of the postrevolutionary 
republic. Officials valorized those components of indigenous culture that, according to 
Julia Elena Fortún, “por útil y positivo merezca ser incorporado a nuestro moderno 
caudal de vida.”1014 Those components of Andean civilization deemed “útil y positive” 
were nonetheless limited to the cultural realm and valorized solely as symbolic 
representation of the postrevolutionary republic.   
One of the unintended outcomes of the postrevolutionary state’s contradictory 
approach to indigenous Bolivians was ethnogenesis. The knowledge produced by 
government social scientists coupled with growing resentment toward the assimilationist 
policies of the postrevolutionary state resulted in the emergence of ethnicity as a site of 
sociopolitical mobilization. Continued ethnographic, anthropological, and archeological 
research carried out by social scientists affiliated with state cultural institutions 
undermined the postrevolutionary indomestizo ideal by revealing the ethnic diversity of 
Bolivia’s indigenous population.  Though intended for the cultural politics of the 
postrevolutionary state, the knowledge produced by anthropological research provided an 
increasing number of literate Indians with scientifically grounded claims to identity, 
territory, and rights.1015  During the 1960s and 1970s, rural activists drew on this 
knowledge to both define and defend their cultural heritage.  As the Manifiesto de 
Tiwanaku demonstrates, by the 1970s, indigenous leaders were not only promoting the 
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valorization of their customs, traditions, and history, but they were also embracing their 
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